denying motion to dismiss based on fair use after concluding that fair use defense was not ripe before the summary judgment stage
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- denying motion to dismiss based on fair use after concluding that fair use defense was not ripe before the summary judgment stage
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The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MARK JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:19-cv-3202-T-60AEP
THE FLORIDA STATE GOLF
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO DISMISS AND
FOR AN AWARD FOR OF ATTORNEYS FEES;” and
SUA SPONTE ORDER DISMISSING FICTITIOUS PARTIES
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Florida State Golf Association,
Inc.’s “Motion to Dismiss and for an Award of Attorneys Fees,” filed on February 3,
2020. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff responded in opposition on February 17, 2020. (Doc. 9).
Upon review of the motion, response, court file, and record, the Court finds as
follows:
Background
Plaintiff Mark Johnson, a professional photographer, holds a copyright in an
original photograph of a golfer trying to hit a ball out of a water hazard (the
“Image”). Defendant Florida State Golf Association, Inc. (“FSGA”) – a non-profit
organization dedicated to promoting, protecting, and preserving the game of golf –
used the Image on its website without a license. Plaintiff discovered FSGA’s use of
the Image and subsequently filed a single count complaint for copyright
infringement against FSGA and ten unnamed Does (the “Doe Defendants”).
Legal Analysis
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8(a) does not demand “detailed factual
allegations,” it does require “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, factual
allegations must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is generally limited to the four
corners of the complaint. Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 232, 233
(M.D. Fla. 1995). Furthermore, when reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a
court “must accept [a] [p]laintiff’s well pleaded facts as true, and construe the
[c]omplaint in the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Id. (citing Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). “[A] motion to dismiss should concern only the
complaint’s legal sufficiency, and is not a procedure for resolving factual questions
or addressing the merits of the case.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Mosaic
Fertilizer, LLC, 8:09-cv-1264-T-26TGW, 2009 WL 10671157, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(Lazzara, J.).
Analysis
Motion to Dismiss and for an Award of Attorney’s Fees
FSGA contends that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice
because its use of the Image constitutes fair use. However, the fair use doctrine is
an affirmative defense. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2010). “Generally, the existence of an affirmative defense will not support a
motion to dismiss.” Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th
Cir. 1984).
In the context of fair use, it is generally inappropriate to determine the
merits of such a claim at this stage of the proceedings “[u]nless the facts necessary
to make the determination are evident on the face of the complaint.” Land’s End at
Sunset Beach Cmty. Assoc., Inc. v. Land’s End Acquisition Corp., No. 8:16-cv-828-
17JSS, 2016 WL 9526680, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2016) (citing Kelly-Brown v.
Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2013)). As such, courts asked to resolve this
kind of question at this stage of the proceedings will typically deny a motion to
dismiss based on fair use. See, e.g., 3Lions Publ’g, Inc. v. Interactive Media Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1042 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (denying motion to dismiss based on
fair use after concluding that fair use defense was not ripe before the summary
judgment stage); Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1316-17 (S.D. Fla. 2012)
(same).
Here, the necessary facts are not evident on the face of the complaint, and the
record is not sufficiently developed at this time, to determine whether FSGA was
engaging in fair use of the copyrighted image. Therefore, FSGA’s “Motion to
Dismiss and for an Award of Attorneys Fees” is denied. However, FSGA is not
precluded from raising its fair use defense at the summary judgment stage of these
proceedings. See 3Lions Publ’g, Inc. 389 F. Supp. 3d at 1042.
Fictitious Parties
“[F]ictitious-party pleading is generally not permitted in federal court” unless
“the plaintiff's description of the defendant is so specific as to be at the very worst,
surplusage.” Kabbaj v. John Does 1-10, 600 F. App’x 638, 641 (11th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010)).
In this case, Plaintiff fails to provide any detail whatsoever about the identity
of the Does, their relationship to FSGA, or their specific involvement as it relates to
copyright infringement. Plaintiff only alleges that the Doe Defendants were
“responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that Plaintiff’s
damages . . . were proximately caused by the conduct of said [Doe] Defendants.”
(Doc. 1 at ¶ 7). These vague allegations “do not fit the limited exception to the
general prohibition against fictitious-party pleading in federal court.” See Uppal v.
Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 8:19-CV-1334-T-02JSS, 2019 WL 5887182, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 12, 2019), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uppal v. Wells Fargo Fin., No. 19-
14953-H, 2020 WL 1250494 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2020) (sua sponte dismissing John
Doe Defendants based on similarly vague allegations). All fictitious parties are
therefore dismissed from this action.
It is therefore
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. Defendant Florida State Golf Association, Inc.’s “Motion to Dismiss and
for an Award of Attorneys Fees” (Doc. 8) is DENIED.
2. EFSGA is directed to file an answer on or before June 18, 2020.
3. All fictitious parties are dismissed as Defendants in this action.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 28th day of
May, 2020.
“TOM BARBER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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