Williams, Jr. v. Voya Financial Advisors, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

O’DOLL VAN WILLIAMS, JR.,

MARCUS ROBINSON, GWENDOLYN

ROBINSON, BRANDI WHITFIELD,

KIMBERLY SAUNDERS, and

JOHNNIE HALL,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:20-cv-2611-T-33JSS

VOYA FINANCIAL ADVISORS, INC.,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of

Defendant Voya Financial Advisors, Inc.’s Motion to Compel

Arbitration and Stay This Action (Doc. # 5), filed on November

13, 2020. Plaintiffs O’Doll Van Williams, Jr., Marcus

Robinson, Gwendolyn Robinson, Brandi Whitfield, Kimberly

Saunders, and Johnnie Hall responded on November 30, 2020.

(Doc. # 17). For the reasons below, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are African American individuals who worked

in some capacity for Voya Financial, a broker-dealer “that

provides retirement, investing, and financial planning

services.” (Doc. # 1-4 at ¶¶ 3-8, 11). As part of their

working relationship with Voya Financial, Plaintiffs signed

three different written agreements. (Doc. # 5 at 7-9).

Plaintiffs Williams, Whitfield, and Marcus Robinson signed a

“Retail Agent Agreement,” which includes the following

arbitration clause:

9. Arbitration. Agent and Company shall settle by

binding arbitration any dispute, claim, or

controversy, including, without limitation, any

claim alleged under any state or federal statute,

(i) that Agent and Company are required or

permitted to arbitrate under the rules,

constitutions or by-laws of the NASD, as may be

amended from time to time (“NASD Arbitration”), or

(ii) that arises out of or is related in any way to

this Agreement, the breach, termination, or

validity of this Agreement, or the actions of Agent

or Company with respect to one another during the

term of this Agreement. Arbitration of any dispute,

claim, or controversy that is not subject to NASD

Arbitration shall be administered by the American

Arbitration Association under its Commercial

Arbitration Rules. Judgment on any arbitration

award may be entered by any court having

jurisdiction thereof. Agent and Company consent to

arbitration in Hartford, Connecticut. Arbitration

under this Agreement shall be governed by the

Federal Arbitration Act.1

(Doc. # 5-3 at 5-6; Doc. # 5-7 at 5-6; Doc. # 5-14 at 5-6)

(emphasis in original). In addition to the Retail Agent

1. Plaintiff Marcus Robinson’s agreement contains slightly

different language, replacing “NASD Arbitration” with “FINRA

Arbitration,” and stating that the parties agreed to

arbitration in Windsor, Connecticut, rather than Hartford,

Connecticut. (Doc. # 5-7 at 5-6). The National Association of

Securities Dealers (“NASD”) is the Financial Industry

Regulatory Authority, Inc’s (“FINRA”) predecessor. Deutsche

Bank Sec. Inc. v. Simon, No. 19-20053-CIV-GAYLES/MCALILEY,

2019 WL 4864465, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2019).

Agreement, Williams signed an “Advisory Representative

Agreement,” which includes a lengthy agreement to arbitrate:

20. Binding Arbitration. It is understood that the

following AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE does not

constitute a waiver of the right to seek a judicial

forum to the extent that such waiver would be void

under applicable law.

a. The parties each agree that, except as

inconsistent with the preceding sentence, all

claims or controversies, and any related

issues, which may arise at any time between

the parties (including their directors,

officers, employees, representatives, or

agents) with respect to any subject matter;

any transaction, order, or direction; any

conduct of the parties or their directors, of

employees, representatives, or agents; any

construction, performance, or breach of this

or any other agreement between the parties,

whether entered into prior to, on, or

subsequent to the date hereof; any breach of

any common law or statutory duty; or any

violation of any federal or state law of any

nature shall be resolved by binding

arbitration rather than by lawsuit in a court

of law or equity.

b. Any arbitration pursuant to this agreement

shall be in accordance with, and governed by,

a mutually agreeable arbitration forum, but,

in the absence of such agreement, then the

Code of Arbitration Procedure of the NASD, if

the NASD accepts jurisdiction, and, if not,

then the American Arbitration Association.

