Klein v. Receivable Management Group, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

STEPHANIE KLEIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:22-cv-667-WFJ-AAS

RECEIVABLE MANAGEMENT

GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Stephanie Klein’s Motion to

Remand to State Court, Dkt. 8, in which Plaintiff asserts that she does not have

Article III standing to present her case in federal court. Defendant Receivable

Management Group, Inc. filed a response in opposition, Dkt. 11. Upon careful

consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing and her motion

is due to be granted.

Plaintiff brought this lawsuit on February 15, 2022, in the County Court of

the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County, Florida. Dkt. 1-2. In her

complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated provisions of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. and the Florida

Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Fla. Stat. § 599.55 et seq. Id.

Asserting federal-question jurisdiction, Defendant removed the case to this Court

on March 22, 2022. Dkt. 1.

A removing defendant bears the burden of proving a plaintiff has Article III

standing to proceed in federal court. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338

(2016). Concerning her sole federal claim, Plaintiff contends that she has not

alleged an injury-in-fact that would give rise to standing. When the Court issued an

interrogatory directly asking Plaintiff whether she has Article III standing to bring

her FDCPA claim, Dkt. 9, Plaintiff responded “No,” Dkt. 10. Defendant disagrees,

citing Plaintiff’s allegations of her fear of future harms and Defendant’s disclosure

of her private information to a third-party letter vendor. Dkt. 11 at 4−5.

The Court finds that Defendant has not carried its burden of showing

Plaintiff has standing to pursue her claims in this Court. While Plaintiff’s FDCPA

claim alleges an injury-in-law, it does not allege an injury-in-fact. See TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (explaining that an injury-in-law is

not an injury-in-fact). Other courts assessing similar claims under the FDCPA have

found that, without more, allegations of emotional harm are insufficient to

constitute concrete injuries. See, e.g., Ojogwu v. Rodenburg Law Firm, 26 F.4th

457, 463 (8th Cir. 2022) (“fear of answering the telephone, nervousness,

restlessness, irritability, amongst other negative emotions”); Pennell v. Glob. Tr.

Mgmt., LLC, 990 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 2021) (“stress and confusion”); Ross v.

O’Hara, No. 2:18-CV-118-TLS, 2022 WL 951390, at *4−5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30,

2022) (“stress, fear, and anxiety”). Courts have reached the same conclusion

regarding the disclosure of private information to third-party letter vendors in

FDCPA cases. See Sputz v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 21-CV-4663, 2021 WL 5772033,

at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2021); Brown v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 1:21-CV-595, 2022

WL 377001, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2022); Quaglia v. NS193, LLC, No. 21-C-

3252, 2021 WL 7179621, at *3−4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2021).

Given this case law, the parties’ filings, and Plaintiff’s interrogatory answer,

the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing. The Court is therefore without subject

matter jurisdiction and must remand this action to state court. Esteves v. SunTrust

Banks, Inc., 615 F. App’x 632, 636−37 (11th Cir. 2015).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court, Dkt. 8, is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to REMAND this case to the County Court of

the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County, Florida. Thereafter, the Clerk

is directed to TERMINATE any pending motions and CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on April 27, 2022.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record