recognizing previous case law holding “that cutting off a plaintiff’s potentially meritorious action is an unduly harsh sanction for failing to prosecute his claim or comply with a court order, absent willful or contumacious conduct”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing previous case law holding “that cutting off a plaintiff’s potentially meritorious action is an unduly harsh sanction for failing to prosecute his claim or comply with a court order, absent willful or contumacious conduct”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
STEVEN D. YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:19-cv-749-MMH-MCR
MARK S. INCH and JULIE JONES,
Defendants.
____________________________________
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Steven D. Young initiated this action in the Northern District
of Florida by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1). The Honorable
Robert L. Hinkle, United States District Judge, transferred the action to this
Court (Doc. 17). On July 1, 2019, the Court granted Young’s Motion for
Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 20), and ultimately appointed three attorneys
(Buddy Schulz, Derek Mountford, and Robert Gore) from the law firm Holland
& Knight LLP to represent Young (Doc. 23). Young then filed the operative
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 30). Young alleges that Defendants are
violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment because they refuse to provide him with direct-acting antivirals
(DAAs), a lifesaving treatment for his chronic Hepatitis C virus. Id. at 9-12.
Young sues Defendants each in their supervisory role as Secretary of the
Florida Department of Corrections, and alleges Defendants’ employees and
agents have never provided Young with DAAs, nor have they provided him
with “over the counter vitamins or supplements, or other dietary
considerations to address [his] abdominal pain and swelling.” Id. at 9. As relief,
Young seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages.
Id. at 12.
On February 12, 2021, the Court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss
(Doc. 52). On July 9, 2021, during discovery, counsel for Young (Frederick D.
Page)1 moved to withdraw, requesting that the Court discharge him and the
law firm of Holland & Knight as counsel of record for Young (Doc. 64). In
support of that request, Mr. Page described an incident that occurred during
Young’s deposition, in which Young accused the law firm of taking actions
adverse to Young’s wishes and conveying a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship. Id. Considering Mr. Page’s representations and because Young
had been notified of the withdrawal and filed no objection to the request, the
Court granted counsel’s request on August 6, 2021. See Order (Doc. 65). In its
Order, the Court noted that Young would be proceeding pro se. Id. at 2.
Thereafter, the Court granted Defendants’ request to extend the discovery
1 The initial three appointed attorneys left the firm of Holland & Knight, and
thus Mr. Page had appeared as counsel of record for Young. See Doc. 55.
deadline because Young refused to meaningfully participate in the discovery
process and answer deposition questions. See Doc. 68.
In an Order dated October 1, 2021, the Court directed the parties to file
responses to any summary judgment motions by February 14, 2022. See Order
(Doc. 68). Defendants filed a Motion for Final Summary Judgment on January
13, 2022 (Doc. 70; Motion). The Clerk sent Young a Summary Judgment Notice
(Doc. 71) on January 14, 2022, advising Young of his obligation to respond to
the Motion as well as the potential consequences for failing to do so. Young
failed to file a response or request more time to do so. Thus, on March 1, 2022,
the Court directed Young to show cause, by March 30, 2022, why this case
should not be dismissed for his failure to comply with the Court’s Order (Doc.
68) or otherwise prosecute the case. See Order to Show Cause (Doc. 72). The
Court advised Young that his failure to timely comply may result in the
dismissal of this case without further notice. See id. (citing Rule 3.10, Local
Rules, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida).
When Young again failed to comply with the Court’s Order, on April 18,
2022, the Court entered a Final Order to Show Cause (Doc. 73) directing Young
to (1) show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute
and (2) file a response to the Motion by May 18, 2022. See Final Order to Show
Cause (Doc. 73). The Court advised Young that he should consider the statute
of limitations and noted that if the statute of limitations on his claims has
expired, any dismissal, even a dismissal without prejudice for failure to
prosecute, would likely bar any future litigation of these claims. See id. The
Court also advised Young that his failure to comply would result in the
dismissal of this case without further notice. See id.
A district court has inherent authority to manage its docket. See Equity
Lifestyle Prop., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing and Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232,
1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If a plaintiff fails to prosecute an
action or comply with a court order, the court may sua sponte dismiss the case.
Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005);
see Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). However, where a
dismissal of the case “has the effect of precluding [plaintiff] from refiling his
claim due to the running of the statute of limitations . . . [t]he dismissal [is]
thus tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.” Justice v. United States, 6
F.3d 1474, 1482 n.15 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503,
505 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)); Stephenson v. Warden, Doe, 554 F. App’x 835 (11th
Cir. 2014).2
2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
The limitations period for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the
forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations, which is four years in
Florida. See City of Hialeah, Fla. v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1103 n.2 (11th Cir.
