Opinion

Williams v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Flagler County)

Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed: Apr 5, 2022
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 19.9%

“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.”

How later courts described this case

“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.”
noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER CRAIG WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:19-cv-770-TJC-MCR

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this case by

filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc.

1) and a Memorandum in Support (Doc. 2). He challenges a state court (Flagler

County, Florida) judgment of conviction for aggravated child abuse. Petitioner

is serving a 15-year term of imprisonment. Respondents filed a Response (Doc.

8) with exhibits (Doc. 9; Resp. Ex.). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10). This case

is ripe for review.1

1 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish

the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d

1299, 1318 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d

1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions

as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,

and not as a means of error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S.

34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See

Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the

state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the

merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,

hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an

applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle

the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474

(2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the record refutes the applicant’s

factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not

required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that “further

factual development” is not necessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale. It should then

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the

same reasoning. But the State may rebut the

presumption by showing that the unexplained

affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as

alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or

argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the

record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted

“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for

evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation

marks omitted). “It bears repeating that even a strong

case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary

conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The

Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal

courts that an unreasonable application of law requires

more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g.,

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give

proper deference to state courts by conflating error

(even clear error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

citations modified).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254

habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court

remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present[]”

every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on

direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state prisoners

must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional

issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope

v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel applies to the

state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”).

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state

prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the

“‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). To provide

the State with the necessary “opportunity,” the

prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each

appropriate state court (including a state supreme

court with powers of discretionary review), thereby

alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal citations modified).

A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies

results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of

procedural default as follows:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality

of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided

by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments

are accorded the finality and respect necessary to

preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our

system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine

of procedural default, under which a federal court will

not review the merits of claims, including

constitutional claims, that a state court declined to

hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747-48;

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977). A state

court’s invocation of a procedural rule to deny a

prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the claims

if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is

a nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment

and the rule is firmly established and consistently

followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120,

1127-28 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617-

18 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted

claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A

prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim

by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a

violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012) (internal citations modified). Thus,

procedural defaults may be excused under certain circumstances.

Notwithstanding that a claim has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court

may still consider the claim if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause

for and actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). For a petitioner to

establish cause and prejudice,

the procedural default “must result from some objective

factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from

raising the claim and which cannot be fairly

attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v. Newsome,

953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Under the

prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the

errors at trial actually and substantially disadvantaged

his defense so that he was denied fundamental

fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citations

modified).

In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may

receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the

petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the

continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would result.

The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, there

remains yet another avenue for him to receive

consideration on the merits of his procedurally

defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of

a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Carrier,

477 U.S. at 496. “This exception is exceedingly narrow

in scope,” however, and requires proof of actual

innocence, not just legal innocence. Johnson v.

Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157 (internal citations modified). “To meet this standard, a

petitioner must ‘show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him’ of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256

F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327

(1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be

based on reliable evidence not presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523

U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such

evidence, in most cases, allegations of actual innocence are ultimately

summarily rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Courts employ a two-part test when reviewing

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. A court considering

a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a “strong

presumption” that counsel’s representation was

within the “wide range” of reasonable professional

assistance. Id. at 689. The challenger’s burden is to

show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. It is not enough

“to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on

the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Counsel’s

errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at

687.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (internal citations modified).

The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to the validity of guilty

pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

58 (1985). The petitioner must still demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

deficient. See id. at 56-59; Lynch v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 776 F.3d 1209, 1218

(11th Cir. 2015). To establish prejudice, however, the petitioner “must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S.

at 59 (footnote omitted); Lynch, 776 F.3d at 1218.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the

Strickland test before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Both prongs of the

two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment

violation; thus, “a court need not address the performance prong if the

petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay

v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697.

A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is afforded great

deference.

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is

a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. But

“[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of

Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the

more difficult. The standards created by Strickland

and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when

the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Id.

(citations and quotation marks omitted). “The

question is not whether a federal court believes the

state court’s determination under the Strickland

standard was incorrect but whether that

determination was unreasonable - a substantially

higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.

111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is

“any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard,” then a federal

court may not disturb a state-court decision denying

the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal

citations modified). In other words, “[i]n addition to the deference to counsel’s

performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer of

deference--this one to a state court’s decision--when we are considering whether

to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s decision.” Rutherford v.

Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As such, “[s]urmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

371 (2010).

