Acosta v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ASHLEY NICOLE ACOSTA,

on behalf of D.M.A,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:20-cv-2392-KKM-AAS

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

ORDER

Ashley Acosta filed a claim with the Social Security Administration (SSA) seeking

disability benefits on behalf of her adolescent child, who she claimed was disabled. An

administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her benefits, and she seeks review of that decision.

Because she fails to show any error by the ALJ requiring reversal or remand for

reconsideration, the Court affirms SSA’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On January 5, 2017, Acosta filed a claim for Supplemental Security Income on

behalf of her adolescent child, D.M.A. (Doc. 20-2 at 16.) Acosta alleged that her child’s

disability began on September 17, 2004. (Id.) After the claim was initially denied on

February 24, 2017, Acosta requested and received a hearing from an ALJ on August 29,

2019, where she and her child were represented by counsel. (Id.)

The ALJ issued an order denying the requested benefits. (Id. at 13, 24.) The ALJ

concluded that D.M.A. had a “marked,” but not extreme, limitation in “interacting and

relating with others.” (Doc. 20-2 at 21.) The ALJ further concluded that D.M.A. had “less

than marked” limitations in health and physical well-being, in acquiring and using

information, attending and completing tasks, and caring for self. (Id. at 21-22.) Finally,

the ALJ concluded that D.M.A. had “no limitation in moving about and manipulating

objects.” (Id. at 22.) In making these conclusions, the ALJ relied on school records

regarding D.M.A.’s educational development—including test scores—Acosta’s and

D.M.A.’s testimony, and psychologists’ notes. (Id. at 21-23.) The AL] also considered but

gave only “limited weight” to the questionnaires completed by three of D.M.A.’s teachers

because D.M.A. had been frequently absent from school, several of the pages from each

questionnaire appeared to be missing, the first page of each of the forms appeared to have

been duplicated, and it was unclear whether the concerns that the teachers listed were

caused by D.M.A.’s impairments or D.M.A.’s absences from school. (Id. at 23-24.)

Acosta exhausted her administrative remedies when she requested review of the

ALJ’s decision from the Appeals Council of SSA and it denied her request. (Doc. 20-2 at

2; Doc. 27 at 2.) She then brought her Complaint in this Court, seeking review of the

ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 1.) Acosta and the Commissioner of SSA filed their Joint

Memorandum on December 2, 2021. (Doc. 27.) The Court referred the Joint

Memorandum to the Magistrate Judge, who recommends that the Court reverse the AL]’s

decision and remand the matter for the ALJ to develop the record with any missing

portions of the teachers’ opinions and then to reevaluate in the light of that evidence. (Doc.

28 at 13.) The Commissioner objects. (Doc. 31.)

B. Statutory and Regulatory Background

Acosta sought benefits for her adolescent child who, according to Acosta, was

disabled. An individual under the age of eighteen may be eligible for disability benefits

through SSA if the individual “has a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment[] which results in marked and severe functional limitations.” 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); 20 C.F.R. § 416.906; see Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

391 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004).

The Commissioner uses a three-step process to determine whether a child is

“disabled.” See Shinn, 391 F.3d at 1278. First, the ALJ determines whether the child is

“doing substantial gainful activity.” If the child is, the Commissioner “will determine that

[the child is] not disabled.” § 416.924(a). Second, if the child is not engaged in “substantial

gainful activity,” the Commissioner will “consider [the child’s] physical or mental

impairment(s) first to see if [the child] ha[s] an impairment or combination of impairments

that is severe.” Id. If the impairment is not severe, the Commissioner will conclude the

child is not “disabled.” Id. Third, if the impairment is severe, the Commissioner will

determine whether the child has an impairment that causes him to suffer “marked and

severe functional limitations.” § 416.924(d). A claimant can demonstrate “marked and

severe functional limitations” by showing that the child’s impairment causes specifically

delineated medical problems. These medical problems are set forth in the “Listing of

Impairments.” Shinn, 391 F.3d at 1278; see § 416.924(d). If the child does not suffer a

medical problem in the Listing, he can also be considered “disabled” if his impairment

causes him to suffer “marked and severe limitations” that “functionally equal the listings.”

