Thomas v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ROBERT WAYNE THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:21-cv-65-DNF

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Robert Wayne Thomas seeks judicial review of the final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his claim

for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner filed

the Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.” followed by the

appropriate page number), and the parties filed a joint legal memorandum setting

forth their respective positions. For the reasons set out herein, the decision of the

Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. Social Security Act Eligibility, Standard of Review, Procedural

History, and the ALJ’s Decision

A. Social Security Eligibility

The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The impairment must be

severe, making the claimant unable to do his previous work, or any other substantial

gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505–404.1511, 416.905–416.911.

B. Standard of Review

The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a

scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Even if the evidence preponderated against the

Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by

substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004).

In conducting this review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its

judgment for that of the ALJ, but must consider the evidence as a whole, taking into

account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Winschel v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Foote

v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,

1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Unlike findings of fact, the Commissioner’s conclusions of

law are not presumed valid and are reviewed under a de novo standard. Keeton v.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994); Maldonado

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-14331, 2021 WL 2838362, at *2 (11th Cir. July 8,

2021); Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. “The [Commissioner’s] failure to apply the correct

law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that

the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” Keeton, 21 F.3d at

1066.

The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant

is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). At step two, the ALJ must

determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments from which the

claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s

severe impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If the ALJ finds the

claimant’s severe impairments do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment,

then the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

(e)–(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)–(f).

If the claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the ALJ must determine

at step five whether the claimant’s RFC permits him to perform other work that

exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g),

416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). At the fifth step, there are two ways in which the ALJ may

establish whether the claimant is capable of performing other work available in the

national economy. The first is by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines, and

the second is by the use of a vocational expert. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,

1239-40 (11th Cir. 2004); Atha v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F. App’x 931, 933

(11th Cir. 2015).

The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Atha, 616 F. App’x

at 933. If the claimant meets this burden, then the burden temporarily shifts to the

Commissioner to establish the fifth step. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If the Commissioner presents evidence of other work

that exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able

to perform, only then does the burden shift back to the claimant to prove he is unable

to perform these jobs. Atha, 616 F. App’x at 993.

C. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance

benefits on August 19, 2019, alleging disability beginning February 8, 2018. (Tr. 78,

158-59). The application was denied initially on October 3, 2018, and upon

reconsideration on November 13, 2018. (Tr. 78, 88). Plaintiff requested a hearing

and on February 25, 2020, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge

Ryan Johannes (“ALJ”). (Tr. 41-70). On May 7, 2020, the ALJ entered a decision

finding Plaintiff not under a disability from February 8, 2018, through the date of

the decision. (Tr. 20-29).

Plaintiff requested review of the decision, but the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request on November 23, 2020. (Tr. 1-5). Plaintiff initiated the instant

action by Complaint (Doc. 1) filed on January 26, 2021, and the case is ripe for

review. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge

for all proceedings. (Doc. 16).

D. Summary of ALJ’s Decision

In this matter, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of

the Social Security Act through September 30, 2021. (Tr. 22). At step one of the

sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since February 8, 2018, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 23). At step two,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following medically determinable impairments:

“hypertension, aortitis, hyperlipidemia, diverticulosis, alcohol use disorder,

unspecified depressive disorder, panic disorder, and adjustment disorder with next

anxiety and depressed mood.” (Tr. 23). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

“does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that has significantly

limited (or is expected to significantly limit) the ability to perform basic work-related

activities for 12 consecutive months; therefore, the claimant does not have a severe

impairment or combination of impairments (20 [C.F.R. §] 404.1521 et seq.).” (Tr.

23). In other words, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have a severe

impairment or combination of severe impairments at step two. (Tr. 28).

Even though the ALJ “stops short of finding severe physical or mental

impairments,” the ALJ also submitted Vocational Interrogatories to a vocational

expert. (Tr. 28). Relying on the vocational expert’s response that considered

Plaintiff’s age (59 on the alleged onset date), education (at least high school), work

experience, and RFC (full range of work at all exertional levels, but is able to

perform routine work with only occasional changes in the work routine), there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could

perform. (Tr. 28-29, 269-73). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could have

performed such occupations as:

(1) sweeper-cleaner, industrial, DOT1 389.683-010, medium, SVP 2

1 DOT refers to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

(2) fish cleaner, DOT 525.684-030, medium, SVP 2

(3) cleaner II, DOT 919.687-014, medium, SVP 2.

(Tr. 28-29). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from

February 8, 2018, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 29).

II. Analysis

On appeal, Plaintiff raises the following two issues: (1) whether the ALJ

developed Plaintiff’s medical history and properly evaluated the severity of his

physical health impairments at step two; and (2) whether the ALJ properly evaluated

the severity of Plaintiff’s mental health impairments at step two in light of the

available evidence. (Doc. 22, p. 14, 25).

For both issues, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding his medically

determinable impairments non-severe and denying Plaintiff’s claim for benefits at

step two of the sequential evaluation. (Doc. 22, p. 14-17, 25-27). To be entitled to

disability benefits, a claimant must prove disability on or before the date last insured.

Bullard v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 752 F. App’x 753, 754 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing

Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)). To satisfy step two, a

claimant must show that he suffers from an impairment or combination of

impairments that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do work. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Step two operates as a threshold inquiry that allows only

the most trivial impairments to be rejected and therefore the burden is mild. Id. at

755 (citing McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986)); Gray v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 426 F. App’x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2011). But it also acts as a

filter to weed out groundless claims that include no severe impairments. Bullard,

752 F. App’x at 755; Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App’x 949,

950 (11th Cir. 2014). The severity of an impairment is measured in terms of its effect

on a claimant’s ability to work and not simply in terms of deviation from purely

medical standards of bodily perfection. McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547

(11th Cir. 1986). The consequence of an ALJ finding no severe impairment or

impairments at step two is that the ALJ should then reach a finding of no disability

and not proceed to the next step. Tuggerson-Brown, 572 F. App’x at 951. With this

standard in mind, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s issues.

A. Severity of Plaintiff’s Physical Impairments at Step Two

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not developing the record. (Doc. 22, p.

15). Plaintiff claims that the record lacks a physical health opinion at the time of and

after his aortic surgery in June 2019 and it is “intuitive” that based on his advanced

age, he would have some form of limitations from the surgery. (Doc. 22, p. 15-16).

Plaintiff asserts that he has back pain and right leg neuropathy that should have

satisfied the step two requirements. (Doc. 22, p. 16).

A plaintiff bears the burden of proving he is disabled and is responsible “for

producing evidence in support of his claim.” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272,

1275 (11th Cir. 2003). Even so, “[i]t is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty

to develop a full and fair record.” Id. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(3) (“However,

before we make a determination that you are not disabled, we are responsible for

developing your complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative

examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help you get

medical reports from your own medical sources.”). To remand a case because of an

ALJ’s failure to fully develop the record, the claimant must show that his right to

due process has been violated to such an extent that the record contains evidentiary

gaps, which resulted in unfairness or clear prejudice. Washington v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2018). After review of the decision and given

the medical records and other records before the ALJ, the ALJ did not err by failing

to develop the record further, such as by failing to order a consultative medical

examination.

Plaintiff implies that because of his advanced age he must “have some form

of limitation from [aortic surgery].” (Doc. 22, p. 16). Plaintiff also claims that he had

no physical health opinions since November 2018 even though his aortic surgery

occurred on June 22, 2019. (Doc. 22, p. 16). Plaintiff points to two impairments,

residual back pain after surgery and right leg neuropathy, but fails to cite to any

medical records that support these impairments. (Doc. 22, p., 16).

While Plaintiff may not have undergone an evaluation for a physical health

opinion, the ALJ cited the following medical record after the aortic surgery:

In 2020 with his primary care provider, the claimant presented

with normal gait and station, normal sensation, and normal

strength (Ex. 10F/4). The claimant was assessed with

hypertension and aortitis with no mention of peripheral

neuropathy or previously prescribed Gabapentin (Ex. 10F). In

March 2020, the claimant presented for left arm pain reporting

the aorta graft last year secondary to infection and taking a

regular aspirin daily (Ex. 11F/2). The claimant presented in

mild distress, normal range of musculoskeletal motion, no

edema, good strength, and no tenderness upon palpation (Ex.

11F/5). Therefore, the undersigned finds the claimant’s

physical impairments of hypertension, aortitis, hyperlipidemia,

spondylosis, and diverticulosis non-severe as the impairments

did not result in limitations, resolved with treatment in less than

12 months, or the claimant did not pursue additional treatment.

(Tr. 24 (emphasis added)). As cited by the ALJ, the medical records after the surgery

show that Plaintiff did not complain of peripheral neuropathy and did not mention

lingering back pain. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff’s testimony supports the ALJ’s finding that

both his backaches and his neuropathy were non-severe. Plaintiff testified that he

“gets backaches, but not anything serious enough to go back to the hospital for.” (Tr.

51-52). He also testified that he received no treatment for backaches. (Tr. 52). And

he testified that he suffers from neuropathy in his right leg, but he takes medication

for it and the medication helps. (Tr. 56).

