Wiggins v. Prummell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

SHAWN WIGGINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:21-cv-596-JES-MRM

WILLIAM PRUMMELL, NORMAN

WILSON, AND CHARLOTTE

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of Defendant

Major Norman Wilson’s (Wilson) Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

#7), Defendant Sheriff William Prummell’s (Prummell or Sheriff)

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #8), and Defendant Charlotte County

Commissioners’ (Charlotte County) (collectively, Defendants)

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #13). Plaintiff Shawn Wiggins (Plaintiff

or Wiggins) has not timely responded. For the reasons set forth,

the motions are granted in part and the case is dismissed without

prejudice.

I.

Wiggins, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendants

unlawfully took his property when he was initially booked in the

Charlotte County Jail, and placed his property totaling $34.00 in

an inmate bank account. (Doc. #4, p. 4.) He alleges that, in

violation of state and federal law, Defendants then charged him an

initial booking fee and a daily fee, deducting those fees without

his permission from the inmate bank account. (Id.) Wiggins

specifically alleges that Wilson had the authority to waive these

fees for those with indigent status, that Wiggins requested his

fees be waived, and that Wilson biasedly denied his requests.

(Id.)

The Complaint asserts five causes of action related to these

fees against Defendants: (1) violation of Article 1, Section 19 of

the Florida Constitution; (2) violation of Florida Statute §

951.243 and/or § 951.033; (3) unlawful and abusive collection

practices; (4) depriving him of property without due process of

law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) “Florida

Little RICO of Human Trafficking for profit from a criminal

offense.” (Id.) Wiggins’ Complaint also seeks relief on behalf

of himself and a class of similarly situated people. (Id.)

Wiggins originally filed his action in state court on July

12, 2021. (Doc. #1-1.) On August 11, 2021, Wilson and Prummell,

with the consent of Charlotte County, removed the action to this

Court based on federal question and supplemental jurisdiction.

(Doc. #1). All defendants then filed their motions to dismiss.

(Docs. ## 7, 8, 13.) Wiggins did not timely respond to those

motions. The Court extended the response date twice, in part due

to an administrative error, directed Wiggins to respond by October

12, 2021, and advised him that, if no response was filed, the Court

would rule on the motions without further notice or the benefit of

any responses. (Docs. ## 22, 23.) The extension of time has now

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passed, and the motions are ripe for review.

II.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that

a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2). This obligation “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual

allegations must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. See

also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).

This requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citations omitted).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court

accepts all factual allegations in a complaint as true and takes

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Wiggins was provided ample opportunity to respond. His

failure to respond would allow the Court to treat Defendants’

motions as unopposed. M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(c). However, given the

procedural history of this case and Wiggins’ pro se status, the

Court reviews the merits of Defendants’ motions.

them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate

factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,” Mamani v.

Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations that are merely consistent

with a defendant’s liability fall short of being facially

plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th

Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-

step approach: “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations,

a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679.

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

one drafted by an attorney and are liberally construed. Jones v.

Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).

Nevertheless, “a pro se pleading must suggest (even if inartfully)

that there is at least some factual support for a claim; it is not

enough just to invoke a legal theory devoid of any factual basis.”

Id. In other words, pro se status will not salvage a complaint

devoid of facts supporting the plaintiff’s claims.

III.

A. Federal Claim (Count IV)

The Court first addresses Count IV, Wiggins’ sole federal

claim. In this claim, Wiggins argues that, after he was booked

and his property put in an inmate bank account, Defendants

unlawfully deducted amounts from his account without providing him

due process of law and wrongfully took $32.15. (Doc. #4, p. 4.)

All Defendants move to dismiss this claim for failure to state a

claim. (Doc. #7, p. 4; Doc. #8, p. 4; Doc. #13, p. 3.)