There shall be at least three arbitrators

unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The

award of the arbitrators, or of the majority

of them, shall be final and binding upon the

parties, and judgment upon the award rendered

may be entered in any federal or state court

having jurisdiction. Any arbitration shall be

commenced by delivery to the other party of a

written demand for arbitration setting forth

in detail the claim or controversy to be

arbitrated.

c. The arbitrators shall be entitled to order

specific performance of the obligations

imposed by this Agreement.

(Doc. # 5-4 at 8) (emphases in original). Lastly, Plaintiffs

Saunders, Hall, and Gwendolyn Robinson signed a “Registered

Representative Agreement,” which includes a shorter

arbitration provision:

i. Arbitration. Any controversy or claim between

the parties will be settled by arbitration in

accordance with the rules of the Financial Industry

Regulatory Authority, and judgment upon the award

may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.

The arbitrators may award reasonable expenses,

attorneys’ fees and costs.

(Doc. # 5-11 at 7; Doc. # 5-18 at 7; Doc. # 5-21 at 6)

(emphasis in original).

Plaintiffs allege that Voya Financial discriminated

against them on the basis of race in a variety of ways. (Doc.

# 1-4 at ¶ 18-19). Plaintiffs initiated this action in state

court on September 22, 2020. (Doc. # 1-4). Thereafter, on

November 6, 2020, Voya Financial removed the action to this

Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. #

1). The complaint includes claims against Voya Financial for

racial discrimination (Counts I, III, V, VII, IX, XI) and

retaliation (Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X). (Doc. # 1-4).

On November 13, 2020, Voya Financial moved the Court to

compel arbitration and stay the case pending completion of

the arbitration. (Doc. # 5). Plaintiffs have responded (Doc.

# 17), and the Motion is now ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a written

arbitration provision in a “contract evidencing a transaction

involving commerce . . . [is] valid, irrevocable, and

enforceable,” unless law or equity necessitates revocation of

the contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2. Federal law favors arbitration

agreements. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Thus, “any doubts concerning

the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of

arbitration.” Id. However, “a party cannot be required to

submit to arbitration any dispute which he [or she] has not

agreed so to submit.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior

& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).

Before deciding whether a case should be referred to

arbitration, “a court must determine: (1) whether there is a

valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) whether a court or an

arbitrator should decide if the dispute falls within the scope

of the agreement to arbitrate; and (3) whether the dispute

does fall within the scope – the question of arbitrability.”

Convergen Energy LLC v. Brooks, No. 20-cv-3746 (LJL), 2020 WL

5549039, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2020) (citation omitted).

“The question whether the parties have submitted a particular

dispute to arbitration . . . is an issue for judicial

determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably

provide otherwise.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537

U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (citation omitted).

“A motion to compel arbitration is treated as a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Babcock v. Neutron Holdings, Inc., 454 F.

Supp. 3d 1222, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, “the Court may consider matters outside the four

corners of the Complaint.” Id. When determining the existence

of an arbitration agreement, federal courts employ a “summary

judgment-like standard,” “conclud[ing] as a matter of law

that parties did or did not enter into an arbitration

agreement only if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact’ concerning the formation of such an

agreement.’” Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d

1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

“A dispute is not ‘genuine’ if it is unsupported by the

evidence or is created by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’

or ‘not significantly probative.’” Id. (quoting Baloco v.

Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1246 (11th Cir. 2014)).

III. Analysis

Voya Financial moves the Court to compel FINRA

arbitration and stay the case pending such arbitration

because Plaintiffs’ “claims fall squarely within the broad

scope of the parties’ arbitration agreements.” (Doc. # 5 at

1-2). Plaintiffs respond that because FINRA’s Code of

Arbitration Procedures does not require employment

discrimination claims to be arbitrated unless the parties

agreed to arbitrate such claims, they cannot be compelled to

arbitrate the instant suit. (Doc. # 17 at 5).

