Opinion

Estate of Claudia Rameshwar v. Minnesota Life Insurance Company

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Jul 24, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.7%

explaining “a district court has discretion to decline to consider a party’s argument when the argument was not first presented to the magistrate judge”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining “a district court has discretion to decline to consider a party’s argument when the argument was not first presented to the magistrate judge”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

NANDALALL RAMESHWAR;

ARTHUR HOOKS HUMPHREY;

CONSUELA RENAE HOOKS; and

DOROTHY LISA HUMPHREY,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 6:18-cv-1597-Orl-37LRH

MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Defendant.

_____________________________________

ORDER

Defendant moved, unopposed, for the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the

parties’ settlement and address Attorney George E. Ollinger III’s (“Ollinger”) pending

charging lien and retaining lien. (Doc. 66 (“Defendant’s Motion”).) And Ollinger seeks

to review the parties’ settlement agreement. (See Doc. 67 (“Ollinger’s Motion”).) On

referral, U.S. Magistrate Judge Leslie R. Hoffman recommends granting Defendant’s

Motion in part and denying Ollinger’s Motion. (Doc. 93 (“R&R”).) Ollinger objects to the

R&R. (Doc. 95.) Defendant responded and filed its own limited objection to the R&R.

(Doc. 96.) On review, the Court adopts the R&R in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 1, 2018, Ollinger, on behalf of the Estate of Claudia Rameshwar, filed

this case in state court, which Defendant removed here. (Docs. 1, 2.) Plaintiffs Nandallal

Rameshwar, Arthur Hooks Humphrey, Consuela Renae Hooks, and Dorothy Lisa

Humphrey were added later in an amended complaint. (Docs. 15, 17.)

On November 20, 2018, Ollinger filed a notice of charging lien and notice of

retaining lien. (Docs. 30, 31.) Shortly after, Claudia Rameshwar notified Defendant that

Ollinger no longer represented Plaintiffs. (Docs. 39-1, 39-3.) Meanwhile, Ollinger sued

some Plaintiffs in state court. (Doc. 39-2.) On April 16, 2019, after a hearing before

Magistrate Judge Hoffman where Ollinger said he had not represented Plaintiffs for

several months, Ollinger was terminated as Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Doc. 51.) Plaintiffs

proceeded pro se and settled with Defendant after mediation on February 11, 2020. (Doc.

65.)

Defendant filed its Motion as the parties cannot complete their settlement due to

Ollinger’s pending liens. (Doc. 66.) Then Ollinger moved to see the settlement agreement.

(Doc. 67.) Magistrate Judge Hoffman recommends Defendant’s Motion be granted in

part, finding the liens unenforceable in these proceedings. (Doc. 93.) She also

recommends denying Ollinger’s Motion without prejudice. (Id.) With Ollinger and

Defendant’s objections (Docs. 95, 96), the matter is ripe.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s findings, the district court must

“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. When the

parties do not object, the Court examines the R&R only for clear error. See Wiand v. Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:12-cv-557-T-27EAJ, 2016 WL 355490, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan 28, 2016);

see also Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006).

III. ANALYSIS

In a one-paragraph objection, Ollinger argues Magistrate Judge Hoffman is

“wrong on the facts and law” and should have applied Florida law. (Doc. 95.) Defendant

objects to the R&R to the extent it’s unclear regarding Defendant’s liability after it

concludes the settlement with Plaintiffs. (Doc. 96, pp. 2–3.) Let’s address each.

A. Ollinger’s Objection

Ollinger’s objection is woefully inadequate—failing to “specifically identify the

portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.” Macort, 208 F. App’x at 783 (quotation

omitted); (see Doc. 95). His objection isn’t “sufficiently specific” but rather a “general

objection to the report”—so it fails. See Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (citation omitted). But

the Court will address Ollinger’s argument that the R&R “should have applied Florida

State law.” (Doc. 95.)

