holding that by entering 10 a plea agreement and waiving the right to appeal sentencing issues, defendant 11 relinquished his right to seek collateral relief from his sentence on the ground 12 of newly discovered exculpatory evidence
How later courts described this case
- holding that by entering 10 a plea agreement and waiving the right to appeal sentencing issues, defendant 11 relinquished his right to seek collateral relief from his sentence on the ground 12 of newly discovered exculpatory evidence
- upholding constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2285 as within Congress’s 5 authority under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 10
- criminal jurisdiction properly 7 8 extended to any stateless vessels found in international waters
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ROBINSON AGUIRRE SATIZABAL, CASE NO. 20CR0440-LAB
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Petitioner,
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vs. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
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SET ASIDE SENTENCE UNDER
15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Respondent.
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18 Robinson Aguirre Satizabal moves to vacate or set aside his sentence
19 under 28 U.S.C § 2255. (Dkt. 97). The Government opposes Satizabal’s
20 motion. (Dkt. 103). Having carefully considered the pleadings in this action, the
21 Court DENIES the motion.
22 I. BACKGROUND
23 On July 28, 2020, Satizabal plead guilty to two charges: (1) possession
24 of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel; and (2) operation of a
25 semi-submersible vessel without nationality. (Dkt. 97 at 15). The Court
26 sentenced him to 96-months in custody to be followed by five years of
27 supervised release. (Id.). Satizabal filed this motion to vacate his sentence on
II. DISCUSSION
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Satizabal raises two claims: (1) the court lacked subject matter
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jurisdiction; and (2) his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. (Dkt. 97
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at 13–14). The Government argues the motion must be dismissed because:
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(1) it is untimely; (2) Satizabal waived his right to collaterally challenge the
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conviction and sentence in his plea agreement; (3) he failed to satisfy his
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burden of pleading facts to establish that his counsel performed ineffectively.
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8 (Dkt. 103 at 2).
9 A. Statute of Limitations and Collateral Attack Waiver
10 1. Timeliness
11 Under 28 U.S.C § 2255(a) a prisoner in custody may move to vacate, set
12 aside, or correct a judgment if the sentence was imposed in violation of the
13 Constitution or laws of the United States, or the court was without jurisdiction
14 to impose such a sentence, or the sentence was longer than the maximum
15 authorized by law, or the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. A
16 one-year limitations period generally applies to such motions. The limitations
17 period runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction became final.
18 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f); United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.
19 1994). A hearing on the motion must be granted “[u]nless the motions and the
20 files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to
21 no relief.” Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1465.
22 The Court entered judgment in this case on March 22, 2021. (Dkt. 95).
23 The one-year limitations period expired on March 22, 2022. Satizabal filed his
24 untimely motion on August 19, 2022 – five months after the one-year deadline.
25 (Dkt. 97). Satizabal argues his untimeliness should be excused because his
26 counsel “refused to give him any documents [from] his criminal case.” (Dkt. 106
27 at 2–3). He points to his unfamiliarity with the English language and with the
resources created “exceptionally extraordinary and compelling circumstances
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warranting equitable tolling.” (Id.). The Court is dubious that Satizabal’s
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unsubstantiated excuses for filing late justify his 150-day delay, Frye v.
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Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001), but regardless, there are
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sufficient reasons to deny his petition on the merits.
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6 2. Waiver
The right to collaterally attack a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
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8 statutory in nature, and a defendant may waive the right. See, e.g., United
9 States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that by entering
10 a plea agreement and waiving the right to appeal sentencing issues, defendant
11 relinquished his right to seek collateral relief from his sentence on the ground
12 of newly discovered exculpatory evidence). Satizabal explicitly waived in
13 writing the right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence as
14 part of his plea agreement (Dkt. 54 at 3). A knowing and voluntary waiver of
15 the statutory right to collaterally attack one’s conviction is enforceable. United
16 States v. Navarro-Botello, 92 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990).
17 Satizabal’s plea agreement expressly recited that his plea was knowing
18 and voluntary, and he signed an acknowledgment that he fully understood the
19 agreement’s terms. (Dkt. 54). In addition, during his guilty plea hearing, he
20 personally confirmed he understood the concept of collateral attack, stated he
21 was knowingly waiving his right to bring such an attack, and assured the Court
22 his waiver was of his own volition. (Dkt. 102 at 15). He agreed the waiver
23 applied to both his conviction and sentence, provided his sentence didn’t
24 exceed the high end of the guidelines range as calculated by the Government
25 in the plea agreement. (Dkt. 54 at 12–13). The high end of the range was 210
26 months, 114 months higher than the 96-month sentence the Court imposed. In
27 his motion, Satizabal grumbles about “tyrannical powers” and “fundamental
waiver of collateral attack. (Dkt. 106 at 3–4). The Court finds Satizabal’s waiver
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was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. A deal’s a deal, and here the waiver is
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enforceable. His motion to vacate his properly-imposed sentence is DENIED.
