Lawson v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ANISSA LAWSON,

Applicant,

v. CASE NO. 8:17-cv-1628-T-23JSS

SECRETARY, Department of Corrections,

Respondent.

____________________________________/

ORDER

Lawson applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1)

and challenges her convictions for (1) seven counts of procuring a person under

eighteen for prostitution, (2) a count of using a child in a sexual performance, (3) six

counts of principal to lewd and lascivious battery with a child twelve or older but less

than sixteen, and (4) a count of child abuse. Lawson is imprisoned for twenty years.

Numerous exhibits (“Respondent’s Exhibit __”) support the response. (Doc. 9) The

respondent both argues that most of Lawson’s grounds for relief are barred by her

guilty plea and admits that the application is timely. (Response at 6 Doc. 9)

I. BACKGROUND

Lawson recruited and prostituted underage girls for her financial gain. In a

twenty-two count information Lawson, her boyfriend, and another individual were

charged with various sex offenses involving a minor. Lawson was charged in counts

one through fifteen, her boyfriend was charged in counts sixteen through nineteen,

and the other defendant was charged in the remaining three counts. Under the terms

of his plea agreement, the other defendant would have testified against Lawson.

Also, Lawson’s boyfriend was offered a plea agreement. Instead of contesting the

charges and without a plea agreement, Lawson pleaded nolo contendere. A conviction

based on a plea of nolo contendere is reviewed the same as a conviction based on a

guilty plea. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); Wallace v. Turner, 695

F.2d 545, 548 (11th Cir. 1983).

II. GUILTY PLEA

Lawson alleges seven grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and an

eighth ground of cumulative error. Five of the seven grounds of ineffective assistance

are based on a pre-plea event and challenge neither the voluntariness of the plea nor

the trial court’s jurisdiction, specifically, not moving to suppress pre-Miranda

statements (ground one); neither investigating nor moving to suppress counts 3–5

and 11–13 in the information (ground two); neither investigating nor moving to

dismiss counts 7 and 14 in the information (ground three); neither investigating nor

moving to dismiss counts 1 and 9 in the information (ground four); and allowing

Lawson to plead to the charge of using a child in a sexual performance as alleged in

count 8 (ground six).

Lawson must overcome the “well settled [general principle] that a voluntary

and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by

competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.

504, 508 (1984). And, as Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), explains, a

guilty plea waives a non-jurisdictional defect:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which

has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact

guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty

plea.

This waiver of rights precludes most challenges to the conviction. E.g., United

States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1217, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, a voluntary,

unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings.”),

and Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A defendant who

enters a plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality

of the conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the

plea can be sustained.”).

As explained in Hutchins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 273 F. App’x 777, 778 (11th

Cir.),1 cert. denied, 555 U.S. 857 (2008), a guilty plea waives a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on a pre-plea event.

In his habeas petition, Hutchins alleges that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to explicitly define and advise him of a

statute of limitations defense prior to advising him to waive that

defense and plead guilty. Hutchins’s voluntary guilty plea,

however, waived any ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

1 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as

persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.

Consequently, the entry of a guilty plea waives a claim (other than a challenge to the

court’s jurisdiction or a challenge to the voluntariness of the plea), including both a

substantive claim and a purported failing of counsel that occurred before entry of the

plea, as United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630–31 (2002), explains:

[T]his Court has found that the Constitution, in respect to

a defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, does

not require complete knowledge of the relevant circum-

stances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its

accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite

various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant

might labor. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. [742], 757

[(1970)] . . . (defendant “misapprehended the quality of the

State's case”); ibid. (defendant misapprehended “the likely

penalties”); ibid. (defendant failed to “anticipate” a change

in the law regarding relevant “punishments”); McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d

763 (1970) (counsel “misjudged the admissibility” of a

“confession”); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573, 109 S.

Ct. 757, 102 L. Ed. 2d 927 (1989) (counsel failed to point out

a potential defense); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267,

93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973) (counsel failed to find

a potential constitutional infirmity in grand jury proceedings).

Because each allegation is based on a pre-plea event and challenges neither

the voluntariness of the plea nor the trial court’s jurisdiction, each allegation of

ineffective assistance of counsel alleged in grounds one through four and six is barred

by Lawson’s plea. The allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel alleged in

grounds five, seven, and eight are entitled to a review on the merits.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th

Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly

deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in

pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim —

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000), explains this deferential

standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a

federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a

writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the

merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue

only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the

state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was

contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “involved an

unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

“The focus . . . is on whether the state court’s application of clearly established

federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). “As a condition for

obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the

state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014) (“The critical

point is that relief is available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application clause if,

and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of

facts that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question . . . .”)