III. Analysis

Between the Petition (Doc. 1), the Memorandum in Support (Doc. 2), and

the Reply (Doc. 10), it is not entirely clear what grounds Petitioner raises. In

the Petition, he lists the following grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel;

(2) incompetence to proceed to trial; (3) procedural due process violation; and

(4) Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Doc. 1 at 5, 7, 8, 10. Under each

ground, he states: “please refer to the attached petition memorandum,” id., but

his Memorandum does not clearly lay out each ground. He does, however,

indicate that he raised each ground in his postconviction motion filed pursuant

to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. at 6, 7, 9, 10; Doc. 2 at 1.

Respondents argue that “Petitioner’s federal habeas claims, other than

the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, have not been raised in state

court.” Doc. 8 at 8. Thus, Respondents contend any claims other than

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim are unexhausted and

procedurally barred. Id. Additionally, Respondents contend that “[t]o the extent

that Petitioner is raising state claims, they are not cognizable on federal habeas

review.” Id. In his Reply, as to exhaustion, Petitioner argues that he raised “his

‘involuntary plea’ claim in his Rule 3.850 motion,” and that he does not have to

exhaust his incompetency claim. Doc. 10 at 10.

The Court addresses each claim below.

A. Ground One

According to Petitioner, his trial counsel (Kurt Teifke, Esquire) was

ineffective for withdrawing his “Suggestion of Mental Incompetence to Stand

Trial,” and “unduly influenc[ing] and coerc[ing Petitioner] to involuntar[il]y

plead no contest” and “compell[ing] his deleterious incriminating statements at

the plea hearing.” Doc. 2 at 8. Petitioner further argues that his counsel knew

of his “prescribed medications[,] . . . knew of his history of intellectual

disabilities and emotional behavioral disability, and knew that [he] was under

the influence of his anti-psychotic medication at the time of the plea hearing.”

Id. He asserts that counsel should have “ensure[d] conclusion of his competency

reexamination.” Id. at 11. Petitioner argues that but for counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness, he “should have been tried by a jury of his peers.” Id. at 8.

In his Rule 3.850 motion, Petitioner argued that his counsel was

ineffective for similar reasons. The state court identified Strickland as the

controlling legal authority for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and

denied the claim:

Here, Defendant alleges that his history of

“mental incompetence, intellectual disability,

diagnosed severe Disruptive Mood Dysregulation

Intellectual Disorder, manic episodes, depression,

severe emotional stability, diminished frustration

tolerance, premature impulsive responses, severe

cognitive and functional limitations, psychotic

medication . . . acute psychotic episodes, Full Scale IQ

Score of 48, [and a] history of approximately twenty

baker act involuntary institutionalization incidents”

should have caused his trial counsel to seek a re-

examination of his competency and a second

competency hearing. In fact, Defendant’s trial counsel

(his third appointed counsel) filed a Suggestion of

Mental Incompetency to Stand Trial, but withdrew the

motion at the plea hearing:

MR. TEIFKE: I think it’s worth mentioning,

Your Honor, that, as you know, you presided

over this case for the whole time, there was - you

declared him incompetent to proceed at one

point. He was sent off for restoration training.

He was restored in someone’s opinion and that’s

why we’re back on a pretrial docket. I still had

my concerns. I actually filed a motion for a

reevaluation as to competency. I’m going to

withdraw that. I’ve had conversations with

Christopher since then, I’ve gone over the

factors, the competency factors, I’m

comfortable that he is indeed restored or

he is competent to proceed. That being said,

mental health is very much a part of this case,

and that’s going to be part of the sentencing.

Trial counsel requested an order for a new mental

health evaluation for purposes of a presentence

investigation report. Trial counsel reiterated that he

had concerns about Defendant’s mental health with

respect to sentencing, but not about Defendant’s

competency to proceed:

MR. TEIFKE: One other thing, Judge, just from

a how much time do we need standpoint, I am

going to move the Court for -- to declare him

indigent for costs so that I can have a --

THE COURT: Granted.

MR. TEIFKE: -- mental health evaluation.

THE COURT: Just get me a short order, and it’s

granted. I know enough of the history that I

agree with you.

. . . .

MR. TEIFKE: And, again, I do have concerns

about mental health. I think it’s very relevant to

how this case is going to play out. But

specifically competency, I’m aware of those

factors, I agree with [the Agency for Persons

with Disabilities’] determination that he

has been restored, he is competent, so, you

know, for whatever it’s worth I am

withdrawing that – I’m not pursuing that.

