Opinion

Estate of Geraldine F. Jennings v. Gulfshore Private Home Care, LLC

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Sep 4, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.8%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ESTATE OF GERALDINE F.

JENNINGS, ROBERT J. JENNINGS,

CHERYL FAZO and KIM S. JENNINGS,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No.: 2:19-cv-72-FtM-38NPM

GULFSHORE PRIVATE HOME

CARE, LLC,

Defendant/Third Party

Plaintiff

CRIS-CAROL SAMUELS,

Third Party Defendant. /

OPINION AND ORDER1

Before the Court is Defendant Gulfshore Private Home Care, LLC’s Motion to Limit

the Opinion Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert Joseph Rubino (Doc. 103) and Plaintiffs’

response (Doc. 118).

Background

Gulfshore is a nurse registry that connects home healthcare workers to elderly and

disabled clients. In March 2017, Gulfshore connected caregiver Cris Carol Samuels with

a client—Antoinette Janich. While Janich was in her car, Samuels drove off the road and

onto a sidewalk, fatally striking Geraldine Jennings. Jennings’ estate and surviving

husband and daughters sued Gulfshore for negligence and wrongful death based on

1 Disclaimer: Documents hyperlinked to CM/ECF are subject to PACER fees. By using hyperlinks, the

Court does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products

they provide, nor does it have any agreements with them. The Court is also not responsible for a hyperlink’s

availability and functionality, and a failed hyperlink does not affect this Order.

three theories: (1) Samuels was an agent for, or in a joint venture with, Gulfshore; (2)

Gulfshore was negligent in selecting, hiring, retaining, instructing, and/or supervising

Samuels; and (3) Gulfshore breached its non-delegable duty to ensure that the

transportation services were provided in a safe manner.

To help make their case, Plaintiffs retained medical transportation expert Joseph

Rubino. Gulfshore seeks to exclude five of Rubino’s opinions due to lack of expertise,

foundation, methodology, and relevance. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not bother submitting any

legal argument opposing Gulfshore’s Motion. Plaintiffs’ response instead consists of a

lengthy excerpt from United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2005), a factual

summary of the case, a list of evidence with no obvious relevance to the admissibility of

Rubino’s testimony, and about ten pages of block quotes from a Declaration of Joseph

M. Rubino (Doc. 109).2

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides the starting point when considering the

admissibility of expert testimony:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the

product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably

applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

2 This is a remarkable display of lazy lawyering. Rubino charges $295/hour for in-office

work and $325/hour for out-of-office work. Yet Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to protect the

investment in Rubino’s testimony by preparing a legal argument defending its

admissibility. As a result, the arguments raised in Gulfshore’s Motion are mostly

unopposed.

FED. R. EVID. 702. In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) and

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court held that

trial courts have a gatekeeping function designed to test expert evidence for relevance

and reliability. In performing this function, the Court applies a “rigorous three-part inquiry”

by considering whether (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently about the issues

at hand, (2) the expert’s methodology is sufficiently reliable, and (3) the expert’s testimony

helps the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a factual issue. United States

v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). “While there is inevitably some overlap

among the basic requirements—qualification, reliability, and helpfulness—they remain

distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Id. Defendant’s

challenges span all three elements, and Plaintiffs must prove each by a preponderance

of the evidence. Id.

Discussion

Gulfshore seeks to exclude five of Rubino’s opinions. As explained above,

Plaintiffs do not counter Gulfshore’s objections with any legal argument of their own—a

risky tactic for a party that bears the burden of proof. The Court addresses each

challenged opinion in turn.

1. The classification of Gulfshore’s business

Rubino opined that Gulfshore “is an in-home service registry that provides private

home care to individuals and families and is regulated by the State of Florida.” (Doc. 103-

1 at 5). Gulfshore objects because Rubino admitted he has no expertise in Florida nurse

registries and because Rubino did not review Gulfshore’s license, the contract between

Gulfshore and Janich, or applicable statutes. In response, Rubino affirms his lack of

expertise on nurse registries. It is thus undisputed that Rubino is unqualified to give this

opinion, and the Court will exclude it.

2. The adequacy of Gulfshore’s background check of Samuels

Rubino’s expert report states that Gulfshore should not have allowed Samuels to

provide transportation services because of her “extensive criminal history” and “her

repeated pattern of unsafe (and unlicensed) driving.” (Doc. 103-1). But at his deposition,

Rubino could not identify the source of his information about Samuels’ background or

identify any crimes for which Samuels was convicted. Rubino did not conduct his own

investigation into Samuels’ background, nor did he review the Florida statutes that set

background-screening requirements for nurse registries. Gulfshore challenges Plaintiffs

to show the facts and methodology on which Rubino’s opinion rests. Plaintiffs make no

attempt to meet this challenge and have thus failed to prove that Rubino’s opinion is

reliable. The Court will exclude it.

3. The deceptiveness of Gulfshore’s representations to the public

Rubino opined, “Gulfshore is engaged in public deception by claiming it provides

quality services to its clients, while lacking even a minimum vetting process for caregivers

that will provide transportation services.” (Doc. 103-1 at 7). Gulfshore argues that since

none of Plaintiffs’ causes of action are based on fraud or misrepresentation, this opinion

is irrelevant and meant only to inflame the jury. Plaintiffs make no attempt to explain the

relevance of this opinion and thus fail to prove its helpfulness. The Court finds the opinion

irrelevant and will exclude it.

4. The existence of an agency or joint venture relationship between Gulfshore and

Samuels

Rubino found, “Not only was Ms. Samuels Gulfshore’s agent, but Gulfshore and

Ms. Samuels were in joint venture business undertaking.” (Doc. 103-1 at 7). In his

deposition, Rubino explained that he was not using the terms “agent” and “joint venture”

in a legal sense. Gulfshore argues Rubino lacked an adequate foundation for this opinion

because he does not know the elements of a joint venture and did not review the contracts

between Gulfshore, Samuels, and Janich. Plaintiffs did not respond to Gulfshore’s

argument. The Court will exclude this opinion because Plaintiffs failed to prove its

reliability, and because it would likely confuse the jury.

5. Janich’s beliefs about Gulfshore

Finally, Rubino opined, “Ms. Janaich [sic] believed that Ms. Samuels officially

represented Gulfshore and was authorized to conduct Gulfshore’s business, and she

entered Ms. Samuel’s vehicle due to that belief.” (Doc. 103-1 at 7). Gulfshore objects

because Rubino never spoke to Janich and relied solely on her statements recorded in a

motor vehicle accident report. Again, Plaintiffs fail to address the admissibility of this

opinion. Rubino briefly addresses Gulfshore’s objection when he argues a portion of the

accident report confirms “that Ms. Samuels was sent to Ms. Janish [sic] due to the

relationship of each party to Gulfshore[.]” (Doc. 118 at 16). But that does not prove that

Rubino can reliably testify about Janich’s beliefs. The Court will exclude this opinion.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Defendant Gulfshore Private Home Care, LLC’s Motion to Limit the Opinion

Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert Joseph Rubino (Doc. 103) is GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this 4th day of September, 2020.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

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