Coleman v. Scott

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SHAW VALE COLEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:19-cv-318-J-39PDB

MARK S. INCH, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

I. Procedural Status

Plaintiff, Shaw Vale Coleman, an inmate of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on March

14, 2019, by mailing for filing a pro se civil rights complaint

(Doc. 1). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc.

4). Finding the amended complaint deficient, the Court directed

Plaintiff to submit a second amended complaint. See Order (Doc.

7). The Court noted why Plaintiff’s amended complaint was deficient

and advised him of the federal pleading standards. Id. The Court

warned Plaintiff his failure to comply with the order may result

in the dismissal of this action. Id.

Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint (Doc. 11; SAC),

which is before the Court for screening under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA). The PLRA requires a district court to dismiss

a complaint if the court determines the action is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). With respect to whether a

complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,”

the language of the PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so courts apply the same standard

in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th

Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th

Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to

“naked assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quotations, alteration,

and citation omitted).

Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or

inferential allegations respecting all the material elements

necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.”

Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th

Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). In reviewing a pro

se plaintiff’s pleadings, a court must liberally construe the

plaintiff’s allegations. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-

21 (1972); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011).

However, the duty of a court to construe pro se pleadings liberally

does not require the court to serve as an attorney for the

plaintiff. Freeman v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 679 F. App’x 982, 982

(11th Cir. 2017) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132

F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations & Claims

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff names twenty-eight

Defendants,1 asserts fifty-five paragraphs of factual allegations,

which are exceedingly confusing, and states nine causes of action,

all of which include essentially the same conclusory language

devoid of connection to factual allegations. See SAC at 2-4, 15-

21.

As Defendants, Plaintiff names former Governor Rick Scott;

former Inspector General Jeffrey T. Beasley; an “investigative

manager,” Heather Robinson, who appears to have worked for Governor

Scott; the former and current Secretary of the FDOC, Julie Jones

and Mark Inch, along with three individuals identified as

“secretary representative[s]”; deputy inspector Donaldson; former

Warden of Florida State Prison (FSP) John Palmer; Assistant Wardens

of FSP, J.S. Edwards and Jeffrey R. McClellan; and sixteen FSP

corrections officers of different rank. Id. at 2-4.

1 While he names twenty-eight Defendants in section I

(Parties), Plaintiff asserts claims against twenty-nine

individuals. See SAC at 2-4, 18.

Plaintiff alleges he was “victimized by the officers and other

staff members” at FSP in 2014 and 2015, and he sought protection

from former Governor Rick Scott, whose office referred his

complaint (a letter) to the Inspector General’s office.2 Id. at 5-

6. Plaintiff claims the Governor’s and Inspector General’s offices

failed to investigate “whether [he] had received his

Constitutional Rights [and] . . . failed to protect [him] from

being treated in an inhumane matter [sic], by allowing the officers

to continue their ‘customs and policies’” of falsifying

disciplinary reports and placing inmates on strip status. Id. at

6-7.

Plaintiff identifies one corrections officer, Defendant

Olson, whom he says “victimized” him by “buck[ing] [him] on dayroom

privileges,” yelling at him, and falsifying disciplinary reports

against him. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff asserts Defendant Olson

falsified disciplinary reports in retaliation for Plaintiff

“stabbing [Olson’s] friends that were on the cell extraction team

and for exercising [his] rights to write grievances and to file

lawsuits.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges he declared psychological

emergencies and asked to be placed in protective custody because

of Defendant Olson, but his requests were not honored, and he “was

2 Plaintiff is now housed at Taylor Correctional Institution.

See Notice of Address Change (Doc. 9).

left to be continually victimized and abused.” Id. at 9-10, 11,

12.

Sometime in August 2015, after Defendant Olson wrote three

disciplinary reports against Plaintiff, three officers, Defendants

Andrews, Olson, and Risner, placed Plaintiff on property

restriction/strip status for seven days. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff

alleges he had no clothing other than boxers and no bedding, though

he was permitted to have his legal work. Id. at 13.

Counts one through eight3 are against different groups of

Defendants. In all counts, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated

his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and

state constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. at 15-21. And

in each count, Plaintiff repeats the following vague, conclusory

language: “while acting under the Color of State Law, [Defendants]

did act with deliberate indifference, or within the scope of their

employment, or in bad faith, or with malicious purpose, or in a

manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the Plaintiff’s

Human Rights and Safety.” Id.

The only variation in language in each count is the manner in

which, according to Plaintiff, the different groups of Defendants

allegedly acted with deliberate indifference or in disregard of

3 Plaintiff sets forth nine causes of action, but the last

one is a request for declaratory relief, not a separate claim

against any of the named Defendants. See SAC at 22.

his rights. Plaintiff’s assertions in this regard are similarly

vague and conclusory. He alleges Defendants failed to act “in the

face of well documented widespread abuse” (count one); failed to

“adhere to administrative rules and regulations” and/or failed to

investigate alleged constitutional violations (counts two, four,

five, and six); “repeatedly and systematically allowed . . .

subordinates to place inmates on [s]trip and file false and

unjustified disciplinary reports” (count three); and filed or

approved “false and unjustified disciplinary reports or authorized

[Plaintiff] to be placed on [s]trip [s]tatus4 (counts seven and

eight). Id.

Plaintiff alleges emotional injuries, numbness in his legs

and feet, and severe back pain. Id. at 22. As relief, he seeks

compensatory and punitive damages and to have “the disciplinary

reports in question overturned and expunged.” Id.

III. Analysis & Conclusions

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is subject to dismissal

under this Court’s screening obligation because he fails to “state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff

4 Counts seven and eight are essentially the same, but in

count eight, Plaintiff alleges two of the six Defendants named in

count seven acted in retaliation for Plaintiff “exercising his

[First] Amendment Rights to file grievances against [Defendant]

Olson.” See SAC at 21.

must allege “(1) both that the defendant deprived [him] of a right

secured under the Constitution or federal law and (2) that such a

deprivation occurred under color of state law.” See Bingham, 654

F.3d at 1175 (alteration in original).

With minor changes, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is

the same as his first. And like his first amended complaint,

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is deficient under federal

pleading standards. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the

First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and state constitutional

and statutory provisions. However, Plaintiff does not connect his

factual allegations to his separate causes of action, he identifies

federal and state constitutional or statutory provisions as labels

or conclusions without explaining how each Defendant violated his

rights under those laws, and he does not explain how each Defendant

caused the injuries he allegedly sustained.

Despite the pleading deficiencies, the Court will analyze

whether Plaintiff’s allegations permit the reasonable inference

Defendants violated the federal constitutional provisions

Plaintiff identifies (the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments) to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under § 1983.

A. First Amendment

While Plaintiff repeats in each count a violation of the First

Amendment, it appears he asserts a retaliation claim against only

two Defendants: Olson and Reeder, corrections officers at FSP. To

state an actionable claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) his speech was constitutionally protected;

(2) the inmate suffered adverse action such

that the [official’s] allegedly retaliatory

conduct would likely deter a person of

ordinary firmness from engaging in such

speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship

between the retaliatory action [the

disciplinary punishment] and the protected

speech [the grievance].

O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011)

(alterations in original). The third element, causation, requires

proof that “a prison official’s actions were ‘the result of [the

inmate’s] having filed a grievance.’” Id. (emphasis and alteration

in original).

Plaintiff asserts Defendants Olson and Reeder retaliated

against him because he filed grievances against Olson.5 See SAC at

21. But Plaintiff includes no factual allegations showing a causal

connection between any retaliatory action and his protected

speech. For instance, Plaintiff does not describe the nature of

the grievances he wrote against Defendant Olson, nor does he

include allegations permitting the reasonable inference Defendants

Olson or Reeder filed disciplinary reports or took other punitive

measures against him because he wrote grievances.

5 Plaintiff also contends Defendant Olson retaliated against

him for stabbing another officer. See SAC at 8. Even if true,

stabbing someone is not “protected speech” under the First

Amendment.

Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation are simply conclusory,

amounting to “naked” assertions. See Hall v. Smith, 170 F. App’x

105, 107-08 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Vague and conclusory allegations

will not support a claim under § 1983.”). Naked assertions without

factual support do not satisfy the minimal pleading standards under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tani v. Shelby Cty.,

Ala., 511 F. App’x 854, 857 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678) (affirming dismissal of a complaint that alleged, as

labels and conclusions, violations of various constitutional

rights with no supporting facts “explain[ing] what actions caused

which violations”); see also Lawson v. City of Miami Bch., 908 F.

Supp. 2d 1285, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (dismissing a retaliation

claim where the plaintiff alleged only “unsubstantiated legal

conclusions” that officers arrested him in retaliation for

exercising his First Amendment right to free speech).

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the First

Amendment.

B. Eighth Amendment

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, he

attempts to assert Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect and

conditions-of-confinement claims. Plaintiff alleges Defendants

failed to protect him from being “victimized,” exposed him to cruel

and unusual prison conditions by placing him on strip status, and

verbally abused or threatened him.6 See SAC at 6-7, 10, 13, 15.

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment,

however, does not require prison officials to ensure “comfortable

prisons.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir.

2010). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must

show a prison official “actually (subjectively) knows that an

inmate is facing a substantial risk of serious harm, yet disregards

that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively)

reasonable manner.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508

F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837,

844). “The known risk of injury must be a ‘strong likelihood,

rather than a mere possibility.’” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F. 2d 1533,

1537 (11th Cir. 1990).

6 As noted earlier, Plaintiff does not say what factual

allegations support each cause of action. The best the Court can

discern, Plaintiff alleges the following Defendants failed to

protect him: Scott, Beasley, Robinson, Jones, Inch, Neel, Greene,

Paynter, Donaldson, Palmer, Edwards, McClellan, Smith, and Gay;

and the following Defendants improperly placed Plaintiff on or

approved his placement on strip status: Epperly, Risner, Reeder,

Olson, and Andrews. Plaintiff does not state a separate count for

verbal abuse, but his allegations suggest he seeks to hold

Defendant Olson responsible for abusive language, either in

connection with his purported retaliation claim or as a separate

claim.

An inmate’s complaints of vague, generalized, and

unsubstantiated fears do not put prison officials on notice that

he faces a substantial risk of serious harm. See, e.g., Carter v.

Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding the

plaintiff’s report that he interpreted his cellmate’s vague

statement as a threat did not “provide a sufficient basis to make

the inferential leap that a substantial risk of serious harm to

[the plaintiff] existed”); McBride v. Rivers, 170 F. App’x 648,

655 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding the plaintiff’s report to guards

that he and his cellmate had problems and that the plaintiff was

in fear for his life were too vague to permit the inference that

the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm).

A claim that a prisoner was subjected to inhumane prison

conditions requires a prisoner to allege a prison official was

deliberately indifferent to conditions that were “sufficiently

serious.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004)

(“The ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ standard applies to the

conditions of a prisoner’s confinement.”). Conditions of

confinement are sufficiently serious under the Eighth Amendment

only if they are so extreme that they expose the prisoner to “an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or

safety.” Id. at 1289. Allegations of merely harsh conditions do

not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Id. Similarly,

allegations of verbal abuse, aggressive language, or threats, do

not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Hernandez v.

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008).

A prisoner who alleges he was placed on strip status with

only boxers, even if for longer than a few days, fails to state a

claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F.

App’x 931, 932 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Confinement without clothing

(other than boxers), bedding, or hygienic materials for 72 hours

during the months of April and August in Florida is not the type

of extreme prison condition[] that create[s] a substantial risk of

serious harm.”); O’Connor v. Kelley, 644 F. App’x 928, 932 (11th

Cir. 2016) (holding the prisoner failed to state the conditions of

his confinement were cruel and unusual when he was placed on strip

status for weeks).

Plaintiff fails to allege conduct by Defendants that meets

the stringent Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard.

As to his failure-to-protect claim, Plaintiff does not allege he

put any Defendant on notice that he faced a substantial risk of

serious harm. Plaintiff alleges he sought protection from the

Governor’s office in July 2014, because he believed officers were

retaliating against for having stabbed an officer. The alleged

acts of retaliation were the filing of false disciplinary reports,

assaults, and destruction of property. See SAC at 5. Plaintiff

fails to allege he provided officials specific examples of the

alleged retaliatory actions. Id. at 5-6.

Plaintiff also contends he sought protection from officials

at FSP in March 2015 when he was before the disciplinary hearing

committee. Id. at 9. Plaintiff asserts he “informed the (D.R.)

committee that [his] life was in danger, and that [he] wanted to

be placed in Protective Custody because Officer Gary Olson,

threatened [him].” Id. at 10. Plaintiff claims the committee

members did not report his allegations and he was not placed in

protective management. Id. Plaintiff sent another “formal

complaint” to the Governor’s office in March 2015. Id. at 11.

Plaintiff does not indicate the basis of his complaint, but he

asserts the Governor’s office responded stating his complaint

would be investigated by the office of the Inspector General. Id.

Plaintiff concedes he thereafter had a medical examination, though

he complains the investigators, Defendants Donaldson and Smith,

did not interview him.7 Id.

Plaintiff’s reports of fear to the Governor’s office and to

officials at FSP constitute vague, generalized, unsubstantiated

claims of past harm. Plaintiff does not allege he reported specific

facts permitting the inference he faced a substantial threat of

serious harm in the future. See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617 (“[T]he

question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials,

7 Plaintiff alleges the medical examination was useless

because he “had been assaulted years before.” SAC at 11.

acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a

sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future

health.’”). See also Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349; McBride, 170 F.

App’x at 655.8 To the extent Plaintiff reported to officials that

he feared future harm based on the past incidents involving

Defendant Olson or others, his complaints were speculative.

Moreover, assuming Plaintiff reported Defendant Olson’s

alleged retaliatory conduct (verbal abuse and falsified

disciplinary reports), this conduct cannot fairly can be

characterized as abuse under Eighth Amendment standards. See,

e.g., Hernandez, 281 F. App’x at 866 (“[V]erbal abuse alone is

insufficient to state a constitutional claim.”); Wagner v. Smith,

No. 5:06CV11 MCR/EMT, 2006 WL 2482782, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25,

2006) (“[T]he filing of false disciplinary charges against an

inmate does not alone amount to a constitutional violation.”).

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff suggests any Defendant failed to

8 Plaintiff’s suggestion that a failure to investigate his

complaints amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation similarly

fails. As alleged, Plaintiff did not report a specific or

particularized threat of harm. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. See

also Reynolds v. Henry, 69 F.3d 548 (10th Cir. 1995) (Table) (“A

conclusory allegation of a failure to investigate without other

non-conclusory allegations relating to the defendant’s state of

mind and the defendant’s knowledge of dangerous circumstances does

not constitute a cognizable claim for violations of Eighth

Amendment rights.”).

protect him from Defendant Olson’s “abuse,” he does not state a

plausible claim for relief under § 1983.

Plaintiff also fails to allege facts permitting the inference

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his reports of fear.

Plaintiff says the Governor’s office referred his 2014 complaint

to the Inspector General’s office, and his 2015 complaint resulted

in an investigation. See SAC at 6, 11. That Plaintiff was

unsatisfied with the response from the Governor’s office or the

investigation does not mean Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Plaintiff’s allegations also show the disciplinary hearing

committee members were not deliberately indifferent to his request

to be placed in protective management in March 2015. Plaintiff

alleges he was adjudicated guilty of the disciplinary charges and

sent to disciplinary confinement for sixty days. As Plaintiff was

no longer housed under Defendant Olson’s custody, there was no

need to send him to protective management.9

In August 2015, Plaintiff appeared before the disciplinary

hearing committee again. Id. at 13. Plaintiff provides copies of

9 Plaintiff alleges that when he was released from

disciplinary confinement in May 2015, he was “move[d] back to”

Defendant Olson’s dorm. SAC at 11. Plaintiff does not allege

Defendant Olson physically harmed him after he was sent back to

Olson’s dorm. Id. The only alleged retaliatory conduct Defendant

Olson directed toward Plaintiff after May 2015, was writing

additional disciplinary reports.

his disciplinary reports, which show he voiced complaints about

Defendant Olson, and his complaints were not ignored (Docs. 11-1,

11-2, 11-3, 11-4; Pl. Exs. A through D). For instance, on August

5, 2015, the disciplinary hearing report notes, “[Plaintiff]

stated the DR is false and that he needed protection from the

reporting officer [Gary Olson]. He was advised his allegations

would be reported.” See Pl. Ex. C at 3. On August 6, 2015, Plaintiff

“repeated his written allegations that the reporting officer was

harassing him and stated he needed protection.” See Pl. Ex. D at

3. The hearing committee advised Plaintiff “his allegations would

be reported.” Id.

As to Plaintiff’s contention that his placement on strip

status was inhumane, the Eleventh Circuit has held the conditions

of which Plaintiff complains are not cruel and unusual. See

Woodson, 673 F. App’x at 932; O’Connor, 644 F. App’x at 932.

Plaintiff does not allege facts permitting the inference he endured

conditions “so extreme as to violate contemporary standards of

decency.” See Alfred v. Bryant, 378 F. App’x 977, 980 (11th Cir.

2010) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff

lived in a prison cell for eighteen days with no mattress and a

malfunctioning toilet).

For the above reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible

Eighth Amendment claim against any of the named Defendants.

C. Fourteenth Amendment

The remainder of Plaintiff’s allegations, liberally

construed, speak to alleged due process violations. Plaintiff

asserts he was adjudicated guilty of disciplinary charges “without

being given the procedural due process guaranteed by the Department

Rules and Regulations”; and some Defendants failed to “correct .

. . constitutional abuses” by denying grievances and appeals of

his disciplinary charges, refusing to properly investigate his

complaints of fear, and failing to follow protocol when he declared

psychological emergencies.10 See SAC at 10, 13, 14, 16, 18.