A. Initial Question of Arbitrability

Generally, it is for the Court to determine the scope of

an arbitration agreement. Betkowski v. Kelley Foods of Ala.,

697 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1298 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 23, 2010). However,

“[w]hen the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability

question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the

contract.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,

139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019). Still, “there must be ‘clear and

unmistakable’ evidence that the parties agreed to have an

arbitrator decide such issues.” Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza

Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 2020).

Here, none of the arbitration agreements expressly state

that the initial question of arbitrability must be submitted

to arbitration. (Doc. ## 5-3; 5-4; 5-7; 5-11; 5-14; 5-18; 5-

21). Although the agreements do incorporate either the NASD

or FINRA rules, “incorporating the FINRA rules into an

arbitration agreement is insufficient on its own to evidence

the parties’ clear intent for the arbitral panel to determine

arbitrability.” 2 Retina Consultants P.C. Defined Benefit

Pension Plan v. Benjamin, No. CV-119-037, 2020 WL 1491756, at

*5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2020); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner

& Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 384 (11th Cir. 1995)

(“We conclude that, at most, section 35 [of the NASD Code]

creates an ambiguity as to who determines arbitrability.

Because an ambiguity is insufficient to override the

2. Although expressly incorporating the American Arbitration

Association’s (“AAA”) Rules into an arbitration clause does

constitute clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties

delegated the initial question of arbitrability to an

arbitrator, the contracts signed by Williams, Whitfield, and

Marcus Robinson refer cases to the AAA only to the extent

that the disputes cannot be arbitrated before FINRA. (Doc. #

5 at 6-9); see JPay, Inc. v. Houston, 904 F.3d 923, 937 (11th

Cir. 2018). Indeed, the parties preferred forum is FINRA, and

none of the other clauses refer to the AAA. (Doc. # 5 at 6-

9). Considering that the AAA’s rules would not apply if the

parties were able to arbitrate before their chosen forum

(FINRA), as well as the fact that the parties appear to agree

that the initial question of arbitrability can be decided by

this Court, and the presumption that courts decide such

questions, the Court finds that this inclusion creates enough

ambiguity so that the initial question of arbitrability need

not be submitted to arbitration. (Doc. ## 5; 17).

presumption that courts determine arbitrability, . . . we

conclude that the district court must determine whether the

dispute between [the parties] is arbitrable.”). Therefore,

the Count finds that it can decide the issue of arbitrability.

B. Application of the Arbitration Agreements

The Court now turns to the substance of the Motion.

Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the agreements on the

ground that this suit involves a claim of employment

discrimination, which is carved out from FINRA’s rule on

mandatory arbitrations. (Doc. # 17 at 5). Plaintiffs argue

that this carveout, and the fact that the broad agreements do

not expressly include employment discrimination claims,

evidences an intent not to arbitrate such claims. (Id.).

Additionally, Plaintiffs posit that these agreements

represent invalid contracts of adhesion. (Id.).

As noted, under the FAA, arbitration agreements are

“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” unless grounds exist

to revoke said contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2. This represents a

“federal policy favoring arbitration.” Moses, 460 U.S. at 24.

“When faced with a broadly worded arbitration clause,

[courts] should follow the presumption of arbitration and

resolve doubts in favor of arbitration.” Cheruvoth v.

SeaDream Yacht Club, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-24416-GAYLES/OTAZO-

REYES, 2020 WL 6263013, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2020)

(citation omitted). “Accordingly, the FAA requires a court .

. . to compel arbitration upon a showing that (a) the

plaintiff entered into a written arbitration agreement that

is enforceable ‘under ordinary state-law’ contract principles

and (b) the claims before the court fall within the scope of

the agreement.” Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d 1192, 1195

(11th Cir. 2008) (citing Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs.,

Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1061 (11th Cir. 1998)).

