United States v. Brown

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4817

CHRISTOPHER ALLEN BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

William L. Osteen, District Judge.

(CR-02-176)

Submitted: March 26, 2003

Decided: April 24, 2003

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Car-

olina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney,

Paul A. Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

2 UNITED STATES v. BROWN

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Allen Brown appeals the district court’s judgment

accepting his guilty plea to a charge of being a felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)

(2000). Brown filed a motion to suppress evidence below and

reserved his right to appeal the court’s denial of that motion.

It is well-established law that before an officer may detain a per-

son, he must have a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and

articulable facts, that the person has or is about to commit a crime.

See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 ((1989); see also Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1963). The facts must be judged against an

objective standard of whether the facts available to the officer at the

moment of the seizure or search would "warrant a man of reasonable

caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate. See Soko-

low, 490 U.S. at 7.

Brown argues that the officer in question had no reasonable suspi-

cion to make the Terry stop that led to the protective pat down, which

yielded the weapon that was the basis of the underlying charge. We

review the ultimate question of reasonable suspicion to make a war-

rantless search or seizure de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517

U.S. 690, 699 (1996). For the following reasons, we find that the

Terry stop was proper.

Although Brown attempts to provide innocent explanations for

each individual event that aroused police suspicion in this case, the

circumstances must be viewed in their totality in determining whether

the requisite reasonable suspicion existed. See United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266 (2002). We find that the officer did, in fact, have rea-

sonable suspicion to make the Terry stop. The officer observed the

rental car in which Brown was a passenger make elusive movements,

reenter the area it had just left, and noted the driver and passenger

glance at him and then quickly look back at the road as if to avoid

eye contact. He also observed the driver of the car pull into a drive-

way and turn its headlights off while the occupants remained inside

for quite some time. Moreover, all of these actions occurred in a "high

UNITED STATES v. BROWN 3

crime" area late at night. Furthermore, upon approaching the parked

car, the driver immediately exited the vehicle and proceeded to the

darkened rear of the house, ignoring commands to return to the drive-

way. Brown also exited the vehicle, repeatedly fumbling around in his

right pocket, which was obscured from the officer’s view. Thus, we

find that, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the officer had

reasonable suspicion to conduct the Terry stop.

Brown also argues that reasonable suspicion did not exist to con-

duct a protective pat down for weapons. In order to justify such a pro-

tective pat down, an officer must believe that the individual is

dangerous, and this belief must be based on information sufficient to

cause a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances to believe

that either his safety or that of others is in danger. See United States

v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1996). We find that the officer’s

belief that Brown was dangerous was justified under the circum-

stances, thereby allowing him to conduct the protective pat down.

As described above, the officer knew he was dealing with an indi-

vidual who had been in a rental vehicle in a high crime area late at

night that made elusive movements, that contained occupants who

glanced at him and then quickly looked at the road ahead as if to

avoid eye contact, and that sat in a driveway with the headlights off

while the occupants remained inside for quite some time. The officer

further knew that the driver immediately exited the vehicle upon

approach, that the driver ignored repeated commands to return to the

driveway and continued to walk around the darkened rear of the

house, that Brown exited the car and repeatedly fumbled around in his

right pocket even after being told to stop and even after the officer

drew his weapon, and that Brown’s right side was concealed from

view. Finally, Brown did not respond when asked whether he pos-

sessed any weapons.

Again, although Brown attempts to assert innocent explanations for

each individual action, given the totality of the circumstances, we find

that a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness existed to conduct the

protective pat down. Thus, we conclude that reasonable suspicion

existed for both the Terry stop, as well as the resulting protective pat

down.

4 UNITED STATES v. BROWN

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-

tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED