“[E]ven though the causes of action be different, the prior determination 18 of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties as to that issue and 19 every matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its determination.”
How later courts described this case
- “[E]ven though the causes of action be different, the prior determination 18 of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties as to that issue and 19 every matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its determination.”
- court “need not accept as true allegations contradicting documents that are 21 referenced in the complaint or that are properly subject to judicial notice.”
- “[T]he fact a party asserts new legal or factual theories or new evidence relevant 3 || to an issue previously decided does not affect the applicability of the collateral estoppel 4 ||bar.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JONATHAN WEBB, Case No. 20cv2211-MMA-WVG
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS
14 MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
[Doc. No. 16]
INC., MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC and
15
DOES 1 through 10,
16
Defendants.
17
18
19 Jonathan Webb (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Midland Credit
20 Management, Inc., and Midland Funding, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging
21 violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.
22 See Doc. No. 3 (“FAC”). Defendants move to dismiss the action in its entirety for lack of
23 subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See
24 Doc. No. 16. In the alternative, Defendants request that the Court enter judgment in their
25 favor on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Id. Plaintiff
26 filed an opposition to the motion, to which Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 22, 23.
27 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on
28 the pleadings.
1 BACKGROUND
2 This action arises out of events related to the litigation of a state court action
3 brought by Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland”) against Plaintiff in Los Angeles County
4 Superior Court. See Midland Funding, LLC v. Webb, Sup. Ct. Case No. 18NWLC43321.
5 On December 11, 2018, Midland filed a state court complaint against Plaintiff “for
6 the principal amount of $2,183.46 and costs of $246.00 for a total of $2,429.46.” See
7 Doc. No. 3-4 at 2.1 Shortly after, a Midland employee, Jeanette Ruff (“Ruff”), prepared a
8 “Declaration in Lieu of Testimony” (“Declaration”), served Plaintiff with the
9 Declaration, see FAC ¶ 12, and filed the Declaration with the state court. See Doc. No.
10 16-9 at 2. However, Plaintiff’s service copy allegedly differed from the copy filed with
11 the court in so far as Plaintiff’s copy was missing the first two and a half paragraphs of
12 Ruff’s declaration testimony. Compare Doc. No. 3-2 with Doc. No. 3-3. Plaintiff alleges
13 he was not aware of the missing content until after the state court issued its final order
14 and judgment. See FAC ¶ 22.
15 The missing paragraphs included Ruff’s statement that she is an officer of
16 Midland, which the state court accepted as true. See Doc. No. 3-4 at 3. Ruff’s
17 characterization as an officer was dispositive to the outcome of the state court action. See
18 Doc. No. 3-4 at 3. Specifically, absent Ruff’s characterization as an officer of Midland,
19 the state court would not have admitted the Declaration into evidence in lieu of Ruff’s
20 live testimony at trial. See FAC ¶¶ 17–19, 22. Ruff’s declaration testimony provided the
21 key evidence which in the state court’s judgment established Plaintiff’s liability on
22 account stated and breach of contract theories for the full amount of the debt owed. See
23 Doc. No. 3-4 at 3–4.
24 Plaintiff alleges, however, that “R[uff] was never an officer” and that Defendants’
25 “characterization of R[uff] as an ‘officer’ . . . was false and misleading.” See FAC ¶¶
26
27
1 Citations to electronically filed documents refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system
28
1 13–14. Plaintiff alleges that the misrepresentation violated sections 1692e, 1692f, and
2 1692k of the FDCPA and seeks actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and reasonable
3 attorney fees.2
4 DISCUSSION
5 Defendants move to dismiss this action in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of
6 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically,
7 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the doctrine established by
8 Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
9 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (“Rooker-Feldman”), which “prevents federal courts from second-
10 guessing state court decisions by barring the lower federal courts from hearing de facto
11 appeals from state-court judgments.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.
12 2003). In the alternative, Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal
13 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that this action is precluded in light of the
14 previous state court proceeding.