1. Enforceability of the Agreements

Although state law governs the enforceability of an

arbitration agreement, “the Supreme Court has also made clear

that in enacting [Section 2] of the FAA, ‘Congress declared

a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power

of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution

of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by

arbitration.’” Morales v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 306 F. Supp.

2d 175, 180 (D. Conn. 2003) (quoting Southland Corp. v.

Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984)). Therefore, “the FAA preempts

all state laws that impermissibly burden arbitration

agreements or limit the provisions of the FAA favoring

arbitration agreements.” Id. at 181. Only “generally

applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or

unconscionability may be applied to invalidate arbitration

agreements without contravening [Section 2 of the FAA].”

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).

Here, the parties agree that the “Retail Agent

Agreements,” signed by Williams, Whitfield, and Marcus

Robinson, as well as the “Advisory Representative Agreement,”

signed by Williams alone, are governed by Connecticut law,

and the “Registered Representative Agreements,” signed by

Saunders, Hall, and Gwendolyn Robinson, are governed by Iowa

law.3 (Doc. # 5 at 15; Doc. # 17 at 4). Therefore, the Court

turns to Connecticut and Iowa law in determining whether the

arbitration clauses are enforceable.

Under Connecticut law, “[t]he issue of whether the

parties to a contract have agreed to arbitration is controlled

by their intention.” Connecticut v. Philip Morris, Inc., 905

3. The “Retail Agent Agreements” do not include a choice-of-

law clause, but were signed in Connecticut. (Doc. ## 5-3; 5-

7; 5-14); see Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortg. Corp. v. GMAC

Mortg. Corp., No. 5:05-cv-260-Oc-GRJ, 2007 WL 1114045, at *2

(M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007) (“Florida follows the principle of

lex loci contractus, which means that the law of the place

where the contract was signed governs the dispute.”). The

“Advisory Representative Agreement” includes a choice-of-law

clause that selects Connecticut law. (Doc. # 5-4 at 9). The

“Registered Representative Agreements” include a conflict-

of-law clause, which provides: “This Agreement is governed

under the law of the state of Iowa without regard to its

conflicts of laws provisions.” (Doc. # 5-11 at 7; Doc. # 5-

18 at 7; Doc. # 5-21 at 6).

A.2d 42, 48 (Conn. 2006) (citation omitted). The parties’

intent is evidenced from the language used, interpreted in

light of the parties’ situation and circumstances. Goldberg

v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 849 A.2d 368, 373 (2004). “Although

the intention of the parties typically is a question of fact,

if their intention is set forth clearly and unambiguously, it

is a question of law.” Philip Morris, 905 A.2d at 48.

“Under Iowa law, the elements of a valid contract are

offer, acceptance, and consideration.” Owen v. MBPXL Corp.,

173 F. Supp. 2d 905, 914 (N.D. Iowa 2001). “An acceptance of

an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof

made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the

offer.” Heartland Express, Inc. v. Terry, 631 N.W.2d 260, 270

(Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). “The offeree ‘must know of

the offer before there can be mutual assent.’” Duncan v. Int’l

Mkts. Live, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00017-RGE-HCA, 2020 WL 6733636,

at *4 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 6, 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Douglas

& Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Iowa 1995)).

Here, the agreements are valid under both Connecticut

and Iowa law. The contracts at issue all include a provision

requiring arbitration of related disputes. (Doc. # 5 at 7-

9). Plaintiffs signed those agreements, “which serves as

presumptive evidence that an agreement was formed.” Morales,

306 F. Supp. 2d at 181; see also Ziskovsky v. Ziskovsky, 843

N.W.2d 478, 478 (Ct. App. Iowa 2014) (“It is well-settled

contract law that if a party to a contract is able to read

the contract, and is given an opportunity to do so, that party

cannot later argue she did not read the contract and remove

herself from the terms of the contact.). And, Plaintiffs do

not contend that they did not intend to arbitrate at least

some claims or that there was no offer or acceptance.4 (Doc.

