Cain v. Inch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM CAIN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-71-BJD-MCR

ALEXIS FIGUEROA,

Defendant.

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this case in the

Northern District of Florida by filing a Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Doc. 1. Upon screening, the Honorable M. Casey Rodgers, United

States District Judge, transferred the case to this Court. Doc. 31. Plaintiff is

proceeding on a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 29; TAC) against one

Defendant – Alexis Figueroa, M.D.1

1 In the TAC, Plaintiff names four Defendants – Figueroa; N. Anandjiwal,

Mark Inch, and Behazadi. TAC at 2-4. Before transferring this case to this Court, the

Northern District of Florida dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Inch,

Anandjiwal, and Behazadi, and it transferred only Plaintiff’s claims against Figueroa

to this Court. See Doc. 31

Before the Court is Figueroa’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 51; Motion). The

Court advised Plaintiff that the granting of a motion to dismiss would be an

adjudication of the claims against Figueroa that could foreclose any

subsequent litigation of the matter and provided Plaintiff with an opportunity

to respond. See Order (Doc. 41). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the

Motion (Doc. 57; Response). The Motion is ripe for the Court’s review.

II. Complaint Allegations

Although not a model of clarity, Plaintiff’s allegations surround the

medical care he received at six different facilities between 2009 and 2017 to

treat complications involving an abdominal injury. TAC at 10. Because the only

claims before the Court are those involving Defendant Figueroa, the Court

summarizes only the facts surrounding Figueroa’s alleged conduct. According

to Plaintiff, in January 2017, he underwent surgery at Memorial Hospital for

an intestinal blockage. Id. at 11. Following the surgery, Plaintiff’s incision site

became infected, resulting in a second and third surgery. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff

asserts that after his third surgery, prison officials returned him to Suwannee

Correctional Institution where Defendant Figueroa was assigned as Plaintiff’s

medical provider. Id. at 12. According to Plaintiff, during Figueroa’s initial

medical evaluation, Figueroa saw the stitches in Plaintiff’s abdomen had

healed. Id. at 25. Plaintiff contends he asked Figueroa to remove the stitches,

but Figueroa refused, causing “unnecessary scar tissue” and resulting in the

stitches now being “embedded in his abdominal tissue.” Id. at 12, 25. Plaintiff

states he also advised Figueroa that the catheter in his abdomen “began to leak

urine on the outside of his abdomen.” Id. at 12. According to Plaintiff, however,

Figueroa refused to provide any medical care or treatment for the embedded

stitches or leaking abdominal catheter, “including denying [Plaintiff] medical

supplies to control and soak up the urine leaking from his abdominal catheter.”

Id. at 26. As such, Plaintiff asserts officials eventually transferred him to the

Reception and Medical Center for further evaluation. Id. at 13.

Plaintiff asserts that Figueroa was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 13. He

contends Figueroa was aware of Plaintiff’s need for medical care and “ignored,

delayed, and/or interfered with a proper treatment plan to provide adequate

and necessary medical care to treat” Plaintiff. Id. He maintains the embedded

stitches “have and are causing” him to suffer extreme pain and the leaking

catheter has caused him “to be shunned and ridiculed by other inmates and

prison staff.” Id. at 27. As relief, Plaintiff requests $75,000 in compensatory

and punitive damages. Id. at 16.

III. Defendant Figueroa’s Motion and Analysis

Figueroa requests that the Court dismiss the claims against him because

(A) Plaintiff misrepresented that he has never previously filed a civil rights

action; (B) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his

claim that Figueroa refused to remove the sutures from Plaintiff’s healed

surgical site; and (C) Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. See generally Motion.

The Court finds that because Plaintiff misrepresented his prior civil

rights litigation, this case is due to be dismissed. Nevertheless, in the

alternative, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as to his claim regarding Figueroa’s failure to remove his sutures,

and Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief regarding Figueroa’s

failure to replace his leaking catheter. The Court details its findings below.

