The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex
rel. and ANDREA SCHULTZ,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No: 2:17-cv-237-FtM-29MRM
NAPLES HEART RHYTHM
SPECIALISTS, P.A. and
KENNETH PLUNKITT, Doctor,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #32) filed on July 29, 2019. Plaintiff
filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #34) on August 11, 2019. For
the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
I.
This case arises out of an alleged years-long scheme to
defraud the government healthcare programs Medicare and Medicaid.
Relator Andrea Schultz (Relator) filed a qui tam Complaint (Doc.
#1) on May 4, 2017. The Government declined to intervene in this
case on January 1, 2019 (Doc. #2), and Relator filed an Amended
Complaint (Doc. #21) on July 3, 2019. The Amended Complaint
asserts claims against defendants Naples Heart Rhythm Specialists,
P.A. (NHRS) and Dr. Kenneth Plunkitt (Dr. Plunkitt) under the False
Claims Act and the Florida False Claims Act.
According to the Amended Complaint (Doc. #21): Relator is a
registered nurse (RN) and is employed by Naples HMA, LLC (HMA).1
(Doc. #21, ¶ 8.) Dr. Plunkitt is a physician who is “Board
Certified in internal medicine-cardiovascular disease and internal
medicine-clinical cardiac electrophysiology.” (Id. ¶ 10.) As
part of her HMA employment, Relator works in the cardiac
catheterization lab at Physicians Regional Medical Center (PRMC),
where she “has regularly worked alongside” Dr. Plunkitt. (Id. ¶
8.)
Since the beginning of her time working at PRMC, Relator
witnessed Dr. Plunkitt submit “false claims to Medicare and
Medicaid for [] unnecessary and dangerous lead extractions and
pocket revisions performed by [Dr. Plunkitt] for pecuniary gain
and not medical necessity.” (Id. ¶ 25.) A lead is a “special
wire that delivers energy from a pacemaker or [implantable
cardioverter-defibrillator] to the heart muscle.” (Id. ¶ 28.)
Unnecessary lead extractions can be dangerous because leads “that
have been in place for many years can become very attached to the
heart and blood vessel walls, making them difficult to remove.”
1 HMA was named as a defendant in the initial qui tam
Complaint, but was voluntarily dismissed by Relator on May 31,
2019. (Doc. #15).
(Id. ¶ 32.) According to the “Chief Medical Consultant for the
California Correctional Health Care Services Office of Legal
Affairs . . . the extraction of defibrillator leads is not
routinely performed in the absence of an infection, particularly
when . . . the leads have been in place for an extended period.”
(Id. ¶ 36.)
Dr. Plunkitt has performed “lead extractions on the
overwhelming number of patients where [Relator] worked alongside
him regardless of whether there was an infection or not.” (Id. ¶
37.) In working alongside Dr. Plunkitt during such procedures,
Relator witnessed “many patients’ cardiac tissue ripped out of
their pericardium in large chunks.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
Dr. Plunkitt performed lead extractions on patients RB, CL,
IG, TP, and DO (collectively, the Representative Patients). (Id.
¶ 38.) These lead extractions were medically unnecessary because
Relator “saw firsthand that there was no infection or other adverse
symptom being caused by the implanted leads, and there was nothing
documented by [Dr. Plunkitt] in the patient charts” indicating the
need for lead extractions. (Id. ¶ 40.) When Dr. Plunkitt
performed lead extractions on the Representative Patients, he
pulled the leads out “with a great deal of force” because the leads
were “anchored into the [P]atients’ heart tissue.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
As part of her employment, Relator had access to Dr.
Plunkitt’s patient records and NHRS’ billing forms. (Id. ¶ 46.)
Relator observed Dr. Plunkitt fill out billing forms for the
Representative Patients’ “unnecessary lead removals.” (Id.)
Relator observed that the NHRS biller picked up the completed
billing forms, and Relator overheard that she “was instructed to
bill those [] codes.” (Id.) Relator also observed that the
Representative Patients’ “unnecessary lead extractions were
included in the PRMC procedure notes, which means that they were
automatically billed for by NHRS.” (Id.) Relator observed Dr.
