Perry v. The Schumacher Group of Louisiana

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

PAMELA M. PERRY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:13-cv-36-FtM-29DNF

THE SCHUMACHER GROUP OF

LOUISIANA, a Louisiana

corporation, THE SCHUMACHER

GROUP OF FLORIDA, INC., a

Florida corporation, COLLIER

EMERGENCY GROUP, LLC, a

Florida limited liability

company, HEALTH MANAGEMENT

ASSOCIATES INC., a Michigan

corporation and NAPLES HMA,

LLC, a Florida limited

liability company,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendants The

Schumacher Group of Louisiana, The Schumacher Group of Florida,

Inc., and Collier Emergency Group, LLC’s Daubert Motion in Limine

to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Mark Cichon Regarding Plaintiff’s

Pecuniary Damages (Doc. #300), and defendant Naples HMA, LLC’s

Daubert Motion to Strike and/or Exclude Expert Testimony and Report

of Mark Cichon, D.O. (Doc. #306), both filed on September 18, 2020.

Plaintiff filed an Omnibus Response (Doc. #315) to the motions on

October 16, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the motions

are granted in part and denied in part.

I.

The Schumacher Group (TSG), consisting of defendants the

Schumacher Group of Louisiana, Inc., the Schumacher Group of

Florida, Inc., and the Collier Emergency Group, LLC (CEG), is a

corporation that provides healthcare staffing services at medical

facilities in certain states throughout the country. (Doc. #142,

p. 12.) In 2011, CEG entered into an exclusive agreement with

defendant Naples HMA, LLC (HMA) to staff the emergency department

at two hospitals in Naples, Florida. (Doc. #244-1, p. 30.)

Plaintiff Pamela Perry, M.D., an African American female emergency

physician, was hired in June 2011 to serve as the medical director

in the emergency department at one of the hospitals, Pine Ridge.

(Doc. #244, p. 5.) However, plaintiff’s employment was

subsequently terminated in 2012 and she has filed suit against the

defendants alleging various discrimination and retaliation claims.

(Doc. #235.)

In support of her claims, plaintiff has engaged Dr. Mark

Cichon to provide an independent analysis of the impact of her

termination “on her career in emergency medicine and on her

earnings and future earnings in that position.” (Doc. #304-1, p.

3.) Dr. Cichon, who specializes in emergency medicine and pre-

hospital care, has a bachelor of science degree in biology, a minor

in psychology and chemistry, and a doctor of medicine. (Doc.

#302-1, pp. 19, 28; Doc. #304-1, p. 17.) He has also completed a

two-year professional development program from Harvard which

addressed topics such as human resources and finances. (Doc.

#302-1, p. 21; Doc. #304-1, p. 17.) Dr. Cichon is currently the

Associate Chief Medical Officer and Physician in Chief at Loyola

University Medical Center in Illinois, having previously served as

Chairman of the Department of Emergency Medicine. (Doc. #304-1,

p. 18.) Dr. Cichon has also served as an emergency department

medical director at various hospitals since 1996, and taught at

various colleges since 1994. (Id.)

In his report, Dr. Chicon offers seven opinions to be

expressed at trial. TSG and HMA now seek to exclude Dr. Cichon’s

opinions on a variety of grounds. (Doc. #300; Doc. #306.)

II.

The admission of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in

the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge will help the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient

facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable

principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the

principles and methods to the facts of the

case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 contemplates that the district court

serve as gatekeeper for the admission of scientific testimony in

order to ensure that any and all expert testimony is both relevant

and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,

589 (1993); Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng’g, Inc., 731 F.3d 1171,

1183 (11th Cir. 2013). “The Supreme Court did not intend, however,

that the gatekeeper role supplant the adversary system or the role

of the jury: vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary

evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the

traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but

admissible evidence.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299

(11th Cir. 2004) (marks and citations omitted).

In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under

Rule 702, the Court applies a “rigorous” three-part inquiry.

United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en

banc). Expert testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is

qualified to testify on the topic at issue, (2) the methodology

used by the expert is sufficiently reliable, and (3) the testimony

will assist the trier of fact. Arthrex, Inc., v. Parcus Med.,

LLC, 2014 WL 3747598, *1 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2014) (citing Tampa

Bay Water, 731 F.3d at 1183). The burden of laying the proper

foundation for the admission of expert testimony “is on the party

offering the expert, and the admissibility must be shown by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613

F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting McCorvey v. Baxter

Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002)). The

admission of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of

the district court, which is accorded considerable leeway in making

its determination. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1258.

III.