§ 416.924(d).

The ALJ concluded that D.M.A. was not “engaged in substantial gainful activity”

and that D.M.A. had a severe impairment. (Doc. 20-2 at 17.) But he concluded that

D.M.A.’s impairment did not cause D.M.A. to suffer “marked and severe functional

limitations,” either by suffering an impairment on the Listing or by suffering from

limitations that functionally equal an impairment on the Listing. (Doc. 20-2 at 17-18.) In

the Joint Memorandum, Acosta contends only that the ALJ was wrong to conclude that

D.M.A.’s impairment did not cause D.M.A. to suffer “marked and severe limitations” that

“functionally equal the listings.” (Doc. 27 at 12.) Accordingly, the Court considers only

that issue.

To determine whether a child’s impairments functionally equal an impairment on

the Listing, an ALJ looks to “the degree to which the child’s limitations interfere with the

child’s normal life activities.” Shinn, 391 F.3d at 1279. That inquiry requires the ALJ to

consider six “domains of life.” Id.; § 416.926a(b)(1). If the child has an “extreme” limitation

in one domain, or a “marked” limitation in two or more domains, the ALJ must conclude

that the child is “disabled.” § 416.926a(a). The six domains include the child’s ability to (1)

acquire and use information, (2) attend and complete tasks, (3) interact and relate with

others, (4) move about and manipulate objects, (5) care for himself, and (6) the child’s

“(health and physical well-being.” § 416.926a(b)(1).

A child has a “marked” limitation when his impairment “interferes seriously with

[his] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” § 416.926a(e)(2)(i);

accord Planas on behalf of A.P. v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 842 F. App'x 495, 499 (11th Cir.

2021). A child might suffer a marked limitation when his limitation is “more than

moderate’ but ‘less than extreme.” § 416.926a(e)(2)(i).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing an agency’s decision to grant or deny benefits, the Court reviews

the agency’s legal conclusions de novo. See Ingram v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496

F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). But the Court reviews the agency’s factual findings with

deference and affirms the decision if it was “supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

(quotation omitted); see 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Falge v. Apfel,

150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). That evidence is “more than a

mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th

Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Thus, even if most of the evidence is against the AL]’s

decision, the Court must affirm if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination.

See id. The Court may not “reweigh the evidence[] or substitute [its] judgment for that of

the [ALJ].” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)

(quotation omitted). In explaining his decision, an ALJ must provide enough analysis of

the evidence to show the reviewing court that the “[ALJ] considered [the claimant’s]

medical condition as a whole.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quotation omitted) (first alteration

in original); see also 20 § 416.927(f)(2) (requiring that the ALJ provide a sufficient

explanation to permit a reviewing court to “follow the adjudicator’s reasoning”).

After review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, a district judge

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendation made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The court must

review anew any portion of the recommendation to which a party files a timely and specific

objection. See § 636(b)(1)(C). The district court must review legal conclusions de novo,

regardless of objections. See Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir.

1994) (per curiam); Ashworth v. Glades Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 379 F. Supp. 3d

1244, 1246 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (Steele, J.).

Ill. ANALYSIS

Acosta presses for reversal or remand to SSA on three grounds. First, she argues

that the ALJ improperly weighed D.M.A.’s teachers’ questionnaires. (Doc. 27 at 12.)

Second, she contends that the ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record. (Id.) And third,

she contends that the ALJ’s conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence. (Id.

at 18-19.) The Magistrate Judge agrees with Acosta’s first two arguments and recommends

a remand for the ALJ to reevaluate the teachers’ questionnaires. I respectfully disagree. I

lack authority to reweigh the teachers’ questionnaires and Acosta fails to show that the ALJ

did not sufficiently develop the record. Moreover, I disagree with Acosta’s third argument;

the ALJ had substantial evidence for the conclusions that Acosta disputes.

