“[P]rison officials’ actions that allegedly violate an inmate’s right of access to the courts must have impeded the inmate’s pursuit of a nonfrivolous, post-conviction claim or civil rights action.” (quoting Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998))
How later courts described this case
- “[P]rison officials’ actions that allegedly violate an inmate’s right of access to the courts must have impeded the inmate’s pursuit of a nonfrivolous, post-conviction claim or civil rights action.” (quoting Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
ISAAIH XAVIEZER ASH,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:20-cv-1021-J-39PDB
CEDRICK MAY, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiff, Isaaih Xaviezer Ash, a pretrial detainee at the
Columbia County Detention Facility, initiated this action by
filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1; Compl.) and a
motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 2; Motion). Plaintiff
moves to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4).
Plaintiff names as Defendants four corrections officers for
their alleged interference with his ability to submit grievances
and send mail. See Compl. at 2-4. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Stapleton refused to send a letter to the NAACP on August 26, 2020;
Defendant May blocked his request to file a grievance using the
kiosk; and unnamed officers changed the address on one of his
envelopes. Id. at 7-8. As relief, Plaintiff asks that Defendant
Stapleton “have no contact with any of [his] legal mail . . . [and]
that [Defendant] May be held responsible along with [Defendant]
Stapleton for violating [his] constitutional [sic] protected
rights.” Id. at 10. He also seeks monetary damages.1 Id. Aside from
monetary damages, Plaintiff seeks essentially the same relief in
his motion for preliminary injunction. See Motion at 2.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district
court to dismiss a complaint if the court determines the action is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). With respect to
whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language of Rule
12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so courts apply the
same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249,
1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to
“naked assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quotations, alteration,
1 In his complaint, Plaintiff references “attached documents.”
It appears he is referencing the documents included with his motion
for preliminary injunction, which the Court has reviewed.
and citation omitted). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either
direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678,
683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted).
In reviewing a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings, a court must
liberally construe the plaintiff’s allegations. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). However, the duty of a court to
construe pro se pleadings liberally does not require the court to
serve as an attorney for the plaintiff. Freeman v. Sec’y, Dept. of
Corr., 679 F. App’x 982, 982 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing GJR Invs.,
Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA
because he fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) both that the defendant
deprived [him] of a right secured under the Constitution or federal
law and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state
law.” See Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175 (alteration in original).
To state a claim for a denial of access to the courts, a
plaintiff must allege an “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 349 (1996); see also Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225
(11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be established by
demonstrating that an inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous
claim were frustrated or impeded by . . . an official’s action.”
Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1225 (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit
has held a prisoner asserting an access-to-courts violation must
allege the defendant’s conduct interfered with a criminal appeal,
a petition for habeas corpus, or a civil rights action. Al-Amin v.
Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[P]rison officials’
actions that allegedly violate an inmate’s right of access to the
courts must have impeded the inmate’s pursuit of a nonfrivolous,
post-conviction claim or civil rights action.” (quoting Wilson v.
Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998))).
Accepting as true that Defendant Stapleton refused to mail
Plaintiff’s letter to the NAACP, Plaintiff fails to allege
Defendant Stapleton interfered with his ability to pursue a
nonfrivolous criminal appeal, a habeas case, or a civil rights
case. Plaintiff does not identify the content of the letter, nor
does he allege he missed a filing deadline in a post-conviction
matter or a civil rights action. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not
state a plausible claim for relief against Defendant Stapleton.
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Defendant May
for alleged interference with the jail grievance process. The
Eleventh Circuit has held a claim that a jail official interfered
with an inmate’s access to the grievance process is frivolous
because “a prison grievance procedure does not provide an inmate
with a constitutionally protected interest.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at
1177.
Finally, Plaintiff does not assert factual allegations
against the remaining two Defendants, aside from a conclusory
assertion that all Defendants, including Brown and Newcomb,
“played a role in this illegal process.” See Compl. at 10. To the
extent Plaintiff asserts Defendants Brown and Newcomb participated
in the conduct he alleges against Defendants Stapleton and May,
Plaintiff’s claim fails for the reasons already stated.
Plaintiff’s complaint is due to be dismissed and, for that
reason, his motion for preliminary injunction is due to be denied.
To demonstrate entitlement to injunctive relief, a movant must
satisfy four elements, including “a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits” and irreparable injury. Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005).
Because Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief
against Defendants, he is unable to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits of his purported claims. He also fails to
show he faces a threat of irreparable injury given he complains
about past harm. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion is facially
deficient because it does not comply with this Court’s Local Rules.
See M.D. Fla. R. 4.05(b)(1)-(4), 4.06.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED :
1. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 2)
is DENIED.
2. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case
without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the
file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 29th day of
September 2020.
Bhan) Booms
BRIAN J. DAVIS
United States District Judge
Jax-6
Cc: Isaaih Xavizer Ash