Vega v. Sawyer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JUAN FRANCISCO VEGA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:18-cv-723-FtM-29NPM

DONALD SAWYER, Florida Civil

Commitment Center

Administrator,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Sawyer's

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #17). Plaintiff

filed a response to the Motion (Doc. #18). The Court denies

Sawyer’s Motion.

I. Background and Factual Allegations

Plaintiff Juan Francisco Vega, who is civilly confined in the

Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”), filed a civil right

complaint alleging a violation of his federal constitutional and

state statutory rights to marry. (Doc. #1). Vega appends to his

Complaint the State of Florida’s Response to Vega’s Petition for

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (Doc. 1 at

6-10). Vega also attaches these exhibits to his Complaint: FCCC

Resident Grievance dated February 4, 2017 (Doc. #1-1); print out

of email chain from Highland County Clerk of Court regarding Vega-

Martinez Marriage Request dated August 18, 2017 (Doc. #1-2); Letter

form Clerk of Court, Highlands County dated March 9, 2017 (Doc.

#1-3); Highland County Clerk of Court letterhead titled

“Incarcerated Marriages” (Doc. #1-4); and Florida Attorney General

Advisory Legal Opinion- AGO 78-07, dated January 10, 1978, with

subject line “Impediment to marriage license” (Doc. #1-5).

According to the Complaint and attachments, Vega and his

fiancée, Mary Martinez, applied for a marriage license with the

Highlands County Clerk of Court on February 3, 2017. The clerk

advised the couple that a marriage license could not be issued

because Vega’s civil commitment was an impediment to marriage and

Highland County policy required the approval of the FCCC

administrator for the County to issue a marriage license. (Id.

at 3). Plaintiff requested approval from Defendant Sawyer, the

FCCC Administrator, to marry but Sawyer refused to either approve

or disapprove of the marriage. (Id. at 4, Doc. #1-1). Instead,

Sawyer took no position. (Id.). Vega states Sawyer approved the

marriage applications of other residents and claims he is the

“target of discrimination” by Sawyer. (Id. at 5). Vega seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive

damages. (Id.).

Defendant Sawyer seeks dismissal of the Complaint on the basis

that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the Complaint

otherwise fails to state claim. (Doc. #17, ¶ 5).1 Sawyer argues

that Vega’s Complaint is premised only on state law and/or a county

ordinance or procedure and alleges no basis for federal

jurisdiction. (Id. at 4-5). Sawyer claims that because Vega has

failed to cite to any federal authority to support his federal

right to marriage, his Complaint fails to state a federal claim.

(Id. at 5). Sawyer further requests that Vega’s claim for punitive

damages be stricken because Vega has not alleged the requisite

intent behind Sawyer’s conduct or that Sawyer acted knowing that

he was violating a constitutional right. (Id. at 6-7).

II. Motion to Dismiss and Standard of Review

Defendant seeks dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)(1)

and 12(b)(6). See generally Doc. #17. A motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(1) can be asserted under either facial or factual

grounds. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., 572

F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). A facial attack to the court’s

jurisdiction requires the court to determine whether plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction,

accepting the allegations as true. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d

1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Factual attacks challenge the

1 In a careless “cut and paste” of the legal standard portion

of his Motion, Sawyer states Vega’s § 1983 claim is predicated

“upon allegedly deficient medical care he received while

incarcerated.” Doc.#17 at 3. Nowhere does Vega allege he was

denied medical care. See generally Doc. #1.

existence of subject matter jurisdiction despite the complaint,

and permit the court to consider matters outside the pleadings.

Id. Here, Sawyer makes a facial challenge to the Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the

sufficiency of the claim set out in the plaintiff’s complaint.

Harris v. Procter & Gamble Cellulose Co., 73 F. 3d 321, 324 (11th

Cir. 1996). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept

all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bell Atlantic v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A complaint must give the

defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds on which it rests to satisfy the pleading requirements of

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Id. at 555. In addition, the plaintiff’s

claim must be plausible to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss. Id. at 556. The court must be able to draw a reasonable

inference from the complaint that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While

the facts need not be detailed, they must “raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” for the

plaintiff’s claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Labels,

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action are not enough to meet the plausibility standard. Id.

at 555. Dismissal is warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if

the alleged claim is not supported by enough factual allegations

to raise a reasonable expectation of relief. Id.

III. Analysis

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

plaintiff first must allege a violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or under the laws of the United States; and, second

allege that the deprivation was committed or caused by a person

actin under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir.

1998). “[C]omplaints in § 1983 cases must . . . contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal

theory.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further,

plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the defendant’s

conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Swint v. City

of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 999 (11th Cir. 1995). Because

Plaintiff is pro se, the Court must liberally construe the amended

complaint. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263

(11th Cir. 1998)(per curiam).

The decision to marry is a fundamental right. Zablocki v.

Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). A unanimous Supreme Court held

marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the

orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Loving v. Virginia,

388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S.

___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015)(recognizing that it is the “right

to marry in its comprehensive sense” that is the protected right

and thus there must be “sufficient justification for excluding the

relevant class from the right.”). Thus, the Court finds it has

subject matter jurisdiction over Vega’s claim under § 1983 and

denies Sawyer’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).

The Court likewise denies Sawyer’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court held that a Missouri regulation

that prohibited inmates from marrying infringed on the inmates'

fundamental right to marry. 482 U.S. 78, 94–99 (1987)(applying a

reasonable relationship test to restriction to marriage for

inmates). Vega is not a prisoner as he has served his prison

sentence. Vega instead is civilly committed because the State has

determined that he is a “sexually violent predator” and is likely

to engage in “acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure

facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.” Fla. Stat.

§§ 394.912(10)(b); 394.915. Despite his non-prisoner status,

Vega’s civil commitment unquestionably subjects him to

restrictions. See Pesci v. Budz (Pesci 1), 730 F.3d 1291, 1295-

97 (11th Cir. 2013)(discussing modified Turner standard to be

applied in assessing regulations to which civil detainees at FCCC

are subjected). Contrary to Sawyer’s assertion, Vega is not

challenging the Highland County policy that requires him to obtain

an official’s approval before obtaining a marriage license. Vega

is challenging Sawyer’s refusal to either approve or deny his

request for permission to marry Martinez; and, correspondingly the

basis, if any for refusing to approve or deny his request.

Sawyer’s refusal to permit or deny Vega’s request to marry without

reason or justification is tantamount to a blanket prohibition on

Vega’s right to marry and violates Turner. Thus, the Court finds

Vega’s Complaint plausibly alleges sufficient facts to survive

Sawyer’s Motion to Dismiss.

Punitive damages are available “where a defendant's conduct

is motivated by evil intent or involves callous or reckless

indifference to federally protected rights.” Barnett v.

MacArthur, 715 F. App'x 894, 904 (11th Cir. 2017). The Complaint

adequately alleges a violation of federally protected right.

Arguably, Sawyer’s refusal to respond to Vega’s request for

permission to may be construed as reckless indifference at this

stage of pleadings. Thus, the Court denies the incorporated

motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint

(Doc. #17) is DENIED in its entirety.

2. Defendant Sawyer shall file an answer to Plaintiff’s

Complaint within twenty (20) days.

3. By separate order the Court will set a discovery and

dispositive motion schedule.

DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 28th day

of February, 2020.

Z — 2, _ □

AA 9 = Pe

JGHH E. STEELE

5 IGOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies:

Counsel of Record