“In opposition 16 to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the 17 burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper”
How later courts described this case
- “In opposition 16 to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the 17 burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper”
- “A district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend if it determines that ‘allegation 19 other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the 20 || deficiency.’” (citation omitted)
- “What is needed—and what is missing here—is a 21 connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”
- “there must be 23 ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CARLOTA ENCUENTRA, an individual, Case No.: 23-cv-02051-H-SBC
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Plaintiff,
13 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
v. CHURCH & DWIGHT’S MOTION
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TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC., a
15 AMEND
Delaware Corporation; AMAZON.COM
16 SERVICES LLC, a Delaware Limited
[Doc. No. 5.]
Liability Company; BRICK ADAMS
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LLC, a New Jersey Domestic Limited
18 Liability Company; and DOES 1 through
30, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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21 On November 14, 2023, Defendant Church & Dwight Co., Inc. (“Church &
22 Dwight”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Carlota Encuentra’s complaint pursuant to
23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 4.)
24 On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Church & Dwight’s
25 motion. (Doc. No. 9.) On December 6, 2023, the Court took the motion to dismiss under
26 submission. (Doc. No. 10.) On December 11, 2023, Church & Dwight filed a reply. (Doc.
27 No. 11.) For the reasons below, the Court grants Defendant Church & Dwight’s motion to
28 dismiss without leave to amend.
1 Background
2 The following factual background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s state
3 court complaint. Defendant Church & Dwight is a consumer goods company that
4 manufactures household personal care products, including body hair remover products and,
5 specifically, the “Nair Au Natural Milk & Honey roll-on wax hair remover” (“the product
6 at issue”). (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.)
7 On or about May 6, 2020, Plaintiff purchased the product at issue from Defendant
8 Amazon.com Services LLC (“Amazon”)’s website. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Defendant Brick
9 Adams was the third-party seller for the product. (Id. ¶ 13.)
10 On or about October 29, 2021, Plaintiff decided to use the product. (Id. ¶ 16.) It
11 was the second time Plaintiff had used the product, and she did not have the printed
12 instructions that were on the product’s packaging insert anymore, so she relied on her
13 memory from her prior use to prepare the product. (Id.) Plaintiff placed the product on a
14 plate and microwaved it to heat it up, but Plaintiff did not remember to take off the
15 product’s “hidden cap.” (Id.) Plaintiff heated the product in the microwave for more than
16 the 15 seconds stated on the product’s enclosed instructions. (See id. ¶¶ 12, 15-16.)
17 Plaintiff then took the product and plate out of the microwave, placed the plate on a counter,
18 and then the product exploded, causing heated wax to spray across Plaintiff’s body. (Id. ¶
19 16.) Plaintiff suffered serious and permanent bodily injuries including second degree burns
20 from the incident. (Id.)
21 Plaintiff alleges that it is a customary standard in the industry for similar products to
22 have instructions and a warning printed directly on the product itself. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff
23 asserts, therefore, that the product at issue should have had: “1) instructions stating to
24 remove the hidden cap before placing in the microwave; and 2) a warning of the dangers
25 of an explosion, printed directly on the Product.” (Id.)
26 On October 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the County
27 of San Diego against Defendants Church & Dwight, Amazon, and Brick Adams, alleging
28 claims for: (1) negligent product liability; (2) strict product liability – design and
1 manufacturing defect; and (3) strict product liability – failure to warn. (Doc. No. 1-2,
2 Compl. ¶¶ 27-64.) On November 7, 2023, Defendants removed the action from state court
3 to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28
4 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal.)
5 On November 14, 2023, Defendant Amazon filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.
6 (Doc. No. 4.) On November 28, 2023, Defendant Brick Adams filed an answer to
7 Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. No. 7.) By the present motion, Defendant Church & Dwight
8 moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
9 for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 5-1 at 3, 17.)
10 Discussion
11 I. Legal Standards for a Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss
12 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a complaint may be dismissed for
13 lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The plaintiff bears the burden of
14 establishing personal jurisdiction. Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th
15 Cir. 2014); see Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In opposition
16 to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the
17 burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper”). “When a motion to dismiss is ‘based
18 on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, “the plaintiff need only make a
19 prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.”’” Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th
20 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d
21 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004)). Under that standard, “‘uncontroverted allegations in the
22 complaint must be taken as true’” and “‘[c]onflicts between parties over statements
23 contained in affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor.’” AMA Multimedia,
24 LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at
25 800). But the “prima facie standard ‘is not toothless.’” Id. (quoting In re Boon Glob. Ltd.,
26 923 F.3d 643, 650 (9th Cir. 2019)). A court “‘may not assume the truth of allegations in a
27 pleading which are contradicted by affidavit.’” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1209 n.1
28 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Tech., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th
1 Cir. 2011)). Further, “disputed allegations in the complaint that are not supported with
2 evidence or affidavits cannot establish jurisdiction.” AMA Multimedia, 970 F.3d at 1207.
3 “Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is tested by a two-part analysis.
4 First, the exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the requirements of the applicable state long-
5 arm statute. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with federal due process.”
6 Dow Chemical Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chan v. Society
7 Expeditions, 39 F.3d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1994)); see Impossible Foods Inc. v.
8 Impossible X LLC, 80 F.4th 1079, 1086 (9th Cir. 2023). “Under California’s long-arm
9 statute, California state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction ‘on any basis not
10 inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.’ California’s long-
11 arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under
12 the U.S. Constitution.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (quoting Cal.
13 Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10). District courts in California therefore inquire whether the
14 exercise of personal jurisdiction “comports with the limits imposed by federal due
15 process.” Id.
16 “The Due Process Clause permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction if the
17 defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state ‘such that the
18 maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
19 justice.’” Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at 1086 (quoting LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l Motors,
20 Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2022)); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud.
21 Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
22 316–17 (1945)). There are two bases for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-
23 resident defendant: (1) “general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction;” and (2)
24 “specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (citing
25 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Here,
26 Plaintiff asserts that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendant Church & Dwight.
27 (See Doc. No. 9 at 2, 7-10.)
28 “Specific jurisdiction ‘covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but
1 only as to a narrower class of claims.’” Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at 1086 (quoting Ford,
2 141 S. Ct. at 1024). The Ninth Circuit has articulated “three requirements for establishing
3 specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant:”
4 “(1) the defendant must either purposefully direct his activities toward the
forum or purposefully avail himself of the privileges of conducting activities
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in the forum; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
6 defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.”
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Id. (quoting Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.
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2017)). The plaintiff bears the burden on the first two prongs. Id.; Ayla, 11 F.4th at 979.
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If they are met, the defendant then “must come forward with a ‘compelling case’ that the
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exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Ayla, 11 F.4th at 979 (quoting
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Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016).
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II. Analysis
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Here, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second requirement of the Ninth Circuit’s
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specific jurisdiction test – the “arises out of or relates to” requirement. For there to be
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specific jurisdiction, “a plaintiff’s claims must ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s
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contacts with the forum.’” Ayla, 11 F.4th 972, 983 (quoting Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026). The
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Ninth Circuit has “long understood that for an injury to arise out of a defendant’s forum
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contacts required ‘but for’ causation, in which ‘a direct nexus exists between [a
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defendant’s] contacts [with the forum state] and the cause of action.’” Yamashita v. LG
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Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 504 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas
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Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
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Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (“there must be
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‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy’”).
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In conducting this second prong of the inquiry, courts “‘consider the extent of the
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defendant’s contacts with the forum and the degree to which the plaintiff’s suit is related
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to those contacts.’” Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at 1091. “A single contact with the forum
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state may be sufficient to support jurisdiction if the action ‘arise[s] out of that particular
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1 purposeful contact of the defendant with the forum state.’” Id. “Conversely, a stronger
2 showing of purposeful contacts with the forum state ‘will permit a lesser showing’ of
3 relatedness to the litigation.” Id.
4 Defendant Church & Dwight has provided the Court with undisputed evidence
5 stating that Church & Dwight did not design, manufacture, label, or distribute the product
6 at issue in California or within the United States. (Doc. No. 5-3, Dixon Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. No.
7 12, Hetrick Decl. ¶ 7.) The product at issue was designed in France and Spain,
8 manufactured and labeled in Spain, and distributed directly from Spain to Church &
9 Dwight Canada Corp. for sale in the Canadian market. (Doc. No. 5-3, Dixon Decl. ¶ 7.)
10 Further, Church & Dwight has not sold, supplied, or otherwise distributed the product at
11 issue in California or in the United States. (Doc. No. 5-3, Dixon Decl. ¶ 6; Doc. No. 12,
12 Hetrick Decl. ¶ 8.) And Church & Dwight did not sell, supply, or otherwise distribute the
13 product at issue to either Brick Adams or Amazon. (Doc. No. 5-3, Dixon Decl. ¶ 8; Doc.
14 No. 12, Hetrick Decl. ¶ 9.) Church & Dwight has no information regarding how Brick
15 Adams or Amazon procured the product at issue before allegedly selling it to Plaintiff.
16 (Id.)
17 In an attempt to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant Church &
18 Dwight, Plaintiff relies on the following contacts: (1) a product advertisement from the
19 May 2005 issue of CosmoGirl! magazine; and (2) Church & Dwight’s sale of other sugar
20 wax products in California. (See Doc. No. 9 at 7-9.) But a review of the record shows that
21 both of these purported contacts involve different products from the product at issue that
22 is the subject of Plaintiff’s claims. The product at issue in this case and the subject of
23 Plaintiff’s claims is the “Nair Au Natural Milk & Honey roll-on wax hair remover” product.
24 (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶ 4.) The product in the 2005 issue of CosmoGirl! is a different
25 Nair wax product. (Compare Doc. No. 9-3, Castro Decl. at pp. 27-29 with id. at pp. 34-35;
26 see also Doc. No. 11 at 4-5.) Importantly, the Nair product from the 2005 ad was a “no
27 heat roll-on” wax product that was ready for use without heating. (See Doc. No. 9-3, Castro
28 Decl. at p. 29.) Because the lack of instructions and warnings on the product at issue related
1 to its heating requirements is the crux of Plaintiff’s claims in this case, the fact that the Nair
2 product from the 2005 ad did not require heating is an important distinction. As to the
3 other sugar wax products relied on by Plaintiff, Plaintiff concedes that these are different
4 products from the product at issue that is the subject of her claims. (See Doc. No. 9 at 9.)
5 Because these contacts relied on Plaintiff involve products that are different from the
6 product at issue that is the subject of her claims, the contacts do not arise out of or relate to
7 Plaintiff’s claims and cannot be used to establish specific personal jurisdiction as to
8 Defendant Church & Dwight in this action. See Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 506–07 (finding
9 contacts not related where the contacts were for products different from the product that
10 allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injury); see also Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., No. 22-15815,
11 2023 WL 8225346, at *5 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2023) (“There is no such causal relationship
12 between [defendant]’s broader California business contacts and [plaintiff]’s claims because
13 these contacts did not cause [plaintiff]’s harm.”).
14 In an effort to establish jurisdiction, Plaintiff also relies on the fact that Church &
15 Dwight has a manufacturing plant in Victorville, California. (See Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶
16 3.) But it is undisputed that the product at issue was not designed, manufactured, labeled,
17 or distributed in or through the Victorville plant. (Doc. No. 5-3, Dixon Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. No.
18 12, Hetrick Decl. ¶ 7.) As a result, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court has
19 specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant Church & Dwight. See Bristol-Myers
20 Squibb, 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017) (“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a
21 connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”).
22 III. Plaintiff’s Request for Jurisdictional Discovery
23 In her opposition, Plaintiff states that, in the alternative, she seeks leave to conduct
24 expedited and limited jurisdictional discovery in order to determine Defendant Church and
25 Dwight’s specific jurisdiction in California. (Doc. No. 9 at 10.) “Jurisdictional discovery
26 ‘should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction
27 are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.’”
28 Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 507 (quoting Laub v. U.S. Dept. of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th
1 || Cir. 2003)). “But ‘a mere hunch that discovery might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts,
2 bare allegations in the face of specific denials, are insufficient reasons for a court to
3 || grant jurisdictional discovery.’” Id. (quoting LNS, 22 F.4th at 864-65).
4 Here, Plaintiff makes a conclusory request for jurisdictional discovery at the end of
5 brief. (See Doc. No. 9 at 10.) Plaintiff does not substantiate her request for
6 || jurisdictional discovery with any affidavits or evidence or describe with any precision how
7 ||such discovery could be helpful to the Court. As such, Plaintiff's request for jurisdictional
8 discovery amounts to a “mere ‘hunch that discovery might yield jurisdictionally relevant
9 || facts.” See LNS, 22 F.4th at 865 (quoting Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020). That is
10 ||insufficient. See id. As a result, the Court denies Plaintiff's request for jurisdictional
11 || discovery.
12 Conclusion
13 For the reasons above, the Court grants Defendant Church & Dwight’s motion to
14 |} dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In addition, the Court denies Plaintiff's request
15 || for jurisdictional discovery. Because the jurisdictional deficiencies identified above cannot
16 || be cured by amendment of the complaint, the Court dismisses Defendant Church & Dwight
17 || without leave to amend. See Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir.
18 2010) (“A district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend if it determines that ‘allegation
19 other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the
20 || deficiency.’” (citation omitted)); see also Picot, 780 F.3d at 1209 n.1 (A court “‘may not
21 |/assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit.’”). The
22 action will proceed against the remaining Defendants.
23 IT IS SO ORDERED.
24 || DATED: January 2, 2024 | | | l | | |
2° MARILYNW. HUFF, Distri ge
26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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