4 B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
While a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can survive a valid
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waiver of collateral attack, Washington v. Lampert, 422. F.3d 864,870 (9th Cir.
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2005), Satizabal’s fake claims of attorney incompetence are patently bogus.
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8 “[I]n the context of § 2255 challenges brought by federal prisoners, [collateral
9 attack] waivers cannot bar [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims associated
10 with the negotiation of plea agreements.” Id. To establish ineffective assistance
11 of counsel, a petitioner must prove more likely than not that: (1) the assistance
12 provided by counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and
13 (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of
14 the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
15 668, 688 (1984). To satisfy Strickland’s deficiency prong, a petitioner must
16 show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
17 reasonableness” and wasn’t “within the range of competence demanded of
18 attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687 (quoting McMahan v. Richardson, 397
19 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). This is a difficult showing to make because there is a
20 “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of
21 professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
22 Satizabal complains his attorney failed to challenge the United States’
23 jurisdiction over the case. But his lawyer was no dummy and knew that such
24 a challenge would have been pointless. (Dkt. 97 at 5, 16–17; Dkt. 106 at 1).
25 The semi-submersible, drug-loaded vessel in which Satizabal was arrested
26 was stateless or “without nationality” because: (1) the master of the vessel
27 failed to make a claim of nationality even when the arresting officer inquired;
didn’t contain papers documenting the vessel’s nationality. (Dkt. 54 ¶ B.4).
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Congress long ago constitutionally extended United States criminal jurisdiction
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over stateless vessels in international waters (where Satizabal was
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apprehended). See United States v. Velarezo-Orobio, 635 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir.
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2011) (upholding constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2285 as within Congress’s
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authority under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 10); United States v. Marino-
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Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir. 1982) (criminal jurisdiction properly
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8 extended to any stateless vessels found in international waters), so there was
9 little point in Satizabal’s lawyer arguing otherwise. Because the Court properly
10 exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Satizabal, his “my lawyer was
11 incompetent claim” fails.
12 Satizabal’s other argument is that his counsel underperformed by not
13 challenging the reasonableness of his sentence (Dkt. 97 at 1, 27; Dkt. 106
14 at 1). To begin with, this argument ignores that Satizabal, via his plea
15 agreement, acquiesced to possibly receiving a sentence more than twice as
16 long as the sentence he received. His sentence was even below the low end
17 of his applicable Guidelines. Satizabal hasn’t identified the procedural error or
18 errors the Court supposedly committed, nor has he explained his rationale for
19 claiming his counsel should be faulted after he persuaded the Court to impose
20 a substantially reduced sentence. Satizabal’s grousing aside, nothing counsel
21 said or did fell below the objective standard of reasonableness of attorney
22 competency.
23 Satizabal’s claims that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective
24 assistance are DENIED. A hearing isn’t required because Satizabal hasn’t
25 made “specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief.”
26 Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir.1982). Nor has Satizabal
27 established that he was prejudiced, i.e., that any different result would have
4 | Ul. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
2 A certificate of appealability is authorized “only if the applicant has made
3 ||a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
4 || § 2253(c)(2). Santizabal must show that “jurists of reason could disagree with
5 || the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could
g || conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
7 || proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). On this record,
g || it is difficult to conceive that reasonable jurists would disagree with this Court's
g || resolution of Santizabal’s claims or that the issues he raises should go any
10 || further. The Court DENIES a certificate if appealability.
41 || IV. CONCLUSION
12 Plaintiff's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under
13 || 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate is DENIED. So is his request for appointment of
44 || counsel and for a certificate of appealability.
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 || Dated: May 26, 2023
17 laud 4: (Aywy7
18 Hon. LARRY ALANBURNS □□□□□□
19 United States District Judge
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