Louis v. Milton Transportation, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MAXO LOUIS and INASE

FRANCOIS,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 2:20-cv-6-FtM-29NPM

MILTON TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

a Pennsylvania Corporation,

BTR, INC., a Pennsylvania

Corporation, and WILLIAM

DAVIS,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of defendants’

Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc.

#20) filed on April 23, 2020. After being ordered to do so,

plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. #22) on May 26, 2020. For the

reasons that follow, the motion is granted.

I.

A. Parties

Plaintiffs Maxo Louis and his wife Inase Francois are

residents of Lee County, Florida. (Doc. #5, ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants

Milton Transportation, Inc. and BTR, Inc. are Pennsylvania

corporations with their principal places of business in that state.

(Doc. #1, ¶¶ 6-7.) Finally, defendant William Davis is an

1

individual domiciled in Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 8.)

A. Factual Background

According to the allegations in the Complaint, Louis was

operating his motor vehicle in New Hampshire on August 2, 2018.

(Doc. #5, ¶ 11.) At approximately 8:13 a.m., Davis, who was

operating a semi-tractor-trailer vehicle, collided with the rear

and side of Louis’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 13.) Due to the accident,

Louis has sustained serious personal injuries and significant

financial damages. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) The Complaint alleges Davis

was an employee of Milton and BTR, and that Milton and BTR are the

registered owners of the tractor trailer. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)

B. Procedural Background

In December 2019, plaintiffs initiated this action by filing

a Complaint for Damages in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth

Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida. (Id. p. 1.) The

Complaint contains the following three claims: (1) negligent

operation of a motor vehicle against Milton and BTR; (2) negligent

operation of a motor vehicle against Davis; and (3) loss of

consortium against all three defendants. (Id. pp. 2-5.) The first

1

As part of their Response, plaintiffs suggest Davis has died

since the accident. (Doc. #22, pp. 4-5.) Given the Court’s

conclusion that this case will be dismissed for lack of personal

jurisdiction, the Court finds it unnecessary to further address

that this matter.

two claims are alleged by Louis, while the third claim is alleged

by Francois. (Id.)

On January 6, 2020, defendants removed the case to this Court

on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332. (Doc. #1.) The same day, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing the case should

be dismissed because the only connection to Florida is plaintiffs’

residency. (Doc. #3, p. 1.) In response, plaintiffs argued the

Court could exercise personal jurisdiction or, alternatively,

allow for evidentiary discovery related to defendants’ business

ties with Florida. (Doc. #16, p. 5.) The Court granted the latter

request, denying the motion without prejudice and permitting

plaintiffs to conduct factual discovery on the personal

jurisdiction issue within forty-five days of the Court’s Order.

(Doc. #17, p. 2.) The Court also permitted plaintiffs to file an

amended complaint within sixty days, and defendants to file a

renewed motion to dismiss within fourteen days of the amended

complaint or the expiration of the time to file an amended

complaint. (Id.)

No amended complaint was subsequently filed and on April 23,

2020, defendants filed the Renewed Motion to Dismiss currently

before the Court. (Doc. #20.) In the motion, defendants argue

they do not have sufficient contacts with Florida to permit the

Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the matter. (Id.

p. 3.) In their Response, plaintiffs acknowledge that their

previous opposition to dismissal was based on defendants’ prior

assertion that they were registered to do business in Florida and

had appointed agents for service of process. (Doc. #22, pp. 1-

5.) However, because defendants have since stated this was an

erroneous assertion, plaintiffs request the motion be denied with

prejudice, but the case transferred to the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Id. pp. 5-6.)

II.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

This Court has previously described the personal jurisdiction

requirements as follows:

To hear a case, a federal court must have

jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the action

and the parties to the action. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon

Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999). Absent either, “the

court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Id.

A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if:

(1) personal jurisdiction is authorized under the forum

state’s long-arm statute and (2) the exercise of such

jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process.

Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1203

(11th Cir. 2015); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d

1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008). The exercise of personal

jurisdiction comports with due process if the non-

resident defendant has established “certain minimum

contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the

suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.” Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414

(1984) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310, 316 (1945)).

The plaintiff “bears the initial burden of alleging

in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima

facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v.

Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). A prima

facie case is established if the plaintiff alleges

enough facts to withstand a motion for directed

verdict. SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.

1997) (citation omitted). “First, the plaintiff must

allege sufficient facts in [its] complaint to initially

support long arm jurisdiction before the burden shifts

to the defendant to make a prima facie showing of the

inapplicability of the statute.” Future Tech. Today,

Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If the defendant sustains

its burden by raising “a meritorious challenge to

personal jurisdiction” “through affidavits,

documents[,] or testimony,” the burden shifts back to

the plaintiff. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd.,

94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff is then

required to “substantiate the jurisdictional allegations

in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof,

and not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the

complaint.” Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at

1247 (citation omitted).

