Collins v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

TONI COLLINS o/b/o L.R.,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE No. 8:20-cv-1419-T-SPF

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1

Acting Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

ORDER

Plaintiff Toni Collins, as parental great aunt and legal guardian of L.R. (“Claimant”),

seeks judicial review of the denial of her claim for child’s Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”). In addition to the arguments the parties advance in their Joint Memorandum (Doc.

25), before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

in light of medical evidence Plaintiff submitted to the Court for the first time (Doc. 26). The

Commissioner opposes the motion (Doc. 30). As the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

decision was based on substantial evidence and employed the proper legal standards, and the

new evidence Plaintiff submitted to the Court does not compel remand under sentence six,

the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

1 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021 and is

substituted as Defendant in this suit pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on Claimant’s behalf on April 19, 2017 (Tr. 194-

203).2 The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claims both initially and upon reconsideration

(Tr. 80-89, 91-102, 104-06, 110-15). Plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing (Tr.

116-18). Per Plaintiff’s request, the ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff and Claimant

appeared and testified (Tr. 41-79). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding

Claimant not disabled and accordingly denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits (Tr. 20-34).

Subsequently, Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council (“AC”), which the AC

denied (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint with this Court (Doc. 1). The case is

now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

II. Factual Background and the ALJ’s Decision

Claimant, who was born in 2006, claimed disability beginning on August 25, 2010 (Tr.

20, 23) Claimant was a school-aged child on the date the application was filed and at the time

of the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 23). Plaintiff alleged Claimant is disabled due to a learning

disability, developmental delays, emotional issues, and anger problems (Tr. 227). After

conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ determined that Claimant

had not engaged in substantial activity since April 19, 2017, the application date (Tr. 23). The

ALJ then determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: asthma, a learning

disability, and a neurodevelopmental disorder (Id.). Notwithstanding the noted impairments,

the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

2 All references to “Tr.” refer to the transcript and page numbers of the Social Security

administrative record filed on March 8, 2021 (Doc. 22).

met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1 (the “Listings”) (Tr. 24). The ALJ further found that Claimant did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equaled a Listing (Id.). In

making this determination, the ALJ concluded that Claimant had less than marked

limitations in the domains of acquiring and using information, attending and completing

tasks, interacting and relating with others, and caring for oneself, and no limitation in the

domains of moving about and manipulating objects and health and physical well-being (Tr.

27-33). Accordingly, the ALJ found Claimant not disabled (Tr. 34).

III. Legal Standard

An individual younger than the age of eighteen is considered disabled if he or she has

a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that results in marked and severe

functional limitations and that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be

expected to last, for at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i).

Child disability claims are assessed under a three-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.924(a). Under this process, the ALJ must determine, in sequence, the following: (1)

whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has

a severe impairment or combination of severe impairments; and (3) whether the claimant’s

impairment or combination of impairments “causes marked and severe functional

limitations” for the child. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). A child’s impairment is recognized as

causing marked and severe functional limitations if the impairments meets, medically equals,

or functionally equals the severity of a Listing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a), (d).

To “meet” a Listing, a child must suffer from the limitations specified in the Listings.

Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2004). To

“medically equal” the limitations found in the Listings, the child’s limitations must be “at

least of equal medical significance to those of a listing impairment.” Id. at 1279 (citing 20

C.F.R. § 416.926(a)(2)). Alternatively, if a child’s impairment does not meet or medically

equal a Listing, a child may be found disabled if the child’s impairment “functionally equals”

a Listing, which is determined by the extent to which the impairment limits the child’s ability

to function in the following six domains of life: (1) acquiring and using information; (2)

attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and

manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi).

A child’s limitations “functionally equal” those in the Listings, and thus constitute a

disability, if the child’s limitations are “marked” in two of the six domains or are “extreme”

in one. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). A child’s limitation is “marked” when it is “more than

moderate” but “less than extreme.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). A marked limitation

“interferes seriously” with a child’s “ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete

activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). An “extreme” limitation is a limitation that is

“more than marked” and “interferes very seriously with [the child’s] ability to independently

initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i).

A determination by the Commissioner that a child is not disabled must be upheld if it

is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable legal standards. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). While the court reviews

the Commissioner’s decision with deference to the factual findings, no such deference is given

to the legal conclusions. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th

Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not re-weigh the evidence or

substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even if it finds that the evidence preponderates

against the ALJ’s decision. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). The

Commissioner’s failure to apply the correct law, or to give the reviewing court sufficient

reasoning for determining that he or she has conducted the proper legal analysis, mandates

reversal. Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066. The scope of review is thus limited to determining whether

the findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal

standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2002).