Defendant has failed to set forth circumstances

sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on this

claim. Trial Counsel acknowledged that Defendant

had previously been evaluated, deemed incompetent,

then restored and deemed competent to proceed. Trial

counsel assessed Defendant’s competency based on his

own knowledge of the competency factors, and believed

Defendant competent to proceed. There was no

deficient performance by trial counsel in failing to seek

a second competency determination. Trial counsel’s

performance did not fall below an objective standard

of reasonableness, and this claim therefore fails under

the Strickland deficiency prong.

Resp. Ex. W at 3-5 (internal citations omitted). Petitioner appealed the denial

of his Rule 3.850 motion, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal per curiam

affirmed the postconviction court’s order without issuing a written opinion. See

Resp. Ex. Z.

This Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough

review of the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state

court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal

law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented. The record supports the state court’s adjudication.

Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this ground.

Even assuming the state court’s adjudication is not entitled to deference,

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. On January 5, 2016, Petitioner was charged

by information with one count of aggravated child abuse. Resp. Ex. A.

Petitioner’s counsel, Regina Nunnally, Esquire filed a suggestion of mental

incompetence to stand trial on January 12, 2016. Resp. Ex. B. On January 15,

2016, the trial court ordered Petitioner to undergo a mental examination

(Adult-Competency / Mental Illness). Resp. Ex. C. On February 25, 2016, Louis

Legum, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who was appointed by the trial court,

authored a report finding Petitioner to be “incompetent to proceed to trial

because of his intellectual disability.” Resp. Ex. E at 10. Dr. Legum also noted,

in part:

[T]his evaluation does not suggest that

[Petitioner] is acutely psychotic or otherwise

disengaged from reality. Rather, impressions gleaned

from the mental status examination and some

assessments of malingering suggest that [Petitioner]

is transparently and dramatically invested in

exaggerating his psychological issues to the purpose of

securing either an exoneration on the charge against

him or its being resolved through placement in a

mental hospital. Intellectual testing of [Petitioner] is

seen to be of uncertain validity as it appeared that

during some facets of it, he was deliberately being less

than responsive to the test demands. However, taken

as a whole, including the corroborative documentation

from the Flagler County School System, it is believed

that [Petitioner] most likely is functioning in the mild

range of intellectual disability. . . . [Petitioner] is

regarded as being in need of involuntary placement in

a residential hospital facility to this purpose rather

than the services being rendered in the community. It

is believed that [Petitioner] is capable of attaining

competency with residential competency training in

90-120 days.

Id.

The trial court subsequently ordered another evaluation to determine

intellectual disability or autism. Resp. Exs. G, H. On April 8, 2016, Petitioner

was examined by Jeff Oatley, Ph.D., who opined that Petitioner “appear[ed] to

suffer from an Intellectual Disability,” and recommended that the court find

Petitioner incompetent to proceed. Resp. Ex. I. Dr. Oatley also noted: “While

much of this exam was influenced by probable malingering, his school records

do in fact reflect an Intellectual Disability which would impact his ability to

retain more complex information.” Id. Based on those reports, on April 27, 2016,

the trial court found Petitioner incompetent to proceed and committed him to

the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD). Resp. Ex. J.

On June 8, 2016, APD provided a report from Ryan Cuddy, Psy.D., finding

Petitioner had been restored to competency. Resp. Ex. K. Dr. Cuddy indicated

that Petitioner “appeared to be putting forth good effort regarding the

competency questions.” Id. at 5. Dr. Cuddy found that Petitioner had sufficient

capacity to “appreciate his current pending legal charge,” “appreciate possible

penalties associated with his current pending charge,” “appreciate the

adversarial nature of the legal process,” “disclose pertinent facts to his attorney

and to assist in the preparation of his defense,” “apply courtroom knowledge

and behave appropriately when in the courtroom,” and “testify relevantly.” Id.

at 5-6.

Thereafter, on July 13, 2016, the parties stipulated to the report’s

competency finding, and the trial court found Petitioner competent to proceed.

Resp. Exs. M (circuit court action form), CC (transcript of hearing). Notably, at

the hearing, Petitioner engaged with the trial court. Petitioner expressed

concerns about his daughter in foster care, and he discussed with the judge

what his plan was for when he got released. Resp. Ex. CC at 6-8. While

requesting pre-trial release and/or a different attorney, Petitioner stated, “I

know I was wrong.” Id. at 11.

