Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MICHAEL ABATTI, et al., Case No. 22-cv-1323-MMA (KSC)

12 Plaintiffs,

ORDER AFFIRMING TENTATIVE

13 v. RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

14 IMPERIAL IRRIGATION [Doc. No. 17]

DISTRICT, et al.,

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Defendants.

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18 Plaintiff Michael Abatti is a farmer and landowner in California’s Imperial Valley

19 who, along with twenty-five other Plaintiffs, brings this civil action against Defendants

20 Imperial Irrigation District and five individual members of the Imperial Irrigation

21 District’s Board of Directors, seeking money damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory

22 judgment related to alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ asserted federal right to Colorado

23 River water. See generally Doc. No. 16 (Second Amended Complaint, the “SAC”).

24 Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC in its

25 entirety. Doc. No. 17. On September 6, 2023, the parties appeared before the Court for a

26 hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 32. In anticipation of the hearing,

27 the Court issued a tentative ruling on the pending motion. See Doc. No. 31. Upon due

28 consideration of the motion, the response and reply thereto, the applicable law, the

1 parties’ oral arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS its

2 tentative ruling. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc.

3 No. 17, in its entirety and without leave to amend.

4 I. BACKGROUND1

5 Plaintiffs Michael Abatti, The Michael and Kerri Abatti Family Trust, Mike Abatti

6 Farms, LLC, James Abatti, The Abatti Family Trust dated July 21, 2005, Madjac Farms,

7 Inc., Margaret L. Abatti, The Abatti Family Trust dated August 7, 1991, Robert Presley,

8 Dana Presley, Smoke Tree Ranches, LLC, Alex Abatti, Jr., La Valle Sabbia, Inc., The C.

9 Alex Abatti, Jr. 1996 Family Trust UDT dated February 2, 1996, Russell Bros. Ranches,

10 Inc., Nowlin Family LLC, Victor Thomson Trust, Thomson Infinity X I & Quasar Z Q

11 JT, Osborn Family Trust & Stacey L. Love Trust, Steve G Dahm Trust, Harold E. Richter

12 Revocable Trust, Richter 1991 Family Trust Exemption Trust, Roy F. Richter Family

13 Revocable Living Trust, Mary A. Jackson, Mary A. and Chrisman B. Jackson Trust dated

14 February 22, 1993, and The Todd and Jennifer Mitosinka Family Trust (collectively,

15 “Plaintiffs”), who initiated this action on September 2, 2022, are farmers, landowners,

16 and companies in the farming business that use Colorado River water for irrigation in the

17 Imperial Valley.2 SAC ¶¶ 10–28.

18 Defendant Imperial Irrigation District (the “District”) is an irrigation district, which

19 is a “public corporation governed by a board of directors and empowered to distribute

20 and otherwise administer water for the beneficial use of its inhabitants.” Id. ¶ 29. The

21 District is responsible “for the diversion, transportation, and distribution of water from

22 the Colorado River to the Imperial Valley.” Id. ¶ 44 (internal citation omitted).

23 Defendants Alex Cardenas, Javier Gonzalez, J.B. Hamby, Karin Eugenio, and Gina

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26 1 Reviewing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts as true all facts alleged in the SAC and

construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v.

27 United States, 859 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017).

2 In the interest of clarity, the Court will generally use the term “farmers” to refer to irrigating

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1 Dockstader are members of the District’s Board of Directors (together with the District,

2 “Defendants”). Id. ¶ 30.

3 Plaintiffs bring the instant suit against Defendants to “prohibit the District from

4 enforcing” its 2022 Equitable Distribution Plan (the “2022 EDP”), which is a “permanent

5 water allocation scheme” that was adopted on June 21, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8–9.

