the purpose 17 || of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(a) is to allow the parties to adequately prepare their 18 cases for trial and to avoid unfair surprise"
How later courts described this case
- the purpose 17 || of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(a) is to allow the parties to adequately prepare their 18 cases for trial and to avoid unfair surprise"
- late disclosure was not harmless because it disrupted 20 || both defendant's and the court's schedules
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ||] GRADY SHAUGHNESSY, Case No.: 20-CV-1809-DMS-WVG
12 Plaintitt, ORDER ON DISCOVERY DISPUTE
13 || V-
14 || LVNV FUNDING, LLC; RESURGENT
15 CAPITAL SERVICES, L.P.,
16 Defendants.
17
18 Pending before this Court are the Parties’ briefs on the most recent discovery dispute
19 this matter. (Doc. Nos. 37, 39.) In short, LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV’”) and Resurgent
20 ||Capital Services, L.P. (collectively, “Defendants”) seek to depose Scott Grace (“Mr.
21 ||Grace”), one of three attorneys presently representing Grady Shaughnessy □□□□
22 ||Shaughnessy” or “Plaintiff’) and who previously represented Mr. Shaughnessy in a prior
23 ||related state court action. Mr. Shaughnessy objects to Defendants taking Mr. Grace’s
24 deposition on relevance and privilege grounds. The Court has reviewed Defendants and
25 ||Mr. Shaughnessy’s (“Parties”) respective briefs, counsels’ declarations, and all
26 ||accompanying exhibits, as well as Defendants’ in camera brief, which was lodged directly
27 || with Chambers. Having done so, the Court addresses the Parties’ positions, ORDERS as
28 || follows, and explains below.
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Defendants removed this action on September 14, 2020. (Doc. No. 1.) It was not
3 ||their first time in an adversarial position against Plaintiff. Prior to such time, the Parties
4 || were embroiled in a state court action (“prior action”). In the prior action, LVNV sued Mr.
5 ||Shaughnessy to collect on a debt Mr. Shaughnessy owed LVNV. As noted, Mr. Grace
6 ||represented Mr. Shaughnessy in the prior action. The prior action resulted in a settlement
7 between LVNV and Mr. Shaughnessy. In relevant part, Mr. Grace and a certain law firm,
8 || The Mandarich Law Group (“MLG’”), were involved in bringing the matter to resolution,
9 ||structuring the settlkement agreement, and participating in the resulting settlement
10 || proceedings. Following settlement, the prior action was eventually dismissed. This action
11 || followed. As aforementioned, Mr. Shaughnessy retained Mr. Grace’s services, in addition
12 ||to the services of two other attorneys, for purposes of this litigation.
13 In the instant action, Mr. Shaughnessy alleges Defendants failed to update crediting
14 || agencies that Mr. Shaughnessy had paid off his debt following the prior action’s dismissal.
15 ||Mr. Shaughnessy brings suit under California Civil Code section 1785.25, also known as
16 ||the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. With fact discovery underway,
17 ||Defendants now seek to depose Mr. Grace regarding his involvement in the settlement
18 proceedings in the prior action. Defendants specifically seek Mr. Grace’s testimony
19 ||regarding (1) who the parties to the settlement agreement from the prior action were; (2)
20 ||the date on which the settlement agreement was reached; and, more broadly, (3)
21 “information related to Plaintiff's State Court Matter settlement” and other “non-privileged
22 information related to the claims and defenses set forth in the operative pleadings.” (Doc.
23 || No. 37, 2:3-10; 5: 17-20.)
24 Defendants contend they tried to obtain the first two categories of information
25 || through Plaintiff's deposition, but the deposition yielded non-responses from Plaintiff. U/d.,
26 || 3:4-8.) Regarding the third category of information, Defendants pose that Mr. Grace “likely
27 even more complete knowledge of the circumstances surrounding settlement than Mr.
28 ||Shaughnessy himself.” (/d., 6:24-7:4.) Therefore, Defendants conclude, deposing Mr.
1 ||Grace is an appropriate means of obtaining foundational information regarding the prior
2 ||action’s settlement proceedings because “Mr. Shaughnessy has put the facts surrounding
3 || the settlement at issue as the very basis of his claim here rests on a failure to properly report
4 ||his settlement.” (/d., 7:7-11.)
