Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

HAMZA ESA MALDONADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:20-cv-638-MMH-JRK

BAKER COUNTY SHERIFF’S

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Hamza Esa Maldonado, a federal inmate who is incarcerated at

the Federal Correctional Institution in Tallahassee, Florida, initiated this

action on May 19, 2020, by filing a Complaint with exhibits (Docs. 3-1 through

3-6) in the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Baker County, Florida.1

See Doc. 1-2 at 1, Case No. 2020-CA-71, Docket. Defendants removed the case

to this Court on June 22, 2020. See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). In the

Complaint (Doc. 3), Maldonado names the following Defendants: (1) Baker

1 The Court cites to the document and page numbers as assigned by the

Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.

County Sheriff’s Office; (2) Baker County Detention Center; (3) Captain Evelyn

Blue; (4) Jessica Adrien Looby; and (5) Wyatt Martin Rhoden. He asserts that

Defendants violated his right of access to the courts and retaliated against him

when they unjustly transferred him on or about April 22, 2020, from the Baker

County Detention Center to the Nassau County Jail. As relief, Maldonado

seeks monetary damages.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(Motion; Doc. 5). The Court advised Maldonado that granting a motion to

dismiss would be an adjudication of the case that could foreclose subsequent

litigation and gave him an opportunity to respond. See Orders (Docs. 6, 20).

Maldonado filed a response in opposition to the Motion, see Response (Doc. 22),

and submitted exhibits, see Notice of Motion of Refiling Exhibits in Compliance

with Court Order and Motion Requesting the Court to Take Judicial Notice of

Related Cases (Docs. 33-1 through 33-7).2 Thus, Defendants’ Motion is ripe for

review.

2 Maldonado included several of these exhibits as part of his Complaint.

2

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations3

In the Complaint, Maldonado presents a mosaic of allegations, mostly

related to his April 2020 transfer to the Nassau County Jail and the subpar

conditions he experienced while housed there. He attached exhibits to his

Complaint: (1) an April 9, 2020 letter to Circuit Court Judge Gloria R. Walker,

who was presiding over several of Maldonado’s cases, see Doc. 3-2 at 2-6; (2)

Maldonado’s March 27, 2020 Affidavit, filed in Case No. 3:20-cv-418-BJD-

PDB,4 see Doc. 3-3; (3) Maldonado’s March 31, 2020 Affidavit, filed in Baker

County Case No. 2020-CA-47, Maldonado’s state-court case that defendants

removed to federal court (Case No. 3:20-cv-418-BJD-PDB), see Doc. 3-4; (4)

3 The Complaint is the operative pleading. In considering a motion to

dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true,

consider the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Burban v.

City of Neptune Beach, 920 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019); Miljkovic v.

Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations and

citations omitted). As such, the recited facts are drawn from the Complaint and

may differ from those that ultimately can be proved.

4 In Case No. 3:20-cv-418-BJD-PDB, Maldonado asserts that Defendant

Rhoden retaliated against him for filing grievances and other lawsuits and

discriminated against Maldonado because he is an African-American Muslim.

According to Maldonado, Rhoden denied him use of the telephone in March

2020; denied him extra time in the law library; denied him the ability to ask a

shift supervisor for relief; threatened him with physical harm, specifically a

restraint chair; and discriminated against him by segregating black and white

inmates from going to the law library together.

3

Maldonado’s April 21, 2020 Affidavit, filed in Baker County Case No. 2020-CA-

62, Maldonado’s state-court case that defendants removed to federal court

(3:20-cv-524-BJD-PDB), 5 see Doc. 3-5; (5) Maldonado’s March 30, 2020

Affidavit, filed in Baker County Case No. 2020-CA-47, Maldonado’s state-court

case that defendants removed to federal court (Case No. 3:20-cv-364-BJD-

JBT),6 see Doc. 3-6 at 1-3; and (6) newspaper articles related to COVID-19

cases in Nassau County, see id. at 4-5.

Maldonado asserts that Defendants transferred him from the Baker

County Detention Center to the Nassau County Jail on or about April 22, 2020,

when “he was in the middle of” filing motions and meeting deadlines in his case

and helping other detainees (Jessica D. Gray, James Hill, Devon Weaver,

Darryl Gray Smith, and Romeo Langhorne) with their legal work. Complaint

at 5. He states that Defendants “designed” the “illegal transfer” in an effort “to

block him and his legal helpers” from preparing a “new lawsuit” that

Defendants learned about when they illegally accessed his Universal Serial

5 The Court granted Maldonado’s motions to remand, and directed the

Clerk to remand the case back to the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court. See Case

No. 3:20-cv-524-BJD-PDB, Order (Doc. 33), filed July 31, 2020.

