The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
RONALD HOROWITZ,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:22-cv-119-MMH-PDB
v.
MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL
SERVICES USA LLC,
Defendant.
/
O R D E R
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (Doc. 2; Motion) filed on February 3, 2022. Simultaneously
with the Motion, Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint and
Request for Injunction (Doc. 1; Complaint). In the Motion, Plaintiff seeks the
entry of a temporary restraining order restraining Defendant from repossessing
his vehicle, a 2019 Mercedes-Benz E450. Upon review, the Motion is due to be
denied.
Generally, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.
1998); see also Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1300
(11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, “[a] preliminary injunction is a powerful exercise of
judicial authority in advance of trial.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir.
1990). Thus, in order to grant a request for preliminary injunctive relief, the
movant bears the burden to clearly establish the following:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction were not
granted, (3) that the threatened injury to the [movant] outweighs
the harm an injunction may cause the [opposing party], and (4)
that granting the injunction would not disserve the public interest.
Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir.
1998); see also Davidoff & CIE, S.A., 263 F.3d at 1300; McDonald’s Corp., 147
F.3d at 1306; Ne. Fla., 896 F.2d at 1284-85. The movant, at all times, bears the
burden of persuasion as to each of these four requirements. See Ne. Fla., 896
F.2d at 1285. And the failure to establish an element will warrant denial of the
request for preliminary injunctive relief and obviate the need to discuss the
remaining elements. See Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994)); Del
Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1339 n.7 (S.D.
Fla. 2001).1
1 “[T]he four criteria for obtaining a preliminary injunction are identical to those for
issuance of a temporary restraining order . . . .” See Windsor v. United States, 379 F. App'x
912, 916–17 (11th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff is not entitled to the drastic and extraordinary relief he seeks.
Plainly, the threatened repossession does not rise to the level of irreparable
harm necessary for the issuance of a temporary restraining order as any harm
caused by repossession would be compensable through money damages.2 See
Ne. Fla., 896 F.2d at 1285 (“An injury is ‘irreparable’ only if it cannot be undone
through monetary remedies.”). The Court could deny the Motion for this reason
alone. See id. (“A showing of irreparable harm is ‘the sine qua non of injunctive
relief.’” (quoting Frejlach v. Butler, 573 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 1978))).
However, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits in that the Complaint does not set forth any
discernible cause of action.3 As such, denial is warranted for this reason as well.
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Controlling precedent is clear that injunctive relief may not be granted unless
2 Plaintiff argues that the harm will be “significant, if not devastating” because he uses
the vehicle for “a variety [of] needs,” including “periodically to visit his children,” and “to attend
various functions of non-profit corps to which Plaintiff sits on its boards.” See Motion at 5.
According to Plaintiff, it will be difficult for him to obtain another vehicle if a repossession is
reported on his credit history. These arguments are frivolous. The inconvenience of not being
able to drive his car to attend a board meeting or visit his children does not warrant the
extraordinary relief of a temporary restraining order. Regardless, Plaintiff does not address
why he would be unable to rent a car or use public transportation to attend to his needs.
3 Plaintiff identifies the “Federal Credit Reporting Act” in the Complaint as a basis for
this Court’s jurisdiction, see Complaint at 2, and refers to a “claim under 15 USC 1681” in the
Motion, see Motion at 1, but no such claim is pled in the Complaint. Although the Complaint
includes a list of factual allegations, it does not set forth any counts or causes of action. While
pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney,
Plaintiff identifies himself as a retired attorney.
the plaintiff establishes the substantial likelihood of success criterion.”).4 In
light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of
establishing an entitlement to a temporary restraining order and the Motion is
due to be denied.® Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 4th day of
February, 2022.
MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge
4 The Court’s identification of certain deficiencies in the instant Motion is intended to
cite only examples and should not be interpreted as determining whether all other
requirements have been satisfied. For example, Plaintiff also fails to verify the Complaint or
submit affidavits in support of the requested relief. See Rule 65(b)(1)(A), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rule(s)); Local Rule 6.01(a)(2)-(8), United States District Court, Middle District of
Florida (Local Rule(s)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
5 As noted above, Plaintiff identifies himself as a retired lawyer who “was [and] still is
admitted to the bars of’ New Jersey, New York, and Florida. See Complaint at 6. As such,
the Court takes this opportunity to remind Plaintiff that even as a pro se litigant, he is still
subject to the requirements of Rule 11. Rule 11 authorizes the imposition of sanctions on a
litigant if he files a pleading, written motion, or other paper for “any improper purpose, such
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” See Rule
11(b)(1), (c)1). In addition, to avoid Rule 11 sanctions, a litigant's claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions must be, to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief,
“warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.” See Rule 11(b)(2). Given that Plaintiff allegedly
practiced law for over thirty years, the Court questions whether he could have filed the instant
Motion in keeping with his obligations under Rule 11. Plaintiff is cautioned that the filing of
any future emergency motions without a good faith basis in law and fact to seek such relief
may result in the imposition of sanctions.
lc11
Copies to:
Pro Se Parties