Pennisi v. Reed, 2018 WL 3707835, *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2018)

(footnote and marks omitted). If the plaintiff’s complaint and

the defendant’s evidence conflict, “the district court must

construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” Thomas v. Brown, 504 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir.

2013) (quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.

1990)).

Defendants argue (1) plaintiffs have alleged insufficient

facts to bring this action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm

statute, and (2) defendants do not have sufficient contacts with

Florida to satisfy due process requirements. (Doc. #22, pp. 4-

13.) The Court will address these arguments in turn.

1. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute

Florida’s long-arm statute authorizes general and specific

personal jurisdiction. § 48.193(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. Section

48.193(2) addresses the exercise of general personal jurisdiction,

providing that “[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and

not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is

wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the

jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim

arises from that activity.” In contrast, “specific personal

jurisdiction authorizes jurisdiction over causes of action arising

from or related to the defendant’s actions within Florida and

concerns a nonresident defendant’s contacts with Florida only as

those contacts related to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Louis

Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir.

2013) (citation omitted). Based on the language in the Complaint,

it appears plaintiffs are asserting both general and specific

jurisdiction for each defendant. (Doc. #5, ¶ 7.) Accordingly,

the Court will address each assertion as it applies to each

defendant.

a. General Jurisdiction

“Although no connexity is required for general jurisdiction,

the ‘substantial and not isolated activity’ requirement means

‘continuous and systematic general business contact with

Florida.’” Gazelles FL, Inc. v. Cupp, 2018 WL 7364591, *5 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 26, 2018) (quoting Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd.,

739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). For general jurisdiction

to apply, the non-resident defendant’s affiliations with a state

must be “so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially

at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,

127 (2014) (marks and citations omitted).

Having reviewed the allegations in the Complaint, the Court

finds plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to

establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction over any of

defendants. The Complaint alleges Milton and BTR operate “an

interstate trucking and transportation business in the State of

Florida,” and actively “transact business throughout Florida,

including Lee County.” (Doc. #5, ¶¶ 4-5.) However, Milton and

BTR are both Pennsylvania corporations (id.), and the allegations

in the Complaint are insufficient to show that these defendants

have “continuous and systematic general business contact with

Florida.” See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (“[O]nly a limited set of

affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-

purpose jurisdiction there. For an individual, the paradigm forum

for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s

domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in

which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” (citations

and marks omitted)); Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d

429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (“It is . . . incredibly difficult to

establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of

incorporation or principal place of business”).

The Complaint’s allegations regarding Davis are even less

sufficient than those regarding Milton and BTR. While the

Complaint generally alleges all the defendants engage in

“substantial and not isolated activity” within Florida (Doc. #5,

¶ 7), the allegations specifically as to Davis simply state he is

a Pennsylvania resident who caused the vehicular accident in New

Hampshire in the course of his employment for Milton and BTR (id.

¶ 6.) The Court finds these allegations insufficient given that

“[a] plaintiff has an especially heavy burden in seeking to

establish general jurisdiction.” In re Amtrak Sunset Ltd. Train

Crash in Bayou Canot, Ala., on Sept. 22, 1993, 923 F. Supp. 1524,

1528 (S.D. Ala. 1996).

Because the Complaint’s allegations regarding all three

defendants are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of

general jurisdiction, the Court will turn to the Complaint’s

alternative allegation of specific jurisdiction.

b. Specific Jurisdiction

Florida’s long-arm statute provides a variety of ways in which

a defendant can subject themselves to personal jurisdiction,

including by “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on

a business or business venture in this state or having an office

or agency in this state.” § 48.193(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. In the

Complaint, the plaintiffs allege jurisdiction is appropriate

because the defendants “are actively engaged in business” in

Florida. (Doc. #5, ¶ 7.) The Court will assume for purposes of

this Opinion and Order that this is an assertion of specific

jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1.

To establish that a defendant is “carrying on a business” for

purposes of section 48.193(1)(a)1., “the activities of the

defendant must be considered collectively and show a general course

of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit.” Future

Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at 1249. Factors relevant, but not

dispositive, to this analysis include the presence and operation

of an office in Florida, the possession and maintenance of a

license to do business in Florida, the number of Florida clients

served, and the percentage of overall revenue gleaned from Florida

clients. Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A.,

421 F.3d 1162, 1167 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

From the outset, it is clear that section 48.193(1)(a)1. does

not apply to Davis, who, as an employee of Milton and BTR, is not

“carrying on a business” within Florida. Furthermore, the Court

finds that the allegations related to Milton and BTR are

insufficient to establish a prima facie case of specific

jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1. The Complaint alleges

that Milton and BTR actively “transact business throughout

Florida, including Lee County.” However, this allegation, by

itself, is insufficient. See Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314,

1318 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting “vague and conclusory allegations”

“are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal

jurisdiction”); Am. Registry, LLC v. Hanaw, 2014 WL 12606501, *8

(M.D. Fla. July 16, 2014) (“Plaintiff also alleges that Levy and

Showmark Media ‘conduct business within this judicial district.’