15 Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion on both grounds. Plaintiff argues that “the
16 facts of this case fall within the extrinsic fraud exception to the doctrine” but that “the
17 ‘exception’ is not even required because the current case does not constitute a de facto
18 appeal and therefore Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable in the first instance.” Doc. No. 22
19 at 12, 16. Plaintiff further contends that neither issue nor claim preclusion bar this action.
20 1. Legal Standards
21 a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
22 Rule 12(b)(1) allows for dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
23 jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction must exist when
24 the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. California State Bd. of
25
26
27 2 The FDCPA prohibits a “debt collector” from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation
or means in connection with the collection of any debt” or “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
28
1 Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, subject matter jurisdiction
2 may be raised “at any stage of the litigation.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506
3 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
4 subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). A party may properly
5 challenge standing in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion given standing “pertain[s] to a federal
6 court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Article III.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242
7 (9th Cir. 2000).
8 A facial attack on jurisdiction asserts that the allegations in a complaint are
9 insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d
10 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In resolving a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the Court
11 accepts the allegations of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in
12 favor of Plaintiff. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). Where
13 dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not
14 possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d
15 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)).
16 b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)
17 Pursuant to Rule 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed . . . a party may move for
18 judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The factual allegations of the
19 nonmoving party are accepted as true. See Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.,
20 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted
21 when, accepting all factual allegations as true, there is no material fact in dispute, and the
22 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Chavez v. United States, 683
23 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). “Analysis under Rule
24 12(c) is ‘substantially identical’ to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) . . ..’” Id.
25 2. Requests for Judicial Notice
26 Both parties request that the Court take judicial notice of certain documents. The
27 Court addresses each request in turn.
28 //
1 a. Legal Standard
2 “Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when
3 assessing the sufficiency of a complaint . . ..” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899
4 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th
5 Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d
6 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002)) (discussing that a court may take judicial notice of
7 matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for
8 summary judgment); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (explaining that if the court considers
9 other materials, a motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or (c) is converted into a
10 motion for summary judgment under Rule 56). However, “a court may take judicial
11 notice of matters of public record,” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (quoting Lee, 250 F.3d at
12 689), and of “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose
13 authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading,”
14 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by
15 Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1125–26; see also Fed. R. Evid. 201.
16 Judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial
17 notice of undisputed facts in matters of public record. See Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999. A
18 court may not take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records. Id.
19 A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
20 (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
21 accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
22 be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
23 In contrast to judicial notice, the incorporation by reference doctrine “is a judicially
24 created doctrine that treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint
25 itself.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999. This doctrine is designed to prevent plaintiffs from
26 selectively referencing portions of documents that support their claims, while omitting
27 portions of those documents that weaken “or doom” their claims. Id. The Ninth Circuit
28 has extended this doctrine to consider evidence on which the complaint “necessarily
1 relies” if: “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the
2 plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the
3 12[(c)] motion.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit
4 urges courts to use caution when drawing any inferences from documents incorporated by
5 reference on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. See Khoja, 899 F.3d
6 at 1003 (noting that “the incorporation by reference doctrine is designed to prevent artful
7 pleading by plaintiffs,” and is “not a tool for defendants to short-circuit the resolution of a
8 well-pleaded claim.”).
9 b. Defendants’ Request
10 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of six documents, including:
11 1) the state court complaint filed by Midland against Plaintiff; 2) a copy of Jeanette
12 Ruff’s Declaration in Lieu of Testimony (“Ruff Declaration”) filed in the state court
13 action; 3) the trial brief filed by Plaintiff in the state court action; 4) the post-trial brief
14 filed by Plaintiff in the state court action; 5) the state court’s Statement of Decision; and
15 6) a copy of the docket in the state court action. See Doc. No. 16-3. The Court need not
16 take judicial notice of the Ruff Declaration and the Statement of Decision as Plaintiff
17 attached those documents as exhibits in support of his amended complaint. See Doc. No.
18 3-1, Ex. 2-3. As to the other four documents, state court documents are generally
19 available for judicial notice. See Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011)
20 (“[W]e may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the
21 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”
22 (internal quotations and citation omitted)); see also Victoria v. City of San Diego, 326 F.
23 Supp. 3d 1003, 1012 (S.D. Cal. 2018). Plaintiff does not object to Defendants’ request.
24 Accordingly, the Court grants the request and takes notice of these documents.
25 c. Plaintiff’s Request
26 Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of two documents, specifically
27 an order entered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in In the Matter of:
28 Encore Capital Group, Inc., et al., 2015-CFPB-0022, and an order entered by the district
1 court in Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Encore Capital Group, Inc., et al.,
2 No. 3:20-cv-01750-GPC-KSC (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2020). See Doc. No. 22-1. Defendants
3 object to Plaintiff’s request, arguing that the reason for the request is to have the Court
4 take judicial notice of facts set forth in the documents, which the Court may not do. As
5 noted above, courts may “take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public
6 record[, as they] are readily verifiable and, therefore, the proper subject of judicial
7 notice.” Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir.
8 2006) (internal citation omitted). However, Defendants’ objection is well-taken in so far
9 as “the court may take judicial notice of the existence of unrelated court documents,
10 although it will not take judicial notice of such documents for the truth of the matter
11 asserted therein.”3 In re Bare Escentuals, Inc. Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1067
12 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request but takes notice only of the
13 documents’ existence, not their content.
14 3. Analysis
15 a. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
16 Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction
17 and thus dismissal is required pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Specifically, Defendants argue
18 that the “[C]ourt ha[s] no subject matter jurisdiction because the claims seek de facto
19 appellate review of a state court judgment.” Doc. No. 16 at 2. Plaintiff argues that the
20 Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because “the current case does not constitute a
21 de facto appeal.”4 Doc. No. 22 at 16.
22
23
3 Defendants also object to certain statements set forth in Plaintiff’s Declaration filed in support of his
24
response in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 23-1 at 2-3. The Court
25 ultimately finds the disputed portions of the declaration irrelevant to the disposition of the instant
proceedings. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES AS MOOT Defendants’ objections thereto.
26
4 Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because “this case
27 fall[s] within the extrinsic fraud exception to the doctrine.” Doc. No. 22 at 12. Because the Court finds
that this action does not constitute a de facto appeal from the state court judgment against Plaintiff, it
28
1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine limits a federal district court’s subject matter
2 jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84
3 (2005). “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which
4 the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
5 caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
6 commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at
7 284. “If a federal plaintiff ‘present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a
8 legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . .[]then
9 there is jurisdiction.’” Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. Of Rosemont Ill., 995
10 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)). Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction “if . . . a
11 federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse
12 party[.]” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (2004) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d
13 at 1164). As such, “Rooker–Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising
14 subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court
15 judgment.” Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bianchi v.
16 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). But a suit is a de facto appeal only if
17 “the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state
18 court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment.” Kougasian, 359
19 F.3d at 1140.
20 Here, Plaintiff asserts as his injury that Defendants’ “characterization of R[uff] as
21 an ‘officer’ . . . was false and misleading” and this “false and misleading assertion to the
22 [State] Court in the Underlying Action that Ruff was an officer, and Defendants’
23 concealment of this assertion from [Plaintiff] were acts that, both separately and in
24 connection with one another, constituted unfair and misleading conduct resulting in
25 damage” to Plaintiff and violation of the FDCPA. FAC ¶¶ 14, 23. According to
26 Plaintiff, “Defendants’ false and misleading conduct ultimately was the deciding factor in
27 the Underlying Action, resulting in an improperly obtained judgment against” Plaintiff.
28 Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff seeks as his remedy actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and
1 reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Thus, while Plaintiff “den[ies] a
2 legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which [Plaintiff] was a party,”
3 Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293, he does not seek expressly “relief from the state
4 court judgment.” Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140. Accordingly, the Court finds that this
5 action is not barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Jenkins-Brown v. Liberty
6 Acquisitions Servicing, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-01610-ST, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125044, at
7 *15 (D. Or. July 29, 2015) (citing Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 F Supp2d 783,
8 798 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (Rooker-Feldman does not bar FDCPA claim when plaintiffs’
9 alleged injuries “are not the result of the state court judgments themselves, but rather
10 from the allegedly illegal practices Defendants used to obtain those state court
11 judgments.”)).
12 b. Issue Preclusion
13 Defendants alternatively seek entry of judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule
14 12(c), arguing that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims are precluded because the underlying issues
15 were resolved or could have been resolved in the state court action.5 Plaintiff responds
16 that the issues “were not litigated because Midland thwarted Webb’s ability to fully
17 litigate the claims.” Doc. No. 22 at 22.
18 Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion is “distinct from the Rooker-Feldman
19 question.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 950. The doctrine forecloses “successive litigation of
20 an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination
21 essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different
22 claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Collateral estoppel is applicable
23 only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to
be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former
24
proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former
25 proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former
26
27 5 Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, federal courts must give a state court judgment the same
preclusive effect as the state court judgment would receive by another court of that state. See 28 U.S.C.
28
1 proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and
on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be
2
the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.
3
4 Lucido v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341 (1990). “The ‘identical issue’ requirement
5 addresses whether ‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings, not
6 whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same.” Id. at 342 (quoting People v.
7 Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 485 (1982)). As such, “when a party has had a fair opportunity to
8 litigate an issue and does not succeed, that party may not disguise the claim as something
9 else or bring essentially the same claim in a different court in hopes of burdening
10 defendant once more.” Moreno v. Fannie Mae, No. 2:15-cv-00199-ODW, 2015 U.S.
11 Dist. LEXIS 97076, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2015).
12 Importantly, the “focus” of the collateral estoppel “inquiry should be on whether
13 the party against whom issue preclusion is being sought had ‘an adequate opportunity to
14 litigate’” the issue in the prior proceeding. Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th
15 860, 869 (2010) (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966))
16 (emphasis added). “The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies on issues litigated even
17 though some factual matters or legal arguments which could have been raised were not.”
18 Lucas v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 277, 286 (1996). As one California
19 appellate court has explained:
20 If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject-matter
and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is
21
conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or
22 otherwise urged. The reason for this is manifest. A party cannot by negligence
or design withhold issues and litigate them in consecutive actions. Hence the
23
rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or
24 could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable.
25
26 Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 177, 182
27 (1989).
28
1 Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that all the elements for collateral estoppel are
2 satisfied. The parties were in privity and there was a final judgment on the merits in the
3 state court action. See, e.g., Dailey v. City of San Diego, 223 Cal. App. 4th 237, 255
4 (2013). In addition, the underlying facts of Plaintiff’s current claims were within the
5 scope of the state court action as clearly indicated in the state court record. Plaintiff
6 elected to place the Ruff Declaration and Defendants’ use thereof and reliance thereon
7 squarely at issue in the state court action. After considering Plaintiff’s multiple
8 objections to the Ruff Declaration and overruling them all, the state court determined that
9 the Declaration was valid and admissible.6 Plaintiff could have challenged the legal
10 adequacy of the service of the Declaration – the gravamen of his current claim – in the
11 state court action; he did not do so. Plaintiff also could have availed himself of his right
12 to pursue a direct appeal from the judgment entered against him; he did not do so. The
13 relevant facts were within the scope of the state court action, “related to the subject-
14 matter and relevant to the issues, so that [they] could have been raised,” and therefore
15 “the [state court] judgment is conclusive.” Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc., 189 Cal.
16 App. 4th 562, 576 (2010); see also Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 211 Cal. App. 4th
17 866, 888 (2012) (“[E]ven though the causes of action be different, the prior determination
18 of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties as to that issue and
19 every matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its determination.”)