A. Misrepresentations About Prior Civil Rights Actions

Figueroa requests that the Court dismiss this case because Plaintiff has

failed to honestly disclose his prior litigation history. Motion at 5-6. According

to Figueroa, in Plaintiff’s TAC, he states he has filed no other federal lawsuits

challenging the conditions of his confinement; but a review of Plaintiff’s prior

federal filings reveals Plaintiff has filed three other pro se civil rights actions

during his incarceration, two of which were dismissed as frivolous and/or for

failure to state a claim. Id. at 5-6. Figueroa asserts that because of Plaintiff’s

misrepresentations, the Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss this

case. Id. at 6.

In response, Plaintiff contends that he is “illiterate and cannot

understand the intricate matters and language of the relevant forms or answer

the appropriate questions.” Doc. 57 at 2. He references the “three-strikes”

provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and suggests he is in imminent danger and

argues that dismissing this case would “encourage the medical practitioners

contracted with the State of Florida to continue to ignore and overlook serious

medical needs of inmates.” Id.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to

dismiss a complaint or a portion of a complaint if the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii),

1915A(b)(1). The Eleventh Circuit has held a court’s discretion to dismiss an

action under § 1915 includes those situations in which a plaintiff fails to

truthfully disclose his litigation history because such conduct “constitutes an

abuse of the judicial process.” Sears v. Haas, 509 F. App’x 935, 936 (11th Cir.

2013) (citing Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 613 (11th Cir. 1997)); see

also Jenkins v. Hutcheson, 708 F. App’x 647, 648 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming

dismissal without prejudice under § 1915 for the plaintiff’s “failure to fully

disclose his litigation history”).

Additionally, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a

district court to impose sanctions on a party who knowingly files a pleading

containing a false contention. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The Eleventh Circuit

instructs that courts should hold pro se litigants to “less stringent standards”

than those proceeding with lawyers, see Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903,

911 (11th Cir. 2020), but “a plaintiff’s pro se status will not excuse mistakes

regarding procedural rules,” see Redmon v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 414 F.

App’x 221, 225-26 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.

106, 113 (1993)).

In his original Complaint (Doc. 1), Amended Complaint (Doc. 19), Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 25), and TAC, all of which Plaintiff signed certifying

his compliance with Rule 11, Plaintiff misrepresented his litigation history. He

certified that he had never previously filed a federal lawsuit relating to the

conditions of his confinement, nor had he had any case dismissed for a reason

listed in § 1915(g). TAC at 17-20. But as Figueroa notes in his Motion, a search

of Plaintiff’s litigation history reveals he has filed these cases: (1) 5:93-cv-50218

(N.D. Fla.) (dismissed as frivolous); (2) 4:94-cv-40344 (N.D. Fla.) (dismissed for

Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute); and (3) 3:98-cv-370 (N.D. Fla.) (dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)). See Docs. 51-1, 51-2.

Upon careful consideration of Plaintiff’s response and his filing history,

the Court finds Plaintiff’s explanation that he misunderstood the complaint

form disingenuous. The question at issue asks whether a litigant has “filed any

other lawsuits in federal court either challenging your conviction or otherwise

relating to the conditions of your confinement?” TAC at 19. This question is

clear, especially when read along with the immediately preceding questions,

which ask whether a litigant has filed other cases “dealing with the same facts”

as those involved in the instant action or whether the litigant has “had any

case dismissed for a reason listed in § 1915(g) which counts as a ‘strike’?” Id.

at 18. Further, and likely of more import, the form cautions Plaintiff that his

“[f]ailure to disclose all prior cases may result in the dismissal of this case.” Id.

at 20. Reading these questions and directions together, there is no ambiguity

that Plaintiff was to, at most, honestly advise the Court that he had previously

filed suits challenging the conditions of his confinement.

While Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has no formal legal training, his

litigation history suggests he is an experienced prison-litigator. Plaintiff has

successfully initiated multiple civil rights cases. Further, he currently has a

federal habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 pending before the Court. See Cain

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:20-cv-1431-TJC-PDB (M.D. Fla.). And when

filling out the form petition for that § 2254 case, Plaintiff detailed the prior

cases he has filed challenging his state court judgment of conviction, showing

he comprehended those questions. Id. at 2-3.