The Court finds no evidentiary gap in the record regarding Plaintiff’s physical

impairments, which resulted in unfairness or clear prejudice. Plaintiff merely

speculates that because of his advanced age, he must have some limitations from

aortic surgery. But speculation alone does not amount to unfairness or clear

prejudice such that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record further.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had not considered Plaintiff’s inability

to pay for medication and mental health treatment in the decision and this is clear

error. Plaintiff claims that he only had insurance for six months after his last day of

employment and could not afford medication and mental health treatment. This

argument is unpersuasive. “[T]he ALJ may not draw any inferences about an

individual’s symptoms and their functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue

medical treatment without first considering any explanations that might explain the

failure to seek or pursue treatment.” Beegle v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 482 F.

App’x 483, 487 (11th Cir. 2012). If an ALJ denies benefits based on non-compliance

with care, he must consider any evidence showing that a plaintiff is unable to afford

medical care. Id. (citing Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003)).

When an ALJ relies on noncompliance with prescribed medical treatment as the

“sole ground for the denial of disability benefits,” and the record contains evidence

that a plaintiff was unable to afford the prescribed medical treatment, then the ALJ

must determine whether a plaintiff could afford the prescribed medical treatment.

Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1275.

The ALJ noted that at an emergency room visit, Plaintiff “reported taking no

medication” and later noted that Plaintiff had no specific ongoing mental health

treatment after 2018. (Doc. 22, p. 16, 26). Plaintiff claims that he was not taking his

medication and not attending therapy because he could not afford it. But Plaintiff

fails to cite any portion of the decision showing that the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s

disability benefits solely based on non-compliance with medical care or treatment.

Indeed, the ALJ made no such finding in the decision.

After consideration of the records as a whole, the ALJ did not err by failing to

order a consultative physical examination, did not err at step two by finding

Plaintiff’s physical impairments non-severe, and did not deny benefits based solely

on Plaintiff’s inability to afford medication and treatment. Thus, substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision on this issue.

B. Severity of Plaintiff’s Mental Health Impairments at Step Two

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step two by not finding Plaintiff’s mental

impairments severe. (Doc. 22, p. 25). In support, Plaintiff relies on a portion of

consultative examiner Cheryl Kasprzak, Psy.D.’s evaluation and two initial

assessments of functional limitations in a work settings. (Doc. 22, p. 25-27).

At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s “unspecified depressive disorder, panic

disorder, and adjustment disorder with next anxiety and depressed mood” were

medically determinable impairments, but not severe impairments. (Tr. 23). A severe

impairment must significantly limit a plaintiff’s ability to do basic work activity,

which is defined as abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(c); 404.1522(a)-(b). Basic mental work activities include: understanding,

carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; using judgment; responding

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and dealing with

changes in a routine work setting. Id. While a claimant has the burden to establish a

severe impairment at step two, the burden is “mild.” Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

935 F.3d 1245, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019).

In March 2018, Plaintiff attended a psychiatric diagnostic evaluation. (Tr.

321-24). Plaintiff presented with concerns about anxiety regarding going to work.

(Tr. 323). He started feeling anxious on his way to work and could not remember

how to do his job when he arrived. (Tr. 323). Plaintiff reported he felt severe

panic/anxiety on and off when going to work, but if he turned around and went home,

the symptoms mainly went away. (Tr. 323). In April 2018, physician’s assistant

Angela Vallejo completed a Medical Request Form for an insurance company. (Tr.

283). She diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety and found Plaintiff had work restrictions

of being “unable to focus, speak to customers, or communicate [with] coworkers.”

(Tr. 283).

Nearly two years later, on March 16, 2020, consultative examiner Dr.

Kasprzak completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related

Activities (Mental). (Tr. 1456-58). While Dr. Kasprzak found Plaintiff to have mild

or no limitations in most areas, she determined that Plaintiff would have mild to

moderate limitations in his ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations

and to changes in a routine work setting. (Tr. 1456-57). Dr. Kasprzak explained that

Plaintiff “denied a clear history as well as any discord with supervisors or co-

workers. The last domain [regarding ability to respond appropriately to usual work

situations and changes in a routine work setting] would be impacted by his

depression and anxiety.” (Tr. 1457).

In the decision, the ALJ thoroughly considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments

and summarized the related medical records. (Tr. 25-28). The ALJ began by

considering PAC Vallejo’s February 2018 treatment records that showed Plaintiff

had good judgment, normal mood and affect, active, alert, oriented, and normal

recent and remote memory with reported stable anxiety. (Tr. 25). The ALJ also

specifically considered the April 2018 treatment notes in which PAC Vallejo

reported that Plaintiff was unable to focus, speak to customers, or communicate with

coworkers. (Tr. 25). The ALJ noted that on examination, Plaintiff presented

generally normal examination results, but was sad and anxious. (Tr. 25). He also

noted that Plaintiff was reportedly able to sit quietly to talk and listen, did not disrupt

the session, his thoughts were very organized, he showed attention to details, and

agreed to medication and therapy. (Tr. 25). In August 2018, Plaintiff again saw PAC

Vallejo, and the treatment notes showed Plaintiff demonstrated good judgment,

normal mood and affect, active, alert, oriented, and normal recent and remote

memory. (Tr. 25). Nearly a year later, in May 2019, Plaintiff went to the emergency

room and the notes reflect that Plaintiff had a normal mood and affect, normal

behavior, and normal thought content. (Tr. 25). The ALJ noted that a June 2019 visit

to the hospital also showed normal mental health, but Plaintiff had anxiety and

depression on discharge. (Tr. 25). In January and March 2020, the ALJ noted that

Plaintiff presented with good judgment, normal mood and affect, active, alert,

oriented, and normal memory. (Tr. 25). The ALJ then summarized Dr. Kasprzak’s

evaluation results and specifically noted that she reported Plaintiff had mild to

moderate limitations in responding appropriately to usual work situations and to

changes in routine work settings. . (Tr. 25-26).

The ALJ considered the persuasiveness of PAC Vallejo’s and Dr. Kasprzak’s

opinions as follows:

The undersigned is not persuaded by the opinions of

Angela Vallejo, PAC, who opined the claimant with

restrictions of unable to focus, speak to customers, or

communicate with coworkers, which is inconsistent with the

findings on examination (Ex. 9F/2). The opinions are

inconsistent with the objective medical record evidence

showing stable mental status examinations.

The undersigned is partially persuaded by the opinions

of Cheryl Kasprzak, Psy.D., who opined the claimant with no

more than mild limitations in ability to understand, remember,

and carry out instructions and no limitations in interacting with

the public, supervisors, and coworkers, which is supported by

the findings on examination and a lack of mental health

treatment (Ex. 12F). However, Dr. Kasprzak opined the

claimant with mild to moderate limitations in responding

appropriately to usual work situations and changes in routine

work setting, which is not supported by the findings on

examination of adequate insight and judgment and prior stable

mental status examinations and lack of treatment since 2018.

(Tr. 28). The ALJ thoroughly considered the medical opinions concerning Plaintiff’s

mental health impairments. The ALJ found PAC Vallejo’s opinion that Plaintiff was

unable to focus, speak to customers, or communicate with coworkers unpersuasive

and supported that determination by findings the objective medical records showed

stable mental status examinations. (Tr 28). The ALJ also found Dr. Kasprzak’s

opinion partially persuasive, but found her opinion that Plaintiff had mild to

moderate limitations in responding appropriately to usual work situations and

changes in routine work settings unpersuasive as it was not supported by the findings

on examination of adequate insight and judgment, prior stable mental status

examinations, and lack of treatment since 2018. (Tr. 28). The ALJ thoroughly

considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments and provided good reasons why he

determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were medically determinable but not

severe.

The ALJ also considered the four broad functional areas of the “paragraph B”

criteria set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders and in

section 12.00C of the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. (Tr. 26). The ALJ found Plaintiff had mild limitations in all four

functional areas: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)

interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4)

adapting or managing oneself. (Tr. 26-27). To support these findings, the ALJ cited

medical records, including records from 2018 and Dr. Kasprzak’s evaluation. (Tr.

26). The ALJ also relied on the state agency physicians who opined that Plaintiff had

no severe mental impairments and no mental limitations. (Tr. 28). And the ALJ

considered Plaintiff’s daily activities, such as driving, preparing simple meals,

washing dishes, taking out the trash, doing laundry, light cleaning, watching

television, shopping, paying bills, handling banking accounts, swimming, and

socializing to find Plaintiff’s mental impairments non-severe. (Tr. 26).

From the medical evidence, the four broad functional areas, and Plaintiff’s

daily activities, the ALJ supported his determination that Plaintiff’s medically

determinable mental impairments caused no more than minimal limitations in

Plaintiff’s ability to do basic work activities and therefore did not meet the step two

threshold for severe impairments. The ALJ also advanced good reasons to find PAC

Vallejo’s opinion unpersuasive and Dr. Kasprzak’s opinion partially persuasive.

Moreover, the Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.

Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). Even if the evidence preponderates

against the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner’s decision. Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5

F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021).* Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

decision.

II. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the decision of the

Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standard. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The

Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion, terminate

all deadlines, and close the case.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 7, 2022.

none N. ROGIER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

? Plaintiff mentions that an ALJ must consider a claimant’s impairments in combination and a

failure to so do is error warranting remand. (Doc. 22, p. 26). Plaintiff does not assert any further

argument on this issue and it is therefore waived. . See Outlaw v. Barnhart, 197 F. App’x 825, 828

n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding claimant waived issue because he did not elaborate on claim or

provide citation to authority regarding claim). In any event, the ALJ thoroughly considered both

Plaintiff's physical and mental impairments in combination in the opinion. (Tr. 24-28).