A. The Court Lacks Authority to Reweigh the Evidence

Acosta first argues that the AL] “failed to properly evaluate all of the evidence which

indicated at least marked limitations in these domains.” (Id. at 12.) Specifically, she

contends that the ALJ gave too little weight to questionnaires supplied by D.M.A.’s

teachers. (Id. at 13, 15.) Although an ALJ must give substantial weight to the “medical

opinions of treating physicians,” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179, the ALJ is not required to

assign evidence from non-medical sources “any particular weight.” Farnsworth v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., 636 F. App’x 776, 784-85 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see Sarria v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 579 F. App’x 722, 724 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (concluding that the ALJ

had “good cause to disregard” a student therapist’s assessment because she was not an

“acceptable medical source”); see also Holland on behalf of West v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

842 F. App’x 344, 349 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding that the ALJ was not

required to give a “detailed accounting” of the evidence within school records). Thus, to

the extent Acosta argues that the AL] improperly gave the teachers’ opinions too little

weight, the argument lacks merit. The ALJ had no obligation to give the evidence a

particular weight and the court lacks authority to reweigh the evidence. See Winschel, 631

F.3d at 1178. To the extent that Acosta argues that the ALJ did not consider the evidence,

that argument is flatly contradicted by the ALJ’s opinion, wherein he explained why he

found the teachers’ questionnaires to be of limited probative value. (Doc. 20-2 at 23-24.)

B. The ALJ Sufficiently Developed the Record

As an inquisitorial rather than adversarial court, ALJs “generally ha[ve] an

obligation to develop the record.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269; accord Graham v. Apfel, 129

F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). This duty ensures that the claimant receive a “full and

fair hearing.” Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985). An AL] fails to

develop the record when the record lacks “sufficient evidence for the administrative law

judge to make an informed decision.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269. But even if the record

development was imperfect, remand of the AL]’s decision is not appropriate unless the

plaintiff demonstrates that the imperfection caused prejudice. See Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540

(noting that the claimant’s hearing was “less than totally satisfactory” but concluding that

the claimant suffered no prejudice and therefore remand was unwarranted).

To show prejudice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the ALJ did not have all of

the relevant evidence before him in the record. . . [or] did not consider all of the evidence

in the record in reaching his decision.” Id.; see also Pennington v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec.,

652 F. App’x 862, 871 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiff bears the

burden of showing that the ALJ lacked relevant evidence or failed to consider all the

evidence); Thomas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 841 F. App’x 128, 131 (11th Cir. 2020) (per

curiam) (holding that the plaintiff “made no such showing” of prejudice). A plaintiff □□ not

prejudiced by a record that was not fully developed if the record still provided “sufficient

evidence” for the ALJ “to make an informed decision.” Brock v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,

758 F. App’x 745, 749 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269).

And a plaintiff does not carry his burden to show prejudice when he fails to point to some

evidence that the ALJ failed to obtain which would support his claim. See Kelley, 761 F.2d

at 1540 (“The assertion that appellant might have benefited from a more extensive hearing

is pure speculation.”); Townsend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 555 F. App’x 888, 891-92 (11th

Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to show prejudice because the

additional evidence would not have been “helpful or credible” and because she failed to

offer what the “ALJ might have learned” from the additional evidence).

Acosta argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record and that the Court should

remand for further development of the record. Specifically, she contends that the ALJ

failed to obtain the missing pages from the teachers’ questionnaires and to obtain

clarification from the teachers about whether their assessments of D.M.A.’s challenges in

school were based on D.M.A.’s impairment or D.M.A.’s absences from school. But her

argument fails for two reasons. First, the record was sufficient for the ALJ to make an

informed decision. See Brock, 758 F. App’x at 749. And second, Acosta offers nothing

more than speculation that evidence could be obtained that would be relevant to her claim.

See Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540. As such, even if the AL]’s record development fell short of

perfection, Acosta fails to show prejudice. Therefore, Acosta’s failure-to-develop claim

fails.

First, the ALJ had a sufficient record to make an informed decision. An ALJ has a

sufficient record to make an informed decision when the record consists of “two years of

notes from [the child’s] treating physician, as well as a [report describing the child’s

functional capabilities completed by his mother], school records, and the opinions of two

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State agency medical consultants.” Banks for Hunter v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 686 F.