Even if Plaintiff’s omission here was unintentional or he legitimately

found the question unclear, the Eleventh Circuit has explained a

misunderstanding does not excuse a prisoner’s failure to truthfully answer

straightforward questions in a civil rights complaint form. See Redmon, 414 F.

App’x at 226 (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion dismissing

a pro se prisoner’s complaint for abuse of judicial process, despite the plaintiff’s

contention that he misunderstood the complaint form, which “clearly asked

[the plaintiff] to disclose previously filed lawsuits . . . with similar facts . . .

[and those] otherwise relating to his imprisonment or conditions of his

imprisonment”). See also Jenkins, 708 F. App’x at 648, 649 (holding “the

district court was entitled to dismiss [the plaintiff’s] complaint based on his

failure to fully disclose his litigation history,” even though the plaintiff

disclosed some of his prior cases and his conduct appeared unintentional). The

Court finds Plaintiff’s misrepresentation of his litigation history amounts to an

abuse of judicial process, warranting dismissal of the action without prejudice.

And thus, Figueroa’s Motion is due to be granted in this regard.

B. Exhaustion

Alternatively, Figueroa argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to his claim that Figueroa failed to remove the

sutures from Plaintiff’s healed abdominal wound. Motion at 6-11. In support of

his argument, Figueroa provides a compilation of the medical grievances

Plaintiff submitted in 2017 and after. Figueroa asserts that while Plaintiff may

have exhausted his claim that Figueroa failed to treat Plaintiff’s leaky

catheter, none of the medical grievances Plaintiff filed between 2017 and 2020

contain allegations that Figueroa or any other medical provider failed to

remove his abdominal sutures. Id. at 9. As such, Figueroa argues that claim

should be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust.

In his Response, Plaintiff contends that he exhausted his administrative

remedies for all his claims against Figueroa, and that he “has explained his

grievance process in this Third Amended Complaint.” Doc. 57 at 3. He asserts

that while Figueroa maintains that Plaintiff’s grievances do not contain any

allegations about the failure to remove sutures, “[f]rom a prisoner’s standpoint,

what goes on in a medical department may be a mystery,” and “[h]e does not

always know . . . who made a particular decision that affects his health.” Id. To

that end, Plaintiff suggests that he did not have to exhaust his claim about the

sutures because his prisoner status prevented him from discovering the claim

or the identity of the responsible prison official, rendering the remedy

unavailable. Id.

The PLRA requires that Plaintiff exhaust his available administrative

remedies before pursuing a § 1983 claim about prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.”); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006) (noting that

a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before challenging the

conditions of confinement, and concluding that the PLRA demands “proper

exhaustion”). But Plaintiff need not “specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion

in [his] complaint[].” See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, the

United States Supreme Court has recognized that “failure to exhaust is an

affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]” Id.

Importantly, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is “a

precondition to an adjudication on the merits.” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368,

1374 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The Supreme Court has

instructed that while “the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not

jurisdictional[,]” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 101, “exhaustion is mandatory . . . and

unexhausted claims cannot be brought,” Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App’x 819, 823

(11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 211). Not only is there

a recognized exhaustion requirement, “the PLRA . . . requires proper

exhaustion” as set forth in applicable administrative rules and policies of the

institution. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93.

Because exhaustion requirements are designed

to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these

parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to

do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims.

Administrative law does this by requiring proper

exhaustion of administrative remedies, which “means

using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on

the merits).”

Id. at 90 (citation omitted). Indeed, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance

with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]” Id.

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, Defendant bears “the burden of proving that [Plaintiff] has failed to

exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d

1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). The Eleventh Circuit has articulated a two-step

process that the Court must employ when examining the issue of exhaustion

of administrative remedies.

