construing 5 former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
How later courts described this case
- construing 5 former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 GREGORY LEON SPATCHER, Case No.: 3:20-cv-01089-JAH-LL
CDCR #BJ-9222,
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ORDER:
Plaintiff,
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vs. (1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
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PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
SHERIFF GORE;
15 § 1915A(b)(1)
JOHN DOE PSYCH DOCTOR,
16 Defendants. AND
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(2) DENYING MOTION TO
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PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
19 AS MOOT
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[ECF No. 2]
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22 Plaintiff Gregory Leon Spatcher, currently incarcerated at the California Institution
23 for Men in Chino, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint
24 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1.
25 Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he
26 filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)
27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).
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1 I. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
2 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, obligates the
3 Court to review complaints filed by anyone “incarcerated or detained in any facility who
4 is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the
5 terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as
6 soon as practicable after docketing” and regardless of whether the prisoner prepays filing
7 fees or moves to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Pursuant to this provision of
8 the PLRA, the Court is required to review prisoner complaints which “seek[] redress from
9 a governmental entity or officer or employee of a government entity,” and to dismiss those,
10 or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon
11 which relief may be granted,” or which “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
12 immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir.
13 2000); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011). “The purpose of § 1915A
14 is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of
15 responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler
16 v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
17 Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
18 § 1915A(b)(1) because it is duplicative of another civil action he filed in this Court last
19 year. See Spatcher v. San Diego Sheriff Dept., et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:19-cv-
20 1919-BAS-BLM (“Spatcher I”). A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts,
21 both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct
22 relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007)
23 (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).
24 In Spatcher I, Plaintiff sued the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, Vista Detention
25 Facility, San Diego Central Jail, George Bailey Detention Facility, Vista Detention
26 Facility’s Medical [Department], the County of San Diego, Deputies Lake and Escobar,
27 several other unidentified Central Jail Deputies, and “John Doe, Psych Doctor/Mental
28 Health,” for allegedly denying him adequate medical and mental health care at various
1 County facilities in May, June, and July 2019‒‒all immediately following his arrest on
2 May 7, 2019. See Spatcher I, Amend. Compl., ECF No.4 at 4-6. Specifically, Plaintiff
3 alleged to have filed a grievance related to his lack of mental health treatment on June 10,
4 2019, after he “started hearing voices” and requested to see a “psych doctor to start [his]
5 medication.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff claimed he “never saw anyone until June 23, 2019, after [he]
6 took a four year deal,” and claimed he was “forced” to plea guilty as a result of his lack of
7 mental health care. Id.
8 On January 27, 2020, Judge Bashant dismissed portions of Plaintiff’s Amended
9 Complaint in Spatcher I pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), including his
10 inadequate mental health care claims against “John Doe Psych Doctor,” but determined
11 Plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claims against San Diego Sheriff’s Department
12 Deputies Lake and Escobar were sufficient to survive sua sponte screening. See Spatcher
13 I, ECF No. 5 at 6‒9. A summons issued and Judge Bashant directed the U.S. Marshal to
14 effect service upon Deputies Lake and Escobar on Spatcher’s behalf pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
15 § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). Id. at 9‒10. The case was dismissed without prejudice
16 on August 13, 2020, however, after Plaintiff failed to respond to an Order to Show Cause
17 why the case should not be dismissed based on his failure to prosecute. See Spatcher I,
18 ECF Nos. 8‒9.
19 In the Complaint Plaintiff filed in this case on June 15, 2020, Spatcher again seeks
20 to sue the San Diego County Sheriff and “John Doe Psych Doctor” for failing to provide
21 him adequate mental health care while he was detained in the San Diego Central Jail and
22 George Bailey Detention Facility after his arrest on May 7, 2019. See Compl., ECF No. 1
23 at 2‒4. Specifically, Plaintiff repeats his previous allegations of having “put in a[n] inmate
24 grievance” after he “started hearing voices telling [him] to sign a prison deal,” and having
25 filled out a “medical request to see the psych doctor” on May 10, 2019 and/or May 11,
26 2019. Id. at 1, 3‒4. Plaintiff realleges, as he did in Spatcher I, that while a “psych doctor
27 came to [his] cell door,” he was denied any opportunity to consult with the doctor privately
28 until after he pled guilty and “got sentence[d].” Id. at 4.
1 As pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims in this case are duplicative of those
2 previously alleged and dismissed in Spatcher I. A prisoner’s complaint is considered
3 frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it “merely repeats pending or previously
4 litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing
5 former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff
6 has already brought and had dismissed the same claims as those presented in the instant
7 action against the same defendants in Spatcher I, dismissal of this duplicative and
8 subsequently filed civil case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) is warranted. See Cato,
9 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1; see also Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health
10 Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n assessing whether the second action is
11 duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well
12 as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.”), overruled on other grounds by Taylor
13 v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).
14 II. Conclusion and Order
15 Good cause appearing, the Court:
16 1) DISMISSES this civil action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
17 § 1915A(b)(1).
18 2) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as moot.1
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21 1 The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP as moot based on the sua sponte
dismissal of this action, but cautions Plaintiff that he may be barred from proceeding IFP
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in any future civil action or appeal while he remains incarcerated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
23 § 1915(g). “The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) instituted a ‘three-strikes’ rule in
an effort to disincentivize frivolous prisoner litigation.” Hoffmann v. Pulido, 928 F.3d
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1147, 1148‒49 (9th Cir. 2019). “Pursuant to the PLRA, once a prisoner has had three
25 actions dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, that prisoner is no longer permitted to file an action in forma pauperis
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unless the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
27 § 1915(g)). This “broad language covers all such dismissals: It applies to those issued both
with and without prejudice to a plaintiff’s ability to reassert his claim in a later action.”
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1 3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to
2 1128 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and
3 4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a judgment of dismissal and to close
4 || the file.
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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7 || Dated: September 16, 2020 VU
8 n. John A. Houston
9 Anited States District Judge
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21 || yet have three strikes “called” against him when he filed this case on June 15, 2020, see id.
99 at 1724—25, this Court takes judicial notice of an Order to Show Cause issued on August
27, 2020 in a subsequent civil action Plaintiff filed in the Central District of California on
23 || August 24, 2010. See Bias, 508 F.3d at 1255; Spatcher v. Rivera, et al., C.D. Cal. Civil
Case No. 5:20-cv-01705-DSF-KES (“Rivera”). The magistrate judge assigned to Rivera
has identified three qualifying strike dismissals that may preclude his ability to proceed
25 || IFP in that case, and in other future federal civil actions or appeals. See Rivera, C.D. Cal.
Civil Case No. 5:20-cv-01705-DSF-KES (ECF No. 4 at 2-4) (citing Spatcher v. Baird,
6 S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:19-cv-01936-BAS-MSB (ECF Nos. 3, 4) (strike one); Spatcher
27 || v. City of Oceanside, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:19-cv-2281-JAH-RBM (ECF No.
0g 3) (strike two); and Spatcher v. City of Oceanside, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:20-cv-
01554-JLS-WVG (ECE No. 3) (strike three)).