IV. Analysis

In her portion of the Joint Memorandum (Doc. 25), Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s

determination that Claimant’s impairments do not functionally equal a Listing, contending

the ALJ erred in finding Claimant has less than marked limitations in the domains of

acquiring and using information and interacting and relating to others. In her motion to

remand (Doc. 26), Plaintiff points to evidence obtained after Claimant’s administrative

proceedings concluded. According to Plaintiff, this new evidence undermines the ALJ’s

findings. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s arguments lack merit.

A. Sentence Six Remand

Plaintiff argues a sentence six remand is necessary for the Commissioner to reassess

Claimant’s application in light of a consultative evaluation performed by clinical psychologist

Shelley Ochs, Psy.D. on November 7, 2020 (after the AC’s denial became final), which

Plaintiff submitted to the Court for the first time (Doc. 26, 26-1). According to the

Commissioner, Plaintiff abandoned any argument for a sentence six remand because she did

not advance this argument in the Joint Memorandum (Doc. 30).3 The Commissioner also

argues the November 2020 evaluation is cumulative and immaterial.

Sentence six of § 405(g) permits a district court to remand an application for benefits

to the Commissioner for consideration of new evidence that previously was unavailable. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). “[A] sentence six remand is available when evidence not presented to the

Commissioner at any stage of the administrative process requires further review.” Ingram v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). The “sole means for a district court

to remand to the Commissioner to consider new evidence presented for the first time in the

district court” is when a plaintiff shows that the new evidence in non-cumulative, material,

and that good cause exists for failing to submit the evidence at the administrative level. Id. at

1267; see also Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted) (to prevail on claim of remand under sentence six, claimant must show (1) new, non-

3 The Court does not address this argument and instead denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand

on the merits.

cumulative evidence; (2) that is material, that is, relevant and probative so there is reasonable

possibility it would change administrative results; and (3) there is good cause for failure to

submit evidence at the administrative hearing); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).4

The new evidence must relate to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision.

Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999); Enix v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 461 F. App’x

861 (11th Cir. 2012). Evidence that a condition the ALJ previously considered has

deteriorated may entitle a claimant to benefits under a new application, but it is not probative

of whether a person is disabled during the specific period under review. Wilson, 179 F.3d at

1279; see also Griffin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 723 F. App’x 855, 858 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding

MRI report prepared four months after ALJ’s decision not chronologically relevant or

material as there was no indication report related back to the relevant time). In contrast,

evidence of a condition that existed prior to the ALJ’s hearing, but was not discovered until

afterward, is new and non-cumulative. See Vega, 265 F.3d at 1218-19 (granting motion to

remand based on evidence that after the ALJ’s hearing a doctor discovered and surgically

corrected a herniated disc).

Here, Plaintiff has not shown that Dr. Ochs’s report meets the evidentiary standard for

a sentence six remand. In May 2017 (one month after Plaintiff’s application), licensed

psychologist Lawrence Pasman, Ph.D. met with then-11-year-old Claimant for a consultative

examination at the agency’s request (Tr. 391-403). Dr. Pasman conducted a clinical

interview, a mental status examination, and administered both the Wechsler Intelligence

4 Here, Plaintiff meets the third requirement because Dr. Ochs’s report did not exist until after

the administrative proceedings concluded. See Vega, 265 F.3d at 1218-19.

Scale for Children Test and the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement. Plaintiff told Dr.

Pasman she was concerned about Claimant’s “learning problems . . . anger . . . depression . .

. can’t sit still.” (Tr. 392) She worried Claimant suffered from Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity

Disorder (“ADHD”), although he had not been diagnosed and had no previous mental health

treatment (Id.).

Dr. Pasman observed Claimant’s “incessant movement,” reporting he “exhibits a

heightened degree of restlessness and fidgeting behavior. . . . [he] remains in his seat, yet he

continuously squirms.” (Tr. 393). Testing revealed Claimant had a full-scale IQ in the very

low range, low average processing speed, and very low working memory. His nonverbal,

general ability, and cognitive proficiency index scores were in the very low range, and

Claimant’s ability to pay attention and concentrate on tasks was worse than most children his

age (Tr. 394, 402). Dr. Pasman concluded:

The testing is likely an underestimate of [Claimant’s] true functioning due to

probable [ADHD]. There is a degree of intratest scatter on several of the

intellectual and achievement subtests; such a pattern of responding

inconsistently to test stimuli is not uncommon among individuals with ADHD.