6 Previously, Plaintiffs Michael Abatti, The Michael and Kerri Abatti Family Trust,

7 and Mike Abatti Farms, LLC, filed a petition for writ of mandate in California Superior

8 Court against the District to invalidate its first EDP that was adopted in October 2013

9 (the “2013 EDP”) on the grounds that, among other things, the 2013 EDP violated the

10 Imperial Valley farmers’ alleged water rights which entitle them to receive water

11 sufficient to meet their reasonable irrigation needs. Id. ¶¶ 7, 81. The plaintiffs also

12 alleged breach of fiduciary duty and takings claims in their petition. Doc. No. 17-1 at 18.

13 Before the 2013 EDP, the District managed “Colorado River water and distribute[d]

14 water to Imperial Valley farmers, without any set plan, for decades.” SAC ¶ 79. “The

15 [2013] EDP declared that, in the event of a water shortage, water would be allocated in

16 the following order of priority: (1) Municipal Users; (2) Industrial Users; (3) Feed Lots,

17 Dairies and Fish Farms; (4) Environmental Resources Water; and, lastly, (5) Agricultural

18 Lands.” Id. ¶ 80. In addition, “all non-agricultural water users were entitled to water

19 based on their past usage, while farmers received no such guarantee.” Id. In Abatti v.

20 Imperial Irrigation Dist., Case No. ECU07980 (Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2017), the superior

21 court ruled in favor of the plaintiff farmers, finding “that the 2013 EDP prioritized other

22 groups of water users over farmers,” and “that the 2013 EDP is not equitable because it

23 disadvantages farmers, who should not be treated differently and with a lesser priority

24 than other, non-domestic, classes of water users, such that [the] District abused its

25 discretion in adopting it.” Id. ¶ 81 (internal citations omitted). However, the superior

26 court dismissed plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty and takings claims. Doc. No. 17-1 at

27 18. Following the superior court’s decision, “the District repealed the 2013 EDP in

28 February 2018.” SAC ¶ 81.

1 The District then appealed the superior court’s ruling to the California Court of

2 Appeal. Id.; see Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District, 52 Cal. App. 5th 236 (2020), as

3 modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 5, 2020), review denied (Oct. 28, 2020), cert. denied

4 (June 28, 2021) (“Abatti I”). The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part

5 the superior court’s ruling, holding, in particular, that: (1) the District was the “sole

6 owner of the appropriative water rights to Colorado River water in the Imperial Valley”;

7 (2) all users, including farmers, within the District “possess an equitable and beneficial

8 interest in the District’s water rights, which is appurtenant to their lands, and that this

9 interest consists of a right to water service”; (3) “the District retains discretion to modify

10 service consistent with its duties to manage and distribute water equitably for all

11 categories of users served by the District”; (4) “the [superior] court correctly found that

12 the District abused its discretion in the manner in which it prioritizes water users in the

13 2013 EDP” because “[i]t was not reasonable for the District to adopt a permanent, annual

14 apportionment that applies few, if any, limits on most categories of users and effectively

15 places the burden of shortages almost entirely on farmers”; however (5) “the [superior]

16 court erred to the extent that it found any other abuse of discretion on the part of the

17 District in its adoption of the 2013 EDP.” SAC ¶ 82; Doc. No. 17 at 18–19; Abatti I, 52

18 Cal. App. at 247, 251. In addition, the Court of Appeal noted that the “extent to which

19 the District balances [its water service] obligations implicates questions of discretion and

20 policy, not rights.” Doc. No. 17 at 19; Abatti I, 52 Cal. App. at 266.

21 Following the Court of Appeal’s decision, the California Supreme Court denied the

22 Abatti I plaintiffs’ petition for review on October 28, 2020, and the U.S. Supreme Court

23 denied the Abatti I plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari on June 28, 2021. Doc.