According to the state court’s docket, Petitioner’s counsel (Ms. Nunnally)

filed a motion to withdraw on August 16, 2016, which the court granted on

August 22, 2016. That same day, the office of regional criminal conflict

appeared but withdrew the next day. On September 27, 2016, Mr. Teifke was

appointed to represent Petitioner. On November 10, 2016, Mr. Teifke filed a

suggestion of mental incompetency to stand trial. Resp. Ex. N. Then, on

December 7, 2016, about six months after Dr. Cuddy’s examination, Petitioner

entered a non-negotiated no contest plea. See Resp. Exs. O (circuit court action

form), DD (transcript of hearing).

At the December 7, 2016 hearing, Petitioner was placed under oath, and

he stated that the plea was “the best thing in [his] interest right now.” Resp.

Ex. DD at 5. The trial court explained that it would conduct a sentencing

hearing at a later date and that Petitioner was facing zero to thirty years in

prison. See id. at 5-6. The court further explained that Petitioner was waiving

the right to a jury trial, to hold the state to its burden of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt, and to present evidence on his own behalf. See id. at 6-7.

Petitioner affirmed that he understood the rights he was waiving by entering

the plea. See id. at 6-8. The trial court found that Petitioner entered the plea

freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. See id. at 8-9.

At that point in the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel (Mr. Teifke) then

explained that he had filed a motion for evaluation of competency but that he

was withdrawing the motion. Id. at 9-10. Counsel stated that while he had

concerns about Petitioner’s mental health in terms of mitigation at sentencing,

he was confident that Petitioner was “competent to proceed.” Id. The following

discussion occurred at the end of the hearing:

[THE STATE]: Judge, I’m sorry.

Before we finish, I hate to bring this up. I forgot

Mr. Teifke had raised the issue of his competency, so

my thought is procedurally I think that that has to run

its course before we can do anything. I think that the

proceedings are kind of stayed until that.

THE COURT: He just withdrew it.

MR. TEIFKE: I withdrew the motion.

[THE STATE]: No, I know, I heard that.

I mean, I guess I can look into it. I don’t know if

we can just technically withdraw the suggestion of

incompetency.

THE COURT: This is what Mr. Teifke said - - at

least I think the record bears out what he said, is that

he met with him subsequent to filing the motion and

didn’t feel that it was necessary any longer. I mean,

that it just wasn’t necessary at that point after

meeting with him. I mean, that’s what he put on the

record.

MR. TEIFKE: It is. And, again, I do have

concerns about mental health. I think it’s very

relevant to how this case is going to play out.

But specifically competency, I’m aware of those

factors. I agree with the APD’s determination that he

has been restored, he is competent. So whatever it’s

worth, I’m withdrawing that. I’m not pursuing that.

[THE STATE]: And I’m not questioning

anything you’re saying. I just don’t want this to come

back a couple years down the road and we’re looking

back and saying that we should have done this

correctly. I just have some concerns, that’s all. I just

want to make sure.

THE COURT: Well, I’ll let you address them.

For now I’m going to order a PSI and I’m going to set

it for sentencing when that comes in, and I’ll come

back up here and do it.

But if you feel you need to file something or do

something, feel free. But I think Mr. Teifke corrected

the record.

Id. at 13-14. The state did not file anything after the hearing regarding the

procedural aspect of defense counsel withdrawing the motion.

The trial court ordered a mental examination for sentencing. Resp. Exs.

P, Q. On May 15, 2017, Dr. Legum authored a report, and he testified at the

sentencing hearing on July 28, 2017. Resp. Exs. R (Dr. Legum’s report), EE

(transcript of sentencing hearing). Petitioner also testified at the sentencing

hearing. When Petitioner’s counsel asked him why he entered the no contest

plea, Petitioner responded in part: “Because I felt like I was wrong for what I

did, I felt bad.” Resp. Ex. DD at 47. Petitioner acknowledged the seriousness of

his actions and testified that he was “accepting responsibility for it because the

kid got hurt.” Id. at 48-49. On cross-examination by the state, the following

occurred:

Q So what happened to the victim?

A What happened to the victim was I had

him up in the air like this, and then I had dropped him.

And I had went forward and I dropped him. And before

I could even catch him it was too late. He got up after

he fell and went around the house laughing. I, like,

Jacoby, you all right? He, like, yeah, yeah, I all right.