# 17); see also Ziskovsky, 843 N.W.2d at 478 (finding offer

and acceptance where the parties had an opportunity to read

their contracts, signed them, and did not contest those

signatures). Neither do Plaintiffs contend that they entered

into these agreements out of fraud or duress. (Doc. # 17).

Although Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration clauses

are unenforceable because they are “contracts of adhesion,”

they provide no factual support thereof and this statement

therefore amounts to no more than a legal conclusion. (Id. at

8); DaimlerChrysler Ins. Co. v. Pambianchi, 762 F. Supp. 2d

410, 423 (D. Conn. 2011) (“Under Connecticut law, a court

4. The Court need not address whether adequate consideration

was exchanged because Plaintiffs did not raise a lack of

consideration argument. See Owen, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (“The

Iowa Supreme Court refuses to address the issue [of lack of

consideration] unless raised by the parties.”).

cannot find procedural unconscionability unless the party

opposing enforcement of a contractual provision has

introduced some specific evidence of overreaching by the

other party in the formation of the agreement.” (emphasis in

original)); De Dios v. Brand Energy & Infrastructure Servs.,

No. C-18-4011-MWB, 2018 WL 2976104, at *8 (N.D. Iowa June 13,

2018) (“Under Iowa law, the burden of proof that a particular

provision or contract is unconscionable rests on the party

claiming it is unconscionable.”).

To the extent that Plaintiffs attempt to raise an

unconscionability defense without stating so plainly, “mere

inequality of bargaining power that exists between an

employee and employer is an insufficient reason to find an

arbitration agreement unenforceable.” Gilmer v.

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991); see

also De Dios, 2018 WL 2976104, at *8 (“As Brand points out,

De Dios sought employment with Brand, but there is no reason

to believe that he could not have also sought employment

elsewhere, or that he could only have worked for Brand. . .

. Here, De Dios not only signed the Agreement to Arbitrate in

his employment application, but the Acknowledgement,

expressly representing that he had read and understood the

Agreement to Arbitrate and had been given time to consider

it. Because he does not allege any fraud, he cannot contradict

these representations.”); Billie v. Coverall N. Am., 444 F.

Supp. 3d 332, 347 (D. Conn. 2020) (“[U]nder Connecticut law,

the court cannot deem the delegation clause to be

unconscionable based solely on the adhesive nature of the

contract and the unequal standing of the [parties].”

(citation omitted)).

The Court also notes that in all of the relatively short

contracts, the arbitration clauses were visible, with – at a

minimum – the header noting “arbitration” in bold. (Doc. # 5

at 6-7); see Billie, 444 F. Supp. 3d at 347 (“In both

contracts, the section heading is written in bold, capital

letters. The text of the clause is written in the same font

size as the surrounding clauses. The law requires nothing

more.”). With all of this in mind, as well as the strong

federal policy favoring arbitration, the agreements to

arbitrate are enforceable.

2. Scope of the Agreements

Now that the Court has found that enforceable

arbitration agreements exist, it must determine whether the

instant racial discrimination claims are included in the

scope of those agreements. In gleaning the scope of the

agreements, the Court looks to both the FAA and the

agreements’ text. Because “the FAA creates a presumption in

favor of arbitrability,” the parties “must clearly express

their intent to exclude categories of claims from their

arbitration agreement.” Lambert, 544 F.3d at 1197-98.

“Federal statutory claims are generally arbitrable because

arbitration, like litigation, can serve a remedial and

deterrent function, and federal law favors arbitration.”

Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28).

Additionally, “[a] party cannot avoid arbitration . . .

because the arbitration clause uses general, inclusive

language, rather than listing every possible specific

claim[.]” Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217,

1221 (11th Cir. 2000).

