Harrington v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court

Middle District of Florida

Ocala Division

ANTHONY RALPH HARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v. NO. 5:19-cv-544-PDB

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Order

Anthony Ralph Harrington brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)

and 1383(c) to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying his application for supplemental security income. Under review is a

decision by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 12–34. Summaries of the

law and the administrative record are in the ALJ’s decision, Tr. 15–28, and the

parties’ briefs, Docs. 21, 22, and not fully repeated here.

Harrington presents one issue: whether the ALJ erred by failing to

develop the record regarding his mental limitations. Doc. 21.

Harrington was a janitor and a small business owner. Tr. 88. He stopped

working in 2008 because he went through a divorce and had to raise his

daughter on his own. Tr. 66. In August 2014, he applied for supplemental

security income.1 Tr. 353. He alleges he is disabled because of depression,

1The ALJ states “the claimant amended the alleged onset date to the application date

of August 26, 2014.” Tr. 15. The ALJ also references August 15, 2014, as the application date.

anxiety, panic attacks, ADHD, personality disorder, high blood pressure, and

high cholesterol. Tr. 401.

A court’s review of a decision by the Commissioner is limited to whether

substantial evidence supports the factual findings and whether the correct

legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d

1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).

A claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is the most he can do

despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The “mere existence” of an

impairment does not reveal its effect on a claimant’s ability to work or

undermine RFC findings. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th

Cir. 2005). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an

opinion” on an RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(3).

A claimant has the burden of establishing disability and must produce

evidence to support the claim, Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th

Cir. 2003), while the ALJ has a duty to develop a full and fair record, Cowart

v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). If an ALJ fails to fulfill his

duty to fully develop the record and “the record reveals evidentiary gaps which

result in unfairness or clear prejudice,” remand is warranted. Brown v.

Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If a medical source “cannot or will not give [the Social Security

Administration] medical evidence about [a claimant’s] impairment ..., [the

Social Security Administration] may ask [the claimant] to have one or more

Tr. 16, 17, 38. Harrington states the application date is August 15, 2014. Doc. 21 at 1 (citing

Tr. 64, 98). The Commissioner uses “August 2014” as the application and onset date. Doc. 22

at 2, 5, 6, 7, 11 (citing Tr. 15, 17, 27, 38, 353). The precise application or alleged onset date is

immaterial here.

physical or mental” examinations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.917. The Social Security

Administration generally “will not request a consultative examination until [it]

has made every reasonable effort to obtain evidence” from the claimant’s

medical sources. Id. § 416.912(b)(2).

Contrary to Harrington’s argument, the ALJ fully developed the record,

and substantial evidence supports the decision. Harrington fails to show

evidentiary gaps resulting in unfairness or clear prejudice, and he fails to show

the ALJ needed additional information to make an informed decision.

The ALJ found Harrington suffers from severe impairments including

organic mental disorders and anxiety-related disorders but has no impairment

or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of

an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 17–18. The ALJ observed that no treating or

examining physician found otherwise. Tr. 18.

The ALJ evaluated the severity of Harrington’s mental impairments

under the psychiatric review technique (“PRT”). Tr. 18–20. The ALJ found that,

consistent with the record, Harrington has moderate limitations in each of the

functional areas of the analysis. Tr. 19. The ALJ stated, “There is elsewhere in

this opinion an equivalent discussion of the medical evidence relevant to the

Step Three analysis.” Tr. 20.

In the RFC, the ALJ accounted for Harrington’s moderate limitations in

mental functioning:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds

that the claimant has the [RFC] to perform less than a full range of

medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c). He could perform

work that requires up to 30 days to learn the techniques, acquire

the information and develop the facility for average

performance. He could lift/carry 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds

occasionally. He could stand/walk and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday. He could occasionally ascend and descend stairs. He should

avoid hazards in the workplace, such as unprotected areas of moving

machinery, height, ramps, ladders, scaffolding and on the ground

unprotected areas of holes and pits. He could frequently balance, stoop,

crouch, kneel and crawl, but he could not climb ropes, scaffolds or

ladders exceeding 6 feet. He has nonexertional limitations that

frequently effect his ability to concentrate upon complex or

detailed tasks, but he remains capable of remembering,

understanding and carrying out the above job instructions. He

could make work related judgments and decisions, he could

respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and work

situations and he could deal with changes in a routine work

setting. He should avoid stressful situations. For example, he

could only occasionally work with coworkers in a team,

occasionally work directly with the public and occasionally

work with coworkers where interpersonal interaction is

required. He should work in an environment where he makes

few decisions and uses little judgment.

Tr. 20–21 (emphasis added).

