St. Claire v. State of Florida (Collier County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

WILLIAM ST. CLAIRE,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:19-cv-720-JES-MRM

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition

for habeas corpus relief filed, through counsel, by Petitioner

William St. Claire (“Petitioner” or “St. Claire”). (Doc. 1). At

the Court’s order (Doc. 9), Respondent filed a Response. (Doc.

12). St. Claire filed a reply (Doc. 16), and the petition is ripe

for review.

Upon consideration of the pleadings and the state court

record, the Court concludes that each of St. Claire’s claims is

unexhausted, without merit, or both. Because the Court was able

to resolve the petition on the record, an evidentiary hearing is

not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).

I. Background and Procedural History

According to a report filed by the Collier County Sheriff’s

Office, an assault occurred on September 16, 2014 when St. Claire,

who was friends with a young woman named Haley Brennan (“Brennan”),

went to the home of Brennan, Brennan’s boyfriend Julio Peon

(“Peon”), and Peon’s grandfather Orlindo Vigo (“Vigo”). (Doc. 13-

1

2 at 20–27). St. Claire told police that he went to the residence

to have a meeting with Brennan, Peon, and Peon’s family about

Brennan’s drug use. Id. at 26. He said that Peon and his family

were drug dealers. Id. St. Claire knocked on the door and was

invited in by Peon and Vigo. Id. St. Claire showed them a piece

of paper that detailed his history of running for Congress and

giving speeches about drug use. (Id.) He demanded that Brennan

pack her belongings and come with him so that he could check her

into a hotel and bring her to a rehab facility the following day.

(Id.) He told police that Vigo then pulled out a firearm and shot

at him, but missed. (Id.) The argument continued outside into

the driveway, where Vigo shot at him again, but the bullet hit the

ground. (Id.) When the police told St. Claire that there was no

sign of a gunshot inside the residence, he said that Vigo shot at

him only once and on the driveway. (Id. at 27).

Brennan told the police that on the day of the incident, St.

Claire accused her of using drugs and demanded a meeting with Peon

and his family. (Doc. 13-2 at 23). She said that after Peon and

Vigo answered St. Claire’s knock, St. Claire “barged” into the

home, yelling, and acting erratic. (Id.) St. Claire then threw

a piece of paper at them and demanded that they all sit down. (Id.)

1

Facts taken from police reports are offered for context

only.

When Peon questioned why St. Claire was acting the way he was, St.

Claire pulled out two guns and pointed them at Peon and Vigo.

(Id.) St. Claire told Brennan to pack her things and come with

him. (Id.) Peon then walked outside. (Id.) St. Claire, Vigo,

and Brennan followed Peon outside where St. Claire pointed his

firearm at Vigo and continued to yell. (Id.) St. Claire then

fired a round into the ground and left. (Id.) Peon and Vigo made

statements similar to Brennan’s to the police. (Id. at 24).

On October 9, 2014, the State of Florida charged St. Claire

with aggravated assault with a firearm on Orlando Vigo, a person

65 or older (count one) and aggravated assault with a firearm on

Julio Peon (count two). (Doc. 13-2 at 29).

On September 9, 2016, the State filed a motion in limine

asking the trial court to instruct St. Claire to refrain from

asking questions about several subjects without first obtaining

permission from the trial court. (Doc. 13-2 at 251–52). Included

were:

• any allegation or belief that witness Haley Brennan

used drugs;

• any allegation that victims Orlando Vigo or Julio

Peon used drugs, sold drugs, manufactured drugs, or

were involved in drug trafficking; and

• any mention of any witness’s criminal history

“without a good faith basis to believe such

convictions actually exist and only then when

testimony is elicited in accordance with [Florida

evidentiary rules].”

(Doc. 13-2 at 251–52.) At a hearing on the motion, St. Claire

(proceeding pro se)2 argued that, since he was asserting self-

defense, Brennon’s prior drug use was relevant to describe the

environment he entered when he went to their home. (Doc. 13-3 at

15). He made a similar argument regarding Vigo and Peon. He said

that he wanted to present evidence from out of state to prove that

“[a]ll of these individuals had used drugs, admitted to drugs and

dealt and trafficked in drugs.” (Doc. 13-3 at 20). St. Claire

argued that the evidence of Brennan’s and the victims’ drug use

“needs to be brought in, because in order for the defendant to

prove self-defense, the jury must understand he was not in a church

with people praying. He walked into a drug house.” (Id.) The

court granted the State’s motion and explained why it was excluding

evidence regarding the witnesses’ drug use:

If a person was under the influence of any drug or

alcohol at the time, it would be relevant to affect their

credibility, but not to prove that they’re bad people.

And we’re not bringing in stuff from the state of

Massachusetts. It ain’t going to happen. Okay?

You’ve got to get the concept of what’s really relevant,

and that’s not relevant.

(Id. at 21). The court also advised St. Claire that the mention

of any witness’s criminal history was limited to the number of the

2

St. Claire initially proceeded in this action with defense

counsel, but after hiring or being assigned eight different

attorneys, he was permitted to represent himself after a Faretta

inquiry. (Doc. 13-2 at 235).

witness’s prior felony convictions and the number of convictions

for crimes of dishonesty. (Id. at 30).

Trial commenced on September 19, 2016. (Doc. 13-13 at 8).

The State argued at trial that St. Claire was jealous that Brennan

had a boyfriend and was not romantically interested in him even

after “he spent money on her, training, dinners, fixing things for

her.” (Id. at 508). The State suggested that St. Claire wanted

to remove Brennan from the house, and he wanted Vigo and Peon to

know that Brennan belonged to him, not to Peon. (Id.) In

contrast, St. Claire, who proceeded pro se at trial, argued that

the shooting was in self-defense and that he had merely gone to

the victims’ home to discuss a “life threatening” situation with

Brennan, Peon, and Vigo. He was then attacked by Peon without

provocation. (Id. at 382, 432). He believed that Vigo had a

weapon, so he left the home. (Id. at 432–33). After he left,

Peon rushed at him in the driveway, hit St. Claire’s weapon, and

it accidentally discharged. (Id. at 433).

After a three-day trial, a jury found St. Claire guilty as

charged. (Doc. 13-2 at 303–04). Petitioner received a sentence

of five years in prison to be followed by five years’ probation.

(Id. at 330–33). Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal

affirmed without a written opinion. (Doc. 13-4 at 181).

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on October 3,

2019. (Doc. 1).

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act(“AEDPA”)

Under the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted

with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court

unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). When reviewing a claim under §

2254(d), a federal court must presume that any “determination of

a factual issue made by a State court” is correct. Id. § 2254(e).

The petitioner bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. “Clearly

established federal law” consists of the governing legal

principles set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme

Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White v.

Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 420 (2014); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70,

74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law

if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts

the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2)

reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with

materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144,

1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application”

of the Supreme Court’s precedents if the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the

facts of the petitioner’s case in an objectively unreasonable

manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005), or “if the state

court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme

Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531

(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406).

The section 2254(d) standard is both mandatory and difficult

to meet. To demonstrate entitlement to federal habeas relief, the

petitioner must show that the state court’s ruling was “so lacking

in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” White, 572 U.S. at 420 (quoting Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).

A state court’s summary rejection of a claim, even without

explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits—warranting

deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir.

2008). Generally, in the case of a silent affirmance, a federal

habeas court will “look through” the unreasoned opinion and presume

that the affirmance rests upon the specific reasons given by the

last court to provide a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797 (1991); Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018).

However, the presumption that the appellate court relied on the

same reasoning as the lower court can be rebutted “by evidence of,

for instance, an alternative ground that was argued [by the state]

or that is clear in the record” showing an alternative likely basis

for the silent affirmance. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. at 1196.

B. Exhaustion

The AEDPA precludes federal courts, absent exceptional

circumstances, from granting habeas relief unless a petitioner has

exhausted all means of available relief under state law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1). Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the

state prisoner “fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts

in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct

alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights[.]” Duncan

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995).

A petitioner can avoid the application of the exhaustion rules

by establishing objective cause for failing to properly raise the

claim in state court and actual prejudice from the alleged

constitutional violation. Spencer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 609

F.3d 1170, 1179–80 (11th Cir. 2010). To show cause, a petitioner

“must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the

defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in state

court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999). To

show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable

probability the outcome of the proceeding would have differed.

Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2002).

A second exception, known as the “fundamental miscarriage of

justice,” only occurs in an extraordinary case, where a

“constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent[.]” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.

478, 479–80 (1986).

III. Discussion

St. Claire raises three claims of trial court error in his §

2254 petition. These claims are exhausted only to the extent they

were both raised in the trial court and considered by Florida’s

Second District Court of Appeal on direct appeal. See Jones v.

State, 998 So.2d 573, 581–82 (Fla. 2008) (“To be preserved, the

issue or legal argument must be raised and ruled on by the trial

court.”)(internal quotation and citation omitted); Philip J.

Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice, § 8.1, at 148 (2007 ed.)

(“[T]he aggrieved party must obtain an adverse ruling in the lower

tribunal to preserve an issue for review. . . . Without a ruling

or decision, there is nothing to review.”). The Court separately

addresses the exhaustion and merits of each claim.

A. Ground One

St. Claire asserts that his right to due process was violated

by the trial court’s denial of his motion for costs to pay for a

cell phone expert. (Doc. 1 at 17). Specifically, St. Claire

complains that the trial court did not address his “Motion to Issue

Subpoenas Duces Tecum” and “Motion to Incure [SIC] Costs for

Forensic Expert Witness,” which effectively deprived him of

witnesses he needed to advance his defense. (Id.) He asserts

that the trial court’s failure to grant his motions amounted to a

constitutional violation under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).

(Id. at 19).

At issue were text messages between St. Claire and Brennan on

the day of the incident that St. Claire wanted to introduce to

show that “Brennan and Peon had agreed to meet with St. Claire and

that Brennan believed Vigo and Peon suspected St. Claire was

working with the police to obtain evidence against their drug

organization.” (Doc. 1 at 18). St. Claire argues that an “expert

would have given [him] a fair opportunity to present his defense

as it would have allowed the authentication of cell phone records

crucial to the issue of self-defense and St. Claire’s state of

mind about the dangerousness of the complaining witnesses at the

time he encountered them.” (Id. at 20).

St. Claire raised this claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 13-4

at 110–14). In response, the State argued that the claim was

procedurally defaulted because St. Claire did not obtain a ruling

from the trial court on the motions before raising the claim on

appeal. (Id. at 150). The State argued that St. Claire “simply

filed his motions with the clerk and did not take any steps for

the motions to be addressed by the Court. Additionally, [on the

same day he filed the motions] he filed a demand for speedy trial,

bounding the Court to proceed to trial. Therefore, the issue is

not preserved for appeal.” (Id. at 153).

Although the state also addressed the claim on its merits in

its response brief, Respondent now argues that “[w]here the state

has briefed both an applicable procedural bar and the merits with

respect to a given point, and the appellate decision is silent on

the point, it should be presumed that the state decision rests on

the procedural default.” (Doc. 12 at 13) (citing Bennett v.

Fortner, 863 F.2d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 1989)). In turn, St. Claire

argues that Ground One is not procedurally barred because he

attempted to raise the issue in the trial court, but the court did

not rule on his motions, and as a result, “[t]here was nothing

more [he] could do.” (Doc. 16 at 4).

It is unclear from the record whether St. Claire sufficiently

sought a ruling or a hearing on his motions. However, it is

unnecessary for the Court to determine whether Ground One is

exhausted because St. Claire has not demonstrated entitlement to

federal habeas corpus relief. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785

F.3d 467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015) (“And because exhaustion is non-

jurisdictional . . . a court may skip over the exhaustion issue if

it is easier to deny (not grant, of course, but deny) the petition

on the merits without reaching the exhaustion question.”); 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)(“An application for a writ of habeas corpus

may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State.”).

St. Claire relies on Ake v. Oklahoma to support Ground One.

In Ake the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant has a

right of access to a competent psychiatrist to assist in the

preparation of his insanity defense. 470 U.S. at 83. St. Claire

does not complain that he was denied access to a psychiatrist to

prepare for an insanity defense, and he does not direct the Court

to caselaw or any other authority showing that the Supreme Court

or the Eleventh Circuit has expanded Ake to cover requests for

non-psychiatric experts. Indeed, in Gary v. Hall, 558 F.3d 1229

(11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit rejected a petitioner’s

similar free-standing Ake claim, concluding that he was not

entitled to relief because the denial of funds to hire a forensic

serologist was essentially a determination of state law,

unreviewable on federal habeas review. Id. at 1251 n. 37.

Consequently, as in Gary, St. Claire’s “denial-of-funds claim

[does] not present a federal constitutional question, and [this ]

court should not . . . entertain [] it.” Id. at 1254.

Even if, in an abundance of caution, the Court addresses the

merits of St. Claire’s Ake claim as it relates to funding for a

communications expert, he is not entitled to relief. The Eleventh

Circuit has summarized the analytical framework used to address

Ake claims as follows:

Assuming, arguendo, that Ake extends to non-psychiatric

experts, then we must determine (1) whether [the

petitioner] made a timely request to the trial court for

the provision of expert assistance; (2) whether it was

“reasonable” for the trial court to deny [the

petitioner’s] request; and (3) whether the denial

rendered [the petitioner’s] trial fundamentally unfair.

See Moore[v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710 (11th Cir. 1987)]

(noting that the Supreme Court in Ake followed this

three-part analytical approach). With respect to the

third Moore requirement, we ask whether the Ake error

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict.” Hicks v. Head, 333

F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003).

Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2004).

Given the history of this case and the lack of an actual ruling on

St. Claire’s motions,3 the Court first addresses Conklin’s third

3

This case took two years to get to trial. St. Claire

asserts that he had eight separate attorneys before deciding to

present his case pro se. (Doc. 13-3 at 234, 261, 379). A review

of the trial transcript demonstrates that St. Claire had little

understanding of evidentiary and procedural matters, and as a

result, he had difficulty presenting his case to the jury. When

urged by the trial judge to consider allowing standby counsel to

take over at trial because he was “somewhat concerned that you’re

not up to this[,]” St. Claire argued that standby counsel was

“worth his weight in gold,” but St. Claire felt that he best knew

the case. (Id. at 234). The court told St. Claire that he did

not have authority to force St. Claire to use counsel, but he

element to determine “whether the denial [of money for a

communications expert] rendered [St. Claire’s] trial fundamentally

unfair.” Conklin, 366 f.3d at 1206. As noted, in Hicks v. Head,

the Eleventh Circuit explained that the harmless error standard

announced in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) applies to

Ake violations. Head, 333 F.3d at 1286. Under this standard, a

constitutional error entitles a petitioner to federal habeas

relief only if the error “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S.

at 623.