Appx 706, 714 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The ALJ possessed a more robust record in

this case, with the testimony of both Acosta and D.M.A., a psychologist’s opinion,

opinions (albeit incomplete) from three teachers, treatment records from two pediatric

centers, and educational records for multiple years. (Doc. 27 at 3-11). The ALJ had

sufficient evidence to make an informed decision. See Brock, 758 F. App’x at 749; see also

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that two medical

opinions and the plaintiffs testimony was sufficient evidence to “support[] the AL]’s

conclusion”); Sarria, 579 F. App’x at 724 (concluding that “medical records, the reports of

[the plaintiffs] treating psychiatrists and therapists, the assessments of agency physicians,

and [the plaintiffs] self-assessments” were sufficient).

Second, Acosta fails to point to any evidence that the ALJ failed to obtain that

would support her claim. See Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540. She need not provide the evidence

to the Court, so long as the existence of supporting evidence is not speculative. See Brown

v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935-36 (11th Cir. 1995) (assuming for purposes of the decision

that medical records that the plaintiff alleges show she had an impairment would support

the plaintiffs claim). But if she offers only evidence that she contends would likely support

her position, the evidence is too speculative to show that the ALJ prejudiced her by failing

to develop the record. See Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540; Mosley v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

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Admin., 633 F. App’x 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiffs

suggestion that an I.Q_.test would “likely” support her claim was nothing more than “her

own speculation” and insufficient to show prejudice); Thomas, 841 F. App’x at 131

(holding insufficient the plaintiffs argument that, had an expert been “properly

questioned,” he would have given an answer that “in all likelihood” would have favored the

plaintiff).

Instead of pointing to evidence the ALJ should have considered, Acosta conjectures

that the ALJ might have given the teachers’ questionnaires greater weight if he had

contacted the teachers and asked them to supply the missing pages and to explain what

portions of their ratings were due to D.M.A.’s absences from school and what portions

were due to D.M.A.’s impairment. (Doc. 27 at 17.) Acosta does not allege that the missing

pages would be helpful to her claim or ground that kind of allegation with reasons to believe

it would be. See Townsend, 555 F. App’x at 892 (concluding there was no prejudice, in

part, because the plaintiff failed to indicate how the additional evidence would be relevant).

The missing pages might support Acosta’s claim, but they might just as well support the

AL)’s conclusions or could fail to offer insight on the question altogether. Cf Mosley, 633

App’x at 743-44 (concluding that the existence of relevant evidence was speculative

because other evidence suggested that the potential evidence did not exist). Acosta fails to

give any reason to think that any one of these possibilities is more likely than the others,

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rendering her argument that the pages would be relevant and helpful to her claim

speculation. See Thomas, 841 F. App’x at 131 (holding a plaintiffs “conclusory

speculations” to be insufficient to show prejudice). Thus, Acosta fails to show that the

AL)’s failure to obtain the missing pages or to inquire further of the teachers prejudiced

her. See Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540.

Nor does she provide any reason to think that the teachers would attribute D.M.A.’s

challenges in school to a medical impairment. The fact that Acosta believes it likely that

the teachers would attribute the difficulties to D.M.A.’s medical impairment is not enough

to show that the ALJ’s failure to interview the teachers prejudiced Acosta. See Mosley, 633

App’x at 743; Thomas, 841 F. App’x at 131. Nor does her contention that D.M.A.

testified that the absences were caused by the medical impairment provide her argument

with the needed certainty. (Doc. 27 at 19.) It supplies only the reason that Acosta thinks

it likely the teachers would attribute D.M.A.’s absences to the medical impairment. Cf

Planas, 842 F. App’x at 500 (noting that a child’s school absences “may have been caused

by the depression he suffered when he changed schools” rather than his medical

conditions). And if the teachers would not attribute the absences to D.M.A.’s medical

impairment, the ALJ’s decision to afford limited probative weight to the questionnaires

would only be reinforced. See Townsend, 555 F. App’x at 892 (holding that any lack of

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record development was harmless because the additional evidence could have hurt the

plaintiffs claim).