(citing Richter); Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (“And an ‘unreasonable

application of ’ those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong;

even clear error will not suffice.”) (citing Woodall, 572 U.S. at 419). Accord Brown v.

Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is the objective reasonableness, not

the correctness per se, of the state court decision that we are to decide.”). The phrase

“clearly established Federal law” encompasses only the holdings of the United States

Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. “The [AEDPA]

modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in

order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are

given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694. A

federal court must afford due deference to a state court’s decision. “AEDPA

prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal habeas corpus review

as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v. Lett,

559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (“This

is a ‘difficult to meet,’ . . . and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court

rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt’ . . . .”) (citations omitted).

When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision in a

reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as stated in the

opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct.

1188, 1192 (2018) (“[A] federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons

given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable.”). When

the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied with reasons for the decision,

the federal court “should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related

state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the

unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. The

State may contest “the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance

relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court’s

decision . . . .” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

Notwithstanding her plea of nolo contendere, Lawson appealed. The state

appellate court affirmed Lawson’s convictions. (Respondent’s Exhibit 6) In a

per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court affirmed

the denial of Lawson’s subsequent Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief.

(Respondent’s Exhibit 9) The state appellate court’s per curiam affirmance warrants

deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court’s

decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245,

1254, reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom

Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 100 (“When a

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief,

it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the

absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”), and

Bishop v. Warden, 726 F. 3d 1243, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2013) (describing the difference

between an “opinion” or “analysis” and a “decision” or “ruling” and explaining that

deference is accorded the state court’s “decision” or “ruling” even absent an

“opinion” or “analysis”).

As Pinholster explains, 563 U.S. at 181–82, review of the state court decision is

limited to the record that was before the state court:

We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim

on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a

state-court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was

contrary to, or “involved” an unreasonable application of,

established law. This backward-looking language requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.

It follows that the record under review is limited to the record

in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state

court.

Lawson bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state

court’s fact determination. “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact

but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001). The state court’s rejection of Lawson’s

post-conviction claims warrants deference in this federal action. (Order Denying

Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent’s Exhibit 2 at 65–73) Lawson’s

federal application presents the same grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel that

she presented to the state courts.

IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Lawson claims ineffective assistance of counsel, a difficult claim to sustain.

“[T]he cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of

ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d

1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386

(11th Cir. 1994)). Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998), explains

that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), governs an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim:

The law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

well settled and well documented. In Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the

Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for analyzing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. According to Strickland,

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,

the defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,

a trial whose result is reliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

Strickland requires proof of both deficient performance and consequent

prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“There is no reason for a court deciding an

ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”); Sims, 155 F.3d at 1305 (“When

applying Strickland, we are free to dispose of ineffectiveness claims on either of its

two grounds.”). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual

ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct

on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”

466 U.S. at 690. Strickland requires that “in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance.” 466 U.S. at 690.

Lawson must demonstrate that counsel’s alleged error prejudiced the defense

because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant

setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the

judgment.” 466 U.S. at 691. To meet this burden, Lawson must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694.

Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation

of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and

strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely

to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on

investigation.” 466 U.S. at 690–91. As White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220–21

(11th Cir. 1992), explains, Lawson cannot meet her burden merely by showing that

the avenue chosen by counsel proved unsuccessful.

The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would

have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would

have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the

trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial . . . . We are not interested in grading lawyers’

performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial

process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.

Accord Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To state

the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more

or something different. So, omissions are inevitable . . . . [T]he issue is not what

is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally

compelled.’”) (en banc) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)).

Additionally, Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014),

cert. denied sub nom., Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126 (2015), discusses the required

extent of counsel’s investigation:

[W]e have explained that “no absolute duty exists to

investigate particular facts or a certain line of defense.”

Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1317. “[C]ounsel has a duty to

make reasonable investigations or make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added).

“[C]ounsel need not always investigate before pursuing or not

pursuing a line of defense. Investigation (even a nonexhaustive,

preliminary investigation) is not required for counsel reasonably

to decline to investigate a line of defense thoroughly.” Chandler,

218 F.3d at 1318. “In assessing the reasonableness of an

attorney’s investigation . . . a court must consider not only the

quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also

whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney

to investigate further.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527, 123 S. Ct.

at 2538.

See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (confirming that counsel has no duty

to raise a frivolous claim).

Under Section 2254(d) Lawson must prove that the state court’s

decision “(1) [was] contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States

or (2) [was] based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Sustaining a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is very difficult because “[t]he standards created by Strickland

and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem,

review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. See also Pinholster, 563 U.S. 202 (An

applicant must overcome this “‘doubly deferential’ standard of Strickland and the

AEDPA.”); Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019)

(“Given the double deference due, it is a ‘rare case in which an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief

in a federal habeas proceeding.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 643 F.3d

907, 911 (11th Cir. 2011)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2520 (2020); and Pooler v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corr., 702 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because we must view Pooler’s

ineffective counsel claim — which is governed by the deferential Strickland test —

through the lens of AEDPA deference, the resulting standard of review is “doubly

deferential.”), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 874 (2013).

In summarily denying Lawson’s motion for post-conviction relief, the state

court recognized that Strickland governs a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Respondent’s Exhibit 2 at 67) Because the state court rejected the grounds based

on Strickland, Lawson cannot meet the “contrary to” test in Section 2254(d)(1).

Lawson instead must show that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland or

unreasonably determined the facts. In determining “reasonableness,” a federal

application for the writ of habeas corpus authorizes determining only “whether the

state habeas court was objectively reasonable in its Strickland inquiry,” not an

independent assessment of whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. Putnam v.

Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1244, n.17 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 870 (2002).

As explained above, neither a guilty plea nor a nolo contendere plea waive a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that challenges either the voluntariness of

the plea or a post-plea event, such as sentencing. Nevertheless, the Strickland

standard controls a claim that counsel was ineffective in recommending that a client

plead guilty, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), Agan v. Singletary, 12 F.3d 1012

(11th Cir. 1994), and greater evidence is needed to prove both deficient performance

and prejudice if the client pleads guilty. For the deficient performance requirement,

“counsel owes a lesser duty to a client who pleads guilty than to one who decided to

go to trial, and in the former case counsel need only provide his client with an

understanding of the law in relation to the facts, so that the accused may make an

informed and conscious choice between accepting the prosecution’s offer and going

to trial.” Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984). And to prove

prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on

going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.

The presumption of correctness and the highly deferential standard of review

requires that the analysis of each ground begin with the state court’s analysis.

Ground Five:

Lawson alleges that counsel was ineffective for allowing her “to plea to

a charge she had no involvement in, nor full understanding of what she was

pleading to, therefore rendering her plea as involuntary.” (Doc. 1 at 15) The post-

conviction court addressed grounds five and six2 together and denied relief as follows

(Respondent’s Exhibit 2 at 70–72) (footnotes referencing attachments omitted):

In Ground Five, Defendant alleges that there was no factual

basis for Count 6 because she did not commit the act as

charged. She claims she did not commit the act as it relates to

victim N.M. and that her attorney never asked her about the

charges. In Ground Six. Defendant alleges that the detective

did not question her about Count 8, “use of a child in a sexual

performance” charge. She further alleges that she did not have

any knowledge of the charged act. Therefore, she alleges

2 As discussed above, by pleading nolo contendere Lawson waived the claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel alleged in ground six.

counsel was ineffective because he failed to require the State to

prove a factual basis on this Count.

The Court found a factual basis for the charges and plea based

on the probable cause affidavit (PCA), which was based on the

victims’ statements to law enforcement as well as Defendant’s

own statements to law enforcement. These include Defendant’s

own statements that she watched two juveniles engage in oral

sex on each other in front of her, as well as one victim’s

statement that Defendant watched her have sex with

Defendant’s boyfriend. In light of the PCA and Defendant’s

own statements, the Court finds that even if Defendant’s

counsel had required the State to prove a factual basis for

Counts 6 and 8, the outcome would have remained the same.

Defendant has failed to establish prejudice in Grounds Five and

Six and those claims will, likewise, be denied.

Moreover, the purpose of a plea is to accept the factual basis for

the charges and avoid a trial. During her plea and sentencing

hearing, Defendant affirmed under oath that not only did she

understand the charges against her, but she also understood she

was giving up her right to have a full trial. She further affirmed

that she spoke to her attorney and was thoroughly advised on

the matter. She additionally confirmed that her attorney shared

all of the information with her on the case and that she was

satisfied with the work he had done on her case. When the

Court asked Defendant whether she was aware of the Jimmy

Ryce Act, Defendant responded, “No.” This shows that she

was actively listening to the questions asked rather than simply

saying “yes” to everything. At any time during the questioning

about her attorney’s work, she could have voiced her

displeasure or explained that she did not understand the

charges, but instead she affirmatively indicated she was

satisfied.