St. Claire argues that an expert “would have given [him] a

fair opportunity to present his defense as it would have allowed

the authentication of cell phone records crucial to the issue of

self-defense and [Petitioner’s] state of mind about the

dangerousness of the complaining witnesses at the time he

encountered them.” (Doc. 1 at 20). Although St. Claire argues

that a paid expert could have authenticated the text messages, he

does not assert that he actually attempted to authenticate the

text messages in any other manner or that the trial court suggested

that lack of authentication was the reason the messages were not

4

admitted. That St. Claire, proceeding pro se, was unaware of how

wanted “to make sure [St. Claire got] a fair trial.” (Id. at

235).

4

Notably, under Florida law, St. Claire did not need a paid

communications expert to authenticate text messages that were

to authenticate a text message does not automatically give rise to

a due process violation. See McKenzie v. State, 153 So.3d 867,

(Fla. 2014) (“A defendant who chooses to represent himself cannot

later complain that the quality of his defense was substandard or

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

Moreover, it does not appear that the texts were deemed

inadmissible due to a failure of authentication. In fact, the

trial court allowed St. Claire to testify about the contents of

the texts and his reasons for going to the victim’s home. During

the defense case, St. Claire described his friendship with Brennan,

and testified that he rented her a storage bin after she was

evicted from her apartment. (Doc. 13-3 at 429):

PETITIONER: The date that I met her on September 15

was to take her to that storage bin and

get it out of my name and put it in her

name.

And I talked to her father. I talked to

other relatives, and it just was a safe

place for all her stuff.

contained on his own phone, and written or received by him. See

State v. Torres, 304 S. 3d 781, 784(Fla 4th DCA 2020) (holding

that electronic communications generally can be “authenticated by

appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other

distinctive characteristics taken in conjunction with the

circumstances”); Gilbert v. State, 324 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA

2021) (admitting screenshots of Facebook Messenger messages after

the victim testified that they accurately depicted what was on her

Facebook Messenger); Symonette v. State, 100 So. 3d 180, 183 (Fla

4th DCA 2012) (finding that photographs of texts from the

defendant’s cell phone, combined with testimony of one of the

texters, sufficiently authenticated the texts).

The date that I met her, on that date,

was to take her back and get my name off

of it. That was the purpose of it.

She discussed several problems that she

had. And some of those problems, I didn’t

believe to the extent she explained it.

And so I asked to go ahead and meet with

Julio Peon and Orlindo Vigo.

When I walked into that property, I ended

up meeting them. And the tenseness of it

changed.

And -- is it possible to say the messages

I got at this time? Because it is my

testimony.

COURT: Mr. Mortenson?

PETITIONER: It’s very relevant because –

STATE: The State would object to it, hearsay.

PETITIONER: It’s – it says to the level already –

STATE: There’s no way to authenticate them.

PETITIONER: I know, but it’s what I’m saying I got.

COURT: Okay. Objection overruled. Go ahead.

PETITIONER: Let me (indiscernible).

STATE: Your Honor, I object to him reading

anything.

COURT: Sustained.

PETITIONER: Okay. On the date that I showed up at the

property, her vehicle wasn't at where her

residence was. It was at Julio Peon's

work, and I thought she just wasn't home.

So I sent a message, where are you. And

she says she was here, meaning her

residence. That was at 12:00.

She talked to me between 12 and 3. And

she went into great deal about many

things. Some of those things do not

pertain to this legal, and I won't

discuss it, but to the life-threatening

issues that she was potentially faced, I

was concerned. She was concerned.

And so that's when I asked her that we

should sit down with Julio Peon and

Orlindo Vigo, because I wanted to see

what was truth and what was fiction.

She, I think, explained to them –

STATE: Objection, hearsay.

PETITIONER: Okay.

COURT: Sustained.

PETITIONER: I received a message that stated—

STATE: Objection, hearsay.

PETITIONER: Okay. She told me –

COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. You can answer.

PETITIONER: -- that they --Julio and Orlindo -- Julio

Peon and Orlindo Vigo thought that Haley

and I were setting them up. And she felt

that there was a danger there. And she

described it as an emergency.

Now, it wasn't in the context -- it was

something that you would sit down to

discuss, but I think that because she had

opened up to me between the 12 and 3 p.m.,

I think Orlindo Vigo and Julio Peon were

worried about what she had divulged.

And so when I walked back into that

residence, I proceeded to try to talk to

these individuals. And Julio Peon was

not his self, and he said that in his

depositions.

And the mere fact of handing something

that I had participated in to enter the

discussion, somehow Julio took that wrong

and he heard that he bounced me around

the room. He's a strong person. And there

was no provocation. There was no threat.

