Melendez v. Inch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM H. MELENDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-01023-BJD-JBT

MARK S. INCH, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, William Melendez, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is

proceeding, through counsel, on an amended complaint for the alleged violation

of his civil rights while incarcerated (Doc. 54; Am. Compl.). Plaintiff names

twenty-eight Defendants, including the Florida Department of Corrections

(FDOC), supervisory officials, and individual corrections officers at different

correctional institutions. Before the Court are four motions to dismiss: one filed

by the FDOC and the supervisory officials, Mark Inch, Barry Reddish, Erich

Hummel, John Palmer, P. Hunter, Ronnie Woodall, and Kevin Tomlinson,

(Doc. 95; FDOC Motion); one filed by individual corrections officers Philbert,

Folsom, Brown, Nosbich, Chandler, Atteberry, Holm, Moreland, Geiger,

Williams, Oliva, and Bryant (Doc. 110; Philbert Motion); one filed by

corrections officer Gwara (Doc. 117; Gwara Motion); and one filed by

corrections officer Van Allen (Doc. 125; Van Allen Motion).1 Plaintiff opposes

all motions (Docs. 113, 122, 123, 126).

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Lotierzo v.

Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A plaintiff should allege enough

facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence”

supporting the plaintiff’s claims. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007).

Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a) demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As such, a plaintiff

1 The corrections officers are represented by the same counsel, and their

motions are largely the same. Corrections officers Anderson, Harper, Willis, Woods,

and Hall have not been served. See Docket. Officer Colin Williams was served on June

4, 2021. Id.

2

may not rely on “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements.” Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v.

Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Rather, the well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In assessing the

sufficiency of a complaint, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor

of the plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The purpose of the federal pleading rules is to ensure a plaintiff presents

his “claims discretely and succinctly, so that[ ] his adversary can discern what

he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading.” Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d

1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Weiland v. Palm Bch. Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,

792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)).

III. Complaint Allegations

When he filed his complaint, Plaintiff was a sixty-one-year-old inmate

with mental illness, advanced-stage liver fibrosis, Hepatitis C, and bipolar

disorder, who had spent most of the last four years in solitary confinement at

Florida State Prison (FSP) and New River Correctional Institution (NRCI). See

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3-5. Plaintiff alleges he has “been inhumanely caged and

systematically abused by the defendants.” Id. ¶ 7. He contends he was deprived

his fundamental right of free speech by being retaliated against for

3

complaining about his conditions of confinement, and he was denied due

process at disciplinary and segregation hearings by being prevented from

attending hearings or presenting evidence. Id. ¶¶ 6, 62.

Plaintiff alleges he was transferred to FSP in August 2016, after he

attempted suicide. Id. ¶ 28. At FSP, he was “immediately sent to solitary

confinement without a hearing.” Id. ¶ 29. Classification-review hearings were

held without his presence, so he was unable to “argue for his release to general

population.” Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff alleges he “has been in solitary confinement for

most of the past four years in horrifically repressive conditions that breed

abuse.” Id. ¶ 34. For example, when he was first placed in solitary confinement,

the size of his cell was only “six steps from front to back,” the small window

was covered, and the institution controlled the lights, turning them off late and

on early to limit sleeping hours. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff was further isolated from

communicating with others because the cell had a steel door. To communicate

his needs to corrections officers, he had to hold a sign up to the door’s window,

though he was “routinely ignored.” Id. ¶ 36.

Plaintiff alleges he was routinely found guilty of trivial and pretextual

offenses for which he was punished in various ways, such as by having time

added to his isolation classification or being denied outdoor recreation and

telephone contact with friends and family. Id. ¶¶ 38-40. He contends the

4

“repressive environment in the solitary confinement units at [FSP] is ripe for

correctional officer abuse.” Id. ¶ 46.

Plaintiff describes some instances in which officers allegedly abused him,

both at FSP and NRCI: On October 3, 2017, Defendant Van Allen slammed

Plaintiff’s hand in the food flap, causing severe injury to his fingers, id. ¶ 47;

on February 2, 2018, Defendants (Colin) Williams, Brown, Hall, Philbert,

Nosbich, Chandler, and Atteberry physically assaulted Plaintiff, allegedly in

retaliation for him having filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)

grievance against Defendant Folsom, id. ¶¶ 49, 52; on June 29, 2018, Plaintiff

was gassed after he complained about being prevented from sending legal mail,

and officers thereafter starved him to further punish him, id. ¶ 56; on July 16,

2018, Defendants Willis, Geiger, and Woods “brutally assaulted” Plaintiff in

the infirmary, where he was taken after he attempted suicide, id. ¶ 57; on

October 16, 2019, Defendants Holm and Harper would not allow Plaintiff to

shower allegedly because he hollered out of his cell, and the officers threatened

Plaintiff with physical abuse and more time in isolation if he reported their

conduct, id. ¶ 58; on October 20, 2019, Defendant Anderson wrote Plaintiff a

disciplinary ticket for having asked a female officer a question, id.; on July 26,

2020, corrections officers at NRCI abused Plaintiff, allegedly in retaliation for

him having filed a PREA grievance against Defendant Oliva, id. ¶ 59; on July

5

28, 2020, at NRCI, Defendants Bryant and Oliva took Plaintiff to the medical

unit after he harmed himself, and there, Defendants Williams, Moreland, and

Gwara beat Plaintiff at the direction of Bryant and Oliva, id. ¶ 60.