Plunkitt engage in such billing for medically unnecessary lead
extractions for “hundreds more” patients. (Id.) In performing
some unnecessary lead extractions that resulted in a patient’s
cardiac tissue being ripped out, Dr. Plunkitt “would quickly remove
the heart tissue from [the] coil before [Relator] was able to
capture a photograph of the patients’ cardiac tissue having been
ripped from the patients’ beating heart.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
Relator also witnessed Dr. Plunkitt engage in the medically
unnecessary “implantation of defibrillators and pacemakers.” (Id.
¶ 53.) Relator observed that Dr. Plunkitt “frequently begins to
implant a defibrillator and then performs his own study in an
attempt to justify the implantation of the defibrillator after the
fact and justify the billing.” (Id. ¶ 57)(emphasis in original.)
Dr. Plunkitt “collected reimbursement on thousands of claims to
Medicare and Medicaid for the medically unnecessary
implantations.” (Id. ¶ 66.)
II.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate
factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,” Mamani v.
Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations that are merely consistent
with a defendant’s liability fall short of being facially
plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th
Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-
step approach: “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679.
To survive dismissal in a False Claims Act action, a complaint
must comply with Rule 9(b), which provides that “a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b); United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am.,
290 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). The complaint “must allege
the details of the defendants [sic] allegedly fraudulent acts,
when they occurred, and who engaged in them.” Id. (quotation and
citations omitted).
III.
Any person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented,
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or who
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim” is
liable under the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B).
The False Claims Act “is the primary law on which the federal
government relies to recover losses caused by fraud . . . [and]
creates civil liability for making a false claim for payment by
the government.” McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haleyville Med.
Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005). The Act’s
purpose is “to increase private citizen involvement in exposing
fraud against the government . . . .” Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 565 (11th Cir. 1994). “Private
citizens, called qui tam relators, are authorized to bring FCA
suits on behalf of the United States.” United States v. AseraCare,
Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2019)(citing 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)). For her services, a relator is entitled to a substantial
percentage of the recovery. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). “In the
healthcare context, a False Claims Act violation typically
involves billing for services not provided or not medically
necessary.” United States v. HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x.
783, 788 (11th Cir. 2018)(citing United States ex rel. Sanchez v.
Lymphatx, Inc., 596 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam);
Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1303).
The Florida False Claims Act likewise “authorizes a private
person or the State [of Florida] to initiate a civil action against
a person or company who knowingly presents a false claim to the
State for payment.” Barati v. State, 198 So. 3d 69, 72 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2016). The Florida False Claims Act “mirrors the federal False
Claims Act and is subject to the same pleading standard” noted
infra. United States v. All Children's Health Sys., Inc., No.
8:11-CV-1687-T-27EAJ, 2013 WL 1651811, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16,
2013).
A. Count I: § 3729(a)(1)(A) Claim
Count I asserts a claim against Dr. Plunkitt under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) of the False Claims Act. In essence, Relator
asserts that Dr. Plunkitt presented claims for payment to Medicare
and Medicaid which were false because a portion of his services
was not medically necessary.
Section 3729(a)(1)(A) applies to “any person who-- (A)
knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval . . . .” 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(A). With respect to information, the term “knowingly”
“(A) mean[s] that a person . . . (i) has actual knowledge of the
information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or
falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity of the information; and (B) require[s] no
proof of specific intent to defraud . . . .” 31 U.S.C. §
3729(b)(1)(A)-(B). The term “claim” “(A) means any request or
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or
property . . . that (i) is presented to an officer, employee, or
agent of the United States . . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A).
Dr. Plunkitt argues he is entitled to dismissal of Count I
because (1) Relator’s assertion that Dr. Plunkitt performed
medically unnecessary procedures is premised on “unqualified and
unsupported opinions;” and (2) Relator failed to plead this claim
with particularity, as required by Rule 9(b). (Doc. #32, pp. 11-
12.) The Court finds that neither is a basis for dismissal.
(1) Allegedly Unqualified Expert Opinions
In the Amended Complaint, Relator asserts that “rarely is it
truly medically necessary to perform a lead extraction unless the
lead has caused an infection,” and the “infection rate is just 1-
3%.” (Doc. #21, ¶ 36.) Relator further asserts that unnecessary
lead extractions are dangerous when a patient’s lead has “been in
place for an extended period” because removal may “put a patient
at greater risk of an adverse health event.” (Id.) Relator relies
on “Chief Medical Consultant for the California Correctional
Health Care Services Office of Legal Affairs, Dr. Bennett Feinberg”
as support for these assertions. (Id.) As to the Representative
Patients, Relator alleges the lead extractions were medically
unnecessary because she observed (1) there was no infection; (2)
there were no “other adverse symptom[s] being caused by the
implanted leads”; and (3) their medical charts did not indicate
any need to perform such lead extractions. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Dr. Plunkitt first argues that the Court should disregard
these alleged facts because under Fla. Stat. § 766.102(5)(a)-(b)
Relator and Dr. Feinberg are “not permitted to offer expert
opinions about the standard of care applicable to Dr. Plunkitt.”
(Doc. #32, p. 11.) This argument is misplaced. Section
766.102(5)(a)-(b) of the Florida Statutes govern who may provide
expert opinion testimony in a state-law medical malpractice
lawsuit. The present case is not a medical malpractice case. The
Court is aware of no legal basis – and Dr. Plunkitt cites to none
- to apply Fla. Stat. § 766.102 to the review of a federal False
Claims Act complaint. The Court therefore denies this portion
of Dr. Plunkitt’s motion to dismiss.
Citing to various medical journal articles, Dr. Plunkitt also
disputes Relator’s assertions as to the lead infection rate and
other medical definitions. In disputing these allegations and
relying on his own medical sources, Dr. Plunkitt argues he is
entitled to dismissal because “the entire premise” of Relator’s
medical claims is wrong. (Doc. #32, p. 13.) At this stage of the
proceedings, however, the Court may not resolve the parties’
disputes as to the underlying medical literature. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”).
Even if the Court were to reject Relator’s assertion that the
lead infection rate is 1-3% and adopt Dr. Plunkitt’s contention
that the rate is “as high as 7%,” that would not negate the bases
of relator’s allegations that Dr. Plunkitt performed medically
unnecessary lead extractions. As noted infra, Relator alleges
that Dr. Plunkitt’s lead extractions were medically unnecessary
because (1) there was no infection present (which is the primary
reason lead extractions are conducted), (2) the leads were not
causing any adverse symptoms, and (3) the medical charts provided
no reason for performing such extractions. The Court therefore
denies this portion of Dr. Plunkitt’s motion to dismiss.
(2) Whether Relator Pled Count I with Particularity
As the text of § 3729(a)(1)(A) makes clear,
[t]he submission of a false claim is “the sine
qua non of a False Claims Act violation.”
Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1311. “Because it is the
submission of a fraudulent claim that gives
rise to liability under the False Claims Act,
that submission must be pleaded with
particularity and not inferred from the
circumstances.” Corsello, 428 F.3d at 1013.
Therefore, unless a relator alleges with
particularity that false claims were actually
submitted to the government, our precedent
holds that dismissal is proper.
United States v. HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x. 783, 789 (11th
Cir. 2018).
To plead a Section 3729(a)(1)(A) claim with sufficient
particularity, a complaint must “allege the ‘who,’ ‘what,’
‘where,’ ‘when,’ and ‘how’ of fraudulent submissions to the
government.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th
Cir. 2005). A relator may not “merely [] describe a private scheme
in detail but then [] allege simply and without any stated reason
for h[er] belief that claims requesting illegal payments must have
been submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted
to the Government.” Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1311. Thus, a complaint
must contain “some indicia of reliability . . . to support the
allegation of an actual false claim for payment being made to the
Government.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Dr. Plunkitt argues that Relator has failed to “allege
reliable, detailed information to identify a single false or
fraudulent claim that Dr. Plunkitt submitted.” (Doc. #32, p. 16.)
The Court disagrees.
In the Amended Complaint, Relator alleges that she observed
Dr. Plunkitt perform unnecessary lead extractions and “personally
add[]” billing codes for such procedures on the Representative
Patients’ billing forms. (Doc. #21, ¶ 46.) The Amended Complaint
includes the dates Dr. Plunkitt performed the allegedly
unnecessary procedures on the Representative Patients, and the
Amended Complaint has attached photographs of medical equipment
used on the Representative Patients; in those photographs, the bag
containing such medical equipment includes the date of the
Representative Patients’ admittance and their redacted names and
dates of birth. The Amended Complaint also alleges Relator
observed that (1) such forms were given to NHRS’ biller, who
Relator overheard “was instructed to bill those [] codes” and (2)
the “unnecessary lead extractions were included in the PRMC
procedure notes, which means that they were automatically billed
for.” (Id.)
The Court finds such factual allegations, coupled with the
Amended Complaint’s attachments, provide the “the necessary
indicia of reliability that a false claim was actually submitted”
and thus satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. United
States ex rel. Mastej v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 591 F. App'x
693, 704 (11th Cir. 2014). Although Relator has not provided
specific details for each allegedly unnecessary medical procedure
(Relator alleges Dr. Plunkit performed hundreds of unnecessary
lead extractions and defibrillator and pacemaker implantations),
Dr. Plunkitt is not entitled to dismissal because the Amended
Complaint contains “some of [the required] information for at least
some of the claims.” Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312 n.21.
Although Dr. Plunkitt asserts that Relator does not work “in
a position that gave her access to billing documents” and has no
“personal knowledge of or involvement in Dr. Plunkitt’s billing,”
the Amended Complaint alleges otherwise. (Doc. #32, p. 16.) The
Amended Complaint explicitly asserts that Relator “had access to
each patients’ medical records and NHRS’ billing form,” and Relator
has attached a billing form to the Amended Complaint. (Doc. #21,
¶ 46); (Doc. #21-6.) The Court thus accepts such well-pleaded
facts as true and will not resolve disputed issues of fact at this
stage of the proceedings. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity.”). The allegations in the Amended Complaint, unlike in
the cases relied upon by Dr. Plunkitt, United States ex rel. Atkins
v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2006), United States
v. LifePath Hospice, Inc., No. 8:10-CV-1061-T-30TGW, 2016 WL
5239863, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2016), are sufficient under
Rule 9(b). Unlike those cases, the instant pleading does not
merely contain conclusory allegations that Dr. Plunkitt submitted
false claims to the government. Instead, the Amended Complaint
alleges that Relator observed Dr. Plunkitt personally add billing
codes for the allegedly unnecessary lead extractions, that she
overheard the NHRS biller “was instructed to bill those CPT codes,”
and that she observed that the extractions “were included in the
PRMC procedure notes, which means that they were automatically
billed for by NHRS.” (Doc. #21, ¶ 46.) Collectively, these
alleged first-hand observations – which were not present in
LifePath and Atkins - provide the required indicia of reliability
to support Relator’s assertion that Dr. Plunkitt actually
submitted false claims to the government.
Courts have found similar allegations sufficient to satisfy
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. In United States v. R&F
Properties of Lake Cty., Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1360 (11th Cir.
2005), a nurse practitioner alleged a medical facility submitted
false medical claims to the government. Although she had no
personal involvement in billing and her belief was based upon a
“personal discussion with [the facility’s] office administrator”
who had knowledge about the billing practices, the court found
such “allegations [were] sufficient to explain why [she] believed
[the facility] submitted false or fraudulent claims.” Id. at 1360.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Med.
Care Holdings, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1269 (N.D. Ga. 2012),
the relator worked for a dialysis service provider and managed the
facility’s inventory of two drugs. Based upon his observations of
the inventory, the relator believed the facility submitted
“fraudulent reimbursement claims” by “bill[ing] the government for
doses of [drugs] that it received for free.” Id. Although the
relator did not work in the billing department, the court found
the relator satisfied Rule 9(b) because his belief was based upon
his observation of the facility’s inventory documents and a
conversation with “his clinical manager inform[ing] him that those
documents were used as the basis upon which [the facility] billed
for reimbursement.” Id. at 1277.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Relator has alleged
a Section 3729(a)(1)(A) claim with particularity under Rule 9(b).
Dr. Plunkitt’s motion is thus denied as to Count I.
B. Count II: § 3729(a)(1)(B) Claim
Count II asserts a claim against Dr. Plunkitt under §
3729(a)(1)(B) of the False Claims Act. Section 3729(a)(1)(B)
imposes liability on any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to
a false or fraudulent claim . . . .” Dr. Plunkitt argues the
elements of a claim under Section 3729(a)(1)(B) include that the
government pay out money or forfeit moneys due. (Doc. #32, p.
20)(citing United States ex rel. Bernier v. Infilaw Corp., 347 F.
Supp. 3d 1075, 1085 (M.D. Fla. 2018)). Dr. Plunkitt moves to
dismiss this claim, arguing Relator failed to allege that “the
government ever paid [] a [fraudulent] claim.” (Doc. #32, p. 20.)
In Bernier, the court cited a prior version of the False
Claims Act, which was previously codified at 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(2). That version of the Act imposed liability on any
person who “knowingly ma[de], use[d], or cause[d] to be made or
used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent
claim paid or approved by the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)
(2006). To plead a claim under that version of the Act, a complaint
had to allege that a false statement actually “caus[ed] [] the
government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due.” Urquilla-Diaz
v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2015).
“On May 20, 2009, Congress enacted the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009 (‘FERA’), Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617
(2009), which amended the FCA and re-designated 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1) as 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)
as 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B).” United States ex rel. Phalp v.
Lincare Holdings, Inc., 857 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2017).2
This current version of the False Claims Act imposes liability on
any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). Because Congress has omitted
the statutory language that a false statement must actually cause
the government “to pay out money,” the previous pleading standard
is no longer applicable under the current version of the False
Claims Act. See United States ex rel Patel v. GE Healthcare,
Inc., No. 8:14-CV-120-T-33TGW, 2017 WL 4310263, at *8 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 28, 2017)(“[T]he Court is not persuaded that the requirements
under § 3729(a)(2) are applicable to the . . . claims brought under
§ 3729(a)(1)(B).”).
2 This iteration of the False Claims Act applies to Relator’s
claims, as she asserts Dr. Plunkitt’s allegedly violative conduct
occurred after the 2009 amendment.
To state a claim under Section 3729(a)(1)(B) – the
applicable version of the False Claims Act - a complaint must
allege that “(1) the defendant made (or caused to be made) a false
statement, (2) the defendant knew it to be false, and (3) the
statement was material to a false claim.” Lincare Holdings, Inc.,
857 F.3d at 1154. A false statement is “material” if it has “a
natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the
payment or receipt of money or property.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4).
Since government payment is not an element of a claim under Section
3729(a)(1)(B), Dr. Plunkitt’s motion to dismiss Count II is
denied.3
C. Count III: Fla. Stat. § 68.082 Claim
Count III asserts a claim against Dr. Plunkitt under Fla.
Stat. § 68.082(a)-(b) of the Florida False Claims Act. These
provisions of the Florida False Claims Act impose liability on any
person who:
3 Dr. Plunkitt also argues he is entitled to dismissal of
Count II because “the opinions on which she bases her claim are
wrong.” (Doc. #32, p. 21). As noted supra, however, the Court
may not resolve disputed issues of fact at this stage of the
proceedings. Additionally, Dr. Plunkitt appears to argue that
Relator has failed to plausibly allege Dr. Plunkitt knowingly made
a false representation. As noted earlier, however, the Court finds
Relator has plausibly alleged that Dr. Plunkitt submitted false
claims for reimbursement to the government. Moreover, Relator’s
general assertion that Dr. Plunkitt knowingly submitted such false
claims is sufficient at this stage of the proceedings. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b) (“[K]nowledge, and other conditions of a person's
mind may be alleged generally.”).
(a) Knowingly presents or causes to be presented a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or]
(bo) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used
a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim.
Fla. Stat. § 68.082(a)-(b).
Dr. Plunkitt agrees that these sections of the Florida False
Claims Act mirror their federal counterparts and are subject to
the same Rule 9(b) pleading standards. Dr. Plunkitt argues he is
entitled to dismissal of Count III for the same reasons noted in
Counts I and II. Because the Court has rejected those arguments,
the Court also denies Dr. Plunkitt’s motion as to Count III.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED :
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #32) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 13th day of
April, 2020.
\ £,. = AA
E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Parties of record