Hall v. Poppell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

WENDALL HALL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:20-cv-380-JES-MRM

CHAD POPPELL, DONALD SAWYER,

ELIZABETH PORFERT, PATRICK

MCCAWLEY, and JON CARNER,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on consideration of the

following:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Failure

to Serve (Doc. 32, filed Feb. 26, 2021);

Plaintiff’s Motion for the Marshal to Serve

Defendant Chad Poppell (Doc. 33, filed Feb.

26, 2021);

Defendants Donald Sawyer, Elizabeth Porfert;

Patrick McCawley, and Jon Carner’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc.

35, filed March 29, 2021);

Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to

Defendants Donald Sawyer, Elizabeth Porfert;

Patrick McCawley, and Jon Carner’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc.

36, filed April 8, 2021);

Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment

against Defendant Poppell (Doc. 38, filed

April 21, 2021); and

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc.

40, filed May 14, 2021).

For the reasons given in this Order, the defendants’ motion

to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted in part and

denied in part. All claims against Defendant Sawyer are dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

All retaliation claims against Defendants Porfert, McCawley, and

Carner are dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff filing the

retaliation claims in a new action if Plaintiff’s disciplinary

reports are overturned. The motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s

procedural due process claims against Defendants Porfert,

McCawley, and Carner, and these defendants shall file an answer to

Plaintiff’s amended complaint within twenty-one days from the date

of this Order.

On its own motion, the Court dismisses Defendant Secretary

Chad Poppell from this action for Plaintiff’s failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

I. Procedural History and Pleadings

Plaintiff initiated this action on May 26, 2020 by filing a

pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 9) is the operative pleading

before the Court.

Plaintiff is civilly committed to the Florida Civil

Commitment Center (“FCCC”) under the Sexually Violent Predators

Act (“SVPA”). Fla. Stat. §§ 394.910–.913.1 He was committed on

October 18, 2019 and was diagnosed with “a mental abnormality,

personality disorder, and lack of volitional control and an

exhibitionist mental disorder or an exhibitioners disorder

(masturbation disorder), suicide ideation, and depression.” (Doc.

9 at ¶ 21).

Liberally construing his amended complaint, Plaintiff raises

claims against Department of Children and Family Services

Secretary Chad Poppell2 and FCCC Director Donald Sawyer because

the FCCC has an unconstitutional policy that punishes residents

who violate institutional rules. (Doc. 9 at 3). Plaintiff raises

claims against FCCC Security Chief Jon Carner and FCCC Clinicians

Patrick McCawley and Elizabeth Porfert for retaliating against him

for filing lawsuits and grievances. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff

argues that Defendants Carner, McCawley, and Porfert violated

procedural due process by failing to provide advance written notice

1 Under the SVPA, a person found to be a sexually violent

predator must be housed in a secure facility “for control, care,

treatment, and rehabilitation of criminal offenders, until such

time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder

has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at large.”

Fla. Stat. § 394.917(2).

2 The Court takes notice that, Shevaun Harris is now the

Secretary of the Department of Children and Families. See

https://www.myflfamilies.com/about-us/office-secretary/ However,

because Chad Poppell, the former Secretary, is dismissed from the

action, the Court will not direct the Clerk to change the name of

the defendant.

of disciplinary charges against him or an opportunity for him to

present witnesses at his hearing on the charges. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that the FCCC uses a disciplinary

confinement procedure (PRG-11) similar to that of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC), “with similar rules and

penalties for violations thereof.” (Doc. 9 at ¶ 3). He asserts

that Defendant Donald Sawyer “created and implemented PRG-11.”

(Id. at ¶ 7).

Plaintiff describes the FCCC’s progressive disciplinary

system (PRG-11) as calling for a disciplinary report followed by

placement in lockdown status, and “retribution” for the rule

infraction. (Doc. 9 at ¶ 16). He contrasts this system with the

regressive discipline “delineated in CF Operating Procedure 1455-

20.” (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff urges that in a “regressive

disciplinary system the resident receives an incident report and

is placed on time out, temporary restraint, or temporary seclusion

and a mental health professional immediately evaluates the

resident to determine if it’s safe to release him from said

status.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the Florida statutes

require Defendant Poppell to “exercise executive and

administrative supervision” over the FCCC and that the services

rendered at the FCCC are governed by both the Baker Act and the

SVPA. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9).

