The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CHARLES THEODORE PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 8:20-cv-944-DNF
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Charles Theodore Phillips seeks judicial review of the final decision
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his
claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner
filed the Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.” followed by
the appropriate page number), and the parties filed a joint legal memoranda setting
forth their respective positions. For the reasons set out herein, the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. Social Security Act Eligibility, Standard of Review, Procedural
History, and the ALJ’s Decision
A. Social Security Eligibility
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The impairment must be
severe, making the claimant unable to do his previous work, or any other substantial
gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505–404.1511, 416.905–416.911.
B. Standard of Review
The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Even if the evidence preponderated against the
Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by
substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004).
In conducting this review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the ALJ, but must consider the evidence as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Foote
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Unlike findings of fact, the Commissioner’s conclusions of
law are not presumed valid and are reviewed under a de novo standard. Keeton v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994); Maldonado
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-14331, 2021 WL 2838362, at *2 (11th Cir. July 8,
2021); Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. “The [Commissioner’s] failure to apply the correct
law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that
the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” Keeton, 21 F.3d at
1066.
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant
is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). At step two, the ALJ must
determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments from which the
claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s
severe impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If the ALJ finds the
claimant’s severe impairments do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment,
then the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
(e)–(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)–(f).
If the claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the ALJ must determine
at step five whether the claimant’s RFC permits him to perform other work that
exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). At the fifth step, there are two ways in which the ALJ may
establish whether the claimant is capable of performing other work available in the
national economy. The first is by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines, and
the second is by the use of a vocational expert. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,
1239-40 (11th Cir. 2004); Atha v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F. App’x 931, 933
(11th Cir. 2015).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Atha, 616 F. App’x
at 933. If the claimant meets this burden, then the burden temporarily shifts to the
Commissioner to establish the fifth step. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If the Commissioner presents evidence of other work
that exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able
to perform, only then does the burden shift back to the claimant to prove he is unable
to perform these jobs. Atha, 616 F. App’x at 993.
C. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits on July 13, 2017, alleging disability beginning June 9, 2016. (Tr. 109, 205-
206). The application was denied initially on September 6, 2017, and upon
reconsideration on December 29, 2017. (Tr. 88, 129). Plaintiff requested a hearing
and on April 2, 2019, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Amber Downs. (Tr. 34-70). On May 20, 2019, the ALJ entered a decision finding
Plaintiff not disabled from June 9, 2016, the alleged onset date, through December
31, 2018, the date last insured. (Tr. 15-28).
Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision, but the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request on February 20, 2020. (Tr. 1-5). Plaintiff initiated the
instant action by Complaint (Doc. 1) filed on April 23, 2020, and the case is ripe for
review. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge
for all proceedings. (Doc. 19).
D. Summary of ALJ’s Decision
In this matter, the ALJ found Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements
of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2018. (Tr. 17). At step one of the
sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since June 9, 2016, the alleged onset date, through his date last
insured of December 31, 2018. (Tr. 17). At step two, through the date last insured,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “obesity, spinal
disorders.” (Tr. 17). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526). (Tr. 19).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following
RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the
claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform less
than the full range of light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §]
404.1567(b). The claimant can occasionally lift or carry 20
pounds and frequently lift or carry 10 pounds. Sit for a period
of 6 hours, stand for a period of 6 hours, walk for a period of 6
hours and push/pull as much as they can lift or carry. The
claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, occasionally
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can have
frequent exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical
parts, humidity and wetness, and vibration.
(Tr. 20). At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was capable of performing his past
relevant work as a real estate agent. (Tr. 28). The ALJ further found this work did
not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff’s RFC.
(Tr. 28). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from June
9, 2016, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018, the date last insured.
(Tr. 28).
II. Analysis
On appeal, Plaintiff raises three issues: (1) whether the ALJ’s finding
concerning Plaintiff’s subjective complaints was supported by substantial evidence;
(2) whether the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform light work was supported
by substantial evidence; and (3) whether the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s mental
issues cause no work limitations is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 22, p.
16, 36, 39). The Court will address each issue in turn.
A. Whether the ALJ’s finding concerning Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints was supported by substantial evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide a sufficient explanation or good
reasons why she found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence
in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Doc. 22, p. 19; Tr. 22).
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s summary of the medical records following this
statement strongly support his allegations and are not inconsistent with them. (Doc.
22, p. 19-20).
A claimant may establish that he is disabled through his own testimony of
pain or other subjective symptoms. Ross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 858,
867 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)).
In such a case, a claimant must establish:
“(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2)
objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the
alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity
that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged
pain.”
