Ain Jeem, Inc. v. The Individuals, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

AIN JEEM, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:21-cv-1331-VMC-AEP

THE INDIVIDUALS,

PARTNERSHIPS, AND

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS

IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE A,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court upon Defendant Carl Puckett’s

(“Puckett”) Motion for Judicial Disqualification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and

455(a) (Doc. 268). By the motion, Puckett asserts that, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and

455, the undersigned should be disqualified based upon the undersigned’s findings

set forth in a July 14, 2021 Report and Recommendation (Doc. 66), a July 21, 2021

Report and Recommendation (Doc. 80), during an October 26, 2021 hearing, and

in a subsequent October 27, 2021 Order (Doc. 236). As Puckett provided no basis

for disqualification or recusal, his motion is denied.

Namely, both 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 govern the recusal of a federal district

judge on the grounds of bias, prejudice, or lack of impartiality. See United States v.

Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 884 (11th Cir. 1985); Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State

proceeding in district court timely files a “sufficient affidavit that the judge before

whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in favor

of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein.” The affidavit

must set forth the facts and the reasons for the party’s belief that bias or prejudice

exists, and, notably, the “party may file only one such affidavit in any case.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 144 (emphasis added). Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge shall disqualify himself “in

any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28

U.S.C. § 455(a). The test under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is “whether an objective,

disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on

which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s

impartiality.” United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). A judge should thus disqualify himself only

if a reasonable person would question his or her impartiality, or if the judge harbors

a personal bias against a party. “A party’s complaints regarding ‘judicial rulings,

routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary admonishments (whether or not

legally supportable) to counsel’ are not sufficient to require recusal,” however.

Brown v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 226 F. App’x 866, 869 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994)).

Allegations of bias sufficient to require disqualification under either 28

U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 must indicate that the alleged bias is personal as opposed to

judicial in nature. Meester, 762 F.2d at 884 (citations omitted). “The alleged bias

‘must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on

some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Clark, 605 F.2d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).1 A

motion seeking disqualification therefore may not ordinarily be based on the judge’s

rulings in the same case. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost

never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”); Meester, 762 F.2d at

884. Indeed, the opinions formed by a judge based on facts introduced or events

occurring during judicial proceedings do not form a basis for a bias or a partiality

challenge unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Likewise, judicial remarks

during litigation that are “critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the

parties, or their cases” does not generally form a valid basis for a bias or partiality

challenge. Id. An exception to the general rule that the bias must stem from an

extrajudicial source exists where “such pervasive bias and prejudice is shown by

otherwise judicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party.” Meester, 762

F.2d at 885 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, however, a

judge should not recuse from an assigned case based upon “unsupported, irrational

or highly tenuous speculation.” United States v. Cerceda, 188 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th

Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Giles v.

Garwood, 853 F.2d 876, 878 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh

Circuit adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided prior to

Primarily, Puckett repeats the same arguments throughout his motion

regarding “extreme favoritism for the plaintiff and extreme bias/prejudice against

[] Puckett” (Doc. 268, at 9), asserting the following:

The Magistrate District Court Judge Honorable Anthony E. Porcelli

not only failed to dismiss the shotgun complaint but acted in extreme

favoritism for the Plaintiff and bias and prejudice against the defendant

in scouring the shotgun complaint to construct a report and

recommendations [sic] to be proceeded on and giving the appearance

of lawyering on behalf of the plaintiff. Coupled with the magistrates

[sic] failure to conduct an actual review of the evidence as required

further erodes public confidence in the courts and in this case, has

emboldened the Plaintiff’s counsel to continue to intentionally

misrepresent the facts of the case committing additional fraud against

the defendant without concern for accountability for such egregious

conduct.

(Doc. 268, at 10).2 Puckett does not claim that the undersigned engaged in

extrajudicial activities that would warrant disqualification. Rather, Puckett claims

this case involves one of the rare instances where pervasive bias and prejudice is

shown by judicial conduct. Significantly, to support his claims of pervasive bias and

prejudice, Puckett critiques the undersigned’s case management, findings, and

decisions in the instant matter that have not resulted in his favor and reargues his

theories about the dismissal of the underlying complaint as a shotgun pleading.

Puckett’s claims simply do not warrant disqualification. Instead, his claims for

disqualification are better suited as objections or an appeal for the District Judge’s

consideration of the undersigned’s findings and recommendations. See, generally,

2 The undersigned also permitted Puckett an opportunity to submit a reply brief in support

of his position, which Puckett subsequently submitted (see Docs. 287, 297, 302). In his

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (noting that judicial rulings, almost invariably, “are proper

grounds for appeal, not for recusal”). Accordingly, after careful consideration, it is

hereby

ORDERED:

1. Puckett’s Motion for Judicial Disqualification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 144 and 455(a) (Doc. 268) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this 23rd day of May, 2022.

j SS /f _

pr MA AY)

United Sfates Magistrate Judge

cc: Counsel of Record

Defendant Carl Puckett, pro se