And then that's when I what I thought I

saw is Orlindo having a pistol on his

side.

Ms. Brennan and Julio Peon did not know

that. And that's why in this entire

testimony, they're confused. They don't

know, really, what went on.

(Doc. 13-3 at 429-32). Thereafter, St. Claire reiterated that he

went to the apartment to ensure that Brenan was safe and that he

was “completely shocked” when he was attacked by Vigo and Peon.

(Id. at 435). He stated that he went “to discuss a specific topic

that [Brennan] needed. It was a life and death situation.” (Id.

at 436).

The Court has reviewed the entire trial transcript and

concludes that St. Claire’s testimony and other evidence presented

at trial provided a thorough picture of the text messages and the

alleged reasons St. Claire went to the victims’ home. Given that

St. Claire was allowed to testify about the content of the texts,

it is unclear what additional evidence would have been before the

jury had an expert testified as to the texts’ authenticity. St.

Claire’s argument that he would have been able to present evidence

to the jury that would have resulted in his exoneration if the

court would have given him funds for an expert is based on mere

conjecture. “The Brecht standard reflects the view that a ‘State

is not to be put to th[e] arduous task [of retrying a defendant]

based on mere speculation that the defendant was prejudiced by

trial error; the court must find that the defendant was actually

prejudiced by the error.’” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 268

(2015) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)).

This Court does not make this finding.

St. Claire has not shown that any Ake error actually occurred,

much less caused prejudice under Brecht. And as a result, his

stand-alone Ake claim, even if applicable to non-psychiatric

experts, had no effect on the verdict and any error that may have

occurred was harmless. Ground one is denied.

B. Ground Two

St. Claire asserts that “[t]he trial court misapprehended the

reason [he] wanted to introduce the evidence of why he went to the

house where the incident occurred. This misapprehension led to

the violation of [his] right to fully testify in his own defense.”

(Doc. 1 at 23). Specifically, St. Claire argues that the trial

court had ruled, in response to a motion in limine, that St. Claire

could not introduce evidence of Brennan’s drug use to “show that

she’s just a bad person.” (Id.) St. Claire now argues:

The court’s analysis was wrong and a violation of federal

constitutional guarantees. Throughout the trial, both

the court and the prosecutor continually misapprehended

the issue, referring to St. Claire’s attempts to

introduce evidence of Brennan’s “drug use” rather than

St. Claire’s defense as to why he was at the house that

day: to discuss Brennan entering a drug rehabilitation

facility. This evidence, along with the text messages

from Brennan that the court did not admit, contradicted

the prosecution’s argument that St. Claire was

unexpected and uninvited.

(Id. at 23–24). St. Claire asserts that the trial court’s

misapprehension of his reasons for wanting to raise Brennan’s drug

use violated his constitutional rights under Davis v. Alaska, 415

U.S. 308, 315 (1974) and Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).

Respondent argues that Ground Two is unexhausted because St.

Claire “did not fairly present the trial court his ground by timely

objecting to the evidence on constitutional dimension and

requesting a ruling on the constitutional claim.” And, because

St. Claire did not fairly present this ground to the trial court,

it was not preserved. (Doc. 12 at 20). In reply, St. Claire

argues that he repeatedly tried to elicit the testimony held to be

inadmissible by the trial court, but was stymied by the court’s

rulings on the State’s motion in limine. (Doc. 16 at 7–8).

However, he does not allege that he raised or argued to the trial

court that the failure to allow evidence of Brennan’s drug use was

a federal constitutional error or that he objected to the State’s

motion in limine on constitutional grounds. Rather, he now

asserts that the trial court “is presumed to know” the Supreme

Court holdings “that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal

defendants the right to cross-examine those who testify against

them[.]” (Id. at 8).

The Court finds that St. Claire did not exhaust this claim

because he never raised it at the trial court level. The

presumptive knowledge of the trial court (or lack thereof) has

never been held to excuse a habeas petitioner’s failure to actually

raise a constitutional issue at the trial court level. For this

Court to conclude otherwise would ignore binding Supreme Court and

Eleventh Circuit precedent requiring exhaustion of all

constitutional claims in state court before raising them in federal

court. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (holding that

“ordinarily a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to

a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief

(or a similar document) that does not alert it to the presence of

a federal claim in order to find material . . . that does so”);

Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1350 (11th Cir.

2004)(“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat

similar state-law claim was made. To exhaust the claims

sufficiently [the petitioner] must have presented the state court

with this particular legal basis for relief in addition to the

facts supporting it.”). Petitioner does not show cause for his

failure to exhaust this claim or assert a fundamental miscarriage

justice. Accordingly, Ground Two is subject to dismissal as

unexhausted.

Even if St. Claire had exhausted Ground Two, he is not

entitled to federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

First, the Court finds no constitutional error in the state court’s

evidentiary rulings,5 and to the extent St. Claire alleges a

violation of state law, such claim is not cognizable on habeas

review. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (“[F]ederal

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”).