Ollinger doesn’t specify which portion of the R&R should have used Florida law

but in the sections reviewing the liens and disbursement of settlement proceeds,

Magistrate Judge Hoffman applied Florida law, so Ollinger’s objection does not apply.

(See Doc. 95; cf. Doc. 93, pp. 11–17, 18–19.) In determining supplemental jurisdiction over

the liens, Magistrate Judge Hoffman used federal law. (Doc. 93, pp. 10–11.) This was

appropriate. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378–81 (1994);

Cherry Grp., LLC v. D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P., No. 3:08-cv-222-J-34PDB,

2014 WL 12691591, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2014). And in analyzing Ollinger’s entitlement

to see the settlement, Magistrate Judge Hoffman reviewed the authority Ollinger cited,

which was all federal. (Doc. 93, pp. 17–18; Doc. 87, pp. 18–19.) It’s a stretch for Ollinger

to now argue Magistrate Judge Hoffman should have applied Florida law. See Williams v.

McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining “a district court has discretion to

decline to consider a party’s argument when the argument was not first presented to the

magistrate judge”). And the objection is unavailing—courts apply federal law when

determining the discovery of settlement agreements. See Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Royalty

Carpet Mills, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-0077-HLM, 2013 WL 12090122, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23,

2013). Having reviewed each section of the R&R, the Court finds no error and overrules

Ollinger’s objection.

B. Defendant’s Objection

Defendant objects to the R&R to the extent its liability is unclear after the

disbursement of settlement proceeds to Plaintiffs—pointing to Magistrate Judge

Hoffman’s recommendation that Ollinger’s entitlement to fees may be addressed in a

separate action. (Doc. 96, pp. 2–3.) Defendant asks the Court to clarify Ollinger is

precluded from seeking relief against it regarding the liens. (Doc. 96, p. 3.) It seeks this

clarification because under its reading of Florida law, it may be labile to Ollinger after

disbursing settlement proceeds to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 66, p. 3; Doc. 96, p. 3 (citing Brown v.

Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So. 2d 574, 580–81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)).) But Defendant has

cited no authority the Court has the power to make such a determination. (See Doc. 96,

pp. 2–3.)

The Court has determined Ollinger’s liens are not enforceable in this proceeding,

but whether Ollinger sues Plaintiffs in a separate action for attorney’s fees to attempt to

hold Defendant liable for Plaintiffs’ fees, is beyond the Court’s purview. See Noblet v.

Ditchwitch Trencher of Fla., Inc., No. 6:01-cv-845-Orl-KRS, Doc. 56, pp. 1–2 (M.D. Fla. Oct.

10, 2002) (finding lien unenforceable and explaining dispute between the attorney and

the plaintiff can be addressed in separate action); Montpellier Farm, Ltd. v. Crane Envtl.,

Inc., No. 07-22815-CIV, 2009 WL 722238, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2009) (same); Scutieri v.

Estate of Revitz, 829 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (same). So Defendant’s objection is

overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the portions of the R&R objected to de novo and the rest for

clear error, the Court finds no error and adopts the R&R in its entirety.

It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. U.S. Magistrate Judge Leslie R. Hoffman’s Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 93) is ADOPTED, CONFIRMED, and made a part of this Order.

2. Defendant’s Unopposed Motion for Court to Retain Jurisdiction to Enforce

Settlement and to Address the Pending Charging Lien and Retaining Lien

(Doc. 66) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART:

a. Ollinger’s retaining lien (Doc. 31) and charging lien (Doc. 30) are not

enforceable in proceedings before this Court;

b. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.

3. Ollinger’s Motion as Lienor to See Settlement Agreement, Release,

Mediation Agreement and Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 67) is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

4. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under Local Rule 3.08(b)

subject to the right of any party to move the court within sixty (60) days

thereafter for the purpose of entering a stipulated form of final order or

judgment; or, on good cause shown, to reopen the case for further

proceedings.

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on July 23, 2020.

//]

GB) Litn

a “ROY B. DALTON JR:

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

-6-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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