Williams v. Jones (Duval County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MERLIN WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:18-cv-1103-TJC-JBT

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is proceeding on a pro

se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, filed on

September 10, 2018 (mailbox rule). See Doc. 1.1 He challenges a state court

(Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for first degree murder, robbery

with a deadly weapon, and grand theft auto, for which he is serving life

imprisonment. Id. at 1. Respondents filed a Response with exhibits. See Doc. 8.2

Petitioner filed a Reply. See Doc. 10. This case is ripe for review.

1 The Court cites to the page numbers as assigned by the Court’s electronic case

filing system.

2 The Court cites to the exhibits, see Docs. 8-1 to 8-10, as “Ex.”

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions

as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,

and not as a means of error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S.

34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See

Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the

state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the

merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale. It should then

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the

same reasoning. But the State may rebut the

presumption by showing that the unexplained

affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as

alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or

argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the

record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted

“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for

evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation

marks omitted). “It bears repeating that even a strong

case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary

conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The

Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal

courts that an unreasonable application of law requires

more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g.,

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give

proper deference to state courts by conflating error

(even clear error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

citations modified).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Courts employ a two-part test when reviewing

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. A court considering

a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a “strong

presumption” that counsel’s representation was

within the “wide range” of reasonable professional

assistance. Id. at 689. The challenger’s burden is to

show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. It is not enough

“to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on

the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Counsel’s

errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at

687.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (internal citations modified).

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the

Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.

2010). Both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a

Sixth Amendment violation; thus, “a court need not address the performance

prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.

(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). “If it is easier

to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is afforded great

deference.

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is

a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. But

“[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of

Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the

more difficult. The standards created by Strickland

and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when

the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Id.

(citations and quotation marks omitted). “The

question is not whether a federal court believes the

state court’s determination under the Strickland

standard was incorrect but whether that

determination was unreasonable - a substantially

higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.

111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is

“any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard,” then a federal

court may not disturb a state-court decision denying

the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal

citations modified). In other words, “[i]n addition to the deference to counsel’s

performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer of

deference—this one to a state court’s decision—when we are considering

whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s decision.” Rutherford

v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As such, “[s]urmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

371 (2010).

III. Analysis

A. Ground One

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress the videotape of his confession because it was taken in

violation of his Miranda3 rights. See Doc. 1 at 5-10. Petitioner raised this claim

as ground three in his state post-conviction proceedings pursuant to Florida

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state court denied the claim, finding in

pertinent part:

In Ground Three, Defendant avers counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a Motion to Suppress the

police interrogation video. In support of this

contention, Defendant maintains the police obtained

incriminating evidence in violation of his Miranda

rights. Defendant asserts he made an unequivocal

request for an attorney, but was never provided an

attorney before the police reinitiated the

interrogation. . . .

At the commencement of Defendant’s

interrogation, the detectives read Defendant his

Miranda rights and Defendant issued a written

waiver. After being confronted with portions of [(co-

defendant)] Jerrell’s confession, Defendant exclaimed,

“Well, I definitely need to get me a lawyer now.” The

detectives then advised Defendant to knock on the

door if he wanted to talk again, but explained they had

to leave the room as Defendant asked for an attorney.

The detectives then left the room. Defendant then

reinitiated the conversation. Before continuing the

interrogation, however, the detectives clarified

Defendant wanted to speak to them, to which

Defendant responded with “of course I do.[”]

Thereafter, the detectives reread Defendant’s Miranda

rights and Defendant issued a second written waiver.

Based on this evidence, it is clear the detectives

immediately stopped questioning upon Defendant’s

invocation of Miranda rights and Defendant was the

one to reinitiate the conversation. Defendant then

properly waived those rights for a second time. As

such, a motion to suppress based on a Miranda

violation would have been meritless and counsel

cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless

objection. . . . Ground Three is denied.

Ex. C1 at 279-81 (internal citations omitted). Petitioner appealed, and the First

District Court of Appeal (DCA) per curiam affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s

Rule 3.850 motions without issuing a written opinion, and subsequently denied

Petitioner’s requests for rehearing. See Ex. C2; Williams v. State of Florida, No.

1D17-1672 (Fla. 1st DCA).

Upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law, this Court

concludes that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to

clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Indeed, during the

trial, the video of the interrogation was played for the jury. In pertinent part,

the following exchange among Petitioner and the detectives occurred:

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I definitely need to

get me a lawyer now.

DETECTIVE BARKER: Look, if you want to

talk knock on the door and you can ask me and I’ll be

more than happy to come in and reinitiate, okay? I

can’t talk to you right now. If you change your mind

and you want to talk to me knock on the door. I’ll come

in here, advise you of your rights and we’ll start going

again, but right now I can’t talk with you, okay?

THE DEFENDANT: Why is that?

DETECTIVE BARKER: Because you just asked

for an attorney.

THE DEFENDANT: Golly.

DETECTIVE BARKER: Okay. If you change

your mind and want to talk about - - (Inaudible).

(Detectives exit interview room.)

DETECTIVE KUCZKOWSKI: Yeah?

THE DEFENDANT: I - -

DETECTIVE KUCZKOWSKI: What?

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know. I just - - I need

to - - I need ya’ll to hear what I’m saying.

DETECTIVE KUCZKOWSKI: Okay. Well, you

asked for a lawyer. Do you want to talk to us again?

We’ll readvise you of your rights again, okay, but it’s

at your request. Do you want to talk to us?

THE DEFENDANT: I’d like to get the matter

straight.

DETECTIVE KUCZKOWSKI: Well, answer my

question. Do you want to talk to us again, yes or no?

