Rutherford v. JC Resorts, LLC

Pore eri reescerntm □□□□

! | JUL 3 2020 |

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 || JAMES RUTHERFORD, an individual, Case No.: 19-cv-00665-BEN-NLS

(2 Panties | ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

13 || Vv. MOTION FOR SUMMARY

14 || JC RESORTS, LLC, a Delaware Limited | JUDGMENT

15 Liability Company; and DOES | through [Doe. No. 13]

50, inclusive, .

16 Defendant.

17 _

18 Before the Court is Defendant JC Resorts, LLC’s (“Defendant”) Motion for

19 |)Summary Judgment, filed on February 28, 2020. (Doc. No. 13.) Plaintiff James

20 Rutherford (“Plaintiff”) filed his Response in opposition on March 16, 2019. (Doc. No.

21 Defendant filed its Reply on March 23, 2019. (Doc. No. 16.) Having reviewed the

22 ||party’s submissions, the Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral

23 |/argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and Civil LR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below,

24 Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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26 |]///

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l I, BACKGROUND

2 Factual Background

3 Plaintiff James Rutherford, through counsel, brings claims for violation of the

4 || California Unruh Civil Rights Act and Americans with Disabilities Act! (“ADA”). (See

> No. I-1 § 14.) Plaintiff’s claims stem from an alleged desire to stay at the Rancho

6 || Bernardo Inn (the “Inn’”) in San Diego, California.” Plaintiff alleges that he is a disabled

7 || individual who relies on manually powered mobility devices, such as a cane, a Rollator

8 || walker, or a wheelchair to ambulate at times.? Jd. He asserts that he frequently travels

9 |; with his fiancé, who is quadriplegic, for both business and pleasure.* As a result, public

10 |} accommodation establishments that he and/or they patronize, must be equipped with _

11 |; ADA compliant mobility accessible features. Aside from his personal necessity for

12 access to public accommodation features, Plaintiff also asserts that he is an ADA

13 compliance “tester” for the purpose of determining whether places of public

14 || accommodation are in compliance with ADA guidelines.°

15 |}

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17 His disabilities substantially limit his performance of “one or more major life

12 activities, including but not limited to: walking, standing, ambulating, sitting, in addition

to twisting, turning and grasping objects.” (See Doc. No. 1-1 4 14.)

19 |}? The Defendant owns and operates the Rancho Bernardo Inn in San Diego,

> California. .

0 Plaintiff suffers from spinal stenosis aggravated by a herniated disc, arthritis in his

21 |j hands and damage to his heels from a previous fracture. (Doc. No. 15 at 8.)

> 4 The Court notes that Plaintiff's fiancé is not a party to this action. Plaintiff has no

2 standing to raise any claims his fiancé might; his rights are limited to the right to stay at

23 motel with his fiancé. His fiancé’s disability is therefore relevant, but only to his own

4 claim. See Chapman vy. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2011)

2 (holding that Article III standing requirements mean an ADA plaintiff must show that

25 || “injunctive relief will vindicate the rights of the particular plaintiff rather than the rights

6 third parties”).

26 The standards governing compliance with the ADA are set forth in the ADA

27 || Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”), with is “essentially an encyclopedia of design

0g standards.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011). The

ADAAG “lay[s] out the technical structural requirements of places of public

1 Plaintiff contends that on January 10, 2019, he visited the Inn’s website to book a □

2 |;room for his fiancé and himself.° /d. After searching the website, Plaintiff claims he was

3 unable to determine if the property was equipped with the necessary accessibility features

4 he and his fiancé require.’ Id. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts the website’s reservation

5 || system did not allow accessible room reservations to be made in the same manner as

6 standard room reservations.’ Jd. 410. Asa result of these barriers, he was unable to

7 j/reserve a room at the Inn. Jd. §] 27-37. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings two

8 || causes of action: an ADA claim arising out of the alleged discrimination he suffered from

9 || the absence of or differences in online accessibility information and room reservation

10 || requirements, and a California Unruh Civil Rights Act claim incorporating the same facts

11 |) and pleadings as the ADA claim. Plaintiff seeks: (1) injunctive relief, compelling

12 || Defendant to comply with the ADA and Unruh Act; (2) damages (nominal and statutory),

13 attorney’s fees and costs, and (4) post-judgment interest. Defendant moves this Court

(14 || for an Order granting its Motion for Summary Judgment on both of Plaintiff's claims.

15 ||(Doc. No. 13 at 3.) □

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18 accommodation.” Fortune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080-81 (9th Cir.

2004).

19 ||® Plaintiff alleged that he attempted to use Defendant’s Website to book an

7 accessible room at Defendant’s hotel, find information about accessible features about an.

0 accessible room and the hotel, but was deterred from using the website and visiting

21 || Defendant’s physical locations due to the lack of accessibility of Defendant’s online

reservations system. (Doc. No. 14 at 4.) .