As such, Acosta offers no more than speculation that any potential failure from the

ALJ to develop the record prejudiced her. See Thomas, 841 F. App’x at 131 (concluding

that a plaintiffs argument that a properly questioned expert would have provided evidence

in his favor was a “conclusory speculation” that did not show prejudice); Pennington, 652

F. App’x at 872 (holding that a plaintiff that speculated that he could have given answers

in his testimony that would have helped him had the ALJ asked the correct questions failed

to show prejudice when he “d[id] not actually offer such explanation or supporting

evidence”). “[S]howing prejudice is no trivial matter.” Thomas, 841 F. App’x at 131. Acosta

fails to make that showing here.

C. Substantial Evidence Supported the ALJ’s Decision

Acosta argues that substantial evidence weighed against the AL]’s conclusions that

D.M.A. lacked marked limitations in the domains of acquiring and using information,

attending and completing tasks, and health and physical well-being. The Commissioner

rightly notes that whether substantial evidence weighed against the ALJ’s conclusion is not

the standard; instead, the inquiry is whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s

decision. See Holland, 842 F. App’x at 348 (“But the standard is not whether there is

‘ample evidence’ to support [the plaintiffs] argument; it is whether there is ‘substantial

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evidence’ to support the ALJ's decision to the contrary.”). And the ALJ’s conclusions were

supported by substantial evidence.

First, the ALJ had substantial evidence to conclude that D.M.A. did not suffer

marked limitations in acquiring and using information. The ALJ first reviewed D.M.A.’s

academic reports. He explained that, in 2015, D.M.A.’s academic achievement test scores

and [.Q. scores in 2015 were “fully average.” (Doc. 20-2 at 21.) The ALJ then noted that

two years later, D.M.A.’s academic achievement tests indicated that D.M.A.’s reading was

average and math was a strength for D.M.A. (Doc. 20-2 at 21-22.) These test scores are

all probative of D.M.A.’s ability to acquire and use information and they all indicate that

D.M.A. had less than “marked” limitations. See Muhammad ex rel. T.IL.M. v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec. 395 F. App’x 593, 601 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (concluding that

standardized test scores supported the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant “had less-than-

marked limitations in the domain of acquiring and using information”); England v. Astrue,

490 F.3d 1017, 1021 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that I.Q. scores that were only somewhat

below average support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant lacked marked limitations in

acquiring and using information). The ALJ continued by explaining that, the “committee

on special education” decided in 2018 that D.M.A. did not need consultant teacher services

for math and that D.M.A. could attend a general education class for reading. (Doc. 20-2

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at 22.) This likewise indicates that D.M.A. had less than marked limitations in acquiring

and using information.

Moreover, the ALJ did not rely solely on D.M.A.’s I.Q. scores and academic

performance. He further explained that a psychologist found that D.M.A. suffered “no

disorientation or memory impairment.” (Doc. 20-2 at 22); see 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.926a(g)(3)(iii) (listing the inability to “recal[] important things [the child] learned

in school” the day before as an indicator of limitations in this domain). The AL] noted that

D.M.A. “enjoy[ed] playing video games,” (Doc. 20-2 at 22), an activity which “required

him to respond to instructions and work through problems to achieve a specific goal,”

Planas on behalf of A.P. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 842 F. App'x 495, 500 (11th Cir. 2021);

see Parks ex rel. D.P. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 783 F.3d 847, 852 (11th Cir. 2015)

(relying in part on the fact that the claimant played video games to determine that he had

less than marked limitations in acquiring and using information). Finally, the ALJ noted

that a state agency’s psychological consultant concluded that D.M.A. “ha[d]... no

limitation in acquiring and using information.” (Doc. 20-2 at 22); see Parks, 783 F.3d at

852 (noting that agency consultants’ opinions that the child “had a less than ‘marked’

limitation in acquiring and using information” was probative evidence). Considering all

this information together, a “reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as adequate to

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support [the ALJ’s] conclusion” that D.M.A. had less than marked limitations in acquiring

and using information. Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322 (quotation omitted).

The ALJ relied on the same evidence to conclude that D.M.A. lacked marked

limitations in attending and completing tasks. Although some of that evidence was

irrelevant to this domain, a reasonable mind might find the remaining evidence adequate

to support the ALJ’s conclusion. See id. Some of that evidence, particularly D.M.A.’s □□□□

score, is largely irrelevant to D.M.A.’s ability to focus on and complete tasks. Other

evidence—namely, D.M.A.’s test scores—is less immediately relevant but nonetheless

probative of whether D.M.A. had marked limitations in attending and completing tasks.