In determining the RFC, the ALJ considered the medical evidence as a

whole. See Tr. 24 (“The record as a whole, [], indicates an adequate functional

ability.”). The evidence includes the supplemental anxiety questionnaire

Harrington completed in September 2014, Tr. 23, 418–20, and records of

mental health treatment after the application date, see Tr. 25, 571, 583–85

(October 2014; admitted to the hospital through the “Baker Act” for suicidal

and racing thoughts, feeling helpless and hopeless, severe depression, and no

motivation after losing custody of his daughter; at discharge he showed a

bright affect, good insight and good judgment, good impulse control, and good

memory; treatment included medication and group therapy; advised to see an

outpatient psychiatrist); Tr. 25–26, 590 (February 2017; admitted to inpatient

facility for suicidal ideations, increased agitation and anxiety, and depression

because of the stress of finding a new place to live; at discharge he was alert

and oriented, calm, compliant, and happy to be discharged; no longer presented

a danger to himself or others; compliant with medication, no adverse reactions;

and reported that he enjoys outdoor activities); Tr. 26, 587 (March 2017;

reported normal sleep and good medication efficacy; easily distracted and

paranoid, but an otherwise unremarkable mental status exam—appropriate

rapport, appropriately dressed and groomed, normal interactions, average

intelligence, good (immediate) memory, normal psychomotor activity, fair

insight and fair judgment, logical thought process, ideas of reference but fine

mood, coherent speech, and appropriate affect; and denied suicidal/homicidal

ideations, delusions, or hallucinations); Tr. 26, 692 (August 2017;

unremarkable mental status exam); Tr. 26, 690 (January 2018, complained of

anxiety, acknowledged fair sleep and fair medication efficacy with no side

effects, and had an anxious mood, but an otherwise unremarkable mental

status exam); Tr. 26, 688 (May 2018; oriented and spontaneous interaction,

appropriately dressed and groomed, average intelligence, good immediate and

past memory, depressed and anxious mood, expansive affect, denied

hallucinations, tangential thought process, racing thoughts, slow psychomotor

activity, easily distracted, and poor insight and judgment). See also Tr. 24

(citing Tr. 586–662 (“[H]is mental status evaluations have generally showed

that his interactions were spontaneous, the rapport was appropriate, he was

polite and cooperative and his speech and behavior was normal.”)).

The ALJ also considered Harrington’s testimony and activities of daily

living. Tr. 23–25.

The ALJ also considered the opinions of Dr. James Meyers, a state

agency mental health examiner who reviewed Harrington’s file on September

11, 2014. Tr. 22, 103. The ALJ observed Dr. Meyers opined Harrington’s

complaints appeared to be mildly disproportionate to the objective medical

findings and Harrington could perform simple, repetitive tasks and likely could

perform those tasks at higher levels. Tr. 22, 103, 108.

The ALJ also considered the opinions of Dr. Sally Rowley, another state

agency mental health examiner, who reviewed Harrington’s file on November

14, 2014. Tr. 22, 122. The ALJ observed Dr. Rowley opined Harrington could

meet the basic mental demands of work on a sustained basis. Tr. 22, 122.

Harrington argues the ALJ erred by failing to develop the record

regarding his mental limitations because the record contains no medical

opinion based on evidence after the amended alleged onset date. Doc. 21 at 6.

He emphasizes that Dr. Rowley’s opinions were based on evidence only through

July 2014. Doc. 21 at 6–8; Tr. 112–22. He contends evidence from August 2014

and after, including from the two hospitalizations for suicidal ideation, show

ongoing symptoms and complaints related to his mental impairments. Doc. 21

at 7–8.

Harrington’s argument fails. As the Commissioner contends, Dr.

Meyers’s and Dr. Rowley’s opinions support that Harrington was not disabled

when he asserted his disability began. See Doc. 22 at 7. And the ALJ relied not

only on Dr. Meyers’s and Dr. Rowley’s opinions but also on evidence post-

dating their opinions, including evidence about the hospitalizations. See Tr.

25–26; see also Tr. 25 (“The Administrative Law Judge has considered material

and relevant evidence in the claimant’s current file, regardless of date.”). The

ALJ had the responsibility of assessing the RFC, did not improperly assume

the role of a medical provider in assessing the RFC, and did not have to rely on

a doctor’s opinion about the RFC.? See Castle v. Colvin, 557 F. App’x 849, 853

(11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ALJ did not ‘play doctor’ in assessing Mr. Castle’s RFC,

but instead properly carried out his regulatory role as an adjudicator

responsible for assessing Mr. Castle’s RFC.”).

Because Harrington shows no error, the Court affirms the

Commissioner’s decision and directs the clerk to enter judgment for the

Commissioner and against Anthony Ralph Harrington and close the file.

Ordered in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 24, 2021.

PATRICIA D. BARKSDALE

United States Magistrate Judge

2For an initial determination of a claim involving a mental impairment, the Social

Security Administration must make “every reasonable effort” to ensure that a “qualified

psychiatrist or psychologist has completed the medical portion of the case review and any

applicable [RFC] assessment.” 42 U.S.C. § 421(h)(1). An ALJ has “regulatory flexibility to

evaluate mental impairments to determine their severity.” Sneed v. Barnhart, 214 F. App’x

883, 886 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a and Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,

433 (3d Cir. 1999)).