The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
FREDERICK E. ADDISON,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5:19-cv-121-BJD-PRL
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Respondents.
_______________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, Frederick E. Addison, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action pro se on March 4, 2019 (mailbox rule), by filing a Petition
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody
(Doc. 1; Petition). Petitioner challenges a state court (Citrus County) judgment
of conviction resulting from a violation of probation (VOP) charge. See Petition
at 8.
Petitioner raises one ground for relief: an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Id. at 5, 9. Respondents filed a response, conceding the Petition
is timely and the sole claim exhausted (Doc. 13; Petition Resp.).1 See Petition
1 The appendix will be cited as follows: “App. Ex.” followed by the exhibit’s
letter designation (A through X). Exhibit C spans two separate docket entries (Docs.
14-2 through 14-3), but it has been separately paginated. Thus, page numbers for Ex.
Resp. at 7, 9, 13. Petitioner did not file a reply, though the Court afforded him
an opportunity to do so. See Order (Doc. 6).
II. Governing Legal Principles
A. Habeas Standard
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a
state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “The
purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard
against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as
a means of error correction.” Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic &
Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Greene v.
Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As such, federal habeas review under § 2254 is
“‘greatly circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.’” Id. (quoting Hill v.
Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).
The first task of a federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits.
Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for its decision to
qualify as an adjudication on the merits. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
C are those stamped on the bottom of each page. Page numbers to other exhibits are
those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management system unless otherwise
specified.
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100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation, the district court should “‘look through’ the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide
a relevant rationale . . . . [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted
the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claim on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The burden of proof is high; “clear error will not suffice.” Virginia v. LeBlanc,
137 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017) (quoting Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316
(2015)). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless
rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.” § 2254(e)(1). As such, “AEDPA
erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims
have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013).
The AEDPA standard is meant to be difficult to surmount. Richter, 562
U.S. at 102. A habeas petitioner must demonstrate “the state court’s ruling ...
was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
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comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Meders v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335,
1349 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Meders v. Ford, 140 S. Ct. 394 (2019)
(alteration in original). A district court’s obligation is to “train its attention” on
the legal and factual basis for the state court’s ruling, not to “flyspeck the state
court order or grade it.” Id. (citing Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1191-92). A federal
district court must give appropriate deference to a state court decision on the
merits. Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Appropriate deference requires the court to
defer to the reasons articulated by the state if they are reasonable. Id.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Petition at 5. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per
curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a
person must show (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of
reasonable, professional assistance, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
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prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The prejudice prong
requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 695.
When a petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective, “[r]eviewing courts
apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was ‘within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of
Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689). When the “strong presumption” standard of Strickland is applied “in
tandem” with the highly deferential AEDPA standard, a review of the state
court’s determination as to the “performance” prong is afforded double
deference. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.
Accordingly, the question for a federal court is not whether trial counsel’s
performance was reasonable, but “whether there is any reasonable argument
that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. If there is “any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,”
a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying the claim. Id. As
such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
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III. Facts & Analysis
In 2009, Petitioner was charged by amended information with six counts:
burglary of a dwelling while armed (Count I); burglary of a dwelling – standard
dwelling (Count II); burglary of a conveyance (Count III); aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon (Count IV); grand theft (Count V); and battery (Count
VI).2 App. Ex. A at 11-13. As alleged, on March 13-14, 2019, Petitioner
remained in a dwelling co-owned by Melanie Weaver and Kassie Weaver,3
without their permission, while armed with a knife, and with intent to commit
an assault. Id. at 11. He also remained in Kassie Weaver’s car without her
permission with intent to commit theft. Id. Additionally, the amended
information alleged Petitioner threatened Kassie Weaver with a knife,
intentionally touched or struck her, and stole her computer. Id. at 12.
On October 5, 2009, Petitioner entered a plea of no contest to all counts,
and the state court sentenced him to ten years’ probation as a habitual felony
offender. App. Ex. B; Ex. C at 70-75. The armed burglary charge alone carried
a life sentence for Petitioner. App. Ex. B. Just over six years into his sentence,
2 The State dismissed the original information because the victim could not be
located and would not cooperate with the prosecution. App. Ex. C at 52, 57-58, 60;
App. Ex. U at 244.