In Turner v. Burnside we established a two-step

process for resolving motions to dismiss prisoner

lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541 F.3d at 1082. First,

district courts look to the factual allegations in the

motion to dismiss and those in the prisoner’s response

and accept the prisoner’s view of the facts as true. The

court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the

prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id. Second, if

dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s view of

the facts, the court makes specific findings to resolve

disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those

findings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust.

Id. at 1082–83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining that

defendants bear the burden of showing a failure to

exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v.

Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 218

(stating that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define

the boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The FDOC provides inmates with a

three-step grievance process for exhausting administrative remedies. As the

Eleventh Circuit has described it:

The grievance procedure applicable to Florida

prisoners is set out in § 33-103 of the Florida

Administrative Code. Section 33-103 contemplates a

three-step sequential grievance procedure: (1)

informal grievance; (2) formal grievance; and then (3)

administrative appeal. Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1211.

Informal grievances are handled by the staff member

responsible for the particular area of the problem at

the institution; formal grievances are handled by the

warden of the institution; and administrative appeals

are handled by the Office of the Secretary of the

FDOC. See Fla. Admin. Code. §§ 33-103.005–103.007.

To exhaust these remedies, prisoners ordinarily must

complete these steps in order and within the time

limits set forth in § 33-103.011, and must either

receive a response or wait a certain period of time

before proceeding to the next step. See id. § 33-

103.011(4).

Pavao, 679 F. App’x at 824. However, the ordinary three-step procedure does

not apply in all instances. A prisoner may skip the informal grievance step and

immediately file a formal grievance for issues pertaining to various things,

including “medical grievances” or “a formal grievance of a medical nature.” Fla.

Admin. Code r. 33-103.005(1); Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.008. If a prisoner is

permitted to bypass the informal grievance step, he must file the formal

grievance with the warden within 15 days from the date on which the incident

or action being grieved occurred. Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.011(1)(b). A

response must be provided to the inmate within 20 days of receipt of the formal

grievance. Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.006(6). “If the inmate is unsatisfied with

the resolution of a formal grievance, he may appeal the grievance to the Office

of the Secretary using Form DC1-303 (same form as a formal grievance).”

Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 835 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Fla. Admin.

Code Ann. R. 33-103.007). The grievance appeal to the Office of the Secretary

must be received within 15 days from the date the response to the formal

grievance is returned to the inmate. Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.11(c).

Accepting Plaintiff’s view of the facts as true, the Court finds dismissal

of his claim that Figueroa failed to remove Plaintiff’s sutures for lack of

exhaustion is not warranted at the first step of Turner. Thus, the Court

proceeds to the second step of the two-part process where the Court considers

Figueroa’s arguments about exhaustion and makes findings of fact to resolve

the disputed issues.

In resolving the first disputed issue, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not

complete the administrative grievance process for his claim that Figueroa

violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Figueroa failed to remove

Plaintiff’s sutures after his abdominal wound healed. Figueroa provides over

fifty formal medical grievances and appeals that Plaintiff filed between March

2017 and July 2020. See generally Doc. 53-1. Because Plaintiff initiated this

case on or about October 24, 2019, the Court only considers the grievances that

Plaintiff submitted before that date. Plaintiff submitted around forty-three

grievances during the relevant period, twenty-seven of which Plaintiff

submitted while housed at Suwannee C.I. between March 2017 and September

2018 and sixteen of which he submitted while housed at Northwest Florida

Reception Center between July 2019 and October 2019. See Doc. 51-3 at 30-

120.