20 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal. 2d 715, 724–725 (1955)).
21 Moreover, “the public policies underlying collateral estoppel—preservation of the
22
23
24
6 And even if the state court erred in concluding that the Ruff Declaration was admissible, “that error
25 does not preclude the application of collateral estoppel, for ‘collateral estoppel may apply even where
the issue was wrongly decided in the first action.’” Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., 213 Cal.
26 App. 4th 1258, 1270 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Murphy, 164 Cal. App. 4th 376, 407 (2008). “By
failing to appeal and seek a correction of the error through a reversal of the judgment, it is as conclusive
27 upon the plaintiff as if at the trial he had omitted to present sufficient evidence to the court in support of
his demand.” Proctor, 213 Cal. App. 4th at 1270 (quoting Lamb v. Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91, 95
28
1 integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants
2 from harassment by vexatious litigation”—are served in this case. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at
3 343.
4 Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that he failed to raise the underlying factual issues
5 in the state court action “because Midland thwarted” his “ability to fully litigate the
6 claims” is not well-taken. Doc. No. 22 at 22. The record clearly reflects that Midland
7 filed the Ruff Declaration on the docket of the state court action on November 13, 2019.
8 See Doc. Nos. 3-3, 16-5, and 16-9. The filed copy of the declaration was publicly
9 available and accessible by Plaintiff, proceeding through counsel, at the time Plaintiff
10 filed his trial brief on December 16, 2019 and prior to trial on December 17, 2019. See
11 Doc. No. 16-9. Plaintiff therefore had the opportunity to challenge the Ruff Declaration
12 in all relevant respects – including any discrepancies between the service copy and the
13 filed copy – at trial as well as during post-trial proceedings. Plaintiff’s contrary
14 allegations that “behind [his] back, Defendants presented legally significant, differing
15 information to the adjudicating officer” and “Defendants’ assertion that Ruff is an
16 ‘officer’ was never revealed to [Plaintiff] or counsel until the issuance of the statement of
17 decision in the Underlying Action,” FAC ¶¶ 16, 22, are belied by the state court record –
18 which Plaintiff himself does not challenge as accurate – and therefore need not be taken
19 as true by the Court. See Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir.
20 2008) (court “need not accept as true allegations contradicting documents that are
21 referenced in the complaint or that are properly subject to judicial notice.”); see also
22 Stewart v. Kodiak Cakes, LLC, No. 19-cv-2454-MMA (MSB), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23 82267, at *85 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (“A court does not accept as true allegations
24 contradicted by documents attached to or referred to in the complaint [or] matters subject
25 to judicial notice. . ..”).
26 Ultimately, Plaintiff “had an adequate incentive to fully litigate” these issues in the
27 state court proceeding and “had a fair opportunity” to do so. Murphy, 164 Cal. App. 4th
28 at 404 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from litigating these
1 ||issues in this court. See, e.g., Kemper v. Cty. of San Diego, 242 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1090
2 ||(2015) (“[T]he fact a party asserts new legal or factual theories or new evidence relevant
3 || to an issue previously decided does not affect the applicability of the collateral estoppel
4 ||bar.”). And because collateral estoppel bars this action, amendment of Plaintiff's
5 complaint would be futile; thus, dismissal is with prejudice. See, e.g., Rainwater v.
6 || Banales, 2008 WL 5233138, at *9 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008) (“Because of the
7 ||unavoidable applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel, granting Plaintiff leave
8 amend would be futile.”); see also Cruz v. Child Welfare Servs., Civ. No. 16-00669
9 || JMS-KSC, 9-10 (D. Haw. Feb. 28, 2017).
10 CONCLUSION
1] Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on
12 || the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and DISMISSES this
13 action in its entirety with prejudice. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter
14 judgment accordingly and close the case.
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 || DATE: September 13, 2021 Llletdick LA <f hhlr
7 HO MICHAEL M. ANELLO
United States District Judge
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