Emrit v. Universal Music Group

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

RONALD SATISH EMRIT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:19-cv-2562-T-33SPF

UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP,

ISLAND DEF JAM GROUP,

ESTATE OF SHAKIR STEWART,

and RICK ROSS,

Defendants.

______________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to

Defendants Island Def Jam Group, Rick Ross, and Universal

Music Group’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 60), filed on July

23, 2020. Pro se Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit responded on

August 10, 2020. (Doc. # 65). For the reasons that follow,

the Motion is granted as set forth herein.

I. Background

Emrit is no stranger to federal court. Since 2013, Emrit

has filed hundreds of pro se cases in federal courts across

the country — including multiple cases in the Middle District

of Florida — and has been designated as a vexatious litigant

in multiple districts. See Emrit v. Universal Music Grp., No.

3:19-CV-05984-BHS, 2019 WL 6251365, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4,

2019)(“Plaintiff has a history of abusing the IFP privilege

and Plaintiff has been acknowledged as a vexatious litigator

in at least six district courts. The Ninth Circuit has also

entered a pre-filing review order against Plaintiff. Further,

a search of the Pacer electronic case database for cases filed

under the name Ronald Satish Emrit shows Plaintiff has filed

approximately 375 cases or appeals in the federal court

system.”)(citations omitted), report and recommendation

adopted, No. C19-5984 BHS, 2019 WL 6251192 (W.D. Wash. Nov.

22, 2019); Emrit v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 20-CV-

265-CAB-KSC, 2020 WL 731171, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13,

2020)(“A PACER search reveals that Plaintiff has filed over

250 federal lawsuits since 2013, including 31 so far in 2020.

These complaints have been filed in courts ranging from the

District of Hawaii to the District of Nebraska to the District

of Massachusetts.”).

Emrit, proceeding pro se, brought this action on October

10, 2019. (Doc. # 1). He alleges that “all four Defendants

have committed substantial copyright infringement in which

the Defendants have used the same ‘original works of

authorship’ that [he] has used in one of his songs copyrighted

with the Library of Congress.” (Id. at 1). Emrit claims that

his brother-in-law told him in July 2019 that “the recording

artist Rick Ross had been using the same background beat in

his song ‘Billionaire’ (off of his ‘Skrilla’ album) as [Emrit]

uses in his song ‘Dilemma’ off of [Emrit’s] album ‘Welcome to

Atlantis.’” (Id. at 2). Based on this allegedly unauthorized

use, Emrit seeks to hold Defendants liable for copyright

infringement, conversion, tortious interference with business

relations, and tortious interference with contracts. (Id. at

10-16).

Less pertinent allegations in the complaint include that

Emrit “briefly attended Morehouse College in the spring

semester of 1996,” “attended the University of Memphis in

1997 as a graduate student trying to obtain a Master’s Degree

in Science [] in the field of Biology,” and “worked at the

Memphis Animal Shelter.” (Id. at 3-4). Emrit also notes that

the “original CEO of Island Def Jam Group was Russell Simmons,

i.e. a mogul and entrepreneur who is now contemplating

becoming a ‘flight risk’ from prosecution in the state of New

York . . . as he is trying to travel to Bali in Indonesia

which has no extradition treaty with the United States.”

(Id.). Finally, in his prayer for relief, Emrit requests a

judgment for $250,000 and asks the Court to “mandat[e] that

[he] be signed to a ‘360 deal’ with Island Def Jam Group

and/or Universal Music Group [] with a controlled composition

clause, cross-collateralization clause, and Minimum Delivery

and Release Commitment (MDRC), and certainly not a ‘demo

deal.’” (Id. at 16-18).

Emrit was granted permission to proceed in forma

pauperis. (Doc. # 7). Soon after filing this case, Emrit filed

three other substantively identical cases against the same

four Defendants in the Central District of California, the

Western District of Washington, and the District of Hawaii.

See Universal Music Grp., 2019 WL 6251365, at *2 (“Here,

Plaintiff initiated this same lawsuit by filing the same

complaint, naming the same Defendants, in both the Central

District of California and the Middle District of Florida.”);

see also Emrit v. Universal Music Grp., No. CV 19-00670 HG-

KJM, 2019 WL 7759129, at *1 (D. Haw. Dec. 18, 2019), report

and recommendation adopted, No. CV 19-00670 HG-KJM, 2020 WL

465018 (D. Haw. Jan. 28, 2020).

Subsequently, Emrit was designated as a vexatious

litigant in the Middle District of Florida. See Emrit v.

