Opinion

Jet Recycling America, Inc. v. Glass

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Jun 30, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.7%

explaining that “[p]artial summary judgments … very rarely give rise to a final order for the purposes of appeal” because they “customarily leave some portion of the underlying ‘discrete dispute’ unresolved”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that “[p]artial summary judgments … very rarely give rise to a final order for the purposes of appeal” because they “customarily leave some portion of the underlying ‘discrete dispute’ unresolved”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

IN RE: ANDREW B. GLASS,

Debtor.

/

ANDREW B. GLASS,

Appellant,

Case No. 8:20-cv-506-T-60

v. Bankr. No. 8:18-bk-2707-CPM

Adv. Proc. No. 8:18-ap-577-CPM

JET RECYCLING AMERICA, INC.,

Appellee.

/

ORDER GRANTING “APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

APPEAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION”

This matter is before the Court on “Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal for

Lack of Jurisdiction,” filed on March 23, 2020. (Doc. 5). Appellant, proceeding pro

se, responded in opposition to the motion on March 30, 2020. (Doc. 9). Upon review

of the motion, response, court file, and record, the Court finds as follows:

Factual Background

Appellee Jet Recycling America, Inc. (“JRA”) is a corporation that makes

products that help transform plastic waste into recycled products. (Doc. 7-12). At

JRA’s founding, Appellant Andrew B. Glass served as its Vice President and Chief

Technology and Marketing Officer. (Id.). According to JRA Glass violated his

fiduciary duty to JRA and its shareholders in several ways, including one incident

where he allegedly lied about a board member in an attempt to usurp control of the

business. (Id.). When his attempted coup failed, Glass intentionally interfered with

JRA’s business, stole JRA’s intellectual property for his own use and monetary gain,

and started a direct competitor to JRA under a nearly identical name – Jet

Recycling World, LLC. (Id.).

Procedural Background

In 2017, an arbitrator ruled that Glass engaged in fraudulent conduct and

repeatedly breached his fiduciary duties to JRA. (Id.). On January 19, 2018, a

California state court confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment in

favor of JRA. (Id.).

On April 4, 2018, Glass filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. See In re

Glass, No. 8:18-bk-2707-CPM (M.D. Fla. Bankr.). On November 19, 2018, in

connection with the bankruptcy case, JRA filed an adversary proceeding by filing a

two-count complaint objecting to the dischargeability of the California state court’s

judgment confirming the arbitration award.1 (Doc. 7-7).

JRA moved for summary judgment on Count I only, and Glass moved for

summary judgment on all counts. (Docs. 7-38; 7-47). On January 28, 2020, JRA

moved to amend its complaint and dismiss Count II. (Doc. 7-66). The same day, the

bankruptcy court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment.2 (Doc. 15).

1 The following day, JRA amended its complaint, but maintained the same two counts. (Doc. 7-12).

2 The hearing also considered JRA’s request to take judicial notice, but that request is not relevant to

the instant motion. See (Doc. 15).

Following the hearing, on February 11, 2020, the bankruptcy court entered an order

that: (1) denied Glass’s motion for summary judgment; (2) granted JRA’s motion for

summary judgment as to Count I, finding specifically that Glass’s debt to JRA was

non-dischargeable; and (3) stated that the bankruptcy court would, by separate

order, grant JRA’s motion to voluntarily dismiss Count II. (Doc. 5-1). The

bankruptcy court entered a separate final judgment in favor of JRA as to Count I.

(Doc. 7-67). On February 24, 2020, Glass filed a notice of appeal on the summary

judgment order. (Doc. 1).

Legal Standard

The federal district courts function as appellate courts for review of final

judgments and certain interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy courts. See In re

Colortex Indus., Inc., 19 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). The

bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact are

reviewed for clear error. Bunyan v. Remick, No. 8:18-cv-1519-T-36, 2019 WL

4805428, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2019) (citing In re Globe Mfg. Corp., 567 F.3d 1291,

1296 (11th Cir. 2009)); see also In re Piazza, 719 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2013).

Analysis

JRA argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because

Glass improperly appealed the summary judgment order rather than the final

judgment.3 Upon review, the Court agrees.

3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 is applicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts

through Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7058.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), a federal district court’s jurisdiction to hear

bankruptcy appeals is limited to “final judgments, orders, and decrees,” and certain

interlocutory appeals. “[A] final order in a bankruptcy proceeding is one that ends

the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute its

judgment.” In re Culton, 111 F.3d 92, 93 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Tidewater

Grp., Inc., 734 F.2d 794, 795-96 (11th Cir. 1984)). As such, “to be final, a

bankruptcy court order must completely resolve all of the issues pertaining to a

discrete claim, including issues as to the proper relief.” In re Steffen, 500 F. App’x

877, 879 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Donovan, 532 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (11th Cir.

2008)) (finding that a dismissal order “did not fully resolve” a bankruptcy case

where “resolution of the case remained open and unfinished pending compliance

with the conditions” in the dismissal order).

In the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment order, the bankruptcy court

said it would “grant by separate order the Motion to Amend filed by JRA so as to

dismiss Count II of JRA’s Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 5-1). The summary

judgment order was therefore not a “final order” because Count II remained open

and pending. See, e.g., Failon v. Compass Chem. Int’l, LLC, 3:16-cv-317-JAG, 2016

WL 4599904, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Sept 2, 2016) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction

because the order “was an interlocutory order … not a final order” where the order

granting partial summary judgment resolved Count II but not Count I); In re

Robinson, 194 B.R. 697, 700 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining that “[p]artial summary

judgments … very rarely give rise to a final order for the purposes of appeal”

because they “customarily leave some portion of the underlying ‘discrete dispute’

unresolved”). Glass did not timely appeal the final judgment.4 See 28 U.S.C. §

158(a); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear

Glass’s appeal and “there are no equitable exceptions to such jurisdictional

requirements.” Ford v. Waage, No. 8:18-cv-2053-T-02, 2019 WL 2027729, at *8

(M.D. Fla. May 8, 2019) (quoting Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007)). As

such, the motion to dismiss is due to be granted. This appeal is dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

Accordingly, itis ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

1. “Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction” (Doc. 5)

is GRANTED. This appeal is DISMISSED.

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines

and thereafter CLOSE THIS CASE.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 30th day of

June, 2020.

Oi Bees

TOM BARBER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4 A party may file an interlocutory appeal of a non-final order, but only with leave of court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(8). To do so, a plaintiff must timely file a motion seeking leave and, to succeed on that

motion, must establish that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004 and

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See, e.g., In re Robinson, 3:19-ev-1155-J-32, 2019 WL 5102921, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Oct. 11, 2019) (denying a motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal filed by a pro se

litigant). Plaintiff has not sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal and — even if he had — there

does not appear to be “substantial ground for difference of opinion” as to the outcome of this case.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Page 5 of 5

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.