Bates v. Florida Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JAMES E. BATES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-869-BJD-PDB

FLORIDA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, James E. Bates, an inmate of the Florida penal system

proceeding pro se, initiated this action in the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Florida, Fort Meyers Division, by filing a complaint for

the violation of civil rights (Doc. 1; Compl.) and a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. 2). Shortly after filing his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to

amend his complaint (Doc. 5) and a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 6).

The Fort Meyers Division transferred the action to this Court because Plaintiff

sues officers at Union Correctional Institution (UCI) for injuries he sustained

when they transported him to Charlotte Correctional Institution. See Order

(Doc. 9). In transferring the action, the Fort Meyers Division directed the Clerk

“to deny as moot [Plaintiff’s] pending motions.” Id.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Officers Combs and S. Cook were

negligent in their transport of him. See Compl. at 5. He contends neither officer

fastened his seatbelt, and Officer Combs was “speeding [and] not paying

attention,” and “slam[m]ed on the breaks . . . to avoid rear ending people.” Id.

at 4-5. Presumably because he was handcuffed and shackled, id. at 5, Plaintiff

could not brace himself and was “thrown head first from the rear into the front

steel wall,” id. He received medical treatment for his injuries. Id.

In addition to naming Officers Combs and S. Cook as Defendants,

Plaintiff names the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Warden

of UCI. Id. at 2-3. He asserts the “DOC is liable for [his]safety” and breached

that duty by failing to “seat belt [him] in.” Id. at 5. As relief, he seeks damages.

Id.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a district court shall

dismiss a complaint if the court determines the action is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the

language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so courts apply the

same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th

Cir. 1997). See also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

2

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked

assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Moreover,

a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all

the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal

theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.

2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit

A Sept. 8, 1981)). In reviewing a complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s

allegations as true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se,

but need not accept as true legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA because he

fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See id. To state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that “a person” acting

under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured under the United

States Constitution or federal law. Plaintiff does not identify a constitutional

amendment or federal law he believes Defendants violated. See Compl. at 3.

Moreover, the only Defendants he lodges specific factual allegations against

3

are Officers Combs and S. Cook for failing to fasten his seatbelt or for

“slam[m]ing on the breaks,” causing him to fly forward. Id. at 5. These

allegations at most suggest negligence.

An allegation that a prison official showed a mere “lack of due care” or

was negligent, without more, does not state a claim under § 1983, even if the

inmate sustained injuries. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986);

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). See also Baker v. McCollan, 443

U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (noting that § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those

parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes”).

Even under a liberal reading of the complaint, Plaintiff does not allege

facts permitting the reasonable inference any Defendant violated his

constitutional or federal rights sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. As such,

his complaint is subject to dismissal without prejudice.1

1 Before the case was transferred to this Court, Plaintiff moved to amend his

complaint (Doc. 5)—a request the Fort Meyers Division denied as moot when

transferring the case. See Order (Doc. 9). Thus, that motion is not before this

Court. However, were Plaintiff to renew his motion to amend his complaint, it

would be denied as futile. In his motion to amend, Plaintiff sought only to

substitute the Secretary of the DOC, Ricky Dixon, as a Defendant instead of

the DOC itself. Had Plaintiff stated a plausible claim for relief against the

officers involved in the transport, he would not be permitted to proceed against

the Secretary of the DOC on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in

part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). See

4

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of

August 2022.

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BRIAN/J . DAVIS

United States District Judge

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James E. Bates

also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is axiomatic,

in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more than a

theory of respondeat superior.”).