DeVos, No. 8:20-cv-773-T-60TGW (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020)(Doc.

# 11). Another copyright infringement case against music

business entities that Emrit filed in this District before he

was designated a vexatious litigant was dismissed without

leave to amend on April 23, 2020. See Emrit v. Horus Music

Video Distr., No. 8:19-cv-2531-T-60JSS, 2020 WL 1955330, at

*1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020). That Order explained that

“Emrit’s complaint is ‘conclusory and patently frivolous’

where he fails to draw any connection between his legal claims

and the factual allegations of his complaint.” Id.

Emrit’s vexatious litigant status is well-deserved.

Since the initiation of this case, Emrit has filed numerous

frivolous motions. (Doc. ## 11, 15-19, 21, 27-30, 39-40, 45-

46). And he has continued to do so despite warnings from this

Court. For example, on March 6, 2020, the Court advised:

“Emrit’s motions waste scarce judicial resources and do

nothing to advance Emrit’s claim. The Court warns Emrit that

continued filing of multiple meritless motions will not be

tolerated by the Court and could result in the imposition of

sanctions.” (Doc. # 36 at 5). Again, on April 7, 2020, the

Court “encourage[d] Emrit to cease filing meritless motions.”

(Doc. # 47).

Emrit has ignored these warnings and continued his

frivolous filings, including:

• (Doc. # 56)(another “motion in limine to introduce

extrinsic evidence,” including evidence to “show that

[Emrit] went to school with Dan Quayle’s sons Tucker and

Ben and therefore [Emrit] has had the best of schooling

in his life including earning a Bachelor’s Degree (B.A.)

from Brown University (Ivy League)”);

• (Doc. # 58)(a notice of change of address in which Emrit

announces that he (i) has moved to Maryland for the

summer, (ii) recently met a videographer through

Craigslist, (iii) has previously traveled to Buenos

Aires, Argentina, and (iv) is “interested in obtaining

a ‘carta de invitacion’ for a woman named Solans from

Las Tunas, Cuba through the Treasury Department Office

of Foreign Assets Control”);

• (Doc. # 66)(a motion to compel discovery asking the Court

to, among other things, “take judicial notice that

[Emrit] was a Democratic presidential candidate in 2016,

2020, and [] will again be a presidential candidate in

2024” and that Emrit “had litigated 12 lawsuits against

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a pro se

plaintiff”);

• (Doc. # 67)(a motion for issuance of subpoena noting,

among other things, that he “has already spoken with

attorney Griffin Klema, Tampa, FL-based attorney that

represents Rick Ross which involves a conflict of

interest and perhaps imputed disqualification for any

attorney with his law firm to be a zealous advocate on

behalf of [Emrit] with regards to this copyright

dispute”);

• (Doc. # 68)(a motion for hearing stating, among other

things, that Emrit “was a presidential candidate in 2016

and 2020 and [he] plans to run again for president in

2024” and asking the Court to “take judicial notice that

the applicable laws in campaign finance law are the

McCain-Feingold Act, Ethics in Government Act, and

Federal Election Campaign Act”);

• (Doc. # 69)(a motion for declaratory judgment asking,

among other things, that the Court assign Emrit’s

licensing and publishing rights in his upcoming album to

Defendants if the Court “agree[s] that there is enough

legal detriment and bargained-for-exchange pursuant to

the Peppercorn Theory of Consideration”);

• (Doc. # 70)(a motion for directed verdict asking the

Court to, among other things, order Universal Music

Group and Island Def Jam Group to “finance [Emrit’s]

next album ‘Rough Draft of Publicity Stunts’” and to

take judicial notice that Emrit sued “Ewing Brothers

Towing at Clark County District Court at 200 Lewis Avenue

in Las Vegas, Nevada because [his] laptop with his music

[] had allegedly been stolen from the trunk” of his car);

• (Doc. # 71)(Emrit’s second motion for summary judgment

arguing, among other things, that “the board of

directors for Disney/ABC/ESPN is violating the Business

Judgment Rule and could be subjected to a stock-holder

derivative action or Chapter 11 Reorganization by

opening up Disney World in Orlando, Florida and trying

to promote the ‘Bubble’ for the NBA so that ESPN can

have something to discuss notwithstanding the fact that

the world and America are currently going through a

COVID-19/Coronavirus pandemic”);

• (Doc. # 72)(a motion for preliminary injunction asking

the Court to, among other things, take judicial notice

that Emrit “has had over 12 lawsuits and appeals against

the FBI nationwide and that [Emrit] was a Democratic

presidential candidate in 2016 and 2020”);