Plaintiff asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim against twenty-

four Defendants, including supervisory officials and corrections officers (count

one); an Eighth Amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim against all

individual Defendants for his isolated conditions of confinement (count two);

and Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against seventeen Defendants

for the various instances of physical abuse he endured; a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim against the individual supervisory Defendants

(count four); and claims under the Americans with Disabilities and

Rehabilitation Acts against the FDOC (counts five and six). He seeks

compensatory and injunctive relief.

IV. Analysis

All Defendants assert Plaintiff’s complaint constitutes a “shotgun

pleading” and should be dismissed for that reason. See FDOC Motion at 1, 16-

17; Philbert Motion at 4-6; Gwara Motion at 4-6; Van Allen Motion at 3-6. The

Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion reminding district courts they

should not “piece together claims for plaintiff’s counsel.” Barmapov, 986 F.3d

at 1328 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). As the majority explained, a shotgun pleading

6

is one that violates the federal pleading rules by, among other ways,

“assert[ing] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying

which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which

of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at 1325 (quoting Weiland,

792 F.3d at 1323). A defendant who reads a complaint should not be “hard-

pressed to understand ‘the grounds upon which each claim [against him]

rests’.” Id. (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322-23.

At first blush, the complaint appears straightforward and organized, but

a closer review reveals its inadequacies, at least as to some claims. Take count

one, for example. Plaintiff asserts twenty-four of the twenty-eight Defendants

retaliated against him, but he does not clarify which conduct by which

Defendants constitutes retaliation. As to the twenty officer-Defendants named,

Plaintiff references the February 2, 2018, and July 28, 2020 assaults as

examples of adverse actions taken against him after he filed grievances. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 73. However, those incidents involved fewer than the twenty

officers named in this count, and Plaintiff alleges having written a grievance

against only two of them—Folsom and Gwara.

Count two is another example of lumping all Defendants together

without explaining what conduct amounts to a violation. Plaintiff faults all

individual Defendants for placing Plaintiff in isolation for excessive periods of

7

time, but he does not offer or incorporate by reference factual allegations

showing how each named Defendant was responsible for or involved in

Plaintiff’s classification status at FSP and NRCI. Count three similarly is

confusing but for a different reason. Plaintiff says in the heading of count three

that it applies to seventeen Defendants, but in the numbered paragraphs that

follow, he names additional Defendants. Id. ¶ 91.

While it may be possible to decipher the factual basis upon which some

of Plaintiff’s claims rest as to each Defendant, the Court should not have to

engage in mental gymnastics to determine whether Plaintiff substantively

states a plausible claim for relief. See Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1328 (Tjoflat, J.,

concurring) (“Lawyers simply cannot delegate the responsibility of making

their case to the district courts.”). As the Eleventh Circuit said when confronted

with a shotgun pleading:

We are unwilling to address and decide serious

constitutional issues on the basis of this complaint. We

could perhaps decide whether some of these claims

were subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), leaving

for another day a decision about other claims following

repleading on remand. Piecemeal adjudication of that

kind, however, does not promote judicial efficiency.

And the toleration of complaints such as this one “does

great disservice to the administration of civil justice.”

Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (remanding with

instructions to require the plaintiff to replead his claims because the complaint

8

was “replete with allegations that ‘the defendants’ engaged in certain conduct,

making no distinction among the fourteen defendants”).

Plaintiff may have some plausible claims against some Defendants in

counts one through three, but judicial efficiency is not served by parsing this

complaint to identify the claims that may proceed and those that may not.

Accordingly, the Court will grant the motions only to the extent Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to satisfy federal pleading rules. Plaintiff will be afforded an

opportunity to submit an amended complaint. In doing so, he must cure the

noted deficiencies and consider the other arguments Defendants raise in their

motions.2 In addition to clarifying the allegations supporting each claim

against each Defendant, Plaintiff should clarify the relief he seeks from each

Defendant under each count and whether he pursues such relief against each

Defendant in his or her individual or official capacities.

Upon the filing of an amended complaint, if Defendants find it deficient

such that they are unable to craft a responsive pleading, they must confer with

Plaintiff in good faith to resolve any issues before filing motions to dismiss. See

2 For instance, as to the retaliation claim (count one), some Defendants argue

Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient facts showing a causal connection between a

protected activity (such as writing grievances) and subsequent allegedly retaliatory

conduct by them. See Philbert Motion at 12; Gwara Motion at 9-10; Van Allen Motion

at 8-10. Additionally, as to the excessive force claim (count three), some Defendants

argue Plaintiff fails to allege conduct by them that caused Plaintiff an injury. See

Philbert Motion at 23-24; Gwara Motion at 19; Van Allen Motion at 19.

9

M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(g). Additionally, as Plaintiff points out in response to the

officers’ motions (Docs. 122, 123, 126), a defendant asserting an exhaustion

defense bears the burden. See Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d

1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 95, 110, 117, 125) are

granted only to the extent Plaintiff’s complaint is a shotgun pleading. In all

other respects, the motions are denied.

2. Plaintiff must submit a second amended complaint within twenty

days of the date of this Order.

3. By July 19, 2021, Plaintiff shall show cause why the claims

against Defendants Anderson, Harper, Willis, Woods, and Hall should not be

dismissed without prejudice for his failure to timely serve them. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiff’s failure to show satisfactory cause by the designated

deadline will result in the dismissal of the claims against these Defendants

without further notice.

10

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 21st day of June

2021.

Py inn ( | >» OU

BRIAN, DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

C:

Counsel of Record

11