Next, as discussed in Ground One, claims of trial court error are

subject to Brecht’s harmless error review, and St. Claire has not

shown that the trial court’s failure to allow additional testimony

regarding Brennan’s drug use (as the reason he went to her house)

had a substantial and injurious effect on the proceedings.

St. Claire argues that he should have been allowed to testify

that “he was invited to the house by Brenan and was expected, and

that the other occupants of the house had violent reputations known

to him.” (Doc. 16 at 7). Notably, St. Claire was allowed to ask

Brennan his reasons for coming to the house, and she testified

that she “honestly [didn’t] know. Sorry. Sorry.” (Doc. 13-3 at

218). St. Claire later re-asked the question, noting that “[t]he

reason that I was meeting you that day, you don’t remember going

5

Notably, the trial court did not make a carte blanche ruling

that St. Claire could not mention drugs at all during the defense.

Rather, the judge granted the State’s motion in limine to the

extent that St. Claire could not mention drugs without first

“obtaining permission from the Court outside the presence and/or

hearing of the jury”. (Doc. 13-2 at 251).

to the storage bin that had been leased? I was getting it out of

my name and putting it in your name?” (Id. at 227). Brennan

answered, “I don’t remember exactly why you agreed to meet me that

day.” (Id.)

Likewise, Peon also testified that he did not know why St.

Claire was at the house on the day of the incident. Peon testified

that after St. Claire knocked on the door, “he kind of just like

rushes in. And so I mean, I knew something was up there at that

moment.” (Id. at 241–42). He testified that he had met St.

Claire “four or five” times, and that there was no hostility

towards him. (Id. at 249) St. Claire asked Peon why he

(Petitioner) had gone to the house. (Id. at 251). The State

objected to the question, and the judge excused the jury so that

he could hear Peon’s answer. (Id. at 252–53). Peon told St.

Claire that he did not have any recollection of St. Claire coming

to the house for a discussion on drugs. (Id. at 255, 259).

Thereafter, the judge explained to St. Claire that, while Peon had

denied knowing why he was at the house, he (St. Claire) was free

to testify about his own reasons for being there. (Id. at 259).

When the state objected and argued that St. Claire should not be

allowed to talk about drugs, the trial court, seemingly

exasperated, noted:

I mean, if the defendant wants to get up on the witness

stand and tell this jury that he went to a house to talk

to people about drugs, and he's bringing guns with him,

and goes into their house, if that's what you really

want to do, you know, knock yourself out. That's a sure

loser for you, going into a drug house carrying guns, is

that what you want to do? That's fine. You go ahead and

do that.

. . .

Because you’ll – the jury is going to look at that . .

. and go, why is this guy coming to this house knowing

there’s a drug deal going on, there’s . . . drugs there,

and he’s bringing guns with him?

. . .

I just think you need to talk – you need to have co-

counsel, you need to have Mr. Baker become your counsel

in this case.

(Id. at 260–61). St. Claire protested the court’s suggestion that

he proceed with counsel and stated that he wanted to continue

representing himself. The court then asked St. Claire whether he

thought “telling the jury that you went there because you knew it

was going to be about drugs or there was a drug deal or whatever

it was, and you brought guns with you to a house, that’s your –

that’s your trial strategy? Knock yourself out.” (Id. at 262).

Clearly, the trial judge backtracked from any prior ruling that

prevented St. Claire from explaining that he went to home of

alleged drug dealers to talk about drugs.

Moreover, the jury heard St. Claire’s alleged reason for going

to the house through the testimony of Police Sergeant Goldhorn.

The state questioned the officer about St. Claire’s explanation

(made immediately after his arrest) of why he was at the residence:

Q. Did the defendant tell you how he came to be at

that residence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did he did he discuss with you how he entered

the residence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what did he tell you?

A. He said he knocked on the door and Julio and

Orlindo, the grandfather, invited him in. Opened

the door and then invited him in.

Q. Okay. And what did he tell you happened once he was

inside?

A. He said he sat down for a meeting with them.

Q. Okay. And what came of that meeting?

A. Basically, he wanted to discuss drug use. He

presented them with a piece of paper. He explained

that he presented them with a piece of paper, I

believe it was an e-mail, explaining how he has

history talking about drug use.

And they -- he said that he accused Julio of being

a drug dealer, and Julio – they had an argument.

He told Haley that he's (sic) coming with me. And

that he wanted

Q. I'm sorry. Who said that Haley was coming with him?

A. Mr. St. Claire.

Q. Okay. So he acknowledged in a statement to you that

he was going to take Haley Brennan out of that home?

