Opinion

Almond v. Flagler County Florida

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Aug 30, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.8%

stating that certain subdivisions of local or county governments, such as sheriff’s departments and police departments, generally are not legal entities subject to suit

How later courts described this case

  • stating that certain subdivisions of local or county governments, such as sheriff’s departments and police departments, generally are not legal entities subject to suit
  • affirming dismissal of a civil rights action against the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL ALMOND, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-00830-BJD-MCR

FLAGLER COUNTY, FLORIDA,

et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, Michael Almond, Jr., a pretrial detainee housed at Flagler

County Jail, initiated this action by filing a pro se complaint for the violation

of civil rights (Doc. 1; Compl.) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

2). Plaintiff names as Defendants Flagler County, the Flagler County Sheriff’s

Office, the Flagler County Inmate Facility, the City of Bunnell, and the

Bunnell Police Department. He asserts officers would not allow him to call his

attorney on August 17, 2021; officers violated his right to due process by

changing his jail identification number on August 18, 2021; officers refused to

file a theft report on his behalf on May 1, 2021; jail staff would not let him use

legal resources for his criminal case on April 18, 2021; and officers refused to

permit him to see his attorney on January 1, 2021, because he chose to attend

bible study class. See Compl. at 6, 8, 10. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages. Id. at 9.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to

dismiss a complaint if the court determines the action is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language

of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so courts apply the same

standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.

1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked

assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quotations, alteration, and citation omitted).

Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d

678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted).

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In reviewing a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings, a court must liberally construe

the plaintiff’s allegations. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);

Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). However, the duty

of a court to construe pro se pleadings liberally does not require the court to

serve as an attorney for the plaintiff. Freeman v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 679 F.

App’x 982, 982 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132

F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA because he

fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “a

person” acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured

under the United States Constitution or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

When a plaintiff attempts to sue an entity, as opposed to an individual, the law

of the state in which the district court sits dictates whether the entity can be

sued under § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992)

(stating that certain subdivisions of local or county governments, such as

sheriff’s departments and police departments, generally are not legal entities

subject to suit).

In Florida, a sheriff’s office or jail facility is not a legal entity subject to

suit under § 1983. See Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x

3

696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of a civil rights action against

the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office). See also Monroe v. Charlotte Cnty. Jail,

No. 2:15-cv-729-FtM-99MRM, 2015 WL 7777521, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2015)

(“A correctional facility or [a] jail is not a proper defendant in a case brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (citing Chapter 30, Florida Statutes)). As the Court

previously advised Plaintiff,1 he may not proceed against the Sheriff’s Office or

jail.

Plaintiff says he does not know the names of the officers who allegedly

violated his constitutional rights. See Compl. at 6, 12. Regardless, Plaintiff

does not describe conduct that rises to the level of a constitutional violation.

The closest Plaintiff comes to describing a constitutional violation is the

interference with his exercise of religion. However, a plaintiff seeking to pursue

a First Amendment free-exercise-of-religion claim must allege facts “showing

a ‘substantial burden’ on a sincerely held religious belief.” Robbins v.

Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 801 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing GeorgiaCarry.Org,

Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012)). “First Amendment Free

Exercise Clause precedent is clear: a plaintiff must allege a constitutionally

impermissible burden on a sincerely held religious belief to survive a motion

1 See Case No. 3:21-cv-39-MMH-JRK (dismissing the case for failure to

prosecute and advising Plaintiff a jail facility is not a proper defendant in a federal

civil rights action).

4

to dismiss.” GeorgiaCarry, 687 F.3d at 1256. Plaintiff does not allege facts

permitting the reasonable inference his religious exercise was substantially

burdened.

Plaintiff also fails to state a plausible First Amendment access-to-courts

claim. To state a claim for a denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must

allege an “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also

Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be

established by demonstrating that an inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous

claim were frustrated or impeded by . . . an official’s action.” Barbour, 471 F.3d

at 1225 (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not allege any jail employee’s conduct

interfered with his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim such that he meets

the “actual injury” standard.

Because Plaintiff fails to state a jail employee violated his constitutional

rights, a claim against the city or county necessarily fails. However, had

Plaintiff stated a viable claim against an individual, a claim against the city or

county would be subject to dismissal because a claim under § 1983 may not be

premised on a theory of vicarious liability. Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978). Rather, to proceed against a

municipality, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a “custom or policy that

constituted deliberate indifference to [a] constitutional right” and that caused

5

a constitutional violation. Moody v. City of Delray Bch., 609 F. App’x 966, 967

(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.

2004)). Plaintiff does not allege the existence of a custom or policy that caused

a constitutional violation.

Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient because he improperly joins

multiple, unrelated claims. A plaintiff may set forth only related claims in one

civil rights complaint. He may not join unrelated claims and various

defendants unless the claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or fact

common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). As

recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, “a claim arises out of the same transaction

or occurrence if there is a logical relationship between the claims.” Constr.

Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F. 3d 1334, 1337 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiff improperly seeks to

pursue multiple claims that have no logical relationship.

Because Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief, his complaint

is subject to dismissal. If Plaintiff has a cognizable claim to pursue against a

viable defendant, he may file a new complaint in which he names individuals

allegedly responsible for violating his constitutional rights. He should not join

multiple, unrelated claims in one complaint.

6

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

3. The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form. If

Plaintiff chooses to file a claim, he should not put this case number on the form

because the Clerk will assign a new case number upon receipt.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of

August 2021.

Boa ol) ha

TO ruse | nj LXer

United States District Judge

Jax-6

Cc: Michael Almond, Jr.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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