After a careful reading of those forty-three grievances (id.), the Court

finds that Plaintiff never alleged that he requested any medical official to

remove his abdominal stitches but medical refused to do so, causing scar tissue

to embed the sutures in Plaintiff’s stomach tissue. Instead, the formal medical

grievances and grievance appeals that Plaintiff filed while housed at

Suwannee C.I. involved the return of personal property (Doc. 51-3 at 119-20,

116-17, 114); refusal to adhere to specialist’s recommendations and denying

medical passes (id. at 116, 114, 112, 110, 106, 102-03); failing to provide

Plaintiff with orthopedic footwear (id. at 108, 106); verbal abuse from medical

staff (id. at 94, 74, 72, 70); failure to treat Plaintiff’s leaking catheter (id. at 90-

91, 87, 83, 72); refusal to provide Plaintiff with necessary medication (id. at 86,

75); abdominal pain from what Plaintiff believed was a hernia or tumor (id. at

83, 79); and the nurse’s negligence when drawing Plaintiff’s blood (id. at 78).

Plaintiff also filed several grievances alleging that medical, including

Figueroa, discharged him from the infirmary before his colostomy wound

healed and without wound-care supplies. Id. at 98-99, 75.

The formal medical grievances and grievance appeals that Plaintiff filed

while housed at NWFRC and before initiating this case involved requests for a

c-pap machine (id. at 68, 39); general request that medical provide him

treatment for his “chronic condition” (id. at 66); violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (id. at 60); retaliation by prison staff (id.); treatment for a

hernia (id. at 60, 54, 50); blood in urine (id. at 58, 56, 36); leaking catheter (id.

at 50); request to see a medical specialist (id. at 39); and return of personal

property (id. at 32, 30, 29).

While Plaintiff alleges that his TAC explains the actions he took to

exhaust, Plaintiff did not provide any details or statements under the TAC’s

“exhaustion of administrative remedies” section or otherwise mention any

efforts to exhaust his claims. See generally TAC. The record before the Court,

however, demonstrates that although Plaintiff fully availed himself of the

administrative process to notify prison officials of his medical ailments, he

never alleged or included facts suggesting a perpetual refusal to remove

stitches now embedded in his abdomen and still causing Plaintiff extreme pain.

The Court finds that Figueroa has met his burden in showing that Plaintiff did

not complete the grievance process for that claim.

Plaintiff also appears to argue that the grievance process was

unavailable, relieving him of any obligation to complete the sequential

grievance procedure. In support of that argument, Plaintiff simply asserts that

his incarceration status prevented him from obtaining the relevant

information about his claim or the identity of the responsible prison official.

Doc. 57 at 3. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. Indeed, the record

shows Plaintiff had no issue obtaining grievance forms or identifying his

medical problems. See generally Doc. 53-1. Further, in several grievances

Plaintiff filed while housed at Suwannee C.I., he references Figueroa (see, e.g.,

Doc. 53-1 at 99, 95, 87, 83), and in his TAC, Plaintiff alleges Figueroa was his

primary medical official who treated him at Suwannee C.I. (TAC at 25).

Because Plaintiff was actively availing himself of the grievance process,

especially at Suwannee C.I., during the relevant timeframe, the Court finds

that Plaintiff was not deterred or thwarted from pursuing his administrative

remedies nor was he unaware of medical officials whom he routinely centered

his complaints around. In any event, even assuming Plaintiff did not know the

identity of a particular medical official, his failure to make any allegation in

his grievances that he was suffering from the alleged embedded stitches is

dispositive of this issue. Thus, the Court finds that neither Plaintiff’s

assertions nor the evidentiary materials in the record show that the

administrative remedies were unavailable to Plaintiff. Figueroa’s Motion is

due to be granted to the extent that Plaintiff’s claim about Figueroa’s failure

to remove the stitches is dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust.

C. Failure to State a Claim

Finally, Figueroa argues Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment

claim about his alleged refusal to treat Plaintiff’s leaking abdominal catheter

or provide Plaintiff with “medical supplies to control and soak up the urine

leaking” from the catheter.2 Motion at 11-16. In support of this argument,

Figueroa asserts Plaintiff has failed to allege that the leaking catheter involved

an objectively serious medical need and that Figueroa’s conduct amounted to

more than negligence. Id. at 15-16. In response, Plaintiff contends he has

stated a plausible claim for relief and suggests he should be allowed to conduct

discovery to keep developing his claim. Doc. 57 at 6. He also appears to argue

that because of his medical ailments, prison staff have ridiculed and

humiliated him in the presence of other inmates. Id. at 7.