• (Doc. # 73)(a motion to compel arbitration arguing,

among other things, that Emrit “is more marketable as a

recording artist than corny, tacky [] artists such as

Gucci Mane, Kevin Gates, Travis Scott, Cardi B, Doja

Cat, and Tekashi-69, who will not even be a footnote to

history and do not compare to legendary artists such as

Marvin Gaye and John Lennon”);

• (Doc. # 74)(a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, filed even though this case is still in the

pleading stage);

• (Doc. # 75)(a motion for default judgment against all

Defendants, filed even though Emrit knows that three

Defendants have filed the instant Motion to Dismiss);

• (Doc. # 78)(a notice of intent to file a writ of

certiorari with the Supreme Court in which Emrit notes

his various mental health conditions and informs the

Court of his attempt “to obtain a fiancé or K-1 visa for

his fiancé Mary from Kharkiv, Ukraine”);

• (Doc. # 79)(a motion for joinder of five additional

defendants because Emrit suspects that one of these

entities is a “Performing Rights Organization (PRO) with

which ‘Rick Ross’ is in privity of contract (by signing

an IRS Form W-9)”).

Now, Island Def Jam Group, Ross, and Universal Music

Group seek dismissal of the complaint. (Doc. # 60). Emrit has

responded (Doc. # 65), and the Motion is ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this

Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint

and construes them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, the Court favors the plaintiff

with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the

complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901

F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,

[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal

citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “The scope of review

must be limited to the four corners of the complaint” and

attached exhibits. St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334,

1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

Additionally, motions to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may attack

jurisdiction facially or factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp.,

323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). Finally, a motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction may be filed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).

III. Analysis

Defendants raise many grounds for dismissal of the

complaint.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

First, Defendants argue that this Court lacks personal

jurisdiction over Universal Music Group. The Court agrees.

Courts use a two-part analysis to determine whether

personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper. Lockard v.

Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 1998). The first

step involves determining whether the forum state’s long-arm

statute provides a basis for jurisdiction. Id. Then, the Court

must determine whether there are sufficient minimum contacts

between the forum state and the defendant to satisfy due

process. Id.

The general jurisdiction provision of the Florida long-

arm statute provides: “A defendant who is engaged in

substantial and not isolated activity within this state,

whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or

otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of

this state, whether or not the claim arises from that

activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). As the Eleventh Circuit

has explained, “[t]he reach of this provision extends to the

limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Fraser v. Smith, 594

F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, “[w]ith respect to

general jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute,” the

Court “need only determine whether the . . . exercise of

jurisdiction over [Universal Music Group] would exceed

constitutional bounds.” Id.

Concerning due process, courts may assert general

jurisdiction over foreign corporations “to hear any and all

claims against them when their affiliations with the State

are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them

essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)(quoting

Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp.

& Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945)). However, “only a

limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a

defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.”

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). “A

corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place

of business are ‘paradigm all-purpose forums.’” Carmouche v.

Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.

2015)(quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). “Outside of these

two exemplars, a defendant’s operations will be so

substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation

at home in that State only in an exceptional case.” Waite v.

All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir.

2018)(quotation omitted).

The complaint in this action fails to support the

exercise of general jurisdiction over Universal Music Group.

The complaint expressly alleges that Universal Music Group’s

principal place of business is in Santa Monica, California.

(Doc. # 1 at 3). The Complaint does not set forth Universal

Music Group’s state of incorporation. Accordingly, the Court

cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Universal Music

Group on the basis of its principal place of business or state

of incorporation. Moreover, nothing in the complaint suggests

that this is an “exceptional case” where Universal Music

Group’s activities in Florida are “so substantial and of such

a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.”

Waite, 901 F.3d at 1317.

Indeed, Emrit failed to address the personal

jurisdiction argument in his response at all and thus has

conceded that personal jurisdiction does not exist for

Universal Music Group. See Melendez v. Town of Bay Harbor

Islands, No. 14-22383-CIV, 2014 WL 6682535, at *7 (S.D. Fla.

Nov. 25, 2014)(striking demand for punitive damages because

plaintiff “wholly fail[ed] to address this argument in her

Response [], and therefore concedes the point”); Brady v.

Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-CV-62199-RNS, 2014 WL 1377830, at *6

(S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2014)(“Brady effectively concedes that his

strict product liability claims must be dismissed; he fails

to address this argument in his opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss.”); Glass v. Lahood, 786 F. Supp. 2d 189, 210 (D.D.C.