Plaintiff asserts that PRG-11 was wrongfully used to “punish”

3

him at the FCCC on two occasions. First, on May 1, 2020, Defendant

Porfert wrote a disciplinary report against Plaintiff for a lewd

and lascivious act (masturbating). (Doc. 9 at ¶ 22). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Porfert could not have seen Plaintiff’s

hands or penis, as they were hidden behind the bathroom stall door.

(Id.) He asserts that the disciplinary report was in retaliation

for filing grievances and lawsuits against Defendant Porfert and

her friends. (Id.)

Next, on May 4, 2020, Plaintiff was on suicide observation

status in an isolation cell. (Doc. 9 at ¶ 24). Defendant McCawley

wrote a disciplinary report against Plaintiff for “disrespect or

violation of institutional rules or verbal assault[.]” (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that the disciplinary report was false and made

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s lawsuits against “Ms. Salema and

Donald Sawyer.” (Id.)

On May 14, 2020, Defendant Carner found Plaintiff guilty of

both disciplinary reports and placed him on secure management.

(Doc. 9 at ¶ 25). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Carner found

him guilty in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievances and lawsuits.

3 Plaintiff also appears to argue that the FCCC defendants

failed to comply with PRG-11 when they responded to his

disciplinary infractions. The Court will address Plaintiff’s

claim regarding the constitutionality pf PRG-11 separately from

his claims of procedural due process and retribution.

(Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he did not receive a copy of either

disciplinary report and was denied an opportunity to obtain

witnesses or witness statements in his defense. (Id. at ¶ 26).

Plaintiff seeks five million dollars in damages, a permanent

injunction disallowing the FCCC from “issuing and writing

disciplinary reports against” any FCCC resident, and a permanent

injunction, forcing the FCCC to use other disciplinary procedures.

(Doc. 9 at 11). He also asks that the Court expunge all of his

disciplinary reports and “release him from secure management and

wing restriction and confinements.” (Id.)

The FCCC defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,

arguing that FCCC staff are best equipped to make decisions

regarding the administration of the facility and that “plaintiff

is improperly attempting to challenge the rule making authority of

the staff at the Florida Civil Commitment Center.” (Doc. 35 at

6–8). The defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims are “without any factual basis to support his conclusory

allegations.” (Id. at 8).

II. Standards of Review

A. Motions to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all the

plausible factual allegations in the complaint and construes them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. BellSouth

Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Further,

this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences

from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health

& Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990) (“On a motion

to dismiss, the facts stated in [the] complaint and all reasonable

inferences therefrom are taken as true.”) However, the Supreme

Court has explained that factual allegations must be more than

speculative as follows:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the grounds of his entitlement to

relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, courts are not

“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court,

referring to its earlier decision in Twombly, set forth a two-

pronged approach to evaluating motions to dismiss. First, a

reviewing court must determine whether a plaintiff’s allegation is

merely an unsupported legal conclusion that is not entitled to an

assumption of truth. Next, the court must determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Evaluating a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Id.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A federal district court is required to review a civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint

that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section 1915(e)(2) is

a screening process to be applied on the Court’s initiative at any

time during the proceeding.

Dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii) for failure to

state a claim are governed by the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112

F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997).

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendants

Chad Poppell or Donald Sawyer.

The Court first considers whether Plaintiff has stated a

plausible claim against the Secretary of the Department of Children

and Families or FCCC Director Sawyer based upon the promulgation

and use of policy PRG-11 in disciplinary proceedings.

In Hall v. Poppell, No. 2:19-cv-878-FtM-38NPM, 2020 WL 814001

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2020) (“Hall I”), Plaintiff filed a virtually

identical lawsuit against Defendant Poppell in which he claimed

that he received a disciplinary report under PRG-11 for refusing

to stop moving his legs while sitting after being warned to stop.