With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted,” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), so courts apply the same standard in both contexts.

Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v.

Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of

2 Figueroa also argues that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Eighth

Amendment claim as to Figueroa’s alleged failure to remove Plaintiff’s stitches, but

because the Court finds that claim is due to be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust, it need not address it here.

a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. (quotations,

alteration, and citation omitted). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary

to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman

Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and

citations omitted).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(citations omitted). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit requires “‘an affirmative

causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged

constitutional deprivation’ in § 1983 cases.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,

508 F.3d 611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted

deductions of facts, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent

dismissal.” Rehberger v. Henry Cnty., Ga., 577 F. App’x 937, 938 (11th Cir.

2014) (per curiam) (quotations and citation omitted). In the absence of a federal

constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot

sustain a cause of action against a defendant.

Plaintiff is a prisoner; thus, his claim of deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need arises under the Eighth Amendment. See Kuhne v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 745 F.3d 1091, 1094 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97 (1976)). “To show that a prison official acted with deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective

and a subjective inquiry.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir.

2004) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)). First,

the plaintiff must satisfy the objective component by showing that he had a

serious medical need. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir.

2007).

“A serious medical need is considered ‘one that

has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.’” Id. (citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l

Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)).

In either case, “the medical need must be one that, if

left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Id. (citation and internal quotations marks

omitted).

Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351. Next, the plaintiff must satisfy the subjective

component, which requires the plaintiff to “allege that the prison official, at a

minimum, acted with a state of mind that constituted deliberate indifference.”

Richardson, 598 F.3d at 737 (describing the three components of deliberate

indifference as “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard

of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.”) (citing Farrow,

320 F.3d at 1245)).

In Estelle, the Supreme Court established that

“deliberate indifference” entails more than mere

negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 835. The Supreme Court clarified the “deliberate

indifference” standard in Farmer by holding that a

prison official cannot be found deliberately indifferent

under the Eighth Amendment “unless the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837

(emphasis added). In interpreting Farmer and Estelle,

this Court explained in McElligott [v. Foley, 182 F.3d

1248 (11th Cir. 1999),] that “deliberate indifference

has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a

risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by

conduct that is more than mere negligence.”

McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255; Taylor [v. Adams, 221

F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)] (stating that

defendant must have subjective awareness of an

“objectively serious need” and that his response must

constitute “an objectively insufficient response to that

need”).

Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46; see also Patel v. Lanier Cnty. Ga., 969 F.3d 1173,

1188-89 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2020) (recognizing “a tension within [Eleventh

Circuit] precedent regarding the minimum standard for culpability under the

deliberate-indifference standard,” as some cases have used “more than gross

negligence” while others have used “more than mere negligence”; finding,

however, that it may be “a distinction without a difference” because “no matter

how serious the negligence, conduct that can’t fairly be characterized as

reckless won’t meet the Supreme Court’s standard” (citations omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the leaking catheter was an

objectively serious medical need that posed a substantial risk of serious harm.

Plaintiff never asserts that the leaking catheter caused him pain or suffering

but instead merely alleges that the leaking urine “caused him to be shunned

and ridiculed by other inmates and prison staff.” TAC at 27. While the Court

is not condoning prison staff or other inmates verbally ridiculing Plaintiff

because of that medical device, it cannot find that Plaintiff’s leaking catheter

amounted to an objectively serious medical need simply because it resulted in

that embarrassment. The Court also finds that Figueroa’s failure to replace

the leaking catheter, if true, amounted to no more than mere negligence. As

such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible Eighth

Amendment claim regarding his leaking catheter, and Defendant’s Motion is

due to be granted as to this argument.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendant Figueroa’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 51) is GRANTED.

2. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 3rd day of

December, 2021.

J) ‘ / =

fo Aagee | a OAL.

BRIAN. DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-7

C: William Cain, #819171

Counsel of record

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