2002); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). Here, Young asserts
that Defendants began denying him HCV treatment in “mid-2016,” and
therefore, the applicable four-year statute of limitations may have run, absent
application of a continuing violation theory or other theory warranting tolling.
If Young’s statute of limitations has run, a dismissal of this action would, in
effect, be a dismissal with prejudice.
The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that a dismissal with prejudice is “a
drastic remedy to be used only in those situations where a lesser sanction
would not better serve the interests of justice.” Burden, 644 F.2d at 505
(quoting Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1216 (5th Cir.1970)); Zocaras v.
Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 485 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (“Dismissal with
prejudice is . . . an extreme sanction . . . but it is justified in extreme
circumstances. This is another way of saying that the sanction imposed should
fit the interests jeopardized and the harm caused by the violation.”); Levy v.
NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 686 F. App’x 667, 670 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Justice, 6
F.3d at 1482 n.15). Thus, a dismissal with prejudice is improper unless “the
district court finds a clear record of delay or willful conduct and that lesser
sanctions are inadequate to correct such conduct.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd., 432
F.3d at 1339 (citations omitted). Moreover, a district court’s “findings
satisfying both prongs of [the] standard are essential before dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate,” and the court must make these findings because “the
sanction of dismissal with prejudice is so unsparing[.]” Id. (emphasis deleted;
citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has also instructed:
A district court’s consideration of lesser sanctions
“need not be explicit.” Gratton v. Great Am.
Communications[], 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir.
1999). Nevertheless, while this court has “occasionally
inferred such a finding, as where lesser sanctions
would have ‘greatly prejudiced’ defendants, it has
‘never suggested that the district court need not make
that finding. . . .’” Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193
(11th Cir. 1993)[] (“Mere delay will not suffice; ‘[a]
finding of such extreme circumstances necessary to
support the sanction of dismissal must, at a minimum,
be based on evidence of willful delay; simple
negligence does not warrant dismissal.’”). Kilgo, 983
F.2d at 192-3 (citations omitted).
Abreu-Velez v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 248 F. App’x 116, 118 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Stephenson, 554 F. App’x at 837 (recognizing previous
case law holding “that cutting off a plaintiff’s potentially meritorious action is
an unduly harsh sanction for failing to prosecute his claim or comply with a
court order, absent willful or contumacious conduct”) (citation omitted).
In prosecuting this action, Young was required to comply with this
Court’s Orders. As of the date of this Order, he has neither complied with the
Court’s Orders (Docs. 68, 72, 73), nor requested more time to do so.3 Indeed,
the designated time to respond to the Court’s first Order to Show Cause (Doc.
72) passed almost two months ago and the time for him to respond to the Final
Order to Show Cause (Doc. 73) expired on May 18, 2022. Young has not
responded to either Order and has failed to respond to the summary judgment
Motion despite the cautioning in the Court’s Summary Judgment Notice (Doc.
71). Further, after the Court discharged counsel and deemed Young to be
proceeding pro se on August 6, 2021, Young has not filed a single document
with the Court. And Defendants were forced to request an extension of the
discovery deadline because Young refused to respond to deposition questions
and meaningfully participate in the discovery process. See Doc. 68.
On this record, the Court finds that there is a pattern of delay as
evidenced by Young’s failure to comply with the Court’s Orders and his
unreasonable prolonging of the proceedings. Moreover, faced with an Order
directing him to show cause why this action should not be dismissed, and
advising him that due to the statute of limitations any dismissal may be
tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice barring future litigation, Young
opted not to respond in any way. Given that the potential of dismissal with
prejudice was insufficient to prompt Young to respond to the Court’s Orders
3 The Court’s internal docket shows that all Orders have been mailed to Young
and none have been returned as undeliverable.
and timely comply with his obligations, the Court discerns no lesser sanction
that would correct his recalcitrance. Also, continued delay of this case would
prejudice Defendants, as they are entitled to a speedy and just resolution of
the case. Thus, any lesser sanction would be inadequate, and the Court
concludes that dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute 1s appropriate at
this time.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. This case is DISMISSED, without prejudice, for Young’s failure
to comply with the Court’s Orders and lack of prosecution.‘
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case, terminate
any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 26th day of May,
2022.
MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge
Jax-7
C: Steven D. Young, #861067
Counsel of Record
4 Whether this dismissal actually results in a dismissal with prejudice depends
on whether the statute of limitations has expired. That question is not before this
Court, but must be answered in a subsequent proceeding if Young refiles this claim.