He appears to struggle considerably in the area of reading, suggesting the likely

presence of a Specific Learning Disorder. It is certainly conceivable that some

of this child’s reported “anger” and “depression” are due to academic

frustrations. His prognosis appears to be guarded, although he has yet to

receive any psychiatric or psychological intervention.

(Tr. 403).

The ALJ found Dr. Pasman’s opinions persuasive (Tr. 27) and factored them into his

analysis of whether Claimant’s impairments functionally equal a Listing (discussed in more

detail in the next section). Once the AC denied review of the ALJ’s decision in April 2020,

Plaintiff filed a new application on Claimant’s behalf. At that point, the agency ordered a

second consultative psychological evaluation of Claimant, performed by Dr. Ochs in

November 2020 (Doc. 26-1).5 Plaintiff attaches Dr. Ochs’s report to her motion to remand

and contends it constitutes new, material evidence.

Dr. Ochs conducted a clinical interview and mental status examination of now-14-

year-old Claimant and administered the same tests as Dr. Pasman. Again, Plaintiff expressed

concern about Claimant’s probable ADHD but relayed he was not on any psychotropic

medication and had no mental health treatment history (Id. at 3). Like Dr. Pasman, Dr. Ochs

observed that Plaintiff was “constantly moving,” “not listening to the examiner,” “fidgets

with his hands and feet,” “constantly taps his pencil,” makes “careless errors,” and “loses

focus easily.” (Id. at 4).

Comparing Dr. Pasman’s and Dr. Ochs’s results, Claimant’s verbal comprehension,

visual spatial, and fluid reasoning scores improved in the latter evaluation as did his full-scale

IQ (although he still tested in the very low range) (Id. at 5-6). Claimant’s processing speed

score dropped from low average to extremely low, and his working memory score remained

very low (Id.). Additionally, Dr. Ochs’s results indicate Claimant’s general ability index score

increased from very low to average while his cognitive proficiency index score decreased from

very low to extremely low (Id.). Dr. Ochs also noted deficits in Claimant’s concentration,

persistence, or pace (as did Dr. Pasman). Dr. Ochs concluded:

There is strong support for the presence of [ADHD], Specific Learning

Disorders, and Depressive Disorder. Consistent with his previous evaluation,

[Claimant] exhibits major attention and learning problems which impair his

functioning. In addition, he seems to be experiencing a form of depression.

Current test results indicated average general intelligence and very limited

5 As of the filing of Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Claimant was awaiting an administrative

hearing on the second application.

reading, math, and writing skills, far below expected age and grade levels.

Based on the findings of this assessment, [Claimant] requires intensive

intervention and treatment to address multiple deficits across settings. Medical

and therapeutic follow-up is recommended. Therefore, [Claimant’s] prognosis

is guarded.

(Id. at 13).

Plaintiff has not shown that Dr. Ochs’s report is new and non-cumulative. Although

Dr. Ochs authored her evaluation after the ALJ rendered his decision and after the AC denied

Plaintiff’s appeal, there is similar evidence in the record from Dr. Pasman. Plaintiff contends

Dr. Ochs’s report is “non-cumulative because it indicates a greater severity than earlier

generated medical evidence, upon with the [ALJ] relied” (Doc. 26 at 4). But Plaintiff does

not point to any specific test result, just that the “test results tend to explain why the claimant

manifested marked to extreme difficulty with acquiring information, attending to and

completing tasks, and interacting and related with others[.]” (Id. at 1). The two psychologists

administered the same tests to Claimant and pinpointed similar intellectual weaknesses (with

the variation explained above). If anything, Dr. Ochs’s report suggests that between Dr.

Pasman’s evaluation in May 2017, and Dr. Ochs’s report in November 2020, Claimant

developed the depression symptoms Dr. Pasman warned about if Claimant did not get

psychological intervention. In fact, Dr. Ochs adds a diagnosis that was not present when Dr.

Pasman evaluated Claimant. Her report states: “Consistent with his previous evaluation,

[Claimant] exhibits major attention and learning problems which impair his functioning. In

addition, he seems to be experiencing a form of depression.” (Doc. 26-1 at 13) (emphasis

added); see Wilson, 179 F.3d at 1279 (evidence that a previously considered condition has

deteriorated is not probative of whether claimant was disabled during the relevant period).

Neither has Plaintiff demonstrated that Dr. Ochs’s evaluation is material. “To be

material, the evidence must be relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable probability

that it would change the administrative outcome.” Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th

Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).6 Dr. Pasman’s report was only part of the ALJ’s overall

determination that Claimant’s impairments did not functionally equal a Listing. As discussed

in the next section, the ALJ also relied on Claimant’s testimony, his school records, treatment

notes from pediatric well exams, and evidence from state agency consultants Michael Plasay,

Ph.D., Lee Reback, Psy.D., and Gerald Sokol, M.D., who opined that Claimant had less than

marked limitations in his ability to acquire and use information, attend and complete tasks,

interact with others, and care for himself (Tr. 26). Plaintiff does not show how Dr. Ochs’s

report would change this analysis. Although Claimant tested worse in working memory and

processing speeds and his cognitive proficiency index score decreased from Dr. Pasman’s

report to Dr. Ochs’s, he tested higher in other areas, including a small increase in his full-scale

IQ.7 Plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied.

6 The Court is mindful that “[when] determining whether to remand a case to the

[Commissioner] for consideration of new evidence, the mere statement by the

[Commissioner] that the new evidence would not ultimately change the decision cannot be

accorded any weight since the statement concerning the materiality of the evidence not in the

certified administrative record is advisory at best.” Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877 (citing Cherry v.

Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir. 1985)). The court must accept as valid the new

evidence in deciding whether it is material. Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 806 F.3d 1317,

1321-22 (11th Cir. 2015).

7 In the Eleventh Circuit, “IQ tests create a rebuttable presumption of a fairly constant IQ

throughout [a claimant’s] life.” Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).

B. Functional Equivalence / Acquiring and Using Information and

Interacting and Relating to Others

In the Joint Memorandum, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding Claimant has less

than marked limitations in acquiring and using information and interacting and relating to

others.8 After reviewing Claimant’s and Plaintiff’s testimony, Claimant’s school and medical

records, and the ALJ’s decision, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff’s impairments do not functionally equal a Listing.

The domain of acquiring and using information refers to how well a child can acquire

or learn information and how well a child uses the information he or she has learned. 20

C.F.R. § 416.926a(g); SSR 09-3p. This domain involves how well children perceive, think

about, remember, and use information in all settings, which includes daily activities at home,

at school, and in the community. Id. Examples of difficulty children could have in acquiring

and using information are: (1) does not understand words about space, size, or time; (2)

cannot rhyme words or the sounds in words; (3) has difficulty recalling important things

learned in school the day before; (4) does not use language appropriate for his or her age; (5)

is not developing readiness skills the same as peers (learning to count, reciting ABCs); (6) has

difficulty comprehending written or oral directions; (7) struggles with following simple

8 Plaintiff argues that, out of the six domains of life, Claimant has marked limitations in these

two (Doc. 25 at 13). In her motion to remand, however, Plaintiff appears to add the domain

of attending and completing tasks to this list (Doc. 26 at 1) but does not develop this argument.

Additionally, in the Joint Memorandum, Plaintiff emphasizes “recent evidence generated

after the opinions” relied on by the ALJ, which presumably is a reference to Dr. Ochs’s

evaluation (Doc. 25 at 13). As Dr. Ochs’s evaluation was not in the administrative record

and does not create a basis for remand, the Court does not consider it in its analysis of whether

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

instructions; (8) has difficulty solving mathematics questions or computing arithmetic

answers; or (9) talks only in short, simple sentences and has difficulty explaining what he or

she means. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(3).

The ALJ’s finding that Claimant has less than marked limitations in the domain of

acquiring and using information is supported by substantial evidence. During Dr. Pasman’s

evaluation, Claimant correctly added forward by 3s and spelled the word “world” backwards

without difficulty (Tr. 393). He counted backwards from 20 to 1 and recited the alphabet

“flawlessly.” (Id.). Claimant completed a three-step command (Tr. 394). On a writing test

Dr. Pasman administered, Claimant’s sentences were “typical (simple, but adequate).” (Tr.

401). And “[o]n an applied math problems test, [Claimant] solved initial problems with no

observed difficulty, but demonstrated increasing difficulties solving the latter items (typical).”

(Id.).

Regarding Claimant’s school performance, academic records show he had a 504 plan

that allowed him more time on tests, but he was placed in regular learning classrooms.

Plaintiff reported that Claimant repeated kindergarten (Tr. 232). In fourth grade (the 2016-

2017 school year), Claimant was below level in reading, writing, and math, but he earned As,

Bs, and Cs in science, social studies, art, music, and P.E. (Tr. 427) and was advanced to the

fifth grade. During the 2018-2019 school year (sixth grade), Claimant had low grades across

the board (including on standardized tests) and was retained for summer school but passed

language arts, reading, world history, and his elective class of career research (Tr. 271-74).

Claimant had excessive absences and tardies in math (his first period class) but did not attempt

tutoring or extra help offered at school (Tr. 50-51). Claimant testified he can read “easy

words” like “important” and “description” (Tr. 49) and spends a lot of time on the internet.