TSG and HMA argue the Court should exclude all of Dr. Cichon’s

opinions because (1) he is unqualified to opine on the subjects,

(2) his opinions are based on an unreliable methodology, and (3)

his testimony will not be helpful to a jury. (Doc. #300, pp. 3-

8; Doc. #306, 6-17.) Having reviewed the seven topics on which

Dr. Cichon seeks to offer an opinion, the Court finds they can be

divided roughly into two categories: (1) topics related to

plaintiff’s career prospects, and (2) topics related to

plaintiff’s financial damages. While TSG and HMA’s motions focus

mainly on the opinions related to the latter topics, the Court

will address all the opinions offered in Dr. Cichon’s report.

A. Opinions Related to Plaintiff’s Career Prospects

In his report, Dr. Cichon offers four opinions relevant to

plaintiff’s career prospects following her termination. Those

opinions are as follows:

•

“Dr. Perry’s positive impact on ER performance would have

made her highly likely to remain in her position as medical

director.”

•

“Dr. Perry likely would have been able to continue to work at

Pine Ridge Hospital after the termination of the Schumacher

Group’s contract with Naples HMA.”

•

“The fact that Dr. Perry held a leadership position for only

a short time and then had to go back to a non-leadership

position may undermine her credibility as a leader and prevent

prospective employers from actually learning about her

successful performance as a medical director.”

•

“Given her qualifications and actual performance at her job

at Pine Ridge Hospital, I believe that Dr. Perry would still

be working in an ED medical director’s position.”1

(Doc. #304-1, pp. 9-14.)

1 As part of this opinion, Dr. Cichon estimates how much

“medical director earnings” plaintiff will “not be able to earn

over the remainder of her career.” (Doc. #304-1, p. 14.) The

Court will address this estimate with Dr. Cichon’s opinions on

plaintiff’s financial damages.

As noted, the first inquiry in determining whether an expert’s

testimony is admissible is determining whether the expert is

qualified to testify on the topic at issue. Arthrex, 2014 WL

3747598, *1 (citing Tampa Bay Water, 731 F.3d at 1183). Having

reviewed Dr. Cichon’s report and deposition testimony, as well as

the arguments of the parties, the Court finds he is qualified to

offer the opinions listed above.

Dr. Cichon has extensive experience serving as an emergency

department medical director, as well administrative experience as

Loyola University Medical Center’s Chairman of the Department of

Emergency Medicine, Associate Chief Medical Officer, and Physician

in Chief. (Doc. #304-1, p. 18.) In these roles, Dr. Cichon has

been utilized by Loyola “to give ideas on what compensation would

be on what is the market basket for benefits for emergency

physicians in [the] area,” as well as provide “insight as a

chairman to what is [sic] reasonable expectations and job roles.”

(Doc. #302-1, pp. 50-51.) Dr. Cichon also has experience with

transitioning service providers at medical facilities, including

being responsible for transitioning physicians and hiring new

ones. (Id. p. 73.) The Court finds this sufficient experience

to qualify Dr. Cichon to offer opinions on plaintiff’s career

prospects. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (permitting a witness to be

qualified as an expert based on experience); Anderson v. Techtronic

Indus. N. Am., Inc., 2015 WL 12843836, *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2015)

(“The qualification standard for expert testimony is not

stringent, and so long as the expert is minimally qualified,

objections to the level of the expert’s expertise go to credibility

and weight, not admissibility.” (citation omitted)). HMA argues

Dr. Cichon is not qualified because his experience practicing

emergency medicine in a university setting does not make him “an

expert in other emergency departments or how they run.” (Doc. #306,

p. 9.) However, “[a]n expert is not necessarily unqualified

simply because [their] experience does not precisely match the

matter at hand.” Furmanite Am., Inc. v. T.D. Williamson, Inc.,

506 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

The second inquiry for determining the admissibility of

expert testimony is whether the methodology used by the expert is

sufficiently reliable. Arthrex, 2014 WL 3747598, *1 (citing Tampa

Bay Water, 731 F.3d at 1183). The reliability prong is distinct

from an expert’s qualifications; thus, an expert can be qualified

but his opinions unreliable. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261. “Exactly

how reliability is evaluated may vary from case to case, but what

remains constant is the requirement that the trial judge evaluate

the reliability of the testimony before allowing its admission at

trial.” Id. at 1262. Having reviewed Dr. Cichon’s report and

deposition testimony, the Court finds his opinions regarding

plaintiff’s career prospects are sufficiently reliable.

The record indicates that in formulating his opinions, Dr.

Cichon reviewed, inter alia, interrogatories, depositions, TSG

records, tax returns, and published articles. (Doc. #304-1, pp.