3 Kassie Weaver was dating Petitioner at the time of the incident. App. Ex. U
at 244. Her first name is spelled differently throughout the record—as “Kassie,”
“Cassie,” and “Casey.” See, e.g., App. Ex. A at 11; App. Ex. C at 23-24, 32, 64, 81; App.
Ex. U at 234. It appears the correct spelling is “Kassie.” App. Ex. C at 39.
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Petitioner violated the terms of his probation by having tested positive for
cocaine. App. Ex. C at 114-15, 155, 183-84. Petitioner also admitted to selling
cocaine. Id. at 115. After a VOP hearing, the trial court adjudicated Petitioner
guilty, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to life in prison on the armed
burglary charge. Id. at 128, 130-34, 138, 155. Petitioner also was sentenced on
the other charges, the sentences of which were to run concurrently with his life
sentence. Id. at 141-53.
In his Petition before this Court, Petitioner asserts his attorney, Melissa
Pendergrass, failed “to depose and call [the] victim/witness to provide
mitigating testimony at [his VOP] hearing.” See Petition at 9. According to
Petitioner, the victim, Ms. Kassie Weaver, recanted her statement to police
and would have testified in his favor at the VOP hearing by acknowledging
that she had “conjured up the criminal allegations” against him in retaliation
for his infidelity. Id. at 9-10. Petitioner says he provided his attorney Ms.
Weaver’s name and address before his VOP hearing, but she (his attorney)
“made no attempt to locate [her].” Id. at 10, 11. Petitioner believes that had
Ms. Weaver testified at his VOP hearing, the judge would have “either
reinstated his probation or imposed a bottom of the guideline sentence.” Id. at
12. Petitioner contends his attorney’s deficiency prejudiced him because
“counsel could have used the testimony of Ms. Weaver to demonstrate . . . that
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the charged offenses for which he was placed on probation lacked veracity.” Id.
at 11.
Respondents counter that the trial court’s “detailed order,” entered after
an evidentiary hearing, was not contrary to established federal law and was
not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Petition Resp. at
15-16.
A review of the state-court record shows Petitioner raised this claim as
the sole ground in his motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). App. Ex. O. The state court
summarily denied the motion, App. Ex. P, and the Fifth District Court of
Appeal (Fifth DCA), in a per curiam opinion, reversed because the record did
not conclusively rebut Petitioner’s claim, App. Ex. S. The Fifth DCA directed
the state court to hold an evidentiary hearing on remand. Id. The state court
appointed counsel for Petitioner, App. Ex. T, and held an evidentiary hearing,
App. Ex. U.
At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner said Ms. Weaver would have
testified that “none of this never [sic] really took place” and that he and Ms.
Weaver were having “a domestic dispute” that day. Id. at 237. Ms. Weaver
testified at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 244. Ms. Weaver said she would have
testified as follows had she been called as a witness at the VOP hearing: “I
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think that he’s [Petitioner’s] a good person when he’s not on drugs”; “[h]e sticks
up for others”; “[h]e’s loyal . . . respectful . . . [and] funny.” Id. at 246-47. Ms.
Weaver also would have testified that she remained in contact with Petitioner
after the original charges were filed. Id. at 247. On cross-examination, Ms.
Weaver described Petitioner as “agitated,” “kinda mean,” and “aggressive”
when on drugs, and she believed he was under the influence of cocaine the
night of the subject incident in 2009. Id. at 248, 249-50.
Ms. Pendergrass testified at the evidentiary hearing that Petitioner
mentioned Ms. Weaver had written a letter in which her “story had changed,”
but Petitioner was not sure whether Ms. Weaver sent the letter to probation or
the prosecutor. Id. at 255. Ms. Pendergrass said she was “unable to locate” any
such letter after checking with probation and the prosecutor. Id. at 256. She
also said she did not have contact information for Ms. Weaver in her notes, and
she did not recall Petitioner asking her to subpoena Ms. Weaver for the VOP
hearing.4 Id. at 257, 258.
4 Notably, at the VOP hearing, Ms. Pendergrass mentioned to the judge that
Petitioner believed “there was a letter that was in the possession of Probation that
the victim had [written] recanting . . . the allegations.” App. Ex. C at 218. The
prosecutor did not recall hearing of such a letter, and said, “I do not recall [the
witness] ever denying the facts.” Id. at 217, 218. The judge looked through the
probation file at the hearing and announced, “I have looked through every letter cover
to cover, every entry, every piece of paper in that file. There is no such letter.” Id. at
219.
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At the evidentiary hearing, and after Ms. Weaver testified, the judge
asked Ms. Pendergrass questions suggesting he would not have been
persuaded differently had Ms. Weaver testified at the VOP hearing. First, the
judge asked, “The only issue [at the VOP hearing] was whether or not
[Petitioner] tested positive for cocaine?” Id. at 258-59. Ms. Pendergrass
responded affirmatively. Id. at 259. Second, after Ms. Pendergrass summarized
what Petitioner’s argument would have been had Ms. Weaver testified at the
VOP hearing, the judge asked Ms. Pendergrass, “Was it your analysis that
[Petitioner] had already received a below guidelines disposition from [the
prosecutor] on a negotiated plea likely because of Ms. [K]assie Weaver?” Id.
Ms. Pendergrass again responded affirmatively. Third, the judge asked Ms.
Pendergrass whether she heard Ms. Weaver’s testimony—offered just before
Ms. Pendergrass’s own—that she (Ms. Weaver) believed Petitioner was
agitated, on a scale of seven out of ten, when under the influence of cocaine. Id.
260. Ms. Pendergrass again responded affirmatively. Id.
The court denied Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion. App. Ex. U at 268; App.
Ex. V. The Fifth DCA affirmed the decision without opinion. App. Ex. Y. Under
Wilson, this Court presumes the Fifth DCA adopted the reasoning of the trial
court. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. As such, the Court will “look through”
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the unexplained opinion to the postconviction court’s order on Petitioner’s Rule
3.850 Motion. Id.5
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the judge told Petitioner,
“[I]t is absolutely inconceivable that there would have been any relevance or
… materiality to … [K]assie Weaver coming into the [VOP] sentencing”
because Ms. Pendergrass had no recollection of Petitioner asking that she
arrange for Ms. Weaver to testify, Ms. Pendergrass arranged for two probation
officers to testify, which was “far more probative,” and Petitioner lied to the
probation officer who administered the drug test, telling her he only sold
cocaine but did not himself use it. App. Ex. U at 266. The judge also said:
I wouldn’t care if [Ms. Weaver] came in and threw
herself on the floor crying for your release saying it
was all lies, that all this stuff was lies. She never said
it was a lie. She said when you’re not on cocaine, you’re
a decent person, but when you’re on cocaine, you’re
agitated on the scale of one to ten at a seven.
Id. at 267. The judge orally denied Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 268.
In his written order, the judge set forth the applicable two-prong
Strickland test, App. Ex. V at 2-3, 5,6 and found Ms. Pendergrass, who was
5 In looking through the appellate court’s per curiam affirmance to the circuit
court’s “relevant rationale,” the Court presumes the appellate court “adopted the
same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1194.
6 Page numbers for exhibit V are those at the bottom, center of each page, not
those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management system.
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“qualified as an expert in criminal law,” id. at 4, was not ineffective for failing
to call Ms. Weaver as a witness, id. at 5. After summarizing the testimony
offered at the evidentiary hearing, the court explained:
The [Petitioner] advised Ms. Pendergrass of the
possible existence of a letter that neither he nor his
attorney had; and he never requested his attorney to
contact her as a potential witness. Moreover, the
[Petitioner] has failed to demonstrate Ms. Weaver’s
testimony would have changed the outcome of his VOP
hearing.
Id.
Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, the Court
concludes the state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s claim was neither
contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland, and it is not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As such, under AEDPA’s deferential
standard, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
2. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
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4, If Petitioner appeals the denial of his Petition, the Court denies
a certificate of appealability.’ The Clerk shall terminate from the pending
motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed
in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 23rd day of
December 2021.
fy YQ:
fo ( L eh
BRIAN/J . DAVIS
United States District Judge
Jax-6 12/23
C: Frederick Addison
Counsel of Record
7 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner
makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
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