And he went back to playing.

I say about 20 minutes later he started bleeding

out, 20 minutes later.

Q So if a doctor says that’s not consistent

with the injuries, you’re saying that’s not what

happened?

A That’s what happened, man. I’m telling

the truth what happened. This is my sentencing day. I

know I have to be ready for the bad and good, so . . . .

Q And if three witnesses say it happened

differently - -

A Man, they got three different stories. Look

in the paperwork, man. I ain’t stupid or nothing. I ain’t

trying to be smart. I ain’t trying to be a smart aleck,

man. You read the paperwork.

Them kids got different stories. One say I was

standing by my car. One say I went in the house. The

other one says some other stuff, man. It’s in the

paperwork. Read it black and white. If you all messed

up, it’s not my fault, that’s all I got to say.

I feel bad for the kid anyway. I was feeling bad

the day it happened. I was asking all the officers, Is he

going to be all right?

His mama ain’t worried about him. I was

worried about him. The way I feel, either one care

about that kid, that’s the way I feel. I care more about

him, and that’s not even my blood.

Id. at 51-53.

During closing arguments at sentencing, Petitioner’s counsel stated, in

part:

[Petitioner] was restored to competency per the doctor,

and frankly, I tended to agree with that after meeting

with him a few times. He was able to speak to me,

assist in the defense, understand what’s going on,

albeit with certain emotions. And insanity I don’t

believe was ever a viable defense I wanted to raise,

that he didn’t understand right from wrong.

Id. at 56-57.

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years imprisonment. See

Resp. Ex. S. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. However, as noted above,

Petitioner filed a Rule 3.850 motion, which the postconviction court denied.

Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the postconviction

court’s denial without a written opinion. Petitioner then filed the instant case.

Petitioner’s counsel was not deficient for withdrawing his suggestion of

incompetency and advising Petitioner regarding entry of his plea. Based on

counsel’s statements at the plea hearing, counsel’s interactions with Petitioner

caused him to believe Petitioner was competent to proceed. Petitioner

appropriately responded to the trial court’s inquiries during the plea hearing,

and nothing in the transcript reflects that Petitioner was unable to assist his

counsel in his defense. Rather, to the contrary, Petitioner’s statements reflect

that he had a sufficient present ability to assist counsel with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding and that he had a rational and factual

understanding of the pending proceedings. Counsel reiterated at sentencing

that he believed Petitioner understood the proceedings and was able to assist

counsel in his defense. Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that counsel was

deficient. Ground One is due to be denied.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner apparently claims that his plea was involuntary. He raised a

similar claim in his Rule 3.850 motion, which the postconviction court denied:

Defendant claims that his plea was involuntary

because his trial counsel coerced and compelled him to

enter a no contest plea, and trial counsel and the Court

knew or should have known that Defendant’s plea was

involuntary due to his mental incompetence.

Defendant alleges that the trial court violated the

Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure when it failed to

query whether Defendant was under the influence of

his prescribed medications. Underlying this claim is

an implication of actual incompetency to proceed,

which claim may not be raised in a postconviction

motion. Nevertheless, Defendant’s claim that his plea

was involuntary is refuted by the record. Section 3. I

70(k), Florida Statutes (2016), provides:

Responsibility of Court on Pleas. No plea of

guilty or nolo contendere shall be accepted by a

court without the court first determining, in

open court, with means of recording the

proceedings stenographically or mechanically,

that the circumstances surrounding the plea

reflect a full understanding of the significance of

the plea and its voluntariness and that there is

a factual basis for the plea of guilty. A complete

record of the proceedings at which a defendant

pleads shall be kept by the court.

A defendant has the burden of showing that his

plea was not knowing or voluntary. Allegations that a

plea was involuntary or based on a misunderstanding

or mistake can be refuted by a plea transcript which

conclusively establishes the defendant’s

understanding and that the plea was not coerced.

Here, at the plea hearing, the Court questioned

Defendant about his ability to understand the

consequences of entering a plea, and Defendant

responded appropriately when questioned during the

plea dialogue. Defendant could and did speak

intelligently with the Court about his plea and fully

understood the nature and consequences of the plea,

and the record shows that the plea was not the result

of promises, threats, or coercion. The plea was taken

in open court and was properly recorded.

Defendant has failed to establish that his plea

was involuntary.

Resp. Ex. W at 5-6. Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed

the postconviction court’s denial without a written opinion.