Woodard v. Wallace

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MELVIN WOODARD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-991-J-32JBT

TAPIA M. WALLACE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action in

the Northern District of Florida by filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights

Complaint. Doc. 1. The Honorable Mark E. Walker, Chief United States District

Judge, transferred the Complaint to this Court. Doc. 6. Plaintiff has also filed a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 9. Plaintiff names three Columbia

Correctional Institution employees as Defendants: Tapia M. Wallace, S.R.

Griffis, and OC Phillips. Doc. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Wallace

issued a disciplinary report indicating that Plaintiff was masturbating. Plaintiff

states he requested camera footage to prove that he did not commit the lewd act

and that Defendant Wallace had seen another inmate. Id. at 5. He claims that

the Defendants Griffis and Phillips, members of the disciplinary board,

reviewed the subject video evidence and told Plaintiff the video “showed

someone standing there, but they could not determine who that person was”;

thus, it was not exculpatory. Id. According to Plaintiff, a defect in the recording’s

visibility should have been noted in the investigative report and failure to

document such denied him a fair and impartial hearing. He asserts he was

found guilty solely based on the officer’s statements, which he argues is not

enough to support the finding of the disciplinary team. He further appears to

argue that he was not “read the ‘DR’” nor did anyone explain the range of

punishment that could be imposed if he were found guilty, and omission of these

steps amounted to procedural errors.

Under the “statement of claims” section of his Complaint, Plaintiff

appears to state he is raising a 14th Amendment due process claim because the

video evidence would prove his innocence, but it is defective. Id. at 7. As relief,

he requests court fees and $15,000 in punitive damages. Id.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to dismiss a case at

any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The

Court liberally construes the pro se plaintiff’s allegations. See Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th

Cir. 2011).

2

With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted,” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), so courts apply the same standard in both contexts.

Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v.

Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels

and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

that amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. (quotations, alteration, and

citation omitted). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or

inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain

a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for

Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations

omitted).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a

person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured under the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286,

1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992).

Moreover, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal

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conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Rehberger v.

Henry Cty., Ga., 577 F. App’x 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quotations

and citation omitted). In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or

violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against

a defendant.

Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated because Defendant

Wallace’s disciplinary report was based on inaccurate information, and

Defendants Griffis and Phillips did not provide Petitioner with a fair

disciplinary hearing. The Supreme Court has recognized two instances in which

a prisoner may be deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, such

that due process is required: (1) “when a change in the prisoner’s conditions of

confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the

court”; and (2) “when the state has consistently bestowed a certain benefit to

prisoners . . . and the deprivation of that benefit ‘imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.’” Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). When a prisoner’s due process rights are

triggered, he is entitled to, among other things, an opportunity to call witnesses

and present documentary evidence at a disciplinary hearing. See Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

4

Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of a constitutionally protected

liberty interest that would implicate a due process violation regarding his

disciplinary report and hearing. Although he alleges that he was found guilty

of the disciplinary infractions, he does not allege the punishment he received

for the infraction. Notably, he does not allege that the disciplinary report or

resulting disciplinary hearing caused “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation” that creates a liberty interest. See Allen v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 578 F. App’x 836, 839 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding no due process claim

alleged regarding disciplinary hearing, because the plaintiff failed to allege that

the change in his conditions of his confinement following the hearing created a

liberty interest); see also Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300-01 (30 days in segregated

disciplinary confinement did not trigger due process protection where the

conditions of disciplinary segregation were not significantly different from the

conditions outside disciplinary segregation). Plaintiff also fails to allege that he

lost good time credits as a result of his disciplinary proceedings. See Wolff, 94

S. Ct. at 2975 (prisoners have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in

state-created right to good time credits). As such, because Plaintiff has alleged

no constitutionally-protected liberty interest was affected by his disciplinary

hearing, he has failed to state a due process claim under the Fourteen

Amendment.

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Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of

September, 2020.

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

United States District Judge

Jax-7

Cc: Melvin Woodard, #797250