A plaintiff alleging a denial of procedural due process must

plead three elements: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-

protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3)

constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d

1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). “If the plaintiff does not allege a

constitutionally inadequate process, the complaint fails to state

a claim and should be dismissed.” Watkins v. Israel, 661 F. App’x

608, 609 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

The first two elements here are met; Wiggins has a

constitutionally protected property interest in his bank account

and the state deducted monies from that account. Id. Thus, the

Court considers whether the state’s action satisfies due process:

To determine whether a state action met due

process requirements, we conduct a three-

factor balancing test which considers: “(1)

the private interest…affected by the official

action;” “(2) the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the

procedures used and the probable value, if

any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards;” and “(3) the government’s

interest, including the function involved and

the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.”

Id. at 610 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

The Constitution usually requires a pre-deprivation hearing;

however, “[w]hen pre-deprivation hearings are not feasible, the

state can satisfy due process by providing adequate post-

deprivation remedies…capable of fully compensating the deprived

individual.” Id. (citations omitted).

This case is nearly identical to Watkins, supra. In Watkins,

a Florida inmate alleged that the jail confiscated his property

upon arrest, placed his property in an inmate bank account,

deducted fees without providing any prior opportunity to refuse,

and wrongfully took $64.45. 661 Fed. App’x at 609. The inmate

then challenged the fees and participated in a post-deprivation

grievance process. Id. at 610. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that

the Mathews factors weighed in favor of the government and affirmed

dismissal of the inmate’s due process claim. Id. at 610-11.

First, the “inmate ha[d] only a limited property right in his

inmate banking account” and small deductions from the bank account

were a “minimal incursion on a limited property interest.” Id.

Second, the jail’s policy of deducting these small amounts was “a

ministerial matter which pose[d] little risk of erroneous

deprivation.” Id. at 610 (citing Reams v. Irvin, 561 F.3d 1258,

1264 (11th Cir. 2009)). See also Fla. Stat. § 951.033 (authorizing

the assessment of certain costs against prisoners). Third, the

government had a significant “interest in sharing costs with

inmates,” which would be “undermined by requiring pre-deprivation

hearings.” Id. (citing United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184,

1200 (11th Cir. 2002)). Finally, the government’s post-

deprivation process, of which the inmate took advantage, could

fully compensate the inmate and satisfied due process. Id.

(citations omitted).

The same reasoning applies in this case. Wiggins was deprived

of $32.15 for an initial booking fee and daily board, which was a

minimal incursion on a limited property interest with little risk

of erroneous deprivation. Although Wiggins was not afforded a

pre-deprivation hearing, he had a post-deprivation process to

challenge these fees. Based on the allegations in the Complaint,

he engaged in that process by challenging the fees and seeking

waiver. Accordingly, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of

Defendants, Wiggins has not alleged a constitutionally inadequate

process, and Wiggins’ federal claim must be dismissed without

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prejudice.

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Wiggins’ attempt to assert this claim on behalf of a class

is also inappropriate because while an individual may proceed pro

B. State Law Claims (Count I, II, III, V)

The Court need not consider any other arguments presented by

the parties as to dismissal of the state law claims. Even assuming

these are properly pled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the

Court will exercise its discretion and decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Raney v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004) (encouraging

district courts to dismiss state claims where all claims which

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provided original jurisdiction have been dismissed).

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the complaint (Docs. ##

7, 8, 13) are GRANTED to the extent that Count IV is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a

claim. Counts I, II, III, and V are dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate

all deadlines, and close this case.

se, that right “does not extend to the representation of the

interests of others.” Bass v. Benton, 408 F. App’x 298 (11th Cir.

2011) (citations omitted).

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Based on the allegations in the complaint and the notice of

removal, all parties are Florida residents. Diversity

jurisdiction cannot be invoked.

DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 14th day

of October, 2021.

= bob

JGHN E. STEELE

5 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:

Counsel of Record

Plaintiff, 22370 Hernando Avenue, Port Charlotte, FL 33952