Thus, a reasonable mind could view D.M.A.’s academic achievement scores as indicating

that D.M.A. can focus on academic studies to some extent, as academic scores are often a

result of whether an individual is capable of prolonged studying. See id.; Hunter v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., Comm’, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e give great deference to

the ALJ’s factfindings.”). Finally, some evidence is directly relevant and indicates that

D.M.A. had less than marked limitations in this domain. The ALJ noted that D.M.A.

plays video games, an activity that “required [the child] to respond to instructions and work

through problems to achieve a specific goal.” Planas, 842 F. App’x at 500; see also Wood

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 726 F. App’x 742, 744 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)

(implying that a plaintiffs ability to “watch[] television and play[] video games all day”

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indicates that the plaintiff lacked “marked limitations in sustained concentration”).

D.M.A.’s ability to work through problems to achieve a specific goal directly supports the

AL)’s conclusion that D.M.A. did not suffer marked limitations in the ability to focus on

a task. Finally, the ALJ noted that the state psychologist concluded that D.M.A. had less

than marked limitations in attending to and completing tasks. (Doc. 20-2 at 22); see Parks,

783 F.3d at 852 (noting that agency consultants’ opinions can be probative of a child’s

limitations). Taken together, a reasonable mind might conclude this evidence adequate to

indicate that D.M.A. lacked a marked limitation in attending to and completing tasks. See

Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322.

Finally, the ALJ concluded that D.M.A. had less than marked limitations in the

domain of “health and physical well-being.” This domain considers the “the cumulative

physical effects of physical or mental impairments and their associated treatments or

therapies” on the claimant’s functioning, except for those effects on the claimant’s “gross

and fine motor skills.” § 416.926a(1) (noting that this domain is limited to the effects on

functions that were not “considered in paragraph (j)”); accord Planas, 842 F. App’x at 499.

In support for his conclusion that D.M.A. had less than marked limitations in this domain,

the ALJ noted that an examination of D.M.A. concluded that D.M.A. did not have

“palpitations and shortness of breath.” (Doc. 20-2 at 22 (“A Holter diary... noted [such

problems], but a related examination was normal.”)); see § 416.926a(1)(1) (listing

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“shortness of breath” as an indicator of limitations in this domain). The ALJ also noted

that D.M.A. regularly plays basketball, which suggests that D.M.A. likely does not suffer,

or at least often suffer, “shortness of breath, reduced stamina, [or] fatigue.” § 416.926a(1)(1)

(listing these as effects that indicate limitations in this domain); (Doc. 20-2 at 22.) The

ALJ relied on Acosta’s testimony that D.M.A. “ha[d] not received any cardiac care” and

the fact that D.M.A. had denied to the pediatrician having any headaches. (Id.); see §

416.926a(1)(4)(ii) (listing headaches as one example of evidence indicating limitations in

this domain). The ALJ relied on the limited back pain that D.M.A. suffered, explaining

that D.M.A. reported it only “bothered [DMA once] per week” and only “after long walks.”

(Doc. 20-2 at 22); see § 416.926a(1)(1) (listing “local or generalized pain” as an indicator

of limitations in this domain). Finally, the ALJ noted that D.M.A. asks for help when

needed and the state’s psychological consultant concluded that D.M.A. “ha[d] no

limitation” in health and physical well-being. (Doc. 20-2 at 22.) This evidence is enough

that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the AL]’s] conclusion” that

D.M.A. did not suffer marked limitations in health and physical well-being. Falge, 150

F.3d at 1322 (quotation omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

Acosta sued the Commissioner of Social Security, seeking reversal or remand of the

ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 27 at 30.) But Acosta has shown no error in the AL]’s decision that

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requires remand. Accordingly, the Court DECLINES TO ADOPT the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge and AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ. The Clerk is directed to

enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security, terminate any other

pending motions, and deadlines and to close this case.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on July 10, 2022.

— hati Mizelle

United States District Judge

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