6 In Case No. 3:20-cv-364-BJD-JBT, Maldonado raises various claims

related to a November 10, 2019 assault upon him by another inmate while

housed at the Baker County Detention Center.

4

Bus (USB) flash drive. Id. He avers that Defendants transferred him to prevent

him from filing more lawsuits against the jail. See id. at 6. According to

Maldonado, the retaliatory transfer hindered his ability to litigate because the

Nassau County Jail’s law library was outdated and did not have a keypad to

type pleadings or a USB port to access his legal documents. See id. He also

asserts that Defendants transferred him without notice and a hearing, see id.

at 7-9, and “placed his life in imminent danger and harm by exposing him to a

possible coronavirus infection” at the Nassau County Jail, id. at 6.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint

should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)

5

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further,

the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its

face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262

(explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or

legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal

citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept

as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court

must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

6

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Moreover, when the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—

“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,

therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the court a license to

serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus,

Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)7 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty.

of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation

omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d

at 709); see also Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th

Cir. 2014).

7 “Although an unpublished opinion is not binding . . . , it is persuasive

authority.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per

curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished

opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as

persuasive authority.”).

7

IV. Summary of the Arguments

As an initial matter, Defendants assert that Maldonado is a three-strikes

litigant, as defined in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and urge the

Court to dismiss the action under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). See Motion at 3. Next,

they state that the Baker County Sheriff’s Office and the Baker County

Detention Center should be dismissed because they are not legal entities that

can be sued. See id. at 3-4. Additionally, Defendants Blue, Looby, and Rhoden

maintain that they cannot be held liable in their official capacities. See id. at

4. They also request dismissal of Maldonado’s claims against them for his

failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(Rule(s)). See id. at 4-6.

In response, Maldonado maintains that the PLRA’s three-strikes

provision does not apply to him because Defendants removed the case from

state court, and paid the federal-court filing fee. See Response at 7-9. He also

asserts that he states plausible federal constitutional claims relating to his

illegal transfer and COVID-19 exposure. See id. at 1-6, 10-15. He maintains

that the Baker County Sheriff’s Office and the Baker County Detention Center

are entities that can be sued, see id. at 9, 12, and that Defendants Blue, Looby,

and Rhoden can be sued in their official capacities, see id. at 9. He also states

8

that the federal pleading standards enunciated in Rules 8 and 10 did not apply

when he filed his Complaint in state court. See id. at 13.

V. Discussion and Analysis

A. Three Strikes

In the Motion, Defendants urge the Court to revoke Maldonado’s in

forma pauperis (IFP) status that the state court granted to him and dismiss

the action under § 1915(g) because Maldonado has had three prior qualifying

dismissals and does not meet the imminent danger exception to dismissal. See

Motion at 3. Citing Hamza Maldonado and James Hill v. Baker County

Sheriff’s Office, et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-193-HLA-PDB, in which the Court

revoked Maldonado’s IFP status and dismissed the action under § 1915(g),

Defendants suggest that the Court dismiss this case based on the same

rationale. See Motion at 3 (citing Case No. 3:20-cv-193-HLA-PDB, Order (Doc.

40) at 11, filed June 26, 2020 (stating “in order to effectuate the intent of

Congress, the only reasonable path for this Court to take is to revoke

9

[Maldonado]’s [IFP] status granted to him by the state court and apply §

1915(g) to this prisoner action removed to this Court”)).8

Maldonado disagrees with Defendants’ argument that this case is due to

be dismissed under the three-strikes provision. He states that § 1915(g) “only

applies to actions filed in federal court by [a] plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP[.]”

Response at 8. He contends that § 1915(g) does not apply to him because he

initiated this action in state court, and Defendants paid the federal-court filing

fee when they removed the case from state court. See id. at 7-9. Alternatively,

Maldonado suggests that, even if the Court finds that § 1915(g) is applicable,

the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes bar applies because

Defendants “placed [his] life in imminent danger of serious physical injury”

when they transferred him to the Nassau County Jail in April 2020. Id. at 7.

The PLRA established what is commonly referred to as the “three-strikes

rule” as a mechanism “[t]o help staunch a ‘flood of nonmeritorious’ prison

litigation[.]” Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (citing

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). The three-strikes provision states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or

appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under

this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

8 Maldonado has appealed the Court’s Order dismissing the case. See

Case No. 3:20-cv-193-HLA-PDB, Notices of Appeal (Docs. 48, 50, 52).

10

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the

United States that was dismissed on the grounds that

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The United States Supreme Court focused on § 1915(g)’s

plain text, Congress’s intent, and statutory-construction rules when it held

that a dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim counts as a strike

regardless of whether it was dismissed with or without prejudice. See Lomax,

140 S. Ct. at 1724, 1727 (stating “[t]his case begins, and pretty much ends, with

the text” of § 1915(g), which “makes this case an easy call”); see also Carcieri

v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (“This case requires us to apply settled

principles of statutory construction under which we must first determine

whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. . . . If it is, we must apply

the statute according to its terms.”) (citations omitted).

In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

addressed the applicability of § 1915(g) in a removal case. See Woodson v.

McCollum, 875 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2017). Recognizing the matter as one of

first impression, the Court held that a prisoner-plaintiff whose case was

removed to federal court had no obligation to pay a federal-court filing fee to

avoid a three-strikes dismissal. The Court stated in pertinent part:

11

In this case the defendants paid the federal filing fee,

so Woodson did not seek to proceed IFP. Nevertheless,

the district court ruled that § 1915(g) required him to

pay a filing fee because he has had three prior lawsuits

dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous,

malicious, or failed to state a claim, and he did not

qualify for the exception for prisoners who are in

“imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g). It therefore dismissed his case.

. . . .

We begin by observing that nothing in the statutory

language authorizes the district court’s dismissal. See

Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1763 (focusing on “the plain

language of the statute” when interpreting §

1915(g)).[9] Section 1915(g) applies to prisoners with

three strikes who “bring a civil action ... under this

section.” § 1915(g) (emphasis added). We doubt a

prisoner could “bring” an action by filing a case in state

court only to have it removed to federal court. See

Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017)

(“When a defendant removes a case from state to

federal court, it cannot be said that a prisoner-plaintiff

was the one who brought the case in federal court.”).

But regardless, a prisoner certainly does not bring an

action “under this section” when he does not seek to

proceed IFP under § 1915.

. . . .

The three-strikes rule is to deter prisoners from filing

meritless lawsuits in federal court. See Skinner, 562

U.S. at 535, 131 S.Ct. 1289.[10] It was not offended by

Woodson’s pursuing a claim IFP in the Oklahoma

9 Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015).

10 Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011).

12

courts. That state is free to set less stringent

constraints on prisoner litigation. See Abdul-Akbar v.

McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314-15 (3d Cir. 2001)

(recognizing that prisoners ineligible to proceed IFP

under § 1915(g) “may seek relief in state court, where

limitations on filing I.F.P. may not be as strict” and

stating that “[p]otentially negative consequences in

federal courts, as distinguished from state courts, are

precisely the consequences intended by Congress”);

Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir. 1998)

(noting that while § 1915(g) barred the plaintiff from

proceeding IFP in federal court, he could still “litigate

his federal constitutional causes of action in forma

pauperis in state court”). And it was not Woodson who

sought the federal forum. He did not choose to burden

the federal courts; the defendants did.

Woodson, 875 F.3d at 1306-07 (footnotes omitted).

In December 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit provided some guidance when it held that actions initiated in state

court and removed from state court by defendants cannot count as strikes

under § 1915(g). See Hill v. Madison Cnty, Ill., 983 F.3d 904, 907-08 (7th Cir.

2020) (agreeing with the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits) (citing Dooley v.

Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 377 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020); Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133,

1140 (9th Cir. 2017); Woodson, 875 F.3d at 1307). The Seventh Circuit stated

in pertinent part:

Section 1915(g) requires prepayment of the docket fees

only if the plaintiff has thrice “brought an action or

appeal in a court of the United States” only to have the

suit or appeal decided on one of the listed grounds. Hill

13

did not “bring” this suit in a court of the United States.

He filed it in state court. Defendants brought it to

federal court under § 1441(a), but § 1915(g) does not

apply to complaints brought to federal courts by

defendants.