A. Yes, sir.

(Doc. 13-3 at 361–62). Finally, at trial, St. Claire testified

that he went to the home to discuss “life-threatening issues” that

Brennan faced because he “wanted to see what was truth and what

was fiction.” (Id. at 431). He testified:

[Brennan] had sent me messages of going from meeting at

4 to 4:15. I went into a place that I had an appointment

with. I went in there to discuss a specific topic that

they – that specifically Ms. Brennan needed. It was a

life and death situation. And so, to me, it was

something that I had to address that day.

(Id. at 436). The record shows that, in addition to not being

precluded from testifying that he went to the house to talk about

drugs, the information regarding why St. Claire went to the house

was actually before the jury.

To the extent any constitutional trial court error occurred,

the Court finds that it did not have a substantial or injurious

effect in determining the jury’s verdict. In addition to being

unexhausted, Ground Two is denied on the merits.

C. Ground Three

St. Claire asserts that the trial court’s prohibition on

“evidence of [Vigo’s and Peon’s] drug trafficking to show [his]

fear of the alleged victims as character evidence” violated his

constitutional right to defend himself. (Doc. 1 at 30). St.

Claire argues that “both state and federal courts readily accept

the proposition that ‘guns often accompany drugs.’ ” (Id.)

Therefore, argues St. Claire, he had “a reasonable fear of Vigo

and Peon, and their character was admissible to explain St.

Claire’s fear and why he went to the house prepared to defend

himself[.]” (Id. at 30–31). St. Claire claims that he was denied

a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, violating

both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the

Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth

Amendment. (Id. at 31) (citing Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S.

319, 319 (2006); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).

St. Claire presented a similar argument in his brief on direct

appeal. In response to St. Claire’s argument on appeal, the state

conceded that when a defendant asserts a claim of self-defense,

the victim’s reputation evidence may be admissible to show that

the victim acted consistently with his reputation for violence.

And “specific acts of violence, if known by the defendant” may be

admissible to prove “that the accused was reasonably apprehensive

of the victim and that the defensive measures of the accused were

reasonable.” (Doc. 13-4 at 136) (citing Mohler v. State, 165 So.

3d 773, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Shreiteh v. State, 987 So. @d 761

(Fla 4th DCA 2008)). However, the State noted that, according to

St. Claire’s comments during the hearing on the motion in limine,

“most of the information that he learned about the victims’

criminal records came from an investigator that was hired after

[Petitioner] was arrested.” (Doc. 13-4 at 137 (citing Doc. 13-3

at 31)). Moreover, St. Claire admitted to the trial court that

he did not believe the house was a “drug house” when he entered

it. (Doc. 13-4 at 137 (citing Doc. 13-3 at 262)). And, during

St. Claire’s closing argument, he told the jury:

I went into that house believing that this was not true.

I went into this house saying these are great people.

I had never pulled any type of research on these people,

no police report. I went in believing that Haley had a

certain health issue, certain problems, but everything

else was just a complete lie. That’s what I believed.

I was not concerned about Julio Peon or Orlando Vigo

attacking me.

(Id. (citing Doc. 13-3 at 548)). Therefore, “[Petitioner] himself

denied any apprehension, thus the [state court] was correct in

denying his attempt to introduce any specific acts.” (Id. at

138). The State also argued that Vigo’s decades-old drug

trafficking offense did not constitute reputation evidence. (Id.)

Respondent now argues that Ground Three is unexhausted for

habeas review because St. Claire did not “fairly present the

constitutional dimension of [Ground Three] at trial and

subsequently on direct appeal.” (Doc. 12 at 29 (emphasis in

original)). Indeed, to the extent St. Claire argued this issue

at the trial court level, a complete review of the record does not

show that it was ever presented as a federal constitutional claim.

And St. Claire raised this claim on direct appeal in terms of state

law only. (Doc. 13-4 at 90–94). In his appellate brief, St.

Claire’s only mention of federal law is an argument that “[b]oth

state and federal courts, when examining a law enforcement

officer’s actions, readily accept the proposition that ‘guns often

accompany drugs.’ ” (Id. at 92). St. Claire’ argued:

Why can only a police officer fear for their safety when

dealing with individuals who are drug traffickers?

Common sense is common sense. If “guns often accompany

drugs” then St. Claire had a reasonable fear of Vigo and

Peon, and their character was admissible to explain St.

Claire’s fear and why he went to the house prepared to

defend himself with firearms he had a concealed permit

to carry.

(Doc. 13-4 at 93). St. Claire did not mention due process or the

Sixth Amendment in his brief on appeal, and the federal case he

cited did not stand for the proposition he urges here.6 Rather,

St. Claire relied solely on Florida evidentiary rules to support

his argument that he should have been allowed to testify that “Vigo

had a prior drug trafficking arrest in which he pled guilty to a

lesser charge of possession with intent to sell cocaine. By virtue

of his contact and discussions with Brennan, [Petitioner] was aware

of Vigo’s record and Peon’s participation in drug trafficking.”

(Id. at 90).

Although St. Claire’s state claim was similar to the one

raised here, for exhaustion purposes, it is not sufficient that a

similar claim has been through the state courts. Rather, federal

courts require “a state prisoner to present the state courts with

the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.” McNair v.

Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).

As part of such a showing, the claim presented to the state courts

6

In his appellate brief St. Claire cited United States v.

Oriach, 222 F. App’x 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2007) for the proposition

that, in the context of a stop-and-frisk, it may be objectively

reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in

selling drugs may be carrying a weapon because “guns often

accompany drugs.” (Doc. 3-4 at 92). As argued by Respondent,

Oriach (an unpublished Fourth Circuit case) does not stand for the

proposition that certain types of character evidence is admissible

in a self-defense trial. (Doc. 12 at 29–30).

“must include reference to a specific federal constitutional

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief.” Reedman v. Thomas, 305 F. App’x 544, 545–

46 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). St. Claire’s

failure to apprise the state courts of the constitutional nature

of this claim (both at the trial and appellate levels) leaves it

unexhausted on federal habeas review. Petitioner does not show

cause for his failure to exhaust this claim or assert a fundamental

miscarriage justice. Accordingly Ground Three is subject to

dismissal as unexhausted.

Even had St. Claire exhausted Ground Three, he is not entitled

to federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Notably, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the trial court’s

7

failure to allow character evidence was more than harmless error.

First, while Vigo’s and Peon’s reputation for violence may have

been relevant to his self-defense claim, St. Claire has not offered

evidence of their reputation in the community.8 See Dean v. State,

843 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“Traditionally, character

is proved by evidence of the individual’s reputation in the

community for the character trait involved.”). Vigo’s twenty-

7

As in Ground Two, the Court finds no constitutional error

in the state court’s evidentiary rulings, and to the extent St.

Claire alleges a violation of state law, it is not cognizable on

habeas review.

8

Nor does he do so here.

year-old arrest for possession with intent to sell cocaine would

not have been admissible for that purpose. See Taylor v. State,

513 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that evidence of the

victim’s prior arrest and prior “bad acts” were not admissible as

reputation evidence in a self-defense trial). Therefore, any

claim that such evidence would have been admitted and convinced

the jury that St. Claire acted in self-defense is merely

speculative and cannot support a claim for habeas relief. See

Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991)(recognizing

that vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support

a claim for habeas relief); Sargent v. Armontrout, 841 F.2d 220,

226 (8th Cir. 1998) (“When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on

the petitioner to prove that his rights have been violated.

Speculation and conjecture will not satisfy this burden”).

Next, a review of the trial transcript shows that the jury

was well aware that Petitioner thought Peon and Vigo were involved

with drugs. St. Claire impeached Vigo with his prior felony

conviction, and mentioned the conviction to the jury at least three

times. (Doc. 13-3 at 447, 522, 526). Sergeant Goldhorn testified

that St. Claire told the police that he went to the house to talk

about drugs and that St. Claire believed that Peon and Vigo were

drug dealers. (Id. at 361–62). Throughout his closing argument,

St. Claire talked about Brennan’s “life threatening” issues and

said that “Julio Peon and Orlindo Vigo thought that Haley and I

were setting them up. And she felt that there was a danger there.

And she described it as an emergency.” (Id. at 431). He argued

that the altercation “happened because Haley Brennan scared them.

Haley Brennan had revealed secrets of this family to me and they

were worried that I would know it and what would I do with it.”

(Id. at 546). He repeatedly told the jury that the victims were

scared of what he knew. (Id. at 555, 556). He told the jury that

there were always a lot of men in the house, described as “a small

army” (id. at 435, 454, 548), and he described the neighbor across

the street as Orlindo Vigo’s “sentry.” (Id. at 436).

To the extent any constitutional trial court error occurred,

the Court finds that it did not have a substantial or injurious

effect in determining the jury’s verdict. Notwithstanding St.

Claire’s argument that he acted in self-defense and the

implications that the victims were somehow involved in drug

trafficking, the jury believed Brennan’s, Vigo’s and Peon’s

version of events and rejected St. Claire’s claim of self-defense.

In addition to being unexhausted, Ground Three is denied on the

merits.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, St. Claire is not entitled to relief

on the habeas claims presented here. No allegation not specifically

addressed has been found to warrant habeas relief.

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. Ground One of St. Claire’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition is

DENIED. Grounds Two and Three are DISMISSED as

unexhausted. Alternatively, Grounds Two and Three are

DENIED.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, deny any pending

motions as moot, terminate any deadlines, and close this

case.

Certificate of Appealability9

A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute

entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court or circuit

justice or judge must first issue a certificate of appealability

(COA). “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, St. Claire

“must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or that “the

issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). When,

9 Under Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

in the United States District Courts, the “district court must

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final

order adverse to the applicant.”

as here, the district court has rejected a claim on procedural

grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists of reason would

find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

Upon consideration of the record, the Court declines to issue

a COA. Because St. Claire is not entitled to a COA, he is not

entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 3rd, 2022.

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E. STEELE

Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-2

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties