noting a defendant should have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence”
How later courts described this case
- noting a defendant should have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
THOMAS L. ADAMS,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:17-cv-509-J-39MCR
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Respondents.
_______________________________
ORDER
I. Introduction
Petitioner, Thomas L. Adams, proceeding pro se, challenges
his state court (Clay County) judgment of conviction for attempted
sexual battery of a child under twelve, following entry of a guilty
plea. See Doc. 22-2 at 13.1 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1; Petition), Petitioner raises
three grounds: (1) the ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to investigate possible defenses; (2) the ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to advise Petitioner of the
consequences of his plea; and (3) the denial of due process and
effective assistance of counsel when counsel denied Petitioner’s
request to proceed to trial. See Petition at 4, 5, 7. Respondents
1 Page numbers referenced throughout this order are those
assigned by the Court’s electronic document numbering system,
including exhibits (Docs. 22-1, 22-2, and 22-3). The Court will
cite the exhibits by reference to the document number followed by
the page number (i.e., Doc. __ at __).
filed a response (Doc. 22; Resp.), and Petitioner replied (Doc.
30; Reply).
II. Timeliness & Exhaustion
Respondents concede Petitioner timely filed his Petition and
exhausted all grounds for relief. See Resp. at 11, 14. Thus, the
Court accepts as undisputed that the claims are timely and
exhausted.
III. Applicable Standards
A. Habeas Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus and
“prescribes a deferential framework for evaluating issues
previously decided in state court,” Sealey v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1354 (11th Cir. 2020), limiting
a federal court’s authority to award habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254; see also Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504, 506 (2019) (per
curiam) (recognizing AEDPA imposes “important limitations on the
power of federal courts to overturn the judgments of state courts
in criminal cases”).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claim on
the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the
state court’s adjudication of the claim was “contrary to, or
2
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Nance v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, No. 19-6918, 2020 WL 1325907 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2020). The
burden of proof is high; “clear error will not suffice.” Virginia
v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017).
A federal district court must give appropriate deference to
a state court decision on the merits. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.
Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The state court need not issue an opinion
explaining its rationale for its decision to qualify as an
adjudication on the merits. Id. Where the state court’s
adjudication is unaccompanied by an explanation, the district
court should presume the unexplained decision adopted the
reasoning of the lower court:
[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related
state-court decision that does provide a
relevant rationale. It should then presume
that the unexplained decision adopted the same
reasoning.
Id.
3
To obtain habeas relief, the state court decision must
unquestionably conflict with Supreme Court precedent, not dicta.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). If some fair-
minded jurists could agree with the state court’s decision, habeas
relief must be denied. Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison,
911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 394
(2019). Therefore, unless the petitioner shows the state court’s
ruling was so lacking in justification that there was error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility
for fair-minded disagreement, there is no entitlement to habeas
relief. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19-20 (2013). A state court’s
factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted “by
clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The AEDPA standard is intended to be difficult for a
petitioner to meet. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. A district court’s
obligation is to “train its attention” on the legal and factual
basis for the state court’s ruling, not to “flyspeck the state
court order or grade it.” Meders, 911 F.3d at 1349 (citing Wilson,
138 S. Ct. at 1191-92).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To demonstrate trial counsel was ineffective, a habeas
petitioner must satisfy a rigorous two-prong test by showing (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an
4
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). Restated, a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “is denied when
a defense attorney’s performance falls below an objective standard
of reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defense.” Yarborough
v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 521 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The prejudice prong
requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
The two-prong Strickland test applies when a petitioner
challenges his counsel’s performance with respect to the entry of
a guilty plea such that a petitioner still must demonstrate
counsel’s performance was deficient. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 58-59 (1985). To establish prejudice, however, a petitioner
must show there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.
Notably, there is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to
tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v.
Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of
the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth
5
Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance
prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-
versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
When a petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective,
“[r]eviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s
representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,
822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689). When the “strong presumption” standard of Strickland is
applied “in tandem” with the highly deferential AEDPA standard, a
review of the state court’s determination as to the “performance”
prong is afforded double deference. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.