Hill, 983 F.3d at 907 (emphasis added).

The Eleventh Circuit has not yet decided whether § 1915(g) applies when

a plaintiff initiates an action in state court, and defendants remove the action

to federal court. Nevertheless, the Court provided some thoughtful guidance

when it addressed the propriety of remanding an action to state court. See

Lloyd v. Benton, 686 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2012). Lloyd, a three-strikes litigant

like Maldonado, initiated a civil rights action in state court, and the defendants

removed it to federal court. See id. at 1226. The district court determined that

“allowing Lloyd to proceed in federal court would contravene” the PLRA, and

therefore remanded Lloyd’s case to state court. Id. at 1226-27. The Eleventh

Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order because the district court had

federal-question jurisdiction of the removed claims despite the fact that Lloyd

qualified as a three-strikes litigant. See id. at 1227-28 (citing with approval

Lisenby v. Lear, 674 F.3d 259, 262 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that remand of a

“three strikes” prisoner’s civil action to state court was improper because the

district court had subject matter jurisdiction of the removed claims, and the

district court lacked legal authority under the PLRA to deprive the defendants

14

of a federal forum)). The Court declined to decide whether the district court

should dismiss the action because of Lloyd’s three-strikes status, but warned

that district courts may not take actions that “seem justifiable to them but

which are not recognized by the controlling statute.” Id. at 1228 (internal

quotations and citation omitted).11 Although the Eleventh Circuit addressed

different statutory provisions in Lloyd, the rationale underlying its decision is

persuasive as to the issue at bar.

At the district-court level, some courts have found that three-strikes

litigants who initiate their actions in state court should not be permitted to

circumvent the PLRA’s bar to proceeding in forma pauperis when defendants

remove their cases to federal court. See Toney v. Courtney, No. 3:16cv418-LC-

CJK, 2017 WL 4229068, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2017), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 3:16cv418-LC-CJK, 2017 WL 4226508 (N.D. Fla.

Sept. 22, 2017) (revoking the state court’s grant of leave to proceed as a pauper

because the plaintiff was a three-strikes litigant); Harris v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

No. 4:14cv575-RH/GRJ, 2015 WL 1729474, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2015)

(concluding “there are compelling reasons for applying the three strikes bar to

11 On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the district court dismissed the

case on other grounds, not reaching the issue whether the three-strikes bar

should apply. See Case No. 3:10-cv-559-J-32JRK, Order (Doc. 51) (dismissing

the case for Lloyd’s abuse of the judicial process).

15

prisoner actions removed from state court to federal court”); Riggins v. Corizon

Med. Servs., No. 12-0578-WS-M, 2012 WL 5471248, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 19,

2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-0578-WS-M, 2012 WL

5470892 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2012) (“Whereas, not to apply the ‘three-strikes’ rule

to [the] removed state court action would allow Plaintiff to accomplish an end-

run around the ‘three-strikes’ rule by filing in state court and hoping, perhaps,

for removal of his action to [the district court].”); Bartelli v. Beard, No. 3:CV-

08-1143, 2008 WL 4363645, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008).

On the other hand, another jurist of this Court recently concluded that

the three-strikes provision does not bar Maldonado from proceeding in federal

court when he initiated the action IFP in state court and the defendants

removed the action to this Court. See Samuel Maldonado and Marisol

Maldonado v. Evelyn Blue, et al., No. 3:20-cv-364-BJD-JBT (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2,

2021) (denying defendants’ request to dismiss the case based on Samuel

Maldonado’s status as a three-strikes litigant); Hamza Maldonado v. Baker

Cnty. Sheriff's Office, et al., No. 3:20-cv-418-BJD-PDB, 2021 WL 118979, at *5

(M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2021) (“If Congress intended the three-strikes bar to apply

in actions commenced in state court and removed to federal court, such a

limitation would have been written into the statutory framework. It was not.”)

(footnote omitted). Other district courts agree. See Crisano v. Grimes, No.