5 Plaintiff objects to Mr. Grace’s deposition on relevance and privilege grounds. In
6 || particular, Plaintiff argues Defendants have not met their burden under the applicable three-
7 || pronged test to determine the propriety of attorney depositions. Specifically, Plaintiff poses
8 || that Defendants are already in possession of the settlement agreement from the prior action,
9 ||which readily addresses Defendants’ inquiries concerning signatories and the date on
10 || which the settlement agreement was reached. (Doc. No. 39, 3:14-19.) As to the broader
11 ||information Defendants seek, Plaintiff contends Defendants have not sufficiently shown
12 || whether (1) Defendants have exhausted other practicable means to obtain the information
13 seek from Mr. Grace; and (2) the information sought is crucial to the preparation of
14 ||the case. Ud., 3:22-4:3.) Further, Plaintiff asserts his objection to any potential inquiries
15 || Defendants may pose to Mr. Grace that infringe upon the attorney-client and work-product
16 || privileges. Ud., 4:14-17; 5:11-14.)
17 Of note in Plaintiff's brief is that, “it remains a possibility that The Mandarich Law
18 ||Group might still possess ‘critical’ information that Plaintiff is unable to obtain absent a
19 || deposition.” (/d., 8:1-3.) As acknowledged throughout both Parties’ briefs, MLG served as
20 ||counsel of record in the prior action. (/d., 8:1-3; Doc. No. 37, 3:15-17.) Plaintiff's brief
21 ||signals Plaintiff's belief that MLG does in fact possess information that is “relevant to the
22 ||claims asserted by Plaintiff.” (/d., 8:1-9.) To that end, Plaintiff represents he is in the
23 process of obtaining discovery on such matters implicating MLG’s dealings in the prior
24 ||action, although he has not yet “exhausted other traditional discovery” to warrant
25 ||subpoenaing MLG for deposition. (/d.) In doing so, Plaintiff does not address what bearing
26 || discovery from MLG may have upon Defendants’ request to depose Mr. Grace.
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1 II. LEGAL STANDARD
2 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence
3 || (“Federal Rules”) prohibit taking the deposition of an opposing party's attorney. Townsend
4 || v. Imperial County, 2014 WL 2090689, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 19, 2014) (citing Shelton v.
5 ||America Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986); Johnston Development
6 || Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 130 F.R.D. 348, 352 (D.N.J. 1990)). In
7 || line with the Federal Rules, Defendants correctly observe Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules
8 ||of Civil Procedure permits a party to depose “any person” and does not include a party’s
9 ||counsel within its enumerated exceptions. /d. (citing NF'A Corp. v. Riverview Narrow
10 || Fabric, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 83, 84 (D.N.C. 1987). Concurrently, however, a party’s ability to
11 ||take the deposition of an opponent’s counsel is not boundless.
12 Courts may order counsel to appear for deposition “only in limited situations where
13 party seeking the deposition can show: (1) no other means exist to obtain the
14 ||information than to depose opposing counsel, see, e.g., Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v.
15 || Superior Court, 72 Cal.App.3d 786 (1977); (2) the information sought is relevant and
16 ||nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case.” Nocal, Inc.
17 ||\v. Sabercat Ventures, Inc., 2004 WL 3174427, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2004);
18 || Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cert, 177 F.R.D. 472 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Shelton,
19 F.2d at 1327—28)).
20 This three-pronged framework originates from the Eighth Circuit’s Shelton case (see
21 || generally Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.1986)) which district
22 courts within the Ninth Circuit have applied in the absence of published decisions from the
23 || Ninth Circuit on the matter. Silver v. BA Sports Nutrition, LLC, 2020 WL 6342939, at *2
24 ||(N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2020) (applying Shelton to subpoenas defendant directed to plaintiffs’
25 || counsel); Monster Energy Co. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 2020 WL 2405295, at *8—9 (C.D. Cal.
26 10, 2020) (applying Shelton to subpoenas directed at plaintiff's former counsel and
27 firm); Flotsam of Cal., Inc. v. Huntington Beach Conf. & Visitors Bureau, 2007 WL
28 ||4171136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2007) (applying Shelton to subpoenas directed at
1 || plaintiff's counsel); Nocal Inc., 2004 WL 3174427, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2004)
2 ||(applying Shelton to subpoenas plaintiff directed to defense counsel); see also Fausto v.
3 || Credigy Servs. Corp., 2008 WL 4793467, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008) (citing Wall v.
4 || Leavitt, 2007 WL 4219162, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007) (“While there is no published
5 Ninth Circuit case adopting the test from Shelton, district courts within this circuit have
6 ||used it when analyzing whether to permit the deposition of counsel’’)).
7 The initial burden of proof under the applicable three-pronged test rests with the
8 || party seeking to take the attorney’s deposition. Townsend, 2014 WL 2090689, at *2 (citing
9 || Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327.) Case law makes clear that, short of demonstrating “the
10 || propriety and the need for the deposition,” counsel may not be deposed. Townsend, 2014
11 || WL 2090689, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 19, 2014) (citing Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327; Harriston
12 ||v. Chicago Tribune Company, 134 F.R.D. 232, 233 (N.D. IIL. 1990); Hay and Forage
13 ||Industries v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 687, 689 (D. Kan. 1990); West
14 || Peninsular Title Company v. Palm Beach County, 132 F.R.D. 301, 302 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
15 || Advance Systems, Inc. of Green Bay v. APV Baker PMC, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 200, 201 (E.D.
16 || Wis. 1989); NF'A Corp., 117 F.R.D. at 85).
17 Il. DISCUSSION
18 The Court turns to Shelton three-pronged test to assess Defendants’ request to take
19 ||Mr. Grace’s deposition and examines each prong in turn.
20 a. Prong One: Whether Alternative Means Exist for Defendants to
Obtain the Information from Mr. Grace Short of Deposition
22 The Court finds it necessary to bifurcate its analysis here based upon the three
23 ||categories of information Defendants seek to obtain through Mr. Grace’s deposition,
24 ||namely: (1) who the parties to the settlement agreement from the prior action were; (2) the
25 || date on which the settlement agreement was reached; and, more broadly, (3) “information
26 related to Plaintiff's State Court Matter settlement” and other “non-privileged information
27 ||related to the claims and defenses set forth in the operative pleadings.” (Doc. No. 37, 2:3-
28 || 10; 5: 17-20.) The Court analyzes the first two categories of information jointly and then
1 separately addresses the third and final category of information.
2 As to the first two categories of information, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request
3 || to take Mr. Grace’s deposition regarding these two lines of inquiry based upon Defendants’
4 || failure to satisfy the first prong under Shelton. As a threshold matter, Defendants’ brief did
5 ||not disclose Defendants’ possession of the settlement agreement of the prior action, which
6 Defendants marked as Exhibit 6 to Plaintiff's Deposition and which Plaintiff submitted as
7 \|Exhibit A in support of his responsive brief here. (Doc. No. 39, 3:14-19; 39-2, Exhibit
8 ||(“Exh.”) A.) Defendants also omitted disclosing in their brief their possession of emails
9 ||exchanged between counsel for LVNV and Mr. Shaughnessy confirming settlement of the
10 action, which Defendants marked as Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff's Deposition and which
11 || Plaintiff submitted as Exhibit B in support of his responsive brief here. (Doc. No. 39, 3:19-
12 39-3, Exh. B.) The settlement agreement and emails between counsel for LVNV and
13 ||Mr. Shaughnessy fully inform the Court’s conclusion that Defendants have, and have had,
14 means to determine who signed the settlement agreement of the prior action and when.
15 In studying the settlement agreement of the prior action, the Court notes the
16 ||signatories and settlement date Defendants seek to obtain is readily available through the
17 ||agreement alone, even though not everyone affixed their signatures to that version of the
18 ||document. (Doc No. 39-2.) Even so, Defendants have had at their disposal the alternative
19 ||means of obtaining what they seek through the emails exchanged between counsel for
20 || LVNV and Mr. Shaughnessy. For this reason, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request to
21 ||subject Mr. Grace to a deposition for the purpose of identifying simply when and who
22 signed the settlement agreement to the prior action.
23 Further, although Defendants did not expressly request to depose Mr. Grace on other
24 ||matters which Plaintiff could not recall or chose not to answer in deposition, the Court
25 || DENIES Defendants such opportunity here. Defendants were given full reign to set forth
26 || all specific categories of information they seek to obtain through Mr. Grace’s deposition,
27 |\\inclusive of any and all subject matter Plaintiff did not or could not provide in his own
28 || deposition. Because Defendants have not articulated further requests for information in the
1 context of Plaintiff's deposition, the Court finds no basis to widen the scope of Defendants’
2 discovery beyond what Defendants articulated in their own brief.
3 As to Defendants’ broader request for information regarding “information related to
4 || Plaintiff's State Court Matter settlement,” the Court finds Defendants have satisfied the
5 || first prong of the Shelton test. (Doc. No. 37, 2:3-10; 5: 17-20.) Thus far, Defendants have
6 ||taken Mr. Shaughnessy’s deposition and are in possession of the settlement agreement of
7 ||the prior action as well as emails previously exchanged between counsel for LVNV and
8 ||Mr. Shaughnessy. Taken together, however, these sources of information demonstrate
9 || there are certain knowledge gaps which Mr. Grace appears best suited to bridge. The Court
10 ||agrees with Defendants that Mr. Grace “likely has even more complete knowledge of the
11 || circumstances surrounding settlement than Mr. Shaughnessy himself,” as evidenced by Mr.
12 ||Shaughnessy’s inability to recall basic information regarding the prior action’s settlement
13 |}coupled with Mr. Grace’s direct involvement in negotiating, reaching, and finalizing the
14 || prior action’s settlement. (/d., 6:24-7:4.)
15 b. Prong Two: Whether Defendants Seek to Obtain Relevant and Non-
16 Privileged Information from Mr. Grace
17 With the first two categories of information already dispensed with, the Court
18 ||devotes the remainder of its analysis to the broader third category of information
19 || Defendants seek from Mr. Grace regarding “information related to Plaintiff's State Court
20 Matter settlement.” (Doc. No. 37, 2:3-10; 5: 17-20.) As noted, Plaintiff objects to the
21 ||request, arguing “Defendants have failed to meet either of the first two prongs of the three-
22 || prong test to establish the propriety of commending the deposition of Plaintiffs counsel.”
23 ||(Doc. No. 329, 4:4-7.) Plaintiff also speculates Defendants’ intended inquiries to Mr. Grace
24 |\are likely to infringe upon the attorney-client and work-product privileges given the
25 || broadness of Defendants’ request for information regarding the prior action’s settlement.
26 || Ud., 4:14-17; 5:7-14.) The Court disagrees with Plaintiff as to the lack of relevance.
27 \|Further, the Court is not persuaded that Defendants’ potential inquiry into matters
28 ||implicating the attorney-client or work-product privileges should preclude Mr. Grace’s
1 || deposition from taking place altogether.
2 As a foundational matter, Defendants’ request to obtain information from Mr. Grace
3 during deposition regarding settlement of the prior action is relevant. Mr. Shaughnessy’s
4 |\allegations against Defendants inherently invite Defendants to inquire about the
5 ||circumstances surrounding the settlement of the prior action because “Mr. Shaughnessy
6 ||has put the facts surrounding the settlement at issue as the very basis for his claim here
7 ||rests on a failure to properly report his settlement.” (Doc. No. 37, 7:7-11.) For this very
8 ||reason, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied the second prong of the Shelton test and
9 || sufficiently established the relevance of the information they seek from Mr. Grace.
10 Further, while broadly articulated, Defendants’ request for information is limited by
11 || defense counsel’s assertion that he will “(1) not ask[] Mr. Grace what he said to his client
12 his client said to him; and (2) not inquir[e] into [Mr. Grace’s] or his client’s thoughts or
13 ||ampressions of the case.” (Doc. No. 37, 7:17-21.) The Court has been provided no reason
14 doubt that defense counsel will make a good faith effort to avoid probing into privileged
15 || matters throughout Mr. Grace’s deposition. Further, even if defense counsel inadvertently
16 ||poses a question in deposition to Mr. Grace that implicates either the attorney-client
17 privilege or the work-product doctrine, nothing bars Plaintiff's counsel from asserting
18 proper objections to such inquiries. It would be inconceivable to halt depositions from
19 || proceeding altogether simply because an opposing counsel may pose a question that invites
20 |/an objection based on privilege. Certainly, the Court will not do so here.
21 c. Prong Three: Whether the Information Defendants Seek to Obtain
from Mr. Grace Is Crucial to the Preparation of the Case
23 The Court also finds that Defendants have satisfied the third prong under Shelton.
24 || Because Mr. Shaughnessy himself has put at issue “the facts surrounding the settlement”
25 the prior action, and such issue forms “the very basis for his claim here,” Defendants
26 demonstrate that Mr. Grace’s knowledge of non-privileged matters implicating the prior
27 |\action’s settlement is crucial to Defendants’ preparation and defense of the instant
28 || litigation. (Doc. No. 37, 7:7-11.) Further, Plaintiff has asserted he may require MLG to
1 ||submit to a deposition to obtain additional relevant information. (Doc. No. 39, 7:15-20.)
2 || Although Plaintiff has not yet made that decision, should MLG sit for a deposition, it may
3 ||become crucial for Defendants to have the opportunity to depose Mr. Grace, not only to
4 || place MLG’s testimony into proper context and to probe veracity, but also a matter simply
5 ||of fairness and equity. At all times, fact witness’ credibility and their contributions to the
6 || evidentiary record are crucial to a party’s preparation of the case, including Defendants’
7 || preparation here. For this reason, the Court GRANTS Defendants the opportunity to take
8 Grace’s deposition regarding MLG’s involvement in the settlement proceedings in the
9 || prior action if and only if Plaintiff takes MLG’s deposition.
10 d. Defendants’ Proposed Stipulation to Prohibit Plaintiff's Treatment of
11 Mr. Grace as a Fact Witness and Defendants from Deposing Mr.
Grace
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3 Plaintiff criticizes and ascribes “potentially surreptitious intentions” with
14 Defendants’ proposed stipulation that it would forebear from taking Mr. Grace’s deposition
15 provided Plaintiff agreed not to used Mr. Grace as a fact witness. (Doc. No. 39, 6:17-23.)
16 In doing so, however, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the instant dispute, and resulting
7 motion practice, would be obviated if the Parties entered into such a stipulation — assuming,
18 of course, that Plaintiff truly does not intend to treat Mr. Grace as a fact witness for
19 || Purposes of this litigation. But Plaintiff has not yet been willing to reveal whether Mr.
0 Grace will be used either because he does not now know or simply because it is not
strategically sound to reveal his intention at this point.
Plaintiff's reticence to enter into the stipulation, for whatever reason, however,
3 requires the Court then to view his objection to Mr. Grace’s deposition in a light favorable
A to allowing it. While the Court is not concerned with particular litigation strategies either
5 party employs, so long as they are within the bounds of the law, the Court is concerned that
%6 Plaintiff's ongoing unwillingness to indicate whether he intends to use Mr. Grace as a fact
17 witness may prejudice Defendants if, at the proverbial eleventh hour, Plaintiff incorporates
28 Mr. Grace’s testimony into a dispositive motion or at trial. In such an instance, Defendants
1 || would be subject to the unfair surprise of a new fact witness’ testimony without sufficient
2 || time or opportunity to take the deposition of and/or written discovery from the fact witness.
3 As a routine matter, district courts enjoy “wide discretion in controlling discovery,”
4 || particularly where the Court assesses “the potential for unfair surprise to the opposing
5 || party.” Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 4654472, *12 (9th Cir. Sept.
6 || 19, 2014); see also Holak v. K Mart Corp., 2014 WL 4930762, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
7 2014). “The late disclosure of witnesses throws a wrench into [Rule 26(a)'s] machinery. A
8 || party might be able to scramble to make up for the delay, but last-minute discovery may
9 disrupt other plans. And if the discovery cutoff has passed, the party cannot conduct
10 || discovery without a court order permitting extension. This in turn ... impairs the ability of
11 |/every trial court to manage its docket.” Ollier, 2014 WL 4654472, at *12. Accordingly,
12 |/courts may exclude fact witness’ testimony if it presents an unfair surprise to an opposing
13 party and/or a disruption to the court’s schedule. Stone Brewing Co., LLC v. Millercoors
14 || LLC, 2021 WL 63139, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2021) (citing Kilroy v. L.A. Unified School
15 || Dist. Board of Education, 2017 WL 10544624, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2017) (quoting
16 || Russell v. Absolute Collection Services, Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2014) (the purpose
17 || of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(a) is to allow the parties to adequately prepare their
18 cases for trial and to avoid unfair surprise"); Ingenco Holdings, LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co.,
19 F.3d 803, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2019) (late disclosure was not harmless because it disrupted
20 || both defendant's and the court's schedules); Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541
21 ||/F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming preclusion of evidence of damages disclosed
22 ||on the eve of trial, where late disclosure would likely require court to create a new briefing
23 schedule and re-open discovery).
24 Given Plaintiffs reluctance to commit that he will or will not use Mr. Grace as a fact
25 || witness, the Court will make a decision that affords fairness to both Parties. Regardless of
26 ||how Plaintiff chooses to treat Mr. Grace, either as an attorney exclusively or as another
27 || fact witness, Plaintiff must decide by the time frame set below. The Court appreciates there
28 be a real risk of Defendants being precluded from obtaining Mr. Grace’s testimony on
1 ||matters underlying the prior action if Plaintiff was to announce on the eve of fact
2 ||discovery’s closure, for instance, that Plaintiff obtained a declaration, affidavit, or other
3 ||such testimony from Mr. Grace to be used in Plaintiff's summary judgment motion or at
4 || trial.
5 To avoid such unfair surprise, the Court resolves the instant issue of whether
6 || Defendants may depose Mr. Grace regarding the settlement proceedings of the prior action
7 answers in the affirmative under the following conditions. No later than forty-five
8 ||(45) days before the close of fact discovery, Plaintiff shall decide whether or not he will
9 Mr. Grace as a fact witness for purposes of this litigation and notify Defendants in
10 || writing of Plaintiff's decision within such time. If Plaintiff decides to use Mr. Grace as a
11 || fact witness in this case, then Defendants shall have the right to take Mr. Grace’s deposition
12 Mr. Grace shall make himself available for deposition before the close of fact
13 discovery. Conversely, if Plaintiff decides to not use Mr. Grace as a fact witness in this
14 then Plaintiff and Defendants shall enter into a stipulation confirming that Plaintiff
15 || will not use Mr. Grace as a fact witness in this case at any time and, consequently,
16 || Defendants will not have the right to depose Mr. Grace regarding his involvement in the
17 || prior action to any extent (except as described above if, in the event, Plaintiff chooses to
18 ||depose MLG). Should Plaintiff fail to inform Defendant of his decision to use Mr. Grace
19 |las a fact witness in the timeframe set by this Order, then by the discretion this Court
20 || possesses to regulate discovery, Plaintiff will be prohibited from doing so in any manner.
21 IV. CONCLUSION
22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) DENIES Defendants’ request to take the
23 || deposition of Mr. Grace regarding who signed the settlement agreement of the prior action;
24 ||(2) DENIES Defendants’ request to take the deposition of Mr. Grace regarding when the
25 ||settlement agreement of the prior action was reached; (3) GRANTS Defendants the
26 || opportunity to take Mr. Grace’s deposition regarding any matters implicating MLG if and
27 if Plaintiff takes the deposition of MLG; and (4) GRANTS Defendants’ request to
28 Mr. Grace’s deposition regarding his involvement in the settlement proceedings of the
1 || prior state court action if and only if Plaintiff decides to use Mr. Grace as a fact witness in
2 || this case and provides notice of such decision to Defendants at least 45 days in advance of
3 || the close of fact discovery.
4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
5 || Dated: April 2, 2021 : Se
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7 Hon. William V. Gallo
United States Magistrate Judge
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