Beale v. Clearwater Compliance LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

CHARLES BEALE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:20-cv-2210-VMC-CPT

CLEARWATER COMPLIANCE LLC,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of

Defendant Clearwater Compliance LLC’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. # 40), filed on August 30, 2021. Plaintiff

Charles Beale responded on September 27, 2021. (Doc. # 55).

Clearwater replied on October 20, 2021. (Doc. # 58). For the

reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

Charles Beale was diagnosed with dyslexia at a young age

by the Broward County School Board. (Doc. # 52 at 5). Because

of his dyslexia, it takes Beale “longer to read and assimilate

information” than an individual without dyslexia might. (Pl.

Dep. Doc. # 44-1 at 136:23-24). Beale’s dyslexia also causes

letters and other characters to appear to him as reversed,

which in turn creates difficulty in maintaining his reading

pace. (Id. at 153:19-23). Before working for Clearwater,

Beale worked in the healthcare sales industry for fourteen

years, where he earned several awards and recognitions for

sales positions at other companies. (Doc. # 46-1 at 1-5). The

resume he provided Clearwater showed that Beale had

experience with maintaining sales quotas and generating new

business for prior employers. (Id.; Pl. Dep. Doc. # 44-1 at

114:13-14).

Beale began working for Clearwater1 on February 11, 2019

as a Senior Sales Director for Regional Accounts. (Doc. # 44-

1 at 101:19-21; Doc. # 54 at ¶ 2). He was one of several

individuals hired by Clearwater for a Senior Sales Director

position between February and May 2019. (Doc. # 42-1 at ¶ 9).

Beale was specifically hired to manage the Gulf Coast

Territory, encompassing Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and

Louisiana. (Doc. # 54 at ¶ 2).

Before starting with Clearwater’s sales team, Beale

interviewed several times with three Clearwater

representatives: Dan Pruyn, a Senior Vice President and Chief

Sales Officer; Barry Mathis, a Senior Vice President and Chief

1 Clearwater provides enterprise cyber risk management and

HIPAA compliance solutions to the healthcare industry. (Doc.

# 41-1 at ¶ 3).

Business Development Officer; and Steve Cagle, Chief

Executive Officer. (Pl. Dep. Doc. # 44-1 at 104:3-5; 104:19-

22; 116:5-9). Throughout his interviews, Beale shared that he

had been diagnosed with dyslexia. (Id. at 105:15-18; 110:10-

13; 118:25-119:2). He informed these Clearwater

representatives that, even with his dyslexia, he went on to

attain higher education and other sales positions throughout

his life. (Id. at 105:15-24; 105:15-18; 110:10-13; 118:25-

119:2;). Beale went as far as to indicate that he “overcame”

his dyslexia with the assistance of special computer fonts

and frequent reading. (Id. at 105:8-24; 106: 4-6; 106:13-24;

110:10-111:2). Clearwater ultimately hired Beale, who began

his employment on February 11, 2019. (Doc. # 54 at ¶¶ 2, 4).

All Senior Sales Directors were required to meet one

hundred percent of the sales quota that Clearwater assigned

them. (Doc. # 43-1 at 2). With his offer of employment, Beale

received a copy Clearwater’s Business Development Commission

Plan that specifically advised that sales employees were

expected to attain one hundred percent of their quota. (Doc.

# 41-1 at ¶ 9; Doc. # 43-1 at 2; Doc. # 40 at ¶ 17; Doc. # 55

at ¶ 17). The Plan also included a notice that failing to

meet one’s assigned quota on a “frequent or consistent bases

“could result in the employee’s termination. (Doc. # 43-1 at

2). As a Senior Sales Director, Beale was expected to

“consistently meet or exceed sales goals while ensuring high

customer satisfaction throughout the sales.” (Doc. # 44-1 at

¶ 8; Doc. # 46-1 at 6-10). Beale was also tasked with building

and maintaining a sales pipeline to achieve his assigned

quota, just as he did in prior sales positions. (Doc. # 46-1

at 6-10). All Senior Sales Directors were also expected to

obtain new accounts for their assigned territories to achieve

their sales quotas. (Id.; Doc. # 59 at ¶ 4).