This allegation is conclusory and cannot serve as the basis for

personal jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). In reviewing the

Complaint, the Court finds there are no allegations applicable to

the factors discussed above. Accordingly, the Court finds that

plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of specific

jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1. over any of the

defendants. See Gazelles, 2018 WL 7364591, *9 (“In this case, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie

[case] that § 48.193(1)(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over

the Defendants. In the Amended Complaint, there are no allegations

that Defendants have an office in Florida, a license to do business

in Florida, any Florida clients, nor any information regarding the

percentage of overall revenue received from Florida residents.”);

Am. Registry, LLC, 2014 WL 12606501, *8 (“Due to the absence of

factual allegations showing a general course of business activity

in Florida, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plead a

prima facie case of jurisdiction against Levy under Fla. Stat. §

48.193(1)(a)(1).”).

2. Minimum Contacts

The Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to plead

2

a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction under Florida’s long-

arm statute moots the issue of whether defendants have sufficient

contacts to satisfy due process concerns. See Madara v. Hall, 916

F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Only if both prongs of the

analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”); Goldberg v.

U.S., 2014 WL 2573060, *6 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2014) (“Because the

Court determines that Goldberg failed to allege sufficient facts

to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statue, it is unnecessary to address

whether minimum contacts exist.”). Nonetheless, even if the

Complaint’s allegation of specific jurisdiction under section

48.193(1)(a)1. was sufficient as to Milton and BTR, the Court finds

2

If plaintiffs had sufficiently pled general jurisdiction

over the defendants, the minimum contacts analysis would have been

unnecessary. See Bioderm, Inc. v. Medexus, Inc., 2006 WL 8440122,

*6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2006) (“The due process requirement of

minimum contacts is determined by application of the continuous

and systematic contacts standard. Since Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)

governing general jurisdiction incorporates this high standard,

the Court concludes that Defendant maintained minimum contacts

with Florida to satisfy due process requirements.” (citation

omitted)).

these defendants lack the minimum contacts with Florida necessary

to satisfy due process.

In specific personal jurisdiction cases, the Court applies

the following three-part due process test: (1) whether the

plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” at least one of the

defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident

defendant “purposefully availed” himself of the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the

benefit of the forum state’s laws; and (3) whether the exercise of

personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1355

(citations omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing the first two prongs, and if the plaintiff does so,

“a defendant must make a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of

jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc.

v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010)).

Here, the Court need not make it past the first prong of the

analysis. See Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F. 3d 1307,

1313 n.2 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Because we conclude that the

plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to at least one

of Union Carbide’s contacts with Florida, we need not address

whether Union Carbide purposefully availed itself of the privilege

of conducting activities in Florida or whether the exercise of

jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.”). In determining whether a plaintiff’s

claims arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with the

forum state, the Court “look[s] to the ‘affiliation between the

forum and the underling controversy,’ focusing on any ‘activity or

. . . occurrence that [took] place in the forum State.’” Id. at

1314 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct.

1773, 1780 (2017)). From the allegations in the Complaint, it is

clear plaintiffs’ injuries and claims arise from a vehicle accident

that occurred in New Hampshire, and therefore do not “arise out of

or relate to” any of the defendants’ contacts with Florida.

Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to establish the minimum

contacts required for personal jurisdiction and dismissal is

required.

B. Transfer

As an alternative to dismissal, plaintiffs request the case

be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc.

#22, p. 6.) Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience

of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district

court may transfer any civil action to any other district or

division where it might have been brought or to any district or

division to which all parties have consented.” “In this Circuit,

a court lacking personal jurisdiction of the defendant may transfer

the case under either [§] 1404(a) or [§] 1406(a).” Roofing & Sheet

Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982,

992 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982). As the party requesting the transfer,

it is plaintiffs’ burden “of persuading the trial court that

transfer is appropriate and should be granted,” Am. Aircraft Sales

Int’l, Inc. v. Airwarsaw, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1351 (M.D.

Fla. 1999), and “the decision whether to transfer a case is left

to the sound discretion of the district court,” Roofing & Sheet

Metal Servs., Inc., 689 F.2d at 985. As plaintiffs have failed to

offer any argument as to why this matter should be transferred

rather than dismissed, the Court finds they have failed to meet

their burden under section 1404(a). See Interim Healthcare, Inc.

v. Interim Healthcare of Se. La., Inc., 2020 WL 3078531, *16 (S.D.

Fla. June 10, 2020) (“[A]lthough Defendants mention in the heading

of their Motion to Dismiss that the case should be transferred

pursuant to § 1404(a), they present no arguments regarding the

issue of transfer. Thus, the Court will not address the issue of

transfer pursuant to § 1404(a).”).

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction (Doc. #20) is GRANTED and the Complaint is dismissed

without prejudice to filing such claims in a jurisdiction in which

personal jurisdiction can be asserted against the defendants.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 20th day of

July, 2020.

Z tkteol

JOHN E. STEELE

SHMIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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