6-9.) Regarding the career-prospects opinions at issue, Dr.

Cichon also relied upon (1) patient satisfaction scores and email

correspondence about the scores collected during plaintiff’s

tenure at Pine Ridge, (2) his knowledge of emergency room key

metrics and the tenure of medical directors meeting those metrics,

(3) a review of the current online roster of emergency room

physicians working for HMA, and (4) research into emergency rooms

located within “a suitable geographic location” for plaintiff and

their staffing numbers. (Id. pp. 9-12.) The Court finds this

sufficient under Daubert. See Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal

Family, LLC, 555 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A district

court may decide that nonscientific testimony is reliable based

‘upon personal knowledge or experience.’” (quoting Kumho Tire Co.,

Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)); Goines v. Lee Mem’l

Health Sys., 2019 WL 1101878, *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2019) (finding

expert’s opinion sufficiently reliable when it was based on

examination of record evidence, including depositions, and applied

against expert’s knowledge and experience).

The final criteria for the admission of expert testimony is

the requirement that the testimony assist the trier of fact.

Arthrex, 2014 WL 3747598, *1 (citing Tampa Bay Water, 731 F.3d at

1183). “[E]xpert testimony is admissible if it concerns matters

that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person . . .

Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of

fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties

can argue in closing arguments.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262-63.

Having reviewed the evidence, the Court concludes that Dr. Cichon’s

opinions on plaintiff’s job performance and the impact of the

termination on her career prospects will assist the jury. For

example, such testimony is directly relevant in determining the

potential scope of plaintiff’s damages and the issue of mitigation.

Accordingly, the Court finds the opinions satisfy Daubert and are

admissible.

B. Opinions Related to Plaintiff’s Financial Damages

Dr. Cichon also opines on plaintiff’s financial damages as a

result of the termination, offering the following:

•

Plaintiff would have earned an additional $944,451 in

compensation from 2012 to 2019 had she not been terminated,

and an additional $1,630,347 between 2020 and 2032;

•

Plaintiff suffered $58,670 in damages related to expenses she

paid because she was forced to take positions that required

her to live away from home;

•

Plaintiff is entitled to an additional $504,601 in damages

due to a reduced qualify of life.

(Doc. #304-1, pp. 10-16.)

In determining the amount of back pay plaintiff is owed, Dr.

Cichon multiplied plaintiff’s average monthly earnings while at

Pine Ridge by twelve to create a “baseline” for her annual

compensation. (Id. pp. 10-11.) Dr. Cichon then raised this

figure by 3.6% per year in accordance with trends in the Florida

market to determine plaintiff’s estimated annual income between

2012 and 2019. (Id.) Dr. Cichon then subtracted plaintiff’s

actual earnings from those years and totaled the amount ($944,451).

(Id.)

In determining the amount plaintiff would have continued to

earn after 2019, Dr. Cichon used plaintiff’s medical director

stipend and incentive pay to determine she would have earned an

estimated $152,016 more per year as of 2020. (Id. p. 14.) Dr.

Cichon adjusted this amount by 3.6% per year until 2032, the year

in which plaintiff would turn sixty-five years old. (Id.) When

totaled, this amount ($1,630,347) represents the medical director

earnings plaintiff would have earned over the remainder of her

career. (Id.)

In determining plaintiff’s travel related expenses, Dr.

Cichon used plaintiff’s 2012 to 2019 tax filings to calculate her

mileage deductions as well as hotel and meal expenses. (Id. p.

13.) Dr. Cichon totaled the amount and then subtracted the “tax

benefit” plaintiff received from deducting these amounts from her

income. (Id.) The remaining amount ($58,670) represents the

“expenses [plaintiff] paid because she was forced to take positions

that required her to live away from home.” (Id.)

Finally, in calculating the amount of compensation plaintiff

is owed due to the increased stress and reduced quality of life

from having to work away from home ($504,601), Dr. Cichon

multiplied the amount plaintiff earned from the year of her

termination through 2019 by twenty percent. (Id. p. 15.) Dr.

Cichon used the twenty percent figure because he “assume[d] that

commuting and quality of life issues related [to] her post-

termination positions meant that [plaintiff] had to work a minimum

of 20% harder than she would have had she been able to maintain a

regular career in one location as a medical director.” (Id.)

TSA and HMA argue that Dr. Cichon’s damages opinions are

inadmissible under each of the three prongs of Daubert. (Doc.