THE DEFENDANT: Of course I do.

Ex. B10 at 642-43. Detective Barker then readvised Petitioner of his rights,

Petitioner completed a waiver form, and the interrogation continued. See id. at

643-44.

The record fully supports the state court’s decision. Therefore, Ground

One is due to be denied.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have

his competency evaluated. See Doc. 1 at 12-16. According to Petitioner, he

suffers from bipolar disorder, and “a government psychologist” has declared him

to be “mentally incompetent to the point of being unemployable.” Id. at 12. He

contends that he and his mother advised counsel and the trial court of his

mental health issues, but counsel failed to have Petitioner evaluated. See id. at

12-14; see also Doc. 1-8 to 1-9 (letters from Petitioner’s mother).

Petitioner raised this claim as ground one in his Rule 3.850 proceeding.

The state court denied the claim as follows:

In Ground One, Defendant claims counsel was

ineffective for failing to conduct a competency

evaluation prior to trial. In support of this contention,

Defendant avers he was suffering from bipolar,

hallucinations, and blackouts prior to and during his

trial. Defendant opines his mental illness made him

incompetent to stand trial. Defendant also contends if

counsel had obtained his social security records, it

would show Defendant was previously declared

incompetent to work. Defendant asserts counsel was

aware of his incompetency, but refused to seek a

competency evaluation. Defendant further maintains

he told the trial court about his mental health issues

prior to trial, but the trial court refused to help him.

Initially, this Court notes that on direct appeal,

Defendant alleged the trial court erred in failing to

request a competency evaluation after Defendant

advised the trial court he needed help for his bipolar

condition. In its Answer Brief, the State argued

Defendant’s representations and conduct at trial did

not give the trial court reasonable grounds to believe

Defendant’s competency was in question. In affirming

Defendant’s conviction and sentence, the First District

Court of Appeal rejected Defendant’s argument. Here,

Defendant is attempting to guise the same claim he

raised on direct appeal under the cloak of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Such claims are procedurally

barred.

Further, to satisfy the deficiency prong based on

counsel’s handling of a competency issue, a defendant

must allege specific facts that show a reasonable

attorney would have questioned his or her competency

to proceed. Here, upon a review of the State’s

Response, in conjunction with the record attachments

provided with said Response, this Court finds merit in

the State’s argument. The primary evidence

Defendant highlights to support his allegation is the

statements he made in court during the final pretrial

hearing. Again, this is the exact evidence Defendant

used to support his allegation on direct appeal.

Reviewing the record as a whole, however, there

is no evidence Defendant was incompetent to stand

trial. In fact, in Ground Five of the instant Motion,

Defendant avers counsel was ineffective for

misadvising Defendant not to testify at trial. Indeed,

someone who is allegedly incompetent to stand trial

would not understand this process much less

voluntarily waive the right to testify while

maintaining his right to remain silent. Moreover,

there was evidence Defendant attempted to fabricate

incompetency during trial. Specifically, Defendant’s

co-defendant testified Defendant told her “to play

crazy” when she appeared in court and if she took all

the blame, his dad would hire an attorney to represent

her. Ground One is denied.

Ex. C1 at 275-76 (internal citations omitted). Petitioner appealed, and the First

DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 motions without

issuing a written opinion, and subsequently denied Petitioner’s requests for

rehearing. See Ex. C2; Williams, No. 1D17-1672.

Upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law, this Court

concludes that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to

clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief as to Ground Two.

Even assuming the state court’s adjudication of this claim is not entitled

to deference, the claim is without merit. In the state trial court, Petitioner was

represented by Gregory Messore and Todd Niemczyk. See Ex. B8 at 250. Mr.

Messore, a death penalty certified attorney, served as lead counsel. See Ex. B1

at 36. The record reflects that counsel filed dozens of pretrial motions. At a

pretrial hearing, Mr. Messore was present when Petitioner told the trial judge

he was “mentally ill” and “can’t get any help.” Ex. B6 at 992-93. Mr. Messore,

however, did not interject or say anything on the record. During the trial, when

the trial judge engaged in a colloquy with Petitioner regarding whether he

would testify, Petitioner asked for and was granted additional time to speak

with his counsel. See Ex. B11 at 867-70. Similarly, during the penalty phase,

Petitioner conferred with counsel regarding his attire and appropriately

answered the judge’s questions. See Ex. B13 at 13-15.

“[T]he defendant’s attorney is in the best position to determine whether

the defendant’s competency is suspect. Accordingly, failure of defense counsel

to raise the competency issue at trial, while not dispositive, is evidence that the

defendant’s competency was not really in doubt[.]” Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d

1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 1996). Petitioner has neither demonstrated that a

reasonably competent attorney would have questioned whether he had

sufficient present ability to consult with counsel nor questioned whether he had

a rational, as well as factual understanding of his criminal proceeding. See

Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[N]ot every

manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial;

rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or

understand the charges.”). Moreover, even assuming deficient performance,

Petitioner has failed “to show that there was a reasonable probability that he

would have received a competency hearing and been found incompetent had

counsel requested the hearing.” Lawrence v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d

464, 479 (11th Cir. 2012). As such, Ground Two is due to be denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

3. If Petitioner appeals the denial of the Petition, the Court denies a

certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined that a certificate

of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending

motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed

in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 13" day of July,

2021.

a Cirnotheg g. Corrig an

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

United States District Judge

JAX-3 7/7

C:

Merlin Williams, #J42761

Counsel of Record

4 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner

makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate

that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282

(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 478, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues

presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 5837 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2008) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration of the record as a whole,

the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

14