16

1:19cv1612 (CMH/TCB), 2021 WL 120943, at *6 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2021) (“This

case did not fall under the three-strikes rule because [plaintiff] did not file it

in federal court.”) (citations omitted); Abreu v. Kooi, No. 9:14-CV-1529

(GLS/DJS), 2016 WL 4702274, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 9:14-CV-1529 (GLS/DJS), 2016 WL 4690404

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2016) (reasoning that a three-strikes litigant who initiates

an action in state court is not “circumventing” the PLRA, even if removal is

foreseeable, “because the PLRA does not address prisoner filings in state

court”); Johnson v. Rock, No. 9:14-CV-815 (DNH/ATB), 2014 WL 7410227, at

*6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2014) (“These cases [applying the three-strikes bar]

ignore the fact that the plaintiff did not choose to bring the action in federal

court, and the defendants paid the filing fee.”); Bailey v. Suey, No. 2:12-CV-

01954-JCM, 2014 WL 3897948, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014); Howard v.

Braddy, No. 5:12-CV-404 (MTT), 2013 WL 5461680, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30,

2013).

Indeed, Courts agree that the purpose of the three-strikes rule is to deter

prisoners from filing meritless lawsuits in federal court. See Lomax, 140 S. Ct.

at 1723, 1726 (“The point of the PLRA, as its terms show, was to cabin not only

abusive but also simply meritless prisoner suits.”); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.

521, 535 (2011); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 203; Woodson, 875 F.3d at 1307. In

17

the instant case, Maldonado did not “bring” this action in federal court.

Instead, he chose to initiate the action in state court, a judicial forum where

the filing limitations may not be as strict as they are under the PLRA. See Gay

v. Chandra, 682 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The PLRA’s three-strikes

obstacle does not apply in state courts, where [plaintiff] filed this suit.”); Abdul-

Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314-15 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting three-strikes

litigants “may seek relief in state court, where limitations” on proceeding IFP

“may not be as strict” as they are under the PLRA); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d

596, 605 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The plaintiff, despite being barred from bringing his

present § 1983 claims in federal court as an indigent, still had available to him

at the time of the initial filing the opportunity to litigate his federal

constitutional causes of action [IFP] in state court.”) (citation omitted). Here,

Defendants chose to remove the action to this Court, which is their right under

the removal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).12

After careful consideration, the Court finds that the PLRA’s three-

strikes bar is not applicable to the particular circumstances presented here.

This case does not fall within the ambit of the three-strikes rule because

12 Section 1441(a) authorizes a defendant to seek removal of a lawsuit

originally brought in state court when the federal court has jurisdiction over

the cause of action.

18

Maldonado did not initiate the action in federal court. See Lisenby, 674 F.3d

at 262-63; accord Lloyd, 686 F.3d at 1227. As such, Defendants’ Motion seeking

dismissal on the basis of their assertion that the Court should revoke

Maldonado’s IFP status and dismiss the action under § 1915(g) is due to be

denied.

B. Defendants Baker County Sheriff’s Office

and Baker County Detention Center

Next, the Court turns to Defendants’ assertion that the Baker County

Sheriff’s Office and the Baker County Detention Center are not legal entities

that can be sued. See Motion at 3-4. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege “a person” acting under the color of state law deprived

him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law.

When a plaintiff seeks to sue an entity, as opposed to an individual person, the

law of the state in which the district court sits determines whether the entity

has the capacity to be sued under § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210,

1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that certain subdivisions of local or county

governments, such as sheriff’s departments and police departments, generally

are not legal entities subject to suit). In Florida, a sheriff’s office or jail is not a

legal entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of the Monroe

19

County Sheriff’s Office); see also Herrera v. Rambosk, No. 2:17-cv-472-JES-

MRM, 2019 WL 1254772, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2019) (dismissing the

Collier County Jail under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Monroe v. Charlotte Cnty. Jail,

No. 2:15-cv-729-JES-MRM, 2015 WL 7777521, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2015)

(“A correctional facility or [a] jail is not a proper defendant in a case brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).

Neither the Baker County Sheriff’s Office nor the Baker County

Detention Center is an entity subject to suit under Florida law. The Court also

observes that Maldonado does not include any facts suggesting how these

entities violated his federal constitutional rights. As such, all claims against

the Baker County Sheriff’s Office and the Baker County Detention Center are

due to be dismissed.

C. Official Capacity Liability

Maldonado sues Defendants Blue, Looby, and Rhoden in their individual

and official capacities. See Complaint at 4. Defendants assert that Maldonado

cannot hold them liable in their official capacities. See Motion at 4 (citing

Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999)). Maldonado

maintains that “Defendants’ interpretation is misplaced” because the United

States Constitution and “the law says” that he can sue Defendants in their

official capacities. Response at 9.

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When a plaintiff sues a governmental actor in his or her official capacity,

the action is one against the entity the actor represents. Brown, 188 F.3d at

1290; Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). A

government entity may be liable in a § 1983 action “only where the

[government entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook

ex. rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1116

(11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must establish that an

official policy or custom of the government entity was the “moving force” behind

the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 693-94 (1978).

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governments can be held

liable for constitutional torts caused by official policies. However, such liability

is limited to “acts which the [government entity] has officially sanctioned or

ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). Under the

directives of Monell, a plaintiff also must allege that the constitutional

deprivation was the result of “an official government policy, the actions of an

official fairly deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or practice

so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Denno v. School

Bd. of Volusia Cnty., Fla, 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted); see Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016)

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(stating Monell “is meant to limit § 1983 liability to ‘acts which the

municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered’”; adding that “[t]here are,

however, several different ways of establishing municipal liability under §

1983”).

“A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the [government entity]

or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting

on behalf of the [government entity].” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117

F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The policy requirement is

designed to “‘distinguish acts of the [government entity] from acts of employees

of the [government entity], and thereby make clear that [governmental]

liability is limited to action for which the [government entity] is actually

responsible.’” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 n.5 (11th Cir.

2003) (quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, governmental liability arises

under § 1983 only where “‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is

made from among various alternatives’” by governmental policymakers. City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at

483-84). A government entity rarely will have an officially-adopted policy that

permits a particular constitutional violation, therefore, in order to state a cause

of action for damages under § 1983, most plaintiffs must demonstrate that the

government entity has a custom or practice of permitting the violation. See

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Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330; McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.

2004). A custom is an act “that has not been formally approved by an

appropriate decisionmaker,” but that is “so widespread as to have the force of

law.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404

(1997) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has defined “custom” as “a

practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law” or a

“persistent and wide-spread practice.” Sewell, 117 F.3d at 489. Last, “[t]o hold

the [government entity] liable, there must be ‘a direct causal link between [its]

policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Snow ex rel. Snow

v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).

Because Defendants’ official capacity liability under § 1983 is the functional

equivalent of a suit against Baker County, Maldonado must show that an

official policy or a custom or practice of the county was the moving force behind

the alleged federal constitutional violation.

Upon review, Maldonado has neither identified an official county policy

of deliberate indifference nor an unofficial county custom or practice that was

“the moving force” behind any alleged constitutional violation. Maldonado’s

factual allegations are simply insufficient to sustain a claim that there is either

a policy, practice, or custom of denying inmates their constitutional rights. In

consideration of the above analysis, the Court finds that Maldonado has failed

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to establish a claim that Defendants Blue, Looby, and Rhoden are liable in

their official capacities. Therefore, the Motion is due to be granted as to

Maldonado’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Blue, Looby, and

Rhoden.

D. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10

The Court next turns to Defendants’ assertion that the Court should

dismiss Maldonado’s claims against them because he failed to comply with

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. See Motion at 4-6. They urge the

Court to dismiss the Complaint because it “is precisely the type of pleading the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to prevent.” Id. at 5. They state

that “[t]here simply is not enough cogent factual and legal argument in

[Maldonado]’s complaint for Defendants to determine what claims have been

brought against what Defendants, or if one or more additional defenses might

be available.” Id. at 6. In response, Maldonado contends that the federal

pleading standards in Rules 8 and 10 did not apply when he filed his Complaint

in state court. See Response at 13.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to matters of procedure only

after a case enters federal court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(1) (“These rules apply

to a civil action after it is removed from a state court.”); see Lang v. U.S. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 612 F.3d 960, 866 (8th Cir. 2010) (“It is axiomatic that state rules

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of civil procedure apply to state court actions, and the federal rules of civil

procedure do not.”). Thus, the Court finds that Maldonado was not required to

comply with the federal pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 10 when he filed

his Complaint in state court. As such, Defendants’ Motion on this issue is due

to be denied.

Nevertheless, given the rambling nature of Maldonado’s assertions and

his failure to provide facts sufficient to show how each Defendant violated his

federal constitutional rights, the Court will give Maldonado an opportunity to

amend. A more carefully-drafted amended complaint will narrow the issues

and alert Defendants as to how each of them allegedly violated Maldonado’s

federal constitutional rights. In amending, Maldonado must comply with

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. The Eleventh Circuit recently

explained the requirements of Rules 8 and 10, stating in pertinent part:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a

complaint to provide “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10(b) requires a

party to “state its claims or defenses in numbered

paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a

single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). “If

doing so would promote clarity,” Rule 10(b) also

requires that “each claim founded on a separate

transaction or occurrence ... be stated in a separate

count....” Id. These rules operate for the benefit of the

litigants as well as the court. Complaints that comply

with these rules allow the defendant to “discern what

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[the plaintiff] is claiming and frame a responsive

pleading.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,

792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting T.D.S.

Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1544 n.14

(11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)). Compliant

pleadings also allow the court to determine “which

facts support which claims,” “whether the plaintiff has

stated any claims upon which relief can be granted,”

and whether evidence introduced at trial is relevant.

Id. (quoting T.D.S., 760 F.2d at 1544 n.14 (Tjoflat, J.,

dissenting)).

We have called pleadings that fail to comply with

Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) “shotgun pleadings.” Shotgun

pleadings “are flatly forbidden by the spirit, if not the

letter, of these rules” because they are “calculated to

confuse the ‘enemy,’ and the court, so that theories for

relief not provided by law and which can prejudice an

opponent’s case, especially before the jury, can be

masked.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quoting T.D.S., 760

F.2d at 1544 n.14 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).

The essence of a shotgun pleading is “that it is

virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact

are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”

Anderson v. District Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Florida

Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). In an

effort to categorize the precise defects that produce

this fundamental problem, we have identified four

rough types of shotgun pleadings. First: complaints

that contain “multiple counts where each count adopts

the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each

successive count to carry all that came before and the

last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.”

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321. Second: complaints that

are “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial

facts not obviously connected to any particular cause

of action.” Id. at 1322. Third: complaints that do not

separate “each cause of action or claim for relief” into

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separate counts. Id. at 1323. Fourth: complaints that

“assert multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which of the defendants are

responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the

defendants the claim is brought against.” Id.

Vujin v. Galbut, No. 19-13465, 2020 WL 7090206, at *4 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2020).

It appears that the gravamen of his Complaint is the April 22, 2020 retaliatory

transfer to the Nassau County Jail where he experienced subpar conditions

(inadequate law library, inability to access his USB drive, and COVID-19

exposure). Thus, in amending, Maldonado must not confuse the issues in the

instant case with those in his other cases.

E. Maldonado’s Requests in his Notice (Doc. 33)

In his Notice, Maldonado asks that the Court take judicial notice of Case

Nos. 3:20-cv-193-HLA-PDB and 3:20-cv-524-BJD-PDB and appoint a lawyer to

assist him in this case. See Notice at 1. Preliminarily, the Court notes that a

request for affirmative relief is not properly made when simply included in a

response to a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); see also Rosenberg v. Gould, 554

F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Where a request for leave to file an amended

complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition memorandum, the issue

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has not been raised properly.”) (quoting Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d

1209, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999)).

Moreover, even if it were proper to include such requests in the Notice,

the requests are otherwise due to be denied for failure to comply with Local

Rules 3.01(a) and 3.01(g), United States District Court, Middle District of

Florida (Local Rule(s)). Local Rule 3.01(a) requires a memorandum of legal

authority in support of a request from the Court. See Local Rule 3.01(a). Local

Rule 3.01(g) requires certification that the moving party has conferred with

opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve the issue raised by the motion

and advising the Court whether opposing counsel agrees to the relief

requested. See Local Rule 3.01(g). Thus, the Court will not entertain

Maldonado’s requests for relief included in the Notice. Maldonado is advised

that, if he wishes to pursue such relief, he is required to file an appropriate

motion, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local

Rules of this Court. Additionally, Maldonado may submit exhibits at the

summary-judgment stage, if appropriate.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED as to

Maldonado’s (1) claims against the Baker County Sheriff’s Office and the Baker

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County Detention Center, and (2) official-capacity claims against Defendants

Blue, Looby, and Rhoden. All remaining portions of the Motion are DENIED.

2. Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint on the enclosed civil

rights complaint form no later than April 23, 2021.

3. The Clerk shall provide a civil rights complaint form to Maldonado.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of

March, 2021.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

se 3/30

C:

Hamza Esa Maldonado

Counsel of Record

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