At well child visits to Blossom Pediatric Care in March 2016, April 2017, May 2017,

and October 2018, Plaintiff said she had no concerns about Claimant’s development or

learning (Tr. 291, 295, 474, 477), although this appears to be standard language on the

pediatrician’s treatment records. Nonetheless, Claimant’s pediatrician referred him to mental

health treatment in May 2016, but he did not obtain treatment and was not on any

medications (Tr. 25, 26, 232). Plaintiff confirmed that “he’s not being treated. I need help

for that. I need help to get him treated for these things.” (Tr. 61).

Additionally, at a neurological evaluation with pediatric neurologist Sergio Jacinto,

M.D. in December 2017, Claimant showed adequate attention and concentration (Tr. 430-

34). And non-examining state agency consultant Dr. Plasay opined in June 2017 at the initial

administrative level, after reviewing Plaintiff’s medical records and Dr. Pasman’s evaluation,

that Claimant had less than marked limitations in acquiring and using information, attending

and completing tasks, interacting and relating to others, and caring for himself (Tr. 84-86).

At the reconsideration level, Drs. Reback and Sokol confirmed these findings (Tr. 96-98). On

this record, the ALJ did not err in finding Claimant has less than marked limitations in

acquiring and using information.

Turning to the domain of interacting and relating to others, this domain refers to how

well a child can initiate and sustain emotional connections with others, develop and use the

language of the community, cooperate with others, comply with rules, respond to criticism,

and respect and take care of others’ possessions. 20 C.F.R. § 916.926a(i); SSR 09-5p.

Interacting and relating with others involves all aspects of social interaction at home, at

school, and in the community. Id. Examples of difficulty that children could have in this

domain are: (1) does not reach out to be picked up and held by caregiver; (2) has no close

friends, or all friends are older or younger than the child; (3) avoids or withdraws from people

he knows or is overly anxious or fearful of meeting new people or trying new experiences; (4)

has difficulty playing games or sports with rules; (5) has difficulty communicating with others;

or (6) has difficulty speaking intelligibly or with adequate fluency. 20 C.F.R. § 916.926a(i).

On the one hand, school records from Adams Middle School during the 2018-2019

school year show Plaintiff was regularly disruptive in class and shockingly disrespectful to

teachers, so much so that he was suspended multiple times, and Plaintiff transferred him to

Stewart Middle School under threat of expulsion (Tr. 64-65, 499-509). Plaintiff’s teachers at

Adams reported he would leave the classroom during class, scream profanities, and throw his

notebooks across the room (Tr. 499-509). In fact, Plaintiff testified that Claimant’s school

called her so often to pick him up after an outburst that she lost two jobs (Tr. 72).

On the other hand, Claimant admitted that “[a]t my old school I got in trouble[,]”

but testified that at his new school “I can now leave the classroom to take a break – so I won’t,

like, punch somebody or something.” (Tr. 57). Dr. Pasman observed in May 2017 that

Claimant “exhibits no difficulty in establishing and maintaining emotional rapport. This

child appears to be happy, and he responds favorably to positive reinforcement.” (Tr. 394).

He was “well-behaved and respectful throughout the evaluation.” (Tr. 402). And Plaintiff

completed a function report in April 2017 indicating Plaintiff’s ability to communicate is not

limited (Tr. 217). She reported Claimant gets along well with her but is disruptive in class

and struggles to keep friends due to anger issues (Tr. 220). But there is evidence he interacted

socially with peers: In July of 2017, Plaintiff took Claimant to the ER after he injured his

knee playing football with friends the day before (Tr. 417). In November 2018, at an

appointment at Shriner’s Hospitals for Children for hyperlipidemia, Claimant said he spent

most of his time outside playing basketball with his friends (Tr. 454). Claimant testified that

he likes P.E. because he talks to his friends and said he has a best friend of four years he sees

outside of school as well (Tr. 47-48).

On this record, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Claimant

had less than marked limitations in the domain of interacting and relating to others. The

undersigned reiterates that, when reviewing an ALJ’s decision, the Court’s job is to determine

whether the administrative record contains enough evidence to support the ALJ’s factual

findings. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, ___ U.S. ___; 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

“And whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such

evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. In other words, the Court is not permitted to reweigh

the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ even if it finds the evidence

preponderates against the ALJ’s decision. See Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239

(11th Cir. 1983).

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, after consideration, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 26) is DENIED.

2. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of the Defendant and close

the case.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on February 7, 2022.

Are

SEAN P. FLYNN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17