Id. (quoting Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210).
When evaluating a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ should consider: “(1) the
claimant’s daily activities; (2) the ‘duration, frequency, and intensity’ of the
claimant’s symptoms; (3) ‘[p]recipitating and aggravating factors’; (4) the
effectiveness and side effects of any medications; and (5) treatment or other
measures taken by the claimant to alleviate symptoms.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c), 416.929(c)(3)). The ALJ must consider these factors given all of the
evidence of record. Id. And if the ALJ discredits this testimony, then the ALJ “‘must
clearly articulate explicit and adequate reasons for’ doing so.” Id. (quoting Dyer, 395
F.3d at 1210). The ALJ may consider the consistency of the claimant’s statements
along with the rest of the record in order to reach this determination. Id. “A clearly
articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record will
not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th
Cir. 1995)); see also Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir.
2014). And an ALJ’s decision will be affirmed as long as the decision is not a “broad
rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ
considered [the claimant’s] medical condition as a whole.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211
(quotation and backets omitted).
While the ALJ determined at one point that Plaintiff’s statements concerning
intensity, persistence, and the limiting effects of these symptoms was not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence, (Tr. 22), later in the decision the ALJ repeated
this statement and provided reasons for it. (Tr. 27).1 The ALJ found that the presence
of pain is undisputed, but there is little medical evidence to support that the
limitations “are of the chronicity and severity that [Plaintiff] alleges.” (Tr. 27). The
ALJ determined the longitudinal history of Plaintiff’s medical records show routine
and conservative treatment of his back issues. (Tr. 27). In support of this statement,
the ALJ noted Plaintiff made infrequent trips to the doctor for the allegedly disabling
symptoms. (Tr. 27). He also had no hospitalizations for any physical issues,
including back pain, shoulder pain, knee pain, or issues related to diabetes. (Tr. 27).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored the fact that Plaintiff had no medical
insurance since 2016 and had to pay out-of-pocket for each visit and for medications.
(Doc. 22, p. 24). In evaluating a plaintiff’s symptoms and their functional effect, “the
1 The ALJ’s decision unintentionally omitted the word “not” in the following sentence, but from
the context, the meaning is clear: “After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned
finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are [not] supported by the medical evidence of
record.” (Tr. 25-26).
ALJ may not draw any inferences about an individual’s symptoms and their
functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue medical treatment without first
considering any explanations that might explain the failure to seek or pursue
treatment.” Beegle v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com’r, 482 F. App’x 483, 487 (11th Cir.
2012). An ALJ must consider evidence showing a plaintiff is unable to afford
medical care before denying benefits based on non-compliance with care. Id. (citing
Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003)). When an ALJ relies on
noncompliance with prescribed medical treatment as the “sole ground for the denial
of disability benefits,” and the record contains evidence that a plaintiff was unable
to afford the prescribed medical treatment, then the ALJ must determine whether a
plaintiff could afford the prescribed medical treatment. Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1275. If
a court determines the failure to follow prescribed medical treatment is not one of
the “principal factors in the ALJ’s decision,” then the ALJ is not required to delve
into a plaintiff’s ability to pay, and this failure is not reversible error. Brown v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 425 F. App’x 813, 817 (11th Cir. 2011).
At the hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff why he did not have the recommended
lumbar and possible cervical surgery. (Tr. 48-49). Plaintiff responded that he did not
have the money or insurance to have the surgery. (Tr. 49). In the decision, the ALJ
acknowledged that doctors recommended back surgery, but Plaintiff wanted to
obtain insurance before discussing any further surgery (Tr. 21, 23). Thus, the ALJ
was aware of Plaintiff’s financial circumstances. As summarized by the ALJ, and
even with these financial constraints, Plaintiff was able to visit doctors as needed,
able to obtain medication refills, and never sought hospitalization for his complaints.
(Tr. 22-26). Moreover, the ALJ did not deny benefits solely on Plaintiff not
following a prescribed treatment plan.
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was prescribed and took appropriate
medications for the alleged impairments, and the record suggests the medications
“have been relatively effective in controlling the claimant’s symptoms.” (Tr. 27).