Accordingly, the question for a federal court is not whether
trial counsel’s performance was reasonable, but “whether there is
any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard.” Id. If there is “any reasonable argument
that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” a
federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying the
claim. Id. As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never
an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
6
IV. Analysis
A. Ground One
In ground one, Petitioner asserts his privately retained
counsel, Theodore Zentner, was ineffective by failing to
investigate possible defenses. See Petition at 4. Petitioner
contends he told Zentner of a woman who was willing to testify
that the victim was known to “make up stories all the time” and
had gotten in trouble at school for lying about having had sex
with two class mates, one of whom got the victim pregnant. Id.
Despite Petitioner identifying a potential favorable witness,
Petitioner asserts Zentner did not follow up or investigate.
Petitioner also asserts Zentner “rejected Petitioner’s grandson,”
who testified at deposition that Petitioner did not abuse the
victim, who is the grandson’s sister. Id. Petitioner contends
Zentner’s performance deprived him of the right to prove his
innocence at trial. Id. Petitioner claims the witnesses “could
have put doubt in the minds of a jury.” Id. See also Reply at 4-
5.
Petitioner raised this claim as ground one in his amended
motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Doc. 22-2 at 55. Florida’s
First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed without opinion
and issued its mandate. Doc. 22-3 at 5, 7. To the extent the First
7
DCA affirmed the postconviction court’s denial on the merits, the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications.
See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1194. As such, the Court will “look
through” the unexplained opinion to the postconviction court’s
order on Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion. Id.2
The postconviction court found Petitioner waived his right to
present a defense when he entered his guilty plea in open court.
Doc. 22-2 at 130. The postconviction court found the following:
During the plea hearing, [Petitioner]
testified that he had an opportunity to speak
with his counsel about the facts of this case
and the possible defenses he may have had.
(Ex. C at 5.) [Petitioner] agreed that he and
counsel had “a number of conversations” about
this case and “how to proceed.” (Ex. C at 5-
6.) [Petitioner] testified that counsel
answered all the questions he had and counsel
had done everything that [Petitioner] asked
counsel to do. (Ex. C at 12.) [Petitioner] was
satisfied with counsel’s services and there
was not anything that [Petitioner] believed
counsel should have done that counsel had not
done. (Ex. C at 12-13.) Further, after being
questioned as to whether he had enough time to
think about how he wanted to proceed,
[Petitioner] stated that he felt the plea was
the “best thing at the current time” and the
plea was the way he wanted to go. (Ex. C at
12.)
2 In looking through the appellate court’s per curiam
affirmance to the circuit court’s “relevant rationale,” the Court
presumes the appellate court “adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson,
138 S. Ct. at 1194.
8
Id. The postconviction court’s factual findings are presumed
correct because Petitioner has not overcome the presumption with
clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
The state court’s adjudication of the claim was not contrary
to clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts. In its order denying
Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion, the postconviction court set forth
the applicable two-prong Strickland test and recognized the
nuances of the prejudice-prong analysis in the context of a guilty
plea. Doc. 22-2 at 129. Upon review, Petitioner is unable to
establish the Florida court’s decision is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent, including Strickland and Hill, or is based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, under
the doubly deferential AEDPA/Strickland standard, Petitioner is
not entitled to habeas relief on ground one.
B. Ground Two
In ground two, Petitioner asserts Zentner was ineffective for
failing to advise him of the consequences of his plea. See Petition
at 5-6. Specifically, Petitioner says Zentner did not explain
Petitioner would be designated a sexual predator; would not be
allowed to see his grandchildren who were under the age of
eighteen; could lose his retirement benefits; and would have to
9
complete five years of sex offender probation. Id. at 6. Petitioner
alleges he construed Zentner’s characterization, to the trial
judge, that his plea was “one of convenience” to mean he was
pleading “not guilty.” Id. Petitioner contends, if he had known
all the consequences of his plea, he would have insisted on going
to trial. Id. Petitioner also says, however, that he pleaded guilty
“to try to save his family from having to go through a trial.”3
Id. See also Reply at 5-6.