Here, the arbitration agreements express the parties’

intent to arbitrate any and all controversies or claims

arising from their relationship – including racial

discrimination claims. (Doc. # 5 at 6-9). Indeed, these

provisions are both broad and do not specifically exclude

discrimination claims. (Id.); see Maddox v. USA Healthcare-

Adams, LLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“The

FAA creates a presumption in favor of arbitration so parties

must clearly express their intent to exclude categories of

claims from their arbitration agreement. Adams has explicitly

excluded certain categories from arbitration. However,

discrimination claims do not fall within the purview of noted

exceptions. . . . Maddox should be compelled to arbitrate

[the age and disability discrimination] claims that he has

presented to this court.” (citations omitted)).

The Eleventh Circuit faced a similar issue in Brown v.

ITT Consumer Financial Corp., in which three African American

employees sued their employer for racially discriminatory

treatment. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1217-21. The employees had

signed an arbitration agreement which provided that the

parties “agreed that any dispute between them or claim by

either against the other or any agent or affiliate of the

other shall be resolved by binding arbitration[.]” Id. at

1220-21. The Court found that this was sufficient to compel

arbitration of the discrimination case, despite the fact that

the arbitration clause did not specifically include such

claims. Id. at 1221-22 (“We think that the language of the

instant arbitration clause . . . includes statutory

claims.”). Here, like in Brown, the broad arbitration clause

compels the arbitration of racial employment discrimination

claims. Id.; see Bender v. A.G Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d

698, 700-01 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that Title VII claims

were subject to arbitration under similar circumstances); see

also Maddox, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (“The FAA applies to all

employment contracts not specifically exempted from the FAA

(transportation workers), including statutory claims for

discrimination.”).

And, although Plaintiffs contend that Rule 13201 of

FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure precludes compelling

arbitration of racial discrimination claims here, the Court

does not find this logic persuasive. (Doc. # 17 at 5). Rule

13201 provides that employment discrimination claims are “not

required to be arbitrated” under FINRA’s Code, and rather

that such claims “may be arbitrated only if the parties have

agreed to arbitrate [them].” FINRA Rule 13201(a). Because the

Court has already found that the broad arbitration clauses

include an agreement to arbitrate racial discrimination

claims, Rule 13201 – even if it applies here – is satisfied.

Additionally, a number of courts in the Eleventh Circuit

have previously found that parties can be compelled to

arbitrate racial discrimination claims pursuant to a valid

arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Lewis v. Haskell Co., 108

F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1290-91, 1294 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (directing

African American plaintiffs to arbitrate their racial

discrimination claims in light of a broad arbitration clause

that did not specifically include such claims); Ravelo v.

Shutts & Bowen, LLP, No. 8:09-cv-865-T-26EAJ, 2009 WL

1587272, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. June 5, 2009) (compelling

arbitration in a case involving racial discrimination and

retaliation claims where the arbitration clause provided that

the plaintiff agreed to “resolve all claims, controversies or

disputes which may arise out of his/her employment with the

Firm (including statutory claims) by submitting these claims

to final and binding arbitration”); James v. Cmty. Phone Book,

Inc., No. 3:07-cv-775-J-33TEM, 2008 WL 2741841, at *5 (M.D.

Fla. July 11, 2008) (compelling arbitration of a pro se

plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims).

Therefore, the Motion is granted, and this case is stayed

pending arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Milestrone v.

Citrus Specialty Grp., Inc., No. 8:19-cv-2341-T-02JSS, 2019

WL 5887179, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2019) (“In accord with

Eleventh Circuit law, this case must be stayed rather than

dismissed.” (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3)).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendant Voya Financial Advisors, Inc.’s Motion to

Compel Arbitration and Stay this Action (Doc. # 5) is

GRANTED.

(2) This case is referred to FINRA arbitration and is STAYED

pending resolution thereof. The Clerk is directed to

STAY and administratively CLOSE the case.

(3) The parties are DIRECTED to file a joint report of the

status of the arbitration proceeding by March 8, 2021,

and every ninety days thereafter. The parties must

immediately notify the Court upon the arbitrator's

resolution of the claims asserted in this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this

6th day of January, 2021.

ian? 9h. Hermepbey Cre

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20