Plaintiff argues the evidence shows that he repeatedly stated that the medications did
not help to control the pain. (Doc. 22, p. 25). At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that
the medications do not really help with the pain, but they numb the brain to allow
him to get some rest and afford some help when he sleeps. (Tr. 52). Plaintiff cites
one medical record where he told Maurice Tom Pack, M.D. that two of his pain
medications were not helping with the pain. (Tr. 329). Plaintiff also told consultative
examiner, Dr. Ricardo Varas, that the pain medications prescribed by his doctors
gave him only mild relief. (Tr. 364). In the Supplemental Pain Questionnaire,
however, Plaintiff stated that his pain was relieved in part by pain medication, which
dulls the pain for 1-2 hours. (Tr. 20, 282). Further, arguably Plaintiff continues
obtaining prescriptions for pain medications and, if as ineffective as Plaintiff claims,
then there is no explanation as to why he continues to seek them. (See, e.g., Tr. 337,
340, 357).
The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff is generally described to be in no acute
distress and ambulates without use of an assistive device. (Tr. 27). Plaintiff does not
challenge the factual basis for these statements. (Doc. 22, p. 25-26). Rather, Plaintiff
questions these statements and argues that being in “no acute distress,” means “no
obvious sign of acute illness or injury” and a person who appears in “no acute
distress” may appear well or may appear “with a serious chronic condition not visible
to the naked eye, such as chronic pain . . .” (Doc. 22, p. 26). Likewise, Plaintiff
argues the finding that he ambulates without a cane is not inconsistent with his
subjective complaints, especially when he has used a cane or crutch at times. (Doc.
22, p. 26).
Factually, the ALJ’s findings are supported by the evidence of record and
Plaintiff does not contest these findings. In further support, the ALJ found:
At the consultative evaluation, motor strength was 5/5 in all
extremities, and sensation was intact to pinprick and touch over
upper and lower extremities. Forward flexion, extension,
lateral flexion and rotation of the lumbar spine were limited
with tenderness noted. However, range of motion of the
cervical spine, shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands, knees, hips,
and ankles, were within normal limits. Although the presence
of pain is undisputed, there is little medical evidence of record
to support a determination that his limitations are of the
chronicity and severity that he alleges. The record does not
contain any opinions from treating or examining physicians
indicating that the claimant is disabled or even has limitations
greater than the ones determined in this decision.
(Tr. 27). Nor has Plaintiff cited to any treating or examining physicians who have
indicated that he has limitations greater than those accounted for in the RFC and
decision. For these reasons, the Court finds the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Whether the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform light work
was supported by substantial evidence
Plaintiff argues that ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff capable of performing his
past relevant work as a real estate agent, which required the ability to perform work
at a light exertional level. (Doc. 22, p. 36). Plaintiff claims substantial evidence does
not support this finding. (Doc. 22, p. 36).
Prior to step four, the ALJ must assess Plaintiff’s RFC, which is the most he
can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). It consists of a claimant’s
“impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such as pain, [that] may cause physical
and mental limitations that affect what [a claimant] can do in a work setting.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). An ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s]
residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in
the action. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), (3). So the ALJ must consider
all of a claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not
“severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2); Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245,
1268 (11th Cir. 2019). “The ALJ makes this determination by considering a
claimant’s physical, mental, and other abilities affected by the impairment.” Id.
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b)-(d)).
Plaintiff argues the medical evidence does not support that he is able to stand
and walk for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour day, a requirement for a full range of
light work. (Doc. 22, p. 36). Plaintiff cites consultative medical examiner, Dr.
Varas’s conclusion that Plaintiff “was able to ambulate, had difficulty, but did not
require assistive device.” (Doc. 22, p. 36; Tr. 369). Dr. Varas noted Plaintiff had
difficulty getting up and out of the chair due to back pain, had difficulty getting on
and off the exam tables due to back pain, had difficulty ambulating but did not use
an assistive device, and had abnormal gait that was markedly antalgic due to
kyphosis (curvature of the spine). (Doc. 22, p. 36; Tr. 366). Even though Dr. Varas
noted these difficulties during the examination, he only found Plaintiff limited in the
ability to bend or stoop, which the ALJ accounted for in the RFC. (Tr. 20, 369).
While Plaintiff suggests Dr. Varas’ examination findings support greater limitations,
Dr. Varas made no such findings. For these reasons, the ALJ’s RFC finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
C. Whether the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s mental issues cause no
work limitations is supported by substantial evidence
Plaintiff claims that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding
that Plaintiff’s mental issues do not cause more than minimal limitations in his
ability to perform basic mental work activities. (Doc. 22, p. 39). Plaintiff relies on
consultative examiner Sara Malowitz’s Psy.D.’s Psychological Evaluation. (Doc.
22, p. 39-40). Specifically, Plaintiff cites Dr. Malowitz’s findings that Plaintiff’s
mental health symptoms “would best be characterized as moderate,” and her
summary that his mental health symptoms “appear to be moderately impacting
activities of daily living, vocational performance, and interpersonal interactions.