Plaintiff does not explain how he was denied due process or

what rules and regulations Defendants allegedly violated. However,

the copies of the disciplinary reports Plaintiff filed offer some

insight. See Pl. Exs. A-D. Plaintiff disputes four disciplinary

reports, two of which were overturned after he appealed the

decisions for alleged due process violations (insufficient

investigation, improper evidence, and failure to consider his

evidence). See Pl. Ex. C at 4; Pl. Ex. D at 4.11 Even though two

10 In counts four, five, and six, Plaintiff alleges the

following Defendants denied him due process or did not follow

administrative rules related to his disciplinary charges:

Donaldson, Palmer, Edwards, McClellan, Smith, Gay, Jackson, Perry,

Woodcocok, Lemire, Hardin, Nichols, Anders, Coleman, Roberts, and

Finch. See SAC at 18-19.

11 The responding official informed Plaintiff his charges had

been overturned in both instances because “the disciplinary report

charges were overturned, Plaintiff alleges he served an additional

thirty-five days in disciplinary confinement. See SAC at 13-14;

Pl. Ex. C at 4-5; Pl. Ex D at 4-5. Plaintiff was found guilty of

the other two charges. Plaintiff provides no evidence he

successfully appealed those charges, nor does he allege how he was

denied due process at the respective disciplinary hearings. See

Pl. Ex A at 3; Pl. Ex. B at 3.

The Supreme Court has held the imposition of disciplinary

confinement does not trigger due process protections. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (“[D]iscipline in segregated

confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant

deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty

interest.”). See also Woodson, 673 F. App’x at 933 (“The Due

Process Clause does not create an enforceable liberty interest in

freedom from restrictive confinement while a prisoner is

incarcerated.”). Thus, even if Plaintiff spent more time in

disciplinary confinement than he should have, he does not allege

a protected liberty interest to which due process protections

attach.

Notably, Plaintiff does not allege the disciplinary charges

affected the duration of his sentence. For instance, he does not

allege a loss of good time credits, nor do the disciplinary reports

was made on technical errors made in the processing of the same.”

See Pl. Ex. C at 4; Pl. Ex. D at 4.

reflect such a sanction was imposed. See Pl. Ex A at 3; Pl. Ex. B

at 3; Pl. Ex. C at 3; Pl. Ex D at 3. And Plaintiff asserts no facts

indicating he was subjected to conditions so severe that they

imposed upon him a significant hardship in comparison to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, fail to

demonstrate a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,

and his due process claims are due to be dismissed. See Smith v.

Deemer, 641 F. App’x 865, 867, 868 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding the

district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s due process claim

because the disciplinary hearing did not result in a loss of good

time credits and plaintiff did not allege his term of disciplinary

confinement exposed him to atypical and significant hardship even

though the conditions in disciplinary confinement were more

restrictive and less comfortable than those in general

confinement).

With respect to those Defendants Plaintiff asserts did not

correct alleged constitutional violations as grievance responders,

he does not state a viable claim under § 1983. He alleges no

underlying constitutional violation and, regardless, “[a]n inmate

has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in access to

[the grievance] procedure.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1178 (finding the

district court did not “abuse[] its discretion in dismissing [the

plaintiff’s] claim that the prison’s grievance procedures were

inadequate”); See also Charriez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 596

F. App’x 890, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding the district court

properly found the plaintiff failed to state a claim where he

alleged the defendants did not “take corrective action” in response

to his grievance appeal); Mathews v. Moss, 506 F. App’x 981, 984

(11th Cir. 2013) (holding the plaintiff failed to state a plausible

claim because he merely “alleged that his prison grievances were

either ignored or wrongly decided or that prison officials did not

properly follow the prison’s own grievance procedures”).

D. Supervisory Liability

Given Plaintiff’s vague, conclusory, and confusing

allegations and claims, his theory of liability as to some

Defendants is not readily apparent. To the extent Plaintiff seeks

to hold some Defendants liable simply because they are supervisors

of those Plaintiff believes violated his rights, his claim fails

because he does not allege an underlying constitutional violation.

See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009)

(holding the plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim failed

“because the underlying § 1983 claims fail[ed]”) (citing Hicks v.

Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009)). Moreover, an

individual cannot be held liable under § 1983 based on that

person’s supervisory position alone. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326

F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) (“It is well established in this Circuit that

supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”).

IV. Conclusion

Under a liberal review of Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint and accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff

fails to allege the denial of a constitutional right. Thus, he

does not state a claim for relief under § 1983. Because Plaintiff

fails to state a plausible federal claim, the Court declines to

determine whether any purported state-law claim may be viable.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint will be dismissed in its

entirety without prejudice subject to Plaintiff’s right to pursue

any viable, available claims in state court.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. 11) is

DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the

file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 21st day of

April, 2020.

4 ¢ De

af J. DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

Cc:

Shaw V. Coleman

22