Id. at *1. Plaintiff argued that his due process rights were

violated because the FCCC used a similar method of addressing

disciplinary infractions as the FDOC, and, because a prison is per

se punitive, use of this procedure at the FCCC was also per se

punitive and violated his constitutional rights. Id. The Court

concluded that Plaintiff had failed to state a plausible claim

under section 1983 and dismissed the complaint on initial

screening:

Due process requires that the conditions of

confinement of a non-prisoner not amount to

punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 535 (1979). Whether a condition of

confinement amounts to “punishment” depends on

whether the challenged condition is imposed

for punishment or whether it is incident to

some other legitimate government purpose.

Id. at 50 [sic], 535, 538 n. 16. Although not

a prisoner, sexually violent predators, like

other civil detainees, are unquestionably

subject to security measures like those

employed by corrections officials. See id.

at 540; see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.

364, 373–74 (1986) (detainees may “be

subjected to conditions that advance goals

such as preventing escape and assuring the

safety of others, even though they may not be

punished.”). Other than Hall’s conclusory

allegation that PRG-11 is punitive, the

Amended Complaint is devoid of factual

allegations from which the Court can plausibly

construe that PRF-11 is intended to punish

Hall.

Further, Hall’s argument that his status

should be compared to mentally ill individuals

committed under the Baker Act is similarly

unpersuasive. The state legislature

expressly recognized that commitment under the

Baker Act was “inappropriate” for individuals

sought to be committed under the SVPA.

Significantly, in its statement of “findings

and intent,” the state legislature said that

the SVPA was aimed at “a small but extremely

dangerous number of sexually violent predators

. . . who do not have a mental disease or

defect that renders them appropriate for

involuntary treatment under the Baker Act (§§

394.451–394.4789, Fla. Stat.)” § 94.910,

FLA. STAT. (2000); see also Westerheide v.

State, 831 So. 2d 93, 112 (Fla. 2002)

(rejecting plaintiff’s equal protection

argument on the basis, inter alia, that it

“rests on the false premise that individuals

subject to commitment under the [SVPA] are

similarly situated to mentally ill persons

committed under the Baker Act.”). See also

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)

(“we have sustained civil commitment statutes

when they have coupled proof of dangerousness

with the proof of some additional factor such

as mental illness or mental abnormality”)

(internal quotations omitted). Thus, Hall’s

status as [a] civilly committed person under

the SVPA is not analogous to a person

committed under the Baker Act.

(Hall I at *2–3). As in Hall I, Plaintiff again argues that PRG-

11 is designed to punish residents for the objectionable behavior

they engage in while confined at the FCCC and is, therefore, per

se unconstitutional. (Doc. 9 at 7).

Plaintiff attached a copy of PRG-11 to his response to the

defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 36-1 at 13). The stated

purpose of PRG-11 is as follows:

The purpose of this policy is to provide a

process to maintain a safe and orderly

environment for residents and staff by

establishing facility rules and guidelines to

reflect what behavior is expected from the

resident population. It is necessary for

facility staff to have a system in place to

manage resident behavior by imposing

corrective measures on those residents whose

behavior is not in compliance with facility

rules while offering additional privileges to

residents who maintain appropriate behavior.

The behavior management system is intended to

modify maladaptive behavior, promote safety

and security, encourage the acceptance of

responsibility for one’s actions, and

positively influence the future decision

making abilities of residents. When safe and

appropriate, resident behavior shall be

managed by progressive corrective measures.

(Id.) Notably, the stated purpose of PRG-11 is to maintain

security and control over resident behavior, not to punish the

residents for their past behavior. Plaintiff appears to suggest

that FCCC residents should suffer no repercussions from engaging

in disruptive behavior while at the FCCC. However, that would not

provide a safe environment at the facility and is contrary to the

SVPA’s purpose of ensuring “long-term mental health treatment for

sexual predators and protection of the public from them[.]”

Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 104 (2002).