2011)(“[W]hen a plaintiff files an opposition to a

dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments

raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments

that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” (citation

omitted)), aff’d, No. 11-5144, 2011 WL 6759550 (D.C. Cir.

Dec. 8, 2011). Thus, general jurisdiction over Universal

Music Group does not exist.

Emrit has also failed to establish specific personal

jurisdiction. Florida’s long-arm statute provides in relevant

part:

(1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or

resident of this state, who personally or through

an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this

subsection thereby submits himself or herself and,

if he or she is a natural person, his or her

personal representative to the jurisdiction of the

courts of this state for any cause of action arising

from any of the following acts:

1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or

carrying on a business or business venture in

this state or having an office or agency in

this state.

2. Committing a tortious act within this state.

3. Owning, using, possessing, or holding a

mortgage or other lien on any real property

within this state.

. . .

6. Causing injury to persons or property within

this state arising out of an act or omission

by the defendant outside this state, if, at or

about the time of the injury, either:

a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or

service activities within this state; or

b. Products, materials, or things processed,

serviced, or manufactured by the defendant

anywhere were used or consumed within this

state in the ordinary course of commerce,

trade, or use.

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a).

If the long-arm statute is satisfied, the Court must

next determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction

over Universal Music Group comports with due process. To make

this determination, the Court must apply a three-part test

examining whether (1) the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or

relate to” at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the

forum; (2) the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state;

and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355

(11th Cir. 2013).

Again, Emrit has failed to address the personal

jurisdiction argument in his response and thus has conceded

that specific jurisdiction does not exist for Universal Music

Group. See Melendez, 2014 WL 6682535, at *7. Furthermore, as

Defendants correctly explain, the complaint “fails to allege

a single incident or action connecting [Universal Music

Group] to the forum jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions

set forth in Florida’s long-arm statute,” such as an

allegation that Universal Music Group “transacted business in

the State of Florida,” “contracted to supply services or

conduct business in the State of Florida,” “caused tortious

injury in [] Florida by virtue of an act or omission in the

forum or outside the forum,” or “engaged in a persistent

course of conduct, derived substantial revenue from goods

used or consumed, or rendered any services in [] Florida.”

(Doc. # 60 at 20). The Court lacks specific jurisdiction over

Universal Music Group.

Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over

Universal Music Group, all claims against Universal Music

Group are dismissed without prejudice.

B. Shotgun Complaint

Next, Defendants argue the complaint should be dismissed

as a shotgun complaint.1 The Court agrees.

“A defendant served with a shotgun complaint should move

the district court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) or for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule

12(e) on the ground that the complaint provides it with

insufficient notice to enable it to file an answer.” Paylor

v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (11th Cir.

2014)(footnotes omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has “identified four rough types or

categories of shotgun pleadings”: (1) “a complaint containing

multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of

1 Defendants argue at one point in their Motion that the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the copyright

infringement claim because Emrit has not alleged he

registered his copyright. (Doc. # 60 at 13-15). While

Defendants are correct about the importance of a registered

copyright as a precondition to suit, they are incorrect that

the registration issue is a jurisdictional problem. See Reed

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010)(“Section

411(a)’s registration requirement is a precondition to filing

a claim that does not restrict a federal court’s subject-

matter jurisdiction.”). Thus, there are no subject matter

jurisdiction issues for the Court to resolve.

all preceding counts”; (2) a complaint that is “replete with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint

that does “not separat[e] into a different count each cause

of action or claim for relief”; and (4) a complaint that

“assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which of the defendants are responsible

for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the

claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2015).

“The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun

pleadings is that they fail to . . . give the defendants

adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds

upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.

Here, the complaint asserts each count against all four

Defendants without alleging which Defendant committed which

acts. For example, in count three, the complaint alleges “all

four of the defendants in the present case at bar should be

held liable for the tortious interference with business

relations.” (Doc. # 1 at 15). In short, the complaint lumps

all four Defendants together without differentiating between

them and their conduct. Thus, the complaint is the fourth

type of shotgun complaint identified in Weiland and must be

dismissed.

C. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave

to amend should be freely given when justice so requires.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court “need not, however, allow

an amendment (1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith,

dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment

would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3)

where amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d

1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).