Current prognosis for Mr. Phillips is guarded.” (Doc. 22, p. 39). Plaintiff also argues
that the ALJ cannot rely on non-examining agency psychologists because their
opinions are entitled to little weight and do not constitute substantial evidence. (Doc.
22, p. 39-40).
The same legal authority concerning an RFC determination applies to the
present issue. Basically, “[t]he ALJ makes this determination by considering a
claimant’s physical, mental, and other abilities affected by the impairment.” Schink
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019). (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(b)-(d)). Here, Dr. Malowitz conducted a consultative Psychological
Evaluation in August 2017. (Tr. 353-55). Dr. Malowitz noted that Plaintiff reported
his current mental health condition as being remarkable for anxiety. (Tr. 354).
Plaintiff denied having any significant history of mental health treatment. (Tr. 354).
Dr. Malowitz found, “[t]he current level of mental health symptoms would best be
characterized as moderate.” (Tr. 354). Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Malowitz that
his last “job ended because of his physical difficulties. The longest job was 8 years.
He is unable to return to work because of the severity of his physical problems.” (Tr.
354).
On examination, Dr. Malowitz found Plaintiff alert and oriented to person,
place, situation, and time, and found no gross gait abnormalities. (Tr. 354). The rate
and quality of speech was unremarkable, and the content was relevant, coherent, and
logical. (Tr. 354). Plaintiff demonstrated good attention and concentration, his
mental flexibility appeared good, and he could complete simple calculations at an
appropriate processing speed. (Tr. 354). He completed all verbal commands without
error and all written tasks as well. (Tr. 355). His immediate and remote memory
appeared to be good, but his recent memory appeared to be moderately impaired
because he was able to recall only 1 of 3 words presented after a short delay. (Tr.
355). Dr. Malowitz found Plaintiff had: good mental computation skills; adequate
social skills, adequate abstract reasoning, judgment, and insight; his overall
intelligence was average; his general thought processes coherent, logical and goal
directed; his thought form and content age appropriate and unremarkable; no history
of suicidal or homicidal attempts or ideations; and no hallucinations or delusions.
(Tr. 355). Even with these generally normal findings, Dr. Malowitz concluded
Plaintiff’s “mental health symptoms based on report and clinical observations appear
to be moderately impacting activities of daily living, vocational performance, and
interpersonal interactions. Current prognosis for Mr. Phillips is guarded. In regards
to financial management, Mr. Phillips is recommended to manage benefits and
financial decisions.” (Tr. 355). She included no specific work-related or other
limitations.
The ALJ thoroughly summarized Dr. Malowitz’s findings, including her
finding that Plaintiff’s recent memory appeared to be moderately impaired. (Tr. 24-
25). The ALJ credited the opinions of State Agency psychologists, James Levasseur,
Ph.D. and Richard K. Lyon, Ph.D. who both determined Plaintiff’s mental
impairments were not severe. (Tr. 26). The ALJ found these opinions supported by
the record because Plaintiff’s routine mental health treatment was provided by his
primary care provider and he had generally normal mental status examinations
during his clinical visits. (Tr. 26). The ALJ found the records supports Plaintiff’s
ability to function independently. (Tr. 26, 27). The ALJ also found:
There is no credible indications of psychosis, thought disorder,
or malignant psychopathology. Mental status examinations
showed that recent and remote memory functions are grossly
intact, the claimant is well oriented, and he has no overtly
unusual behaviors or mannerisms. Medications are prescribed
by his primary care doctor and he is not currently engaged in
outpatient mental health treatment. There is no documented
history of inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations. The record
does not suggest that his daily living skills, relational abilities,
or cognitive efficacy, is routinely or especially, affected by
psychological symptoms. The records support that the mental
medically determinable impairments do not significantly limit
his overall functionality or ability to do basic work activities.
(Tr. 27). The ALJ thoroughly reviewed the medical records in evidence and
considered: Plaintiff’s mental status examinations were generally normal; his
primary care doctor prescribed his medications for his mental impairments; he was
not treated by a mental health professional; and his daily living skills, relational
abilities, or cognitive efficacy were not routinely affected by his psychological
symptoms. For these reasons, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's mental impairments
did not affect his ability to do basic work activity. Plaintiff also reported he was
unable to return to work due to physical not mental problems, and Dr. Malowitz
included no work-related limitations based on Plaintiff's mental impairments in her
Psychological Evaluation. (Tr. 354). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC
assessment as to Plaintiff’s mental health impairments.
Hl. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion, terminate
all deadlines, and close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 20, 2021.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties