Prince v. Marson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

RUSSELL S. PRINCE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:19-cv-549-T-35AAS

REBECCA A. MARSON,

Defendant.

______________________________________/

ORDER

The court granted Rebecca A. Marson’s request for apportionment of

reasonable expenses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5).1 (Doc. 60). Specifically, the court

apportioned Ms. Marson 80% of her reasonable expenses in connection with the

motion to quash and protective order. (Id. at p. 4). Ms. Marson seeks an award of

$12,986.202 in attorney’s fees for 45.2 hours by three attorneys at hourly rates of

$435, $295, and $240.3 (Doc. 62). Russell S. Prince opposes the amount sought and

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C) states that when, as here, a motion for

protective order is granted in part and denied in part, “the Court may ... after giving

reasonable opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the

motion.”

2 This amount represents 80% of the of attorney’s fees incurred through the date of

hearing on the motion to quash and for protective order (80% of $10,234.00 =

$8,187.20), plus fees incurred negotiating the fee award and preparing this motion

($4,799.00).

3 Attorney William J. Judge is seeking reimbursement for 13 hours at an hourly rate

of $435; attorney Carolina Blanco is seeking reimbursement for 30 hours at an hourly

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wishes the court would reconsider apportioning reasonable expenses. (Doc. 64). For

the reasons previously stated, requiring Mr. Prince to reimburse Ms. Marson 80% of

her reasonable expenses remains appropriate. However, upon review of the

submitted billing records, the court finds a fee reduction is necessary for several

reasons.

First, Ms. Marson seeks $4,799.00 for “negotiating the amount of fees to be

reimbursed and preparing the instant motion.” (Doc. 62, p. 3). “While attorney’s fees

incurred for litigating the issue of entitlement to attorney’s fees are recoverable, fees

incurred for litigating the amount of attorney’s fees are not.” McMahan v. Toto, 311

F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629

So.2d 830, 833 (Fla. 1993)). Consistent with the court’s ruling permitting

reimbursement for 80% of Ms. Marson’s reasonable expenses (Doc. 60) and the case

law on recovering fees for litigating fees, the court will apportion the reasonable

expenses for litigating the discovery dispute only. Thus, $4,799.00 is subtracted from

Ms. Marson’s requested reimbursement for reasonable expenses, leaving the

requested remaining amount of $8,187.20 (80% of Mr. Marson’s attorney’s fees

incurred through the date of hearing on the motion to quash and for protective order).

Next, “[i]n calculating what hours were reasonably expended on litigation, the

Court should exclude excessive, unnecessary, and redundant hours.” Lumpuy v.

rate of $295; and attorney Thomas Banks is seeking reimbursement for 2.2 hours at

an hourly rate of $240. (Doc. 62-1).

2

Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 8:11-CV-2455-T-24MAP, 2013 WL 4648500, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Aug. 29, 2013), aff’d, 580 F. App’x 807 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Norman v. Housing

Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 1988)). Here, some billing

entries contain duplicative work because three attorneys billed time for reviewing

and analyzing the same documents or having internal meetings and communications

about this relatively simple discovery dispute. (See Docs. 62-1, 62-2). “When a

district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court has

two choices: it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested

hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350

(11th Cir. 2008). Here, an across-the-board cut of 15% is appropriate to offset entries

reflecting duplicative work.

The time entries also contain block billing. Generally, “[b]lock billing occurs

when an attorney lists all the day’s tasks on a case in a single entry, without

separately identifying the time spent on each task.” Ceres EnvtI. Servs., Inc. v.

Colonel McCrary Trucking, LLC, 476 F. App’x 198, 203 (11th Cir. 2012). The problem

with block billing is that it “results in ‘imprecision’ in an attorney’s records ... a

problem for which the opponent should not be penalized.” Id. To remedy this

problem, the Eleventh Circuit, approved the use by district courts of across-the-board

reductions in block billed hours to offset the ill effects of block billing. Id. (citing

Kearney v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2010)

(awarding no attorney’s fees to block billed entries or reducing the requested

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attorneys’ fees); see also McBride v. Legacy Components, LLC, No. 8:15-cv-1983-

17TGW, 2018 WL 4381181, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2018) (reducing billable hours

by 35% based on block billed time entries). Here, an across-the-board cut of 20% is

appropriate to offset the block billed time entries.

In total, considering the duplicative work and block billed time entries, Ms.

Marson’s award is reduced by 35%. Accordingly, Ms. Marson’s Motion for Attorney’s

Fees (Doc. 62) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Ms. Marson is awarded

reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,321.68, to be paid within thirty days

from the date of this order.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on April 16, 2020.

Aranda Ayre □□ Sarma.

AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE

United States Magistrate Judge