At some time during his employment with Clearwater,

Beale added the phrase “Dyslexia Awareness” to his email

signature block. (Pl. Dep. II Doc. # 45-1 at 7:8:21). Only

one email submitted into the record, dated April 24, 2019,

reflects the “Dyslexia Awareness” signature block; the email

appears to have been directed to an individual unaffiliated

with Clearwater regarding Beale’s registration for a summit.

(Doc. # 53-4). Beale asserts that Clearwater human resources

representative Elaine Axum verbally told him remove this

phrase from his signature block after seeing the email. (Id.

at 11:14-16). Ms. Axum denies seeing the email and instructing

Beale to remove the phrase from his signature block. (Axum

Dep. Doc. # 49-1 at 11:19-12:8).

Following his first quarter of employment, the parties

dispute whether Beale’s performance record was satisfactory

in light of the one hundred percent sales quota he was

assigned. (Doc. # 41-1 at ¶¶ 13-14; Doc. # 54 at ¶¶ 6-13).

Beale recounts that his supervisor and Clearwater’s CEO

consistently told him that he was performing adequately since

starting with Clearwater. (Doc. # 54 at ¶¶ 6-13). Beale did

not recall ever being counseled, placed on a performance

improvement plan, or being advised that he might be facing

termination. (Pl. Dep. II Doc. # 45-1 at 37:15-38:3). Beale,

along with the entire Clearwater sales team, were even

recognized in a company periodical for their respective

accomplishments. (Doc. # 52 at 32-33). Beale also insists

that Clearwater had promised to transfer certain high-volume

accounts over to him within his first ninety days of

employment, which would have significantly aided his sales

quota and pipeline metrics if Clearwater had followed

through. (Doc. # 54 at ¶¶ 4-6).

In contrast, Clearwater maintains that Beale was

terminated for “fail[ing] to achieve his requisite quota, his

deficiencies in building his sales pipeline and the low scores

received on the 10-P[oin]t Certification, Industry Trend

Story Board Presentation and QBR evaluation.” (Doc. # 41-1 at

¶ 26). Clearwater noted that Beale consistently failed to

meet the one hundred percent quota required of all Clearwater

sales employees as outlined in the Business Development

Commission Plan. (Id. at ¶ 13; Doc. # 43-1 at 2; Doc. # 43-2

at 2). Yet, in his second quarter (and first full quarter

upon commencement of his employment), Beale only satisfied

fifty-seven percent of his sales quota established by

Clearwater. (Doc. # 43-2 at 3). The following quarter, Beale

achieved only twenty-five percent of his sales quota. (Id.).

Mr. Pruyn also observed that Beale had the lowest “pipeline

health percentage” of all sales representatives. (Doc. # 41-

1 at ¶ 24; Doc. # 43-2 at 2-3).

Clearwater also conducted several assessments that

confirmed Beale’s performance in his Senior Sales Director

position. For instance, Beale scored below-passing marks on

a 10-Point Certification Sales Assessment — a “tool used to

discover customers’ business needs.” (Id. at ¶ 14; Doc. # 46-

1 at 67). Beale failed to obtain a passing score on any of

the five competency areas tested by this assessment. (Doc. #

46-1 at 67). Mr. Pruyn again observed that Beale “was one of

the lowest scoring Sales Representatives” on an Industry

Trend Story Board Presentation. (Id. at ¶ 16; Doc. # 43-3 at

2-5). This presentation was designed to evaluate a sales

representative’s knowledge of Clearwater’s market subject

matter, as well as their ability to present Clearwater’s

solutions and services. (Doc. # 41-1 at ¶ 16.). The Story

Board assessment results show Beale had the seventh highest

percentage of the nine sales employees who were assessed.

(Doc. # 43-3 at 2-4). Beale did not request an accommodation

for the 10-Point Certification Assessment or the Story Board

Presentation, nor did he advise Clearwater that his

performance on the assessments was related to his dyslexia.

(Doc. # 40 at ¶¶ 19; Doc. # 55 at ¶¶ 19, 21).

On August 9, 2019, Clearwater conducted a separate

assessment: the PREVUE assessment. (Doc. # 42-1 at ¶ 10).

Rather than assessing an employee’s job performance or

knowledge of position-related subject matter, Clearwater used

the PREVUE assessment to evaluate sales employees’

personalities, interests, and motivations. (Id. at ¶ 11). The

assessment results were to be used as a baseline for future

hiring decisions, as well assist managers with better

understanding how to oversee their employees based on their

personality types. (Id.; Axum Dep. Doc. # 49-1 at 26:5-13).

While the PREVUE assessment consisted of timed and untimed

sections, completion time did not factor into an employee’s

results. (Axum Dep. Doc. # 49-1 at 26:19-21). Beale in turn

was never told that the PREVUE assessment related to his job

performance. (Doc. # 44-1 at 165:8-11). After completing the

PREVUE assessment on August 12, 2019, Beale sent Mr. Pruyn an

email stating, “I finished the Prevue Assessment this

morning. Some parts I was slower at because of my dyslexia.

Does the assessment account for instances like this?” (Doc.

# 43-4 at 2). Beale did not receive a response to his inquiry.

(Doc. # 54 at ¶ 16).

In late Summer 2019, Clearwater began a new performance

review process titled the “Quarterly Business Review”

(“QBR”). (Doc. # 41-1 at ¶ 21). The QBR consisted of having

sales employees and their supervisors each performing a

subjective assessment of the employees’ performance and was

followed by an individual meeting between the employee and

their supervisor to discuss their results. (Id.). Each then

numerically assessed the employees’ performance between one

and four in several categories, such as “time management

skills, written communication skills, pipeline development,

and consistent application of Clearwater’s sales process.”

(Id. at ¶ 23; Doc. # 46-1 at 68-69). On the QBR, Beale assessed

his own performance at 3.4; Mr. Pruyn rated Beale at 2.4 and

indicated that his performance needed improvement. (Doc. #

46-1 at 68-69). Mr. Pruyn met with Beale on August 13, 2019

to discuss his QBR results. (Id. at ¶ 21). Following the QBR,

Beale did not inform Mr. Pruyn or anyone form Clearwater that

his dyslexia had prevented him from achieving his sales or

performance goals or would do so going forward. (Doc. # 40 at

¶ 32; Doc. # 55 at ¶ 32).

On August 29, 2019 — following the 10-Point

Certification Assessment, the Industry Story Board

Presentation, and the QBR assessments — Clearwater terminated

both Beale and another other Senior Sales Director, Sheila

Petaccio,2 for their continued performance deficiencies.

(Doc. # 42-1 at ¶ 16).

Beale initiated this action against Clearwater on

September 18, 2020, asserting claims for disability

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) and Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) (Counts I and III),

and for failure to accommodate under the ADA and FCRA (Counts

II and IV). (Doc. # 1). Now, after discovery has closed,

Clearwater seeks entry of summary judgment in its favor. (Doc.

# 40). The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. ## 55, 58), and ripe

for review.

2 Where Beale earned the seventh highest percentage on the

Story Board Presentation (seventy-two percent), Ms. Petaccio

earned the eighth (sixty-eight percent). (Doc. # 43-3 at 2-

4).

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to

defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude

a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving

party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742

(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if

it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.

1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing

the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are

no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its

burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the

pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,

593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations

or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to

be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344

F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder

evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference

from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine

issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary

judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846

F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s

response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his

conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only

proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034

(11th Cir. 1981).

III. Analysis

A. Disability Discrimination Claims

In Counts I and III, Beale asserts claims for disability

discrimination under the ADA and FCRA. (Doc. # 1 at 3, 5).

“The burden-shifting analysis of Title VII employment

discrimination claims” — as established by McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) — “is applicable to ADA

claims.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th

Cir. 2000). To succeed on a disability discrimination claim,

a plaintiff must show as part of his prima facie case that:

“(1) he is disabled; (2) he was a qualified individual at the

relevant time . . . ; and (3) he was discriminated against []

because of his disability.” Scott v. Shoe Show, Inc., 38 F.

Supp. 3d 1343, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (citation omitted);

D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1021 (11th

Cir. 2020) (“Given the parallel structure of the statutes,

this Court analyzes state-law disability discrimination

claims under the FCRA using the same framework as it does for

claims made under the federal [ADA].”).

“If the employee is able to establish his prima facie

case, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse

action. Alvarez v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 208 F. Supp. 3d

1281, 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2016). At that point, the burden shifts

back to the plaintiff on the issue of pretext.

Here, the Court will assume — without deciding — that

Beale has established a prima facie case of disability

discrimination. And, for its part, Clearwater has provided

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Beale:

Beale’s consistent failure to meet his established sales

quota with Clearwater and his failure to develop and maintain

his sales pipeline. (Doc. # 40 at 20). These justifications

are supported by Beale’s results on the host of performance

assessments conducted by Clearwater.

Thus, the burden shifts back to Beale to establish a

genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. This he cannot

do. “[T]o avoid summary judgment [the plaintiff] must

introduce significantly probative evidence showing that the

asserted reason is merely a pretext for

discrimination.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217,

1228 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “A legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer is not a

pretext for prohibited conduct unless it is shown that the

reason was false and that the real reason was impermissible

retaliation or discrimination.” Worley v. City of Lilburn,

408 F. App’x 248, 251 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)). “If the

proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable

employer, a plaintiff cannot merely recast the reason, but

must meet it ‘head on and rebut it.’” Id. (quoting Chapman v.

AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)). Thus, to

show pretext, an employee must demonstrate “such weaknesses,

implausibilities, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that

a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of

credence.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1375 (11th Cir.

2008) (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir.

2004)). The Court cannot second guess the defendant’s

business judgment or inquire as to whether its decision was

“prudent or fair.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla.,

Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2003).

Beale’s argument for pretext relies on temporal

proximity and his disagreement with Clearwater’s holding him

to sales quotas when he had not been transferred the high-

volume accounts. This argument ignores that Senior Sales

Directors were expected to draw in new sales and accounts to

meet their sales quotas, rather than rely on existing

accounts. (Doc. # 43-1 at 2; Doc. # 46-1 at 6-10). Beale

cannot survive summary judgment simply by quibbling with

whether his performance was poor enough to merit termination

or by relying on his own speculation as to the true cause of

his termination. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (explaining

that a plaintiff cannot show pretext “simply by quarreling

with the wisdom of” the employer’s proffered non-

discriminatory reason); Aldabblan v. Festive Pizza, Ltd., 380

F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“Plaintiff’s mere

belief, speculation, or conclusory allegations that Defendant

discriminated against [her], therefore, are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment.”).

Nor could the Court find the temporal proximity — 17

days — between Beale’s August 12 email and his termination

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact

regarding pretext. Close temporal proximity is, standing

alone, generally insufficient to establish pretext. See

Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286,

1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The close temporal proximity between

Hurlbert’s request for leave and his termination — no more

than two weeks, under the broadest reading of the facts — is

evidence of pretext, though probably insufficient to

establish pretext by itself.”); see also Johnson v. Miami-

Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining

that temporal proximity of less than two months was

insufficient by itself to establish pretext). The relevant

question is whether Beale has presented other evidence

supporting his claim that Clearwater’s stated reason for

terminating his was pretextual. Daugherty v. Mikart, Inc.,

205 F. App’x 826, 828 (11th Cir. 2006).

In short, the temporal proximity between Beale’s August

12 email and his termination is not sufficient, standing

alone, to establish pretext on his discrimination claim. See

Weiher v. Lincare Procurement, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-2569-VMC-

AEP, 2021 WL 4991528, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2021)

(granting summary judgment for employer that terminated an

employee nearly forty days after providing an accommodation

due to the employee’s extensive performance deficiencies that

pre-dated her accommodation request).

It is insufficient because Beale has not rebutted

Clearwater’s reasons head on – he has not shown that

Clearwater’s proffered reasons for his termination were false

or that the true reasons were discriminatory, and he has not

demonstrated such “weaknesses, implausibilities,

incoherencies, or contradictions in [Clearwater’s] proffered

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable

factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” See McCann,

526 F.3d at 1375; Pitts v. Hous. Auth. for City of Huntsville,

262 F. App’x 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding summary

judgment for employer where “none of the various reasons

identified by Pitts as establishing pretext dispute, ‘head

on,’ the [defendant’s] reason for terminating him”); Crawford

v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007)

(“[Plaintiff] erroneously argues that evidence of a

discriminatory animus allows [her] to establish pretext

without rebutting each of the proffered reasons of the

employer.”).

Here, it is undisputed that Beale did not meet his sales

quotas for two full quarters in a row, and that he failed to

develop and maintain his sales pipeline. While Beale insists

he could not meet those quotas because of Clearwater’s failure

to completely transfer the high-volume accounts to him, this

argument does not rebut that he failed to meet the objective

performance criteria set by Clearwater. Nor does it rebut

that Beale was in fact expected to bring in new accounts to

satisfy his sales quota rather than rely on the existing

accounts. Further, Beale’s temporal argument is unpersuasive

as Clearwater terminated another Senior Sales Director the

same day for the same objective performance concerns.

The Motion is granted as to these claims.

B. Failure to Accommodate Claims

In Counts II and IV, Beale asserts claims for failure to

accommodate under the ADA and the FCRA. (Doc. # 1 at 4-5).

“An employer unlawfully discriminates against a

qualified individual with a disability when the employer

fails to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’ for the

disability — unless doing so would impose undue hardship on

the employer.” Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249,

1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Davis v. Fla. Power & Light

Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000)). A qualified

employee with a disability has the burden of establishing

that reasonable and feasible accommodations were available

that would allow the employee to perform the essential

functions of the job. Waddell Valley Forge Dental Assoc.,

Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001). Once the employee

makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to

present evidence of their inability to accommodate, either

due to the unreasonableness of the request, or the undue

hardship the accommodation would place on the employer.

Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 1998).

Still, “the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation

is not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation

has been made.” Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc.,

167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999). “Where the employee

fails to identify a reasonable accommodation, the employer

has no affirmative duty to engage in an ‘interactive process’

or to show undue hardship.” Spears v. Creel, 607 F. App’x

943, 948 (11th Cir. 2015). Additionally, an “employer is not

required to accommodate an employee in any manner in which

that employee desires.” Terrell, 132 F.3d at 626 (citation

omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying an

accommodation, and of demonstrating that the accommodation

allows him to perform the job’s essential functions.” Lucas,

257 F.3d at 1255-56.

Here, Clearwater argues that Beale never requested a

reasonable accommodation. The Court agrees. The two actions

identified by Beale — the August 12 email and his inclusion

of “Dyslexia Awareness” in his signature block in certain

emails — do not qualify as requests for accommodation. First,

the inclusion of “Dyslexia Awareness” in his signature block

is not a specific request for any accommodation. This language

does not state that Beale has dyslexia, nor does it specify

how Beale would like Clearwater and its employees to alter

his work duties or their behavior towards him. While Beale

asserts that Clearwater later verbally requested that he

remove this phrase from his signature block, the phrase

“Dyslexia Awareness” does not communicate a concrete need for

an accommodation or provide any guidance as to the form of

the accommodation Beale would be seeking.

As for the August 12 email (Doc. # 43-4 at 2), that email

did not request a specific accommodation either. While Beale

was concerned with how his speed in performing the PREVUE

assignment might affect the results, he did not actually

identify an accommodation he would like for this assignment.

Nor could he have requested one, as he had already submitted

his assessment by the time he sent the email to Mr. Pruyn.

Even if the August 12 email could be construed as a request

for an accommodation, it is undisputed that the PREVUE

assessment had no bearing on or relation to Beale’s actual

job performance. (Axum Dep. Doc. # 49-1 at 26:19-21; Doc. #

44-1 at 165:8-11). Ms. Axum confirmed that the PREVUE

assessment’s purpose was, instead, to aide with future hiring

decisions and managerial staff’s ability to connect with

their employees. (Doc. # 42-1 at ¶ 10; Axum Dep. Doc. # 49-1

at 26:5-13). The Court is unpersuaded that a request for the

un-graded PREVUE assessment to take Beale’s dyslexia into

consideration would create a triable issue precluding summary

judgment.

In short, no reasonable jury could conclude that

Clearwater failed to accommodate Beale because no request for

accommodation was made. Summary judgment is granted as to the

failure to accommodate claims.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

Defendant Clearwater Compliance LLC’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. # 40) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to

enter judgment in favor of Clearwater Compliance LLC and

against Plaintiff Charles Beale on all counts of the

complaint. Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to CLOSE the

case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

17th day of December, 2021.

VIR TA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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