24 No. 17-1 at 19–20.

25 Plaintiffs filed their SAC on December 19, 2022. Doc. No. 16. Plaintiffs now

26 allege that the District’s 2022 EDP, which divides users into three categories of

27 “(1) Industrial/Commercial Water Users, (2) Potable Water Users, and (3) Agricultural

28 Water Users,” violates their federal water rights. SAC ¶¶ 83–120. Plaintiffs allege that

1 the “2022 EDP fails to guarantee or allocate to Plaintiffs the water sufficient to meet their

2 irrigation needs, based on their historical beneficial use of water,” and that it “will have a

3 severe economic impact on Plaintiffs,” who “have long owned and operated thriving

4 farming businesses in the Imperial Valley.” Id. ¶¶ 111–112. Thus, Plaintiffs assert the

5 following claims for relief: (1) violation of federal laws governing use of Colorado River

6 water, including the Reclamation Act, Boulder Canyon Project Act, Colorado River

7 Company, and U.S. Supreme Court decrees; (2) violation of the Takings Clause of the

8 Fifth Amendment; (3) violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

9 (4) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) judicial

10 and collateral estoppel; and (6) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 125–202.

11 Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims on January

12 23, 2023. Doc. No. 17. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on March 13, 2023, and

13 Defendants filed a reply on April 10, 2023. Doc. Nos. 23; 27. As stated above, the Court

14 heard oral arguments on September 6, 2023. Doc. No. 32. The Court took the matter

15 under submission following the hearing. Id. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to

16 Dismiss is now ripe for decision.

17 II. LEGAL STANDARDS

18 A. Rule 12(b)(1)3

19 A party may challenge the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction through a motion

20 filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1);

21 see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Because “[f]ederal courts are

22 courts of limited jurisdiction,” “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

23 jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

24 Consequently, “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

25 jurisdiction.” Id.

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1 “Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual.” White, 227

2 F.2d at 1242. “A ‘facial’ attack accepts the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations but asserts

3 that they ‘are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.’” Leite v. Crane

4 Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373

5 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). “The district court resolves a facial attack as it would a

6 motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and

7 drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether

8 the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Id.

9 (citing Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)).

10 “A ‘factual’ attack, by contrast, contests the truth of the plaintiff’s factual

11 allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. (first citing Safe

12 Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039; and then citing Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. &

13 Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). “When the defendant raises a factual

14 attack, the plaintiff must support her jurisdictional allegations with ‘competent proof[]’”

15 and “prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that each of the requirements for

16 subject-matter jurisdiction has been met.” Id. (first quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559

17 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010); and then citing Harris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir.

18 2012)). Generally, “if the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual issues, the

19 district court may resolve those factual disputes itself.” Id. at 1121–22 (first citing Safe

20 Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039–40; then citing Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d

21 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983); and then citing Thornhill Publ’g, 594 F.2d at 733).

22 B. Rule 12(b)(6)

23 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

24 legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732

25 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is appropriate where there is no cognizable legal theory or

26 where there is an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.

27 Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). At the

28 motion to dismiss stage, all material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true

1 and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. Id.

2 The factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief

3 above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

4 Implausible claims for relief will not survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

5 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A claim is plausible if its factual content permits the court to draw

6 a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678.

7 Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

8 the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

9 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556

10 U.S. at 678. “The court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of

11 factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

12 alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994).

13 III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

14 As an initial matter, Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of seven

15 exhibits—comprising copies of the District’s 2013 and 2022 EDPs, a digital presentation

16 regarding the District’s 2023 EDP, and copies of court filings concerning Plaintiff

17 Michael Abatti’s state court case—in support of their Motion to Dismiss. See Doc.

18 Nos. 18; 18-1.

19 A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that “is not subject to

20 reasonable dispute” because it is “generally known within the trial court’s territorial

21 jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy

22 cannot be reasonably questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. While the scope of review on a

23 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is limited to the complaint, a court may

24 consider evidence on which the complaint necessarily relies without converting the

25 motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment if: “(1) the complaint refers to the

26 document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff[’s] claim; and (3) no party questions

27 the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ.

28 Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

1 Furthermore, courts may take judicial notice of publications introduced to “indicate what

2 was in the public realm at the time, not whether the contents of those articles were in fact

3 true.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th

4 Cir. 2009) (citing Premier Growth Fund v. All. Capital Mgmt., 435 F.3d 396, 401 n.15

5 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also Brodsky v. Yahoo! Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (N.D. Cal.

6 2009) (taking judicial notice of “Yahoo! Press releases, news articles, analyst reports, and

7 third party press releases to which the SAC refers, but not for the truth of their contents”).

8 Here, Defendants contend that Exhibits A through G are judicially noticeable court

9 filings and public records. See generally Doc. Nos. 18; 18-1. Plaintiffs do not object to

10 Defendants’ request for judicial notice. Upon review, the Court agrees with Defendants

11 and GRANTS their request for judicial notice, Doc. No. 18, as to each of the seven

12 exhibits. However, the Court does not consider these exhibits for the truth of the matters

13 asserted therein. See, e.g., In re Bare Escentuals, Inc. Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1052,

14 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting defendants’ request to take judicial notice of SEC

15 filings, but specifying that they will not “where inappropriate” be considered for the truth

16 of the matter asserted).

17 IV. DISCUSSION

18 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing both that

19 Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that their claims are

20 barred by res judicata. Doc. No. 17-1 at 11–33. Defendants also argue that this Court

21 lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. at 30. The Court

22 begins by addressing Defendants’ res judicata argument.

23 Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed in its entirety because it is

24 precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. See Doc. No. 17-1 at 30–33; see also Doc.

25 No. 27 at 22–23. Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are bound by the

26 California Court of Appeal’s decision in Abatti I. Doc. No. 17-1 at 31. Plaintiffs respond

27 that res judicata does not preclude the causes of action brought in the instant case for the

28 following reasons: (1) the 2022 EDP at issue in the instant case did not arise before Abatti

1 I; (2) the causes of action asserted in the two cases are not the same; (3) the instant case

2 involves multiple parties other than the plaintiffs in Abatti I; and (4) even if the instant

3 case were barred by res judicata, the public interest exception applies. See Doc. No. 23 at

4 29–32.

5 A defendant may raise the affirmative defense of res judicata by way of a motion

6 to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir.

7 1984). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts are required to give full faith and credit to

8 state court judgments. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. Cty. & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S.

9 323, 336 (2005); Brodheim v. Cty, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009).

10 “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on ‘any claims that were

11 raised or could have been raised’ in a prior action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp., 297 F.3d

12 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health

13 Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001)). “To determine the preclusive effect of a

14 state court judgment[,] federal courts look to state law.” Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc.

15 v. Cty, of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Palomar Mobilehome

16 Park Ass’n v. Cty. of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1993)).

17 Under California law, the doctrine of res judicata precludes a subsequent action if

18 “(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present

19 proceeding [involves] the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties

20 in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior

21 proceeding.” Federation of Hillside & Canyon Ass’n, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1202

22 (2004) (citing Busick v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 974 (1972)).

23 “Unlike the federal courts, which apply a ‘transactional nucleus of facts’ test, ‘California

24 courts employ the “primary rights” theory to determine what constitutes the same cause

25 of action for claim preclusion purposes.’” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1268 (quoting

26 Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 952 (2004)).

27 Neither party disputes that the opinion and final judgment of the California Court

28 of Appeal in Abatti I is the operative decision for res judicata purposes here. Plaintiffs

1 also do not contest that the decision is a final judgment on the merits. Therefore, that

2 leaves two main questions for this Court to resolve: (1) did the Abatti I decision involve

3 the same causes of action as Plaintiffs’ claims here; and (2) does this case involve the

4 same parties, or parties in privity with the state court parties?

5 A. Whether the Causes of Action are the Same

6 Plaintiffs argue the causes of action asserted in Abatti I are not the same causes of

7 action brought in the instant case. See Doc. No. 23 at 29. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue

8 that res judicata is inapplicable because the District’s adoption of the 2013 EDP is a

9 “factually distinct . . . episode[]” from its adoption of the 2022 EDP.” Id. at 31 (internal

10 citation omitted). In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the Abatti I “plaintiffs did not argue

11 that the interplay of state and federal statutes created a property interest” in the District’s

12 water, and that res judicata cannot apply because the 2022 EDP arose after the initial

13 complaint was filed in Abatti I. Id. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the

14 current action concerns the same primary rights at issue in the Abatti I action. See Doc.

15 No. 17-1 at 31–32; see also Doc. No. 27 at 22.

16 Whether Plaintiffs’ challenge to the District’s 2022 EDP and the prior state court

17 challenge to the District’s 2013 EDP constitute the same cause of action turns on whether

18 “they are based on the same ‘primary right.’” Federation of Hillside & Canyon Ass’n v.

19 City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1202 (2004) (“Federation of Hillside”).

20 That is, “[t]he plaintiff’s primary right is the right to be free from a particular injury,

21 regardless of the legal theory on which liability for the injury is based.” Id. “‘[I]f two

22 actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then

23 the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different

24 theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting

25 recovery.’” Tensor Group v. City of Glendale, 14 Cal. App. 4th 154, 160 (1993).

26 In arguing the District’s 2022 EDP constitutes a new wrong, Plaintiffs cite

27 Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th 210

28 (2009) (“Castaic Lake”). In that case, a nonprofit organization challenged an

1 environmental impact report (“EIR”) concerning a water transfer. Id. at 219. The

2 appellate court directed the issuance of a writ vacating the certification of the EIR as

3 legally inadequate. Id. at 221. After a second EIR was certified in 2004, another petition

4 was filed challenging the revised EIR. Id. at 218–219. The court concluded the

5 subsequent petition involved a different cause of action because the second EIR was a

6 “factually distinct attempt[] to satisfy [the California Environmental Quality Act’s

7 (“CEQA”)] mandates.” Id. at 228. Specifically, the court concluded the initial action

8 “and the underlying actions involve distinct episodes of purported noncompliance

9 regarding ‘the same general subject matter’ (citation), namely, the public’s statutory right

10 to an adequate EIR concerning the [water] transfer (citations).” Id.

11 While Castaic Lake concluded the second petition could proceed due to “‘changed

12 conditions and new facts which were not in existence at the time the action was filed,’”

13 Castaic Lake, 180 Cal. App. 4th at 227, other courts have found subsequent petitions

14 barred because they arise from materially similar facts. For example, in Ballona

15 Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal. App. 4th 455 (2011) (“Ballona

16 Wetlands”), objectors filed petitions for writs of mandate challenging Los Angeles’s

17 certification of an EIR and project approvals for a certain real estate development. Id. at

18 462. After the trial court granted the petitions in part, Los Angeles vacated its

19 certification of the EIR and project approvals. Id. at 463. Los Angeles then revised

20 certain sections of the EIR, recertified it, and reapproved the project. Id. at 464. The

21 objectors again challenged the EIR based both on the revisions and on new grounds. Id.

22 The court concluded the objectors were barred from raising new challenges to the revised

23 EIR: “After considering the petitioner’s challenges to an EIR or other agency action and

24 rendering a final judgment and peremptory writ of mandate, a trial court evaluating a

25 return to the writ may not consider any newly asserted challenges arising from the same

26 material facts in existence at the time of the judgment. To do so would undermine the

27 finality of the judgment.” Id. at 480.

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1 Similarly, in Federation of Hillside, Los Angeles prepared a general plan

2 framework and EIR, which cited and relied in large part on a transportation improvement

3 mitigation plan. Federation of Hillside, 126 Cal. App. 4th at 1190. Following an initial

4 petition challenging the general plan framework and EIR, Los Angeles amended the EIR

5 to add responses to comments on the transportation improvement mitigation plan, made

6 new findings regarding mitigation measures, adopted a statement of overriding

7 considerations, and readopted the general plan framework. Id. at 1191–92. A second

8 petition was filed challenging the adoption of the general plan framework, CEQA

9 findings, and statement of overriding considerations. Id. at 1193. On appeal, the court

10 noted certain current findings by Los Angeles were substantially identical to its prior

11 findings. Id. at 1202. Despite Los Angeles’s reliance on information that postdated its

12 initial CEQA findings, the court found “the material facts have not changed and . . . the

13 two proceedings involve the same primary right and the same cause of action” because

14 the reapproval of the general plan framework was primarily based on information and

15 analysis contained in the original EIR. Id. at 1204.

16 Both Castaic Lake, relied on by Plaintiffs, and Ballona Wetlands cite Federation of

17 Hillside. And neither disputes the holding in Federation of Hillside—namely, that res

18 judicata barred the petitioners’ challenges in the second proceeding because, in part, “the

19 material facts had not changed and the issues asserted in the later proceeding could have

20 been asserted in the prior proceeding.” Ballona Wetlands, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 480; see

21 Castaic Lake, 180 Cal. App. 4th at 229 (distinguishing Federation of Hillside on the basis

22 that it “challenged the same EIR and the material facts had not changed”). Ballona

23 Wetlands likewise concluded the materials facts had not changed such that res judicata

24 was appropriate. Id. at 480. Castaic Lake, however, found material facts had changed

25 and allowed the second petition to proceed. Id. at 228.

26 Accordingly, the Court finds that the key question here is whether the 2022 EDP

27 adopted new findings such that they constituted a new injury to Plaintiffs and a new

28 wrong by the District. See Atwell v. City of Rohnert Park, 27 Cal. App. 5th 692, 701

1 (2018), as modified (Sept. 26, 2018). Defendants argue that the same primary right is at

2 issue in both cases—“that the farmers have a protected water right in [the District’s]

3 water rights and [the District] adopted an EDP that violates the farmers’ water right in

4 [the District’s] water.” Doc. No. 17-1 at 31. The Court agrees. Although Plaintiffs

5 maintain that the 2022 EDP is “substantially different” than the 2013 EDP, the Court

6 finds that it is not. Doc. No. 23 at 31. Of course, the Court acknowledges that the

7 District’s 2022 EDP does include changes—such as dividing water users into three

8 categories instead of the five in the 2013 EDP. SAC ¶¶ 86–90. However, other than the

9 fact that the District came out with a new EDP, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not

10 alleging a different primary right in this lawsuit because the materials facts have not

11 changed. Indeed, it appears that the District promulgated both the 2013 and 2022 EDPs

12 while California faced “the threat posed by the longest drought in over a century affecting

13 the Colorado River basin.” Doc. No. 17-1 at 10.

14 Moreover, although Plaintiffs did not raise any federal claims in their state court

15 action, “the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to those claims actually litigated in

16 the first action but also to those which might have been litigated as part of that cause of

17 action.”4 Clark v. Yosemite Community College Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1986).

18 In addition, Plaintiffs do not dispute that many of their arguments are nearly identical to

19 those raised and argued in the Abatti I case.

20 As such, the Court finds this element of res judicata is satisfied with respect to

21 Plaintiffs’ claims alleged in their SAC.

22 B. Whether the Parties are the Same

23 The question of whether the parties are the same is substantially more streamlined.

24 Michael Abatti, The Michael and Kerri Abatti Family Trust, and Mike Abatti Farms,

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27 4 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ first and fifth claims in their SAC could be dismissed on alternative

grounds. For instance, Plaintiffs do not dispute that their first and fifth claims are not causes of action or

28

1 LLC (“the Abattis”) were the plaintiffs in the state action, and are Plaintiffs here. The

2 District was the defendant in the state action, and is a defendant here. Nothing more

3 needs to be established on this score. See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th

4 888, 896 (2002).

5 Plaintiffs suggest that the addition of the new farmer, landowner, and business

6 plaintiffs in this case derails the application of res judicata, see Doc. No. 23 at 32, but the

7 point is not well taken. California courts apply a “practical concept of privity.” Atwell,

8 27 Cal. App. 5th at 702 (2018) (internal citation omitted). “[T]o maintain the stability of

9 judgments,” California courts will enforce preclusion against a party that shares “an

10 identity or community of interest” with a party in the prior action. Id. at 702–03 (quoting

11 Castillo v. Glenair, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 5th 262, 276–277 (2018), disapproved on other

12 grounds in Grande v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr., 13 Cal. 5th 313, 329 (2022)). Indeed, “the

13 privity inquiry focuses on the relationship between supposed privies in the context of the

14 litigation—not a static analysis of the relationship between them. Two litigants may be

15 privies in some circumstances yet strangers in others.” Grande, 13 Cal. 5th at 329.

16 This makes short work of the new farmers, landowners, and businesses that appear

17 as Plaintiffs in the instant case. In their SAC in this case, Plaintiffs allege that the 2013

18 EDP at issue in the state court action “nullified the water rights of Mr. Abatti and other

19 Imperial Valley farmers, provided for the transfer of their rights to other users without

20 compensation, and established a water priority scheme under which agricultural users

21 received no priority at all.” SAC ¶ 80 (emphasis added). This is essentially identical to

22 Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the 2022 EDP at issue in this case. Id. ¶¶ 102–03, 110–

23 20. Therefore, the Court finds that the community of interests in this case are the same as

24 when the Abattis acted as the plaintiffs in the state action.5

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27 5 Neither party appears to argue that the addition of new defendants in this case prevents the application

of res judicata. Even if they did, the same reasoning as above would apply because the new individual

28

1 Consequently, the Court finds that the new plaintiffs’ formal appearance as parties

2 here does not forestall the state court case’s preclusive effect.

3 C. Whether the Public Interest Exception Applies

4 Plaintiffs next contend that, even if this action is barred by res judicata, “the public

5 interest exception” would apply because “there are many property owners in the District

6 whose constitutional rights are affected by the 2022 EDP.” Doc. No. 23 at 32. The Court

7 disagrees.

8 “[W]hen the issue is a question of law rather than of fact, the prior determination is

9 not conclusive either if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that

10 relitigation not be foreclosed.” Sacramento v. State of California, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 64

11 (1990). Importantly, “[t]he public interest exception is an extremely narrow one.”

12 Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep’t of Educ., 2 Cal. 4th 251, 259 (1992)

13 (“Arcadia”). Indeed, the California Supreme Court has emphasized “it is the exception,

14 not the rule, and is only to be applied in exceptional circumstances.” Id. Arcadia

15 illustrates exceptional circumstances of the sort that give rise to a public interest

16 exception. The question before the Arcadia court was whether an Education Code

17 section authorizing school districts to charge fees for student transportation violated the

18 California Constitution. Id. at 255. The California Supreme Court observed that this was

19 “a pure question of law” that “affects the public in general, including children, parents

20 and taxpayers.” Id. at 259. Further, “[b]ecause the [plaintiff] school districts were not

21 parties to the earlier case . . . they [had] not had the opportunity to litigate the

22 constitutionality of” the statute at issue. Id. And because the court had ordered the prior

23 case depublished, id. at 256, “the state of the law on a matter of statewide importance

24 would remain permanently unclear and unsettled” if the case was barred from going

25 forward. Id. at 259.

26 Here, there are no similar exceptional circumstances that would justify applying

27 the narrow public interest exception to Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court agrees with

28 Defendants that “the law defining [Plaintiffs’] interest in [the District’s] water rights is

1 settled.” Doc. No. 27 at 23. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claims do not implicate the interest of

2 || the public at large in any regard, rather, they involve the interests of only one set of the

3 || District’s water users—farmers in California’s Imperial Valley—who will be affected by

4 || the 2022 EDP.

5 Therefore, the Court finds that the public interest exception does not apply and that

6 || this case is barred by res judicata.

7 V. CONCLUSION

8 In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 17, in its

9 entirety and without leave to amend based on the doctrine of res judicata. As such, the

10 Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

11 IT IS SO ORDERED.

12 || Dated: September 13, 2023

13 Maku (lille

HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO

14 United States District Judge

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27 In light of the Court’s decision to dismiss the SAC based on the doctrine of res judicata, the Court

5g || declines to reach Plaintiffs’ remaining 12(b)(6) arguments and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss to the extent it is based on Rule 12(b)(1).