In ground five Lawson alleges that her plea was involuntary because she did

not “full[ly] understand[ ] what she was pleading to” regarding count six of the

information, which charged the sixth of seven counts of procuring a person under

eighteen for prostitution. The post-conviction court found (1) that a factual basis

supported the charge, (2) that Lawson had thoroughly discussed the charge with her

counsel, and (3) that the record showed that Lawson understood the rights she was

waiving by pleading nolo contendere. Attachment five to the post-conviction court’s

order shows that Lawson pleaded knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily as

required under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). (Respondent’ Exhibit 2

at 103–07) Consequently, Lawson fails to meet her burden of showing that the state

court’s denial of her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel either “(1) resulted in a

decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Section 2254(d)(1) and (2).

Grounds Seven and Eight:

In ground seven Lawson alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing “to

make Ms. Lawson fully aware of all charges, severity of the charge, and the sentence

she was facing, therefore rendering her plea involuntary.” (Doc. 1 at 20) In ground

eight Lawson alleges that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors denied her “fair

treatment.” (Doc. 1 at 22) The post-conviction court addressed these grounds

together and denied relief as follows (Respondent’s Exhibit 2 at 72) (footnotes

referencing attachments omitted):

Regarding Defendant’s Ground Seven, the claims are

inherently incredible. Defendant alleges her counsel did not,

at any point, explain the charges to her or possible defenses.

Defendant’s private attorney was appointed by order dated

May 24, 2012. Defendant pled to the charges on October 19,

2012. She effectively alleges that her attorney spoke to her

once or twice for short periods of time during the approxi-

mately five month period her case was pending, and that

during those short conversations the attorney didn’t discuss

her case with her. As explained above, Defendant went to

her plea hearing and affirmed under oath that she understood

the charges. Additionally, at sentencing, Defendant read

statements to the Court and to the victim apologizing for her

actions. It is difficult to believe that Defendant’s attorney left

her so unprepared that she had no idea what she was pleading

to, or alternatively, that Defendant lied to the Court while

under oath when asked about her plea or had no idea what she

was apologizing for at sentencing. This ground will be denied.

Ground Eight alleging cumulative ineffective assistance of

counsel will also be denied. As Defendant failed to demon-

strate ineffective assistance in any of the preceding claims,

no cumulative ineffective assistance of counsel may be found

either.

As discussed above under ground five, the record supports the post-conviction

court’s finding that Lawson both thoroughly discussed the charges with her counsel

and understood the rights she was waiving by pleading nolo contendere. “[T]he

representations of the defendant . . . [at the plea proceeding] as well as any findings

made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). Accord Saldo

v. Crosby, 162 F. App’x 915, 917 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying Allison). Additionally,

attachment five to the post-conviction court’s order shows that Lawson pleaded

knowing the maximum possible sentence for each count. (Respondent’ Exhibit 2

at 102–03) Consequently, Lawson fails to meet her burden of showing that the state

court’s denial of her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel either “(1) resulted in a

decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Section 2254(d)(1) and (2).

Lastly, the post-conviction court correctly determined that “no cumulative

ineffective assistance of counsel may be found” because Lawson “failed to

demonstrate ineffective assistance in any of the preceding claims.” Lawson can

prove cumulative error only by showing two or more errors. “Without harmful

errors, there can be no cumulative effect compelling reversal.” United States v.

Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 852 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985).

Because each individual claim of error lacks merit, Lawson shows no cumulative

prejudicial effect. See Mullen v. Blackburn, 808 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987)

(“Mullen cites no authority in support of his assertion, which, if adopted, would

encourage habeas petitioners to multiply claims endlessly in the hope that, by

advancing a sufficient number of claims, they could obtain relief even if none of

these had any merit. We receive enough meritless habeas claims as it is; we decline

to adopt a rule that would have the effect of soliciting more and has nothing else to

recommend it. Twenty times zero equals zero.”).

V. CONCLUSION

Lawson fails to meet her burden to show that the state court’s decision was

either an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court precedent or an

unreasonable determination of fact. As Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19–20 (2013),

states, an applicant’s burden under Section 2254 is very difficult to meet:

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to

adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a

formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose

claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires

“a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility

for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

[86, 103] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet” — and it

is — “that is because it was meant to be.” Id., at [102]. We will

not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has

experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal

habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at [103] (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Lawson’s application for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The

clerk must enter a judgment against Lawson and CLOSE this case.

DENIAL OF BOTH

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Lawson is not entitled to a certificate of appealability (“COA”). A prisoner

seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district

court’s denial of her application. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court

must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA “only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

To merit a COA, Lawson must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable

both the merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues she seeks to raise.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v.

Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001). Because she fails to show that

reasonable jurists would debate either the merits of the grounds or the procedural

issues, Lawson is entitled to neither a COA nor leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is

DENIED. Lawson must obtain permission from the circuit court to appeal in forma

pauperis.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on September 4, 2020.

STEVEN D. MERRYDAY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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