Petitioner raised this claim as ground two in his Rule 3.850
Motion. Doc. 22-2 at 57. The First DCA affirmed without opinion.
Doc. 22-3 at 5. To the extent the First DCA affirmed the
postconviction court’s denial on the merits, the Court will address
the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal
court review of state court adjudications. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct.
at 1194. As such, the Court will “look through” the unexplained
opinion to the postconviction court’s order on Petitioner’s Rule
3.850 Motion. Id.
The postconviction court found Petitioner failed to
demonstrate Zentner’s “performance was deficient or that there was
a reasonable probability that but for [the] alleged errors,
3 Petitioner questions the veracity of the plea hearing
transcript. See Petition at 6. The Court already considered and
rejected Petitioner’s objection to the transcript. See Order (Doc.
31).
10
[Petitioner] would have insisted on going to trial.” Doc. 22-2 at
132. The postconviction court made the following findings, which
are presumed correct:
[Petitioner] signed a plea agreement form that
expressly stated that he would be designated
a sexual predator and that the State and
defense would recommend five years of Sex
Offender probation. (Ex. A at 1-2.) During the
plea hearing, [Petitioner] testified that he
had reviewed and discussed the plea agreement
form with counsel. (Ex. C at 8.) Counsel, in
the presence of [Petitioner], also informed
that [sic] Court about the joint
recommendation by the State and the defense
that included the sentence of five years of
Sex Offender probation and the sexual predator
designation. (Ex. C at 4.) Further, the Court
advised [Petitioner] that [he] would receive
the sexual predator designation. (Ex. C at 9.)
The plea agreement form also indicated
that [Petitioner] would have no intentional
unsupervised contact with any child under the
age of eighteen without prior approval of the
Court. (Ex. A at 2.) [Petitioner] acknowledged
that the plea agreement provided that he would
not have contact with any children. (Ex. C at
11.) Further, [Petitioner] understood that the
no contact provision included no contact with
his grandchildren. (Ex. C at 11.)
Id. at 131-32. As to Petitioner’s loss of retirement benefits, the
postconviction court found Zentner had no duty to advise Petitioner
of such a possibility because “the law generally does not require
a defendant to be informed of collateral consequences.” Id. at
132.
11
The state court’s adjudication of the claim was not contrary
to clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts. In its order denying
Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion, the postconviction court set forth
the applicable two-prong Strickland test and recognized the
nuances of the prejudice prong analysis in the context of a guilty
plea. Id. at 129. Upon review, Petitioner is unable to establish
the Florida court’s decision is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent, including Strickland and Hill, or is based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts. The record demonstrates
the trial court properly applied the Strickland standard and found
no deficient performance on the part of counsel and no prejudice
to Petitioner’s defense. Accordingly, under the doubly deferential
AEDPA/Strickland standard, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas
relief on ground two.
C. Ground Three
In ground three, Petitioner argues his plea was involuntary.
He asserts he was “denied his right to due process and effective
assistance of counsel . . . when counsel denied [his] request to
go to trial.” Petition at 7. Petitioner contends Zentner told him
his sentence would likely be two years with no sexual offender
designation, but four days before trial, Petitioner found out “none
12
of this was true.”4 Id. at 8. And four days before trial, Zentner
allegedly told Petitioner that Zentner “would not be calling any
witnesses, and that Petitioner would have to come up with another
$1000 dollars [sic] or [Zentner] would not go to trial.” Id. at 7.
Petitioner alleges he had no choice but to accept the plea
agreement. Petitioner maintains he was “robbed” of his opportunity
to prove his innocence at trial. Id. Petitioner says he wrote a
letter to the trial judge asking the judge to appoint the public
defender to represent him because of the “disharmony in the
relationship” between him and Zentner, his privately retained
counsel. Id. The judge did not address Petitioner’s request.5 Id.
See also Reply at 7-9.
4 The State originally charged Petitioner, by Information
dated June 4, 2013, with two counts of sexual battery and one count
of lewd or lascivious molestation. Doc. 22-1 at 3. The capital
sexual battery charges carried a mandatory life sentence without
parole. Id. at 29. On the original Information, Petitioner entered
a plea of not guilty. Id. at 8. On September 9, 2015, the State
entered an Amended Information charging Petitioner with two counts
of attempted capital sexual battery, each of which is punishable
by up to thirty years in prison. Id. at 14, 29. The next day,
Petitioner signed a plea deal and tendered his plea in open court.
Id. at 16, 24. Trial had been set to begin the following week.
Doc. 22-2 at 116-17.
5 Plaintiff wrote a letter to the judge on March 5, 2014. Doc.
22-2 at 192. Plaintiff said he paid Zentner his “life savings,”
but Zentner had done nothing on his case. Plaintiff was frustrated
because neither he nor his wife were able to contact Zentner by
phone, he was unable to afford to hire a new attorney, and he was
unsure what to do. Id. Petitioner asked the judge what he could do
with his case. He said, “If nothing else, may I please be assigned
13
Petitioner raised this claim in ground three of his Rule 3.850
Motion. Doc. 22-2 at 59. The First DCA affirmed without opinion.
Doc. 22-3 at 5. To the extent the First DCA affirmed the
postconviction court’s denial on the merits, the Court will address
the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal
court review of state court adjudications. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct.
at 1194. As such, the Court will “look through” the unexplained
opinion to the postconviction court’s order on Petitioner’s Rule
3.850 Motion. Id.
The postconviction court found Petitioner’s plea was
voluntarily entered and made the following findings, which are
presumed correct:
As previously discussed, [Petitioner]
stated that he felt the plea was the “best
thing at the current time” and the plea was
the “way he wanted to go.” (Ex. C at 12.)
[Petitioner] had discussed his case thoroughly
with his counsel, counsel answered all the
questions [Petitioner] had, and counsel had
done everything that [Petitioner] had asked
counsel to do. (Ex. C at 12.) [Petitioner] was
satisfied with counsel’s services, and there
was not anything that [Petitioner] believed
counsel should have done that counsel had not
done. (Ex. C at 12-13.) Moreover, [Petitioner]
testified that he was not threatened or
coerced into entering his plea. (Ex. C at 11-
12.)
[the public defender].” Id. The receipt of the letter is noted on
the court’s docket. Doc. 22-1 at 11.
14
Doc. 22-2 at 133.
Petitioner fails to demonstrate the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was contrary to clearly established
federal law, involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Accordingly, under AEDPA’s deferential
standard, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on ground
three.
Even if the state court’s adjudication of this claim were not
entitled to deference, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. By
signing the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed he entered the plea
freely and voluntarily and was waiving his right to proceed to
trial and to present and confront witnesses. Doc. 22-1 at 19, 21.
He agreed:
I consider this negotiated sentence to be to
my advantage, and I have freely and
voluntarily entered my plea of guilty. I have
not been offered any hope of reward, better
treatment, or certain type of sentence as an
inducement to enter this plea, other than the
sentence set forth above. I have not been
promised by anyone, including my attorney,
that I would actually serve any less time than
that set forth above, and I understand that
any early release of any sort is not a part of
this plea agreement and is entirely within the
discretion of government agencies other than
this Court. I have not been threatened,
coerced, or intimidated by any person,
including my attorney, in any way in order to
get me to enter this plea.
15
Id. at 19-20. Petitioner also agreed he had “ample time” to discuss
the plea agreement with counsel; his counsel took all actions and
spoke to all people Petitioner asked him to or explained why such
actions were not done; he was satisfied with his counsel’s
representation; he had time to consider the plea agreement, the
charges against him, and the constitutional rights he was waiving;
and he read and understood the plea agreement. Id. at 20-21.
The trial judge signed the plea agreement, certifying he
accepted Petitioner’s plea in open court after discussing the plea
with Petitioner. Id. at 22. The judge found Petitioner understood
the terms of the plea agreement and entered his plea freely and
voluntarily. Id. During the plea colloquy, Petitioner acknowledged
he initialed and signed the plea agreement, which he reviewed and
discussed with his attorney; he said he had had an opportunity to
“speak with [his] attorney about the facts of [the] case and the
possible defenses”; he understood the original charges and amended
charges against him and the maximum sentences associated with those
charges; he understood the rights he was giving up, including the
right to a jury trial; and he understood he would be designated a
sexual predator. Doc. 22-2 at 156-62.6 Before the judge accepted
6 Not only did Petitioner acknowledge he understood he would
be designated a sexual predator, he asked the judge whether he
would be able to see his grandchildren in the presence of their
16
Petitioner’s plea and adjudicated him guilty, the judge read in
open court the details of the plea agreement, including the sexual
predator designation, and confirmed Petitioner’s plea was
voluntarily and freely tendered. The following colloquy, in part,
took place:
THE COURT: Have you been threatened or
coerced into entering this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Have you had enough time to
think about how you want to proceed?
THE DEFENDANT: I feel this is the best thing
at the current time right now to do.
THE COURT: Okay. So you’ve thought about
it and this is the way you want to go[?]
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. And you’ve discussed
this thoroughly with [your attorney]?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And he’s answered all the
questions that you’ve had?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And he’s done everything
you’ve asked him to do?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
parents. Doc. 22-2 at 162. The judge told him the terms of the
agreement would prevent such interaction, but that Petitioner
could move for modification once he is on probation. Petitioner
responded, “All right. Thank you.” Id.
17
THE COURT: And you’re satisfied with the
job he’s done for you?
THE DEFENDANT: As best as I can.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, is there anything
that you believe he should have done that he
hasn’t done?
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And I understand you’re
not happy with the sentence, but other than
that, is there anything else that you have
asked him to do that he has not done?
THE DEFENDANT: I guess not, no.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. And are you
pleading guilty to these charges because you
are, in fact, guilty of these charges?
MR. ZENTNER: Your Honor, this is a best
interest plea.
Id. at 162-64.
A trial judge accepting a criminal defendant’s guilty plea
must ensure the record demonstrates the defendant enters his plea
freely and voluntarily. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244
(1969) (noting a defendant should have “a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequence”).
When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives
a number of constitutional rights, and thus,
“the Constitution insists, among other things,
that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is
‘voluntary’ and that the defendant must make
related waivers knowingly, intelligently, and
18
with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.”
Hernandez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 785 F. App’x 707, 708
(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
628-29 (2002)). A defendant enters a constitutionally valid guilty
plea when “the record accurately reflects that the nature of the
charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the
defendant by his own, competent counsel.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545
U.S. 175, 183 (2005).
The record reflects Petitioner entered a constitutionally
valid guilty plea. Not only did he initial and sign a plea
agreement form, which provides his plea was entered “freely and
voluntarily,” but he told the judge in open court he discussed
both the plea and his case with Zentner, he understood the nature
of the charges and the rights he was giving up, and he wanted to
enter a guilty plea instead of proceeding to trial, which was set
for the following week.7 Doc. 22-2 at 156-64. A criminal
defendant’s solemn declarations in court carry a strong
presumption of truth. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74
(1977); see also Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210,
7 Even in his Petition, Petitioner states he accepted the plea
deal “to save his family from having to go through a trial,” which
contradicts his contention that his plea was not voluntarily
tendered. See Petition at 6.
19
1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (recognizing statements made under oath at
a plea colloquy are presumed true). Thus, Petitioner’s
representations that he understood the plea agreement and the
rights he was giving up “constitute a formidable barrier in any
subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-
74.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is
DENIED.
2. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close
this case.
4. If Petitioner appeals the denial of his Petition, the
Court denies a certificate of appealability.8 The Clerk shall
terminate from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on
8 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only
if a petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this
substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Upon due consideration, this Court will deny
a certificate of appealability.
20
appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such termination
shall serve as a denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this llth day of
May 2020.
4 ¢ De
wt J. DAVIS
United States District Judge
Jax-6
Cc: Thomas Adams
Counsel of record
21