#300, pp. 3-8; Doc. #306, pp. 6-17.) Regarding the first prong,

TSG and HMA assert that because Dr. Cichon does not have degrees

in statistics, economics, human resources, psychology, or

taxation, and because his experience is related to emergency

medicine, he is unqualified to opine on plaintiff’s financial

damages. (Doc. #300, pp. 3-5; Doc. #306, pp. 6-12.) Plaintiff

responds that Dr. Cichon is not being offered as an expert in these

fields, and thus his opinions do not require such a background.

(Doc. #315, pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff further argues that Dr. Cichon’s

experience as a medical director and administrator qualify him to

offer all of his opinions. (Id. pp. 8-9.)

Having reviewed the arguments of the parties as well as Dr.

Cichon’s report and deposition, the Court is unconvinced he has

the requisite experience to opine on plaintiff’s damages. It is

undisputed that Dr. Cichon is not an expert in any financial areas

such as economics or taxation, and he does not have experience

calculating economic losses caused by employment termination.

While Dr. Cichon may have some practical experience involving taxes

and financial matters, such experience is simply insufficient to

constitute expertise under Daubert. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.

of Pittsburgh v. Tyco Integrated Sec., LLC, 2015 WL 11251759, *6

(S.D. Fla. July 6, 2015) (“Although an expert may be permitted to

rely on her experience in formulating her opinion, this alone is

insufficient; Daubert requires an explanation as to how the

experiences yield the conclusion, why the experiences are

sufficient, and how the experiences are reliably applied to the

facts.”).

Even if Dr. Cichon had sufficient experience to qualify as an

expert in calculating financial damages, the Court is unconvinced

his calculations of plaintiff’s damages would assist the jury.

Plaintiff acknowledges that Dr. Cichon “is not an accountant or

human resources professional, tax adviser, or statistician.”

(Doc. #315, p. 7.) Nonetheless, plaintiff argues “[t]he damage

amounts that Dr. Cichon arrived at do not rely on complex economic

models, specialized tax knowledge, or statistics,” and that “[t]he

calculations that he performed . . . are not ones that require the

professional skills that the Defendants fault him for lacking.”

(Id. pp. 7-8.)

Plaintiff is essentially arguing that because Dr. Cichon’s

calculations are not overly complex, he does not need specialized

knowledge or experience to make them. However, the simplicity of

the mathematics is a double-edged sword, because if the

calculations are so simple Dr. Cichon can do them without any

expertise, then the jury can as well. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at

1262-63 (“[E]xpert testimony is admissible if it concerns matters

that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person . . .

Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of

fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties

can argue in closing arguments.”); Rossi v. Darden, 2017 WL

2129429, *9 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2017) (determining expert’s “basic

arithmetic exercise” was “not beyond the understanding of the

average lay person” and “therefore does not assist the trier of

fact through application of an expert’s specialized knowledge or

technique”); Bowe v. Pub. Storage, 2015 WL 11233065, *4 (S.D. Fla.

May 7, 2015) (excluding expert’s damages calculation based on

“simple arithmetic, division and multiplication” because such

calculations were “not beyond the understanding of the average lay

person”); LSQ Funding Grp., L.C. v. EDS Field Servs., 879 F. Supp.

2d 1320, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Dr. Ugone’s simple arithmetic

calculation is not beyond the understanding of the average lay

person and therefore would not help the trier of fact.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiff has failed to meet her

burden of demonstrating (1) Dr. Cichon is qualified to offer

opinions on plaintiff’s financial damages caused by the

termination, and (2) that such opinions would assist the jury.

Therefore, Dr. Cichon’s calculations of plaintiff’s lost wages,

travel expenses, and quality of life compensation are inadmissible

as expert testimony.2 But see Fed. R. Evid. 701 (permitting a

2 The Court’s ruling would not preclude Dr. Cichon from

testifying as to plaintiff’s salary when she was terminated, nor

non-expert witness to testify to an opinion that, inter alia, does

not fall within the scope of Rule 702); U.S. v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d

1316, 1331-32 (llth Cir. 2006) (determining witness’s testimony

was “permissible lay testimony under Rule 701” when such testimony

was based on basic arithmetic calculations).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

The Schumacher Group of Louisiana, The Schumacher Group of

Florida, Inec., and Collier Emergency Group, LLC’s Daubert Motion

in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Mark Cichon Regarding

Plaintiff’s Pecuniary Damages (Doc. #300) and defendant Naples

HMA, LLC’s Daubert Motion to Strike and/or Exclude Expert Testimony

and Report of Mark Cichon, D.O. (Doc. #306) are GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part for the reasons expressed herein.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 4th day of

December, 2020.

if aw (OL

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adi EF. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Counsel of record

testifying as to trends in the Florida market or the expected

retirement age for medical directors, assuming such testimony is

otherwise admissible.