Because the Court cannot plausibly construe PRG-11 as

punishing the FCCC residents for being sexually violent predators

(as opposed to violating rules), the policy does not violate

Plaintiff’s due process rights. The Court adopts the reasoning

from Hall I, and any claims against Defendant Secretary Poppell or

Defendant Sawyer based upon PRG-11 are dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

4

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Because Plaintiff makes no other plausible factual

allegations against either of these defendants, they are dismissed

from this action for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against

them on which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Plaintiff will be allowed to develop his procedural due

process claims against Defendants Porfert, McCawley, and

Carner.

Plaintiff alleges that all disciplinary report charges

against him were false and made in retaliation for Plaintiff filing

grievances and lawsuits against the accusers’ friends. (Doc. 9

at ¶¶ 22, 24). Plaintiff also asserts that no staff member

delivered a copy of either disciplinary report to him or provided

him with notice of the charges and that he was not allowed to

obtain witnesses in his defense. (Id. at ¶ 26). The defendants

did not address Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims in their

motion to dismiss.

4 Notably, this issue has already been extensively litigated

in this Court, not only in Hall I, but in similar complaints filed

by other FCCC residents, with the same outcomes. See, e.g., Vega

v. Kapusta, No. 2:19-cv-717-FtM-29MRM, 2020 WL 836274 (M.D. Fla.

Feb. 20, 2020); Wagner v. Poppell, No. 2:19-cv-810-FtM-38MRM, 2020

WL 871102 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2020); Scott v. Poppell, No. 2:20-

cv-4-FtM-38MRM, 2020 WL 6746255 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2020).

The filing of a false disciplinary charge, standing alone,

does not state a constitutional claim. The Constitution requires

only that the plaintiff be afforded due process at the

institutional hearing (on the allegedly false charge), which

represents the plaintiff’s opportunity to expose falsities or

inaccuracies. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir.

1986) (recognizing that the protections from actions such as false

disciplinary reports are found in “the procedural due process

requirements as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell”).

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the United States

Supreme Court described the minimum due process requirements for

prisoners who receive discipline that results in the loss of good-

time credits or the imposition of solitary confinement.5 These

5 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is not a prisoner. The

Supreme Court has concluded that, as a general rule, civil

detainees are “entitled to more considerate treatment and

conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of

confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.

307, 322 (1982). Indeed, the involuntarily civilly committed have

liberty interests under the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom

from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate

training as might be required to ensure safety and freedom from

restraint. Id. The Eleventh Circuit similarly has held that

“Youngberg establishes that the due process rights of the

involuntarily civilly committed are at least as extensive as the

Eighth Amendment rights of the criminally institutionalized, and

therefore, relevant case law in the Eighth Amendment context also

serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of the

civilly committed.” Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 863

(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041

(11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the case

law that has developed under the Eighth Amendment also sets forth

protections include advance written notice of the charges,

adequate time to prepare a defense, an opportunity to present

witnesses and evidence, and a written statement by the factfinder

explaining the reasons for the decision. Id. In addition, the

decision-maker must be sufficiently impartial so as not to present

“a hazard of arbitrary decisionmaking.” Id. at 571. Moreover,

“the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence

supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board [to impose

a penalty.]” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 455 (1985).

Even a defendant’s failure to comply with these procedural

protections does not automatically give rise to a due process

claim. The Supreme Court has explained that Wolff due process

claims are limited to situations where a defendant’s actions caused

an “atypical significant deprivation” in which a State might

conceivably have created a liberty interest. See Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). In other words, a defendant’s

failure to follow each Wolff procedural requirement violates the

Constitution only when the failure resulted in the deprivation of

the plaintiff’s interest in life, liberty, or property. Wilkinson

v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“The 14th Amendment’s Due

Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life,

the contours of the due process rights of the civilly committed.

Id.

liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural

protection must establish that one of these interests is at

stake.”)

Plaintiff urges that the disciplinary reports resulted in

sixty days’ confinement and wing restriction. (Doc. 9 at ¶ 27).6

Generally, short periods of disciplinary confinement do not

constitute a protected liberty interest. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at

486 (concluding that thirty days of disciplinary confinement did

not give rise to a protected liberty interest); Rodgers v.

Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that

two months in administrative confinement did not constitute a

deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest).

However, at this stage of litigation, and because the actual

restrictions imposed by “confinement and wing restriction” are

unclear, Plaintiff will be allowed to develop his claim of

inadequate procedural due process in his disciplinary proceedings.

6 Plaintiff also speculates that the discipline reports could

be used in the future to deny his release from the FCCC. (Doc. 9

at ¶ 27). However, this is not the type of liberty interested

protected by, and requiring, a Wolff-style hearing. See Sandin,

515 U.S. at 487 (“[T]he chance that a finding of misconduct [in

prison] will alter the balance [in a parole hearing] is simply too

attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process

Clause”).

C. Plaintiff has not stated retaliation claims against

Defendants Porfert, McCawley, or Carner.

Finally, the defendants assert that Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims “contain conclusory allegations of retaliatory motives

without any factual basis to support his conclusory allegations.”

(Doc. 35 at 8). The Court agrees. Plaintiff urges that Defendant

Porfert accused him of masturbating while looking at her “to

retaliate against Plaintiff for filing grievances against her and

for filing a lawsuit.” (Doc. 9 at ¶ 22). He asserts that

Defendant McCawley “falsely accus[ed] Plaintiff of making cursing

and disrespectful statements about staff members, who were not

present at the time, to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing

lawsuits against Ms. Salema and Donald Sawyer.” (Id. at ¶ 24).

He asserts that Defendant Carner found Plaintiff guilty of the

disciplinary reports “to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing

grievances against his friend or girlfriend Ms. Porfert and for

filing lawsuits against his friends Donald Sawyer and Emily

Salema.” (Id. at ¶ 25). These conclusory statements about the

defendants’ retaliatory motives do not raise this claim above the

speculative level. See Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 375 F. App’x

905, 911 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that “conclusory allegations are

not entitled to a presumption of truth”) (citing Iqbal, 129 U.S.

at 1951).

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot maintain a First Amendment

retaliation claim if he “is found guilty of an actual disciplinary

infraction after being afforded due process and there was evidence

to support the disciplinary panel’s fact finding[.]” O’Bryant v.

Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original).

This is because a determination of whether the disciplinary report

made a false accusation is a question of fact that is decided by

the disciplinary panel. Id. Plaintiff was found guilty of the

actual disciplinary infractions at issue. And, while Plaintiff

challenges the due process provided at his hearing, his retaliation

claims are premature because the reports have not been overturned.

Plaintiff will be allowed to develop his First Amendment

retaliation claims if (and after) the disciplinary reports are

overturned.

Accordingly, although the conclusory retaliation claims are

dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be

granted, the dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff re-

raising supported claims of retaliation in a new complaint if the

disciplinary reports are overturned.

IV. Conclusions

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. Defendants Jon Carner, Patrick McCawley, Elizabeth

Porfert, and Donald Sawyer’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

a. The motion is GRANTED as to Defendant Sawyer. All

claims against Defendant Sawyer are dismissed with

prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Clerk

of Court is directed to terminate Donald Sawyer as a

defendant in this action.

b. The motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s First

Amendment retaliation claims. All retaliation claims

are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which

relief can be granted. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The

dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff raising

retaliation claims in a new action if his disciplinary

reports are overturned.

c. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s procedural due

process claims against Defendants Carner, McCawley,

and Porfert.

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Secretary Poppell

are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Secretary

Poppell as a defendant in this action.

3. Because there are no remaining claims against Defendant

Poppell, Plaintiff’s Motion to Serve Defendant Poppell

(Doc. 33) and Motion for Default Judgment against

Defendant Poppell (Doc. 38) are DENIED as moot.

4, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Serve

the FCCC Plaintiffs (Doc. 32) is DENIED as moot.

5. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 40) is

DENIED as premature. The defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Doc. 39) is GRANTED.

6. Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling (44) is GRANTED to the

extent set forth in this Order.

7. Defendants Carner, McCawley, and Porfert shall file an

answer to the remaining claims against them within

TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS from the date of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 13, 2021.

J me Ae

: le hy ) Zz. A, ob

adi EF. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-2

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

19