The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
TARA J. LOUX, MD,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 8:21-cv-1891-WFJ-TGW
BAYCARE MEDICAL GROUP, INC.;
ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL, INC.; and
ANAND NAYEE, MD,
Defendants.
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ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants Baycare Medical Group, Inc. (“BMG”), St. Joseph’s Hospital, Inc.
(“St. Joseph’s”), and Anand Nayee, MD. Dkt. 28. Plaintiff Tara J. Loux, MD, filed
a memorandum in opposition. Dkt. 32. The Court also received cogent oral
argument from the parties at a hearing held on December 1, 2021. Upon
consideration of the filings and arguments presented at the hearing, the Court
denies Defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a double board-certified physician who formerly worked as a
pediatric surgeon for BMG and the pediatric trauma medical director of St.
Joseph’s in Hillsborough County, Florida. Dkt. 26 at 1, 3−4. BMG and St. Joseph’s
are both part of BayCare Health Systems, which employs over 29,000 individuals.
Id. at 3.
Plaintiff alleges that she was continually subjected to gender discrimination
while employed by BMG and St. Joseph’s. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends that after
raising her concerns to individuals at BMG and St. Joseph’s, she was subjected to
an unauthorized review of complications that occurred in her past cases. Id. at 7−9.
This review resulted in several of Plaintiff’s past cases with complications being
presented to St. Joseph’s Peer Review Committee (“the Committee”). Id. at 9.
Plaintiff contends that the Committee required that she choose between (1)
accepting a “collegial intervention” that entailed a ninety-day ban on certain cases
and a ninety-day period of another surgeon scrubbing-in on her procedures or (2)
being recommended for an emergency suspension that would be reported to the
National Practitioner’s Data Bank (“NPDB”). Id. at 10.
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Nayee, Chair of the Committee, falsely represented
that her acceptance of the collegial intervention would not be a formal proctorship
reported to the NPDB and that BMG would coordinate coverage for her during the
sanction. Id. at 11. However, upon accepting the intervention, St. Joseph’s reported
to the NPDB that Plaintiff had been subjected to a proctorship due to quality-of-
care issues. Id. On the day of St. Joseph’s report, BMG terminated Plaintiff’s
employment. Id. at 12. Plaintiff contends that she then revoked her acceptance of
the intervention, but BMG refused to reinstate her employment. Id.
St. Joseph’s subsequently notified Plaintiff that it was invoking an
emergency suspension of her medical staff privileges. Id. at 13. Plaintiff states that
this suspension was unwarranted, as she was not practicing at St. Joseph’s at that
time due to BMG’s termination of her employment and confiscation of her hospital
badge. Id. Plaintiff sought review of the suspension by St. Joseph’s Medical
Executive Committee, which lifted the suspension but imposed what was
essentially the same collegial intervention that she previously faced. Id. at 13−14.
Though Plaintiff sought review of this second sanction, it was twice upheld by St.
Joseph’s. Id. at 15.
Based on these events, Plaintiff brings a nine-count amended complaint. In
Count I, Plaintiff alleges a gender discrimination claim against BMG. Id. at 16.
Count II is a retaliation claim against the same. Id. at 18. Counts III and IV assert a
gender discrimination claim and retaliation claim, respectively, against St.
Joseph’s. Id. at 19, 22. Plaintiff next brings an ADA discrimination claim against
BMG in Count V. Id. at 23. In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges a fraud claim against
BMG, St. Joseph’s, and Dr. Nayee. Id. at 25. Plaintiff also brings a breach of
contract claim against St. Joseph’s in Count VII and a separate breach of contract
claim against BMG in Count VIII. Id. at 28, 33. Finally, Count IX asserts an
unpaid wages claim against BMG. Id. at 33. Defendants move to dismiss Counts
III and IV as shotgun pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b), and Counts VI, VII,
VIII, and IX for failure to state claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. 28 at 1.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its
face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not require
detailed factual allegations but demands more than an unadorned accusation. Id. In
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint’s factual allegations are
accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage
v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, Rule 10(b) requires plaintiffs to bring their claims in separate,
numbered paragraphs, with each claim “limited as far as practicable to a single set
of circumstances.” A complaint that violates this rule is often referred to as a
shotgun pleading, which is a pleading that fails to give defendants adequate notice
of the claims against them. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d
1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
ANALYSIS
The Court turns first to Defendants’ contention that Counts III and IV are
shotgun pleadings. Counts III and IV allege gender discrimination and retaliation
claims, respectively, against St. Joseph’s. Defendants assert that both claims
conflate elements of disparate treatment and hostile work environment, thereby
confusing the pleading. Dkt. 28 at 21. Plaintiff responds that she has properly pled
Counts III and IV, as the disparate treatment and hostile work environment theories
are part of the same causes of action and involve overlapping facts and elements.
Dkt. 32 at 17−18.
The Court finds that Counts III and IV do not violate Rule 10(b). Both
counts provide Defendants with adequate notice of the claims against them.
Moreover, Defendants have not cited, nor has this Court found, any binding
authority requiring disparate treatment and hostile work environment theories to be
pled in separate counts when bringing claims of gender discrimination and
retaliation. Counts III and IV need not be dismissed or re-pled.
Next, the Court considers Defendants’ position that Counts VI, VII, VIII,
and IX warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state claims.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not made the requisite showings of falsity
and reasonable reliance in her Count VI fraud claim. Dkt. 28 at 4. Defendants
relatedly argue that the Counts VII and VIII breach of contract claims fail because
Defendants are immune from such suits under Florida law unless Plaintiff shows
intentional fraud, which Defendants contend she failed to do in Count VI. Id. at 13,
15. Finally, Defendants allege that the Count IX unpaid wages claim fails based on
the terms of Plaintiff’s employment agreement with BMG. Id. at 18.
Applying the standard for assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
Defendants’ motion is denied. The Court finds at this stage of the proceedings that
Plaintiff has alleged plausible claims for relief in the counts contested by
Defendants. Plaintiff has set forth facts that, accepted as true and viewed in a light
most favorable to her, sufficiently allege fraud, breaches of contract, and unpaid
wages. Though Defendants may, in fact, be correct that they have immunity from
the breach of contract claims under Florida law, immunity is a fact-intensive
determination that is more appropriately addressed at the summary judgment stage.
Caruso v. Glencare, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-539-T-33AEP, 2014 WL 1796684, at *6
(M.D. Fla. May 6, 2014) (citing Fariello v. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2004)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 28, is
DENIED. Defendants shall answer Plaintiff’s complaint within fourteen (14) days.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on December 7, 2021.
/s/ William F. Jung
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record