Given Emrit’s history of filing vexatious and harassing

lawsuits (including multiple duplicates of this action), as

well as his numerous frivolous and vexatious filings in this

case, the Court will not grant Emrit leave to file an amended

complaint. See Papadopoulos v. Amaker, No. 12-CV-3608 DLI

RLM, 2013 WL 3226757, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013)(declining

to sua sponte grant a pro se litigant leave to amend, even

though courts usually give pro se litigants leave to amend at

least once, “in light of Plaintiff’s extensive litigation

history, in this district and others, and the frivolous nature

of certain allegations”); Brett v. Garcia, No. 6:15-cv-638-

ORL-40, 2015 WL 3404490, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 26,

2015)(declining to grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend

his complaint based on his “long history of filing frivolous

suits in the Middle District of Florida” and other districts

and “the lack of any basis in the complaint to conclude that

Plaintiff could state a cognizable cause of action in an

amended complaint”).

Leave to amend should not be granted because Emrit is

proceeding in bad faith. See Gianetti v. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of CT., Inc., 351 F. App’x 520, 522 (2d Cir.

2009)(finding district court did not abuse discretion in

denying leave to amend where pro se plaintiff’s “long history

of bringing vexatious claims against former patients and

insurance providers suggests the appearance of bad faith”).

As Emrit well knows, “[f]rivolous, bad faith claims consume

a significant amount of judicial resources, diverting the

time and energy of the judiciary away from processing good

faith claims.” Emrit v. Simon, No. 17-CV-4605 (SRN/SER), 2017

WL 11483901, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2017)(citation omitted),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-4605 (SRN/SER),

2017 WL 11483905 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2017).

The Order designating Emrit a vexatious litigant in this

District held — and this Court agrees — that Emrit is

“obviously not proceeding in good faith”; rather, Emrit is a

“savvy and experienced pro se litigant” who “understand[s]

the legal system’s reluctance to sanction [him] and use[s] it

to [his] advantage.” Emrit v. DeVos, No. 8:20-cv-773-T-60TGW

(M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020)(Doc. # 11 at 7); see also Universal

Music Grp., 2019 WL 6251365, at *2 (“The Court finds the

Proposed Complaint is frivolous and malicious as it is part

of Plaintiff’s ongoing and persistent pattern of abusing the

IFP privilege by filing vexatious, harassing, and duplicative

lawsuits.”); Emrit v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C 13-5951 SBA, 2014 WL

3841015, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014)(dismissing case with

prejudice as “sanction for [Emrit’s] intentional and bad

faith conduct,” including “intentionally misrepresent[ing]

his financial condition and litigation history in bad

faith”).

It is clear that Emrit has filed this action — and others

— against Defendants in a bad faith attempt to force Universal

Music Group to give him a record deal. See, e.g., (Doc. # 1

at 18)(asking in the complaint’s prayer for relief that the

Court “mandat[e] that [Emrit] be signed to a ‘360 deal’ with

Island Def Jam Group and/or Universal Music Group [] with a

controlled composition clause, cross-collateralization

clause, and Minimum Delivery and Release Commitment (MDRC),

and certainly not a ‘demo deal’”); (Doc. # 11 at 1)(Emrit’s

first motion for preliminary injunction in this case,

requesting the Court “issue the equitable remedy of specific

performance and/or an injunction mandating that [Universal

Music Group] sign [Emrit] to a ‘360 deal’ as a commercial

recording contract as opposed to the procedurally and

substantively unconscionable ‘demo deal’”); Emrit v. Indep.

Music Awards, IMA, 605 F. App’x 103, 104 n.1 (3d Cir.

2015)(“On appeal, Emrit also requests specific performance or

injunctive relief in the form of a commercial recording

contract with Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, or

Sony BMG to produce the seven music videos he submitted to

the contest.”); Emrit v. YouTube, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-2245-GPC-

JLB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015)(Doc. # 1 at 12)(stating in

complaint against seven defendants, including Universal Music

Group, that Emrit was “requesting the equitable remedy of an

injunction or specific performance mandating that [he] be

offered a commercial recording contract by either [Universal

Music Group], Sony BMG, or WMG in the form of a ‘360 deal’”).

The Court cannot condone such harassing conduct.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED

(1) Defendants Island Def Jam Group, Rick Ross, and

Universal Music Group’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 60) is

GRANTED.

(2) Pro se Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit’s complaint (Doc.

# 1) is dismissed as to the claims against Universal

Music Group for lack of personal jurisdiction. All other

claims in the complaint are dismissed with prejudice.

(3) The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

17th day of August, 2020.

lagi 9n. Munenby Cree

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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