Barriers that directly affect Plaintiff at a hotel include a lack of accessible routes to

23 from entrances, accessible routes inside facilities, accessible parking, accessible

bathing facilities, handrails and support, accessible pools, accessible elevators, wide

enough doorways, and accessible service counters. In addition to being dangerous for

25 || him because of the danger of falling, these types of barriers also affect his ability to use

either a cane, rollator, or wheelchair to gain access. (Doc. No. 14 at 8.) □

26 “(T]he website and online reservation system prevented me [sic] make a

27 reservation for a room designated as ‘accessible’ (regardless of inadequate descriptions of

28 how a room is accessible) because it required an extra step to make a ‘special request’

before I could make a reservation.” (Doc. No. 14-1 4 11.) .

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| ||B. Procedural Background

2 ‘This case was brought on February 27, 2019, by Plaintiff in the San Diego’

3 ||Superior Court.? (See Doc. No. 1-1.) The Complaint was removed to this Court □□ April

4 |19, 2019, (See Doc. No. 1.) Defendant filed its Answer on April 10, 2019. (Doc. No. 2.)

5 February 28, 2020, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed

6 Response on March 16, 2019, and Defendant filed its Reply on March 23, 2019. (See

7 Nos. 14, 16.)

8 || II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

9 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no-genuine issue of material fact

10 viewing those facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the movant is

11 |/entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

12 ||477 US. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment may also be entered “against a party who

13 || fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

14 || party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Jd. at □□□□ A

15 || fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute is genuine if a

16 j/reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party based on the competing evidence. ©

17 || Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Conclusory or speculative

18 |)testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary

19 |\judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979),

20 Moreover, though a court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility

21 || determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla of contradictory evidence to

22 ||survive summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.

23 |/2000).

24 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply rest

25 |jon the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a material

26 :

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98 9 San Diego Superior Court Complaint, Case Number 37-2019-0001-939-CU-CR-

CTL,

1 |/issue of fact precludes summary judgment. Celotex, 477 US. at 322-23; Matsushita

2 || Elec. Indus, Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cal, Architectural

3 || Bldg, Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

4 Nor will uncorroborated allegations and “self-serving testimony” create a genuine issue

5 material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.

6 }}2002). Thus, “what suffices at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage may not suffice at the later stages

7 the proceedings when the facts are tested.” Syed v. M-I, 853 F.3d 492, n.4 (9th Cir.

8 |/2017). Thus, a court should grant summary judgment against a party who fails to

9 demonstrate facts sufficient to establish an element essential to his case when that party □

10. || will ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. This Court

11 |\is at that later stage now.

12 Ill. DISCUSSION

13 As a threshold matter, Defendant has challenged Plaintiff's standing to sue.

14 Specifically, Defendant argues the entire ADA claim fails as a matter of law because

15 Plaintiffs Complaint does not sufficiently allege that he was “deterred from” or “would

16 visit the Inn in the future.” (Doc. No. 13 at 3.) Next, Plaintiff failed to plead

17 |\sufficient facts to state a claim under the ADA. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff is not entitled to

18 || statutory damages because he cannot show he was denied access to the Inn or that

19 || Defendant intentionally discriminated against him. Finally, Defendant asserts that the

20 || Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. See

21 at3. The Court addresses the threshold issue of standing first.

22 ||A. Article T1 Standing

23 “[A]s with other civil rights statutes, to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts,

24 disabled individual claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy

25 ||jrequirement of Article ITI by demonstrating his standing to sue at each stage of the

26 litigation.” Chapman v. Pier I Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011)

27 |\(citations omitted). “In addition, to establish standing to pursue injunctive relief, which is

28 |/the only relief available to private plaintiffs under the ADA, [a plaintiff] must

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1 || demonstrate a ‘real and immediate threat of repeated injury’ in the future.” Jd. (citing

2 || Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004)).

3 To have standing, a plaintiff must establish three elements. Lujan v. Defenders of

4 || Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). First, the plaintiff “must have suffered an injury

5 |i in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

6 || particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Jd. at 560

7 || (citations omitted). Second, “there must be a causal connection between the injury and

8 ||the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged

9 action of the defendant and not ... th[e] result fof] the independent action of some third

10 || party not before the court.’” Jd. (citations omitted), Third, “it must be ‘likely,’ as

11 || opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

12 ||decision,’” Id. at 561 (citation omitted). The burden falls on the plaintiff to show that it

13 met all three requirements. /d. .

14 Federal courts “to take a broad view of constitutional standing in civil rights cases,

15 especially where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits are the primary method of

16 | obtaining compliance with the Act.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039-40

17 || (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,

18 ||409 U.S, 205, 209 (1972); 42 U.S.C. 12188(a) (providing private right of action for

19 || injunctive relief against public accommodations that violate the ADA). Accordingly,

20 ||“[o}nce a disabled individual has encountered or become aware of alleged ADA

21 violations that deter his patronage of or otherwise interfere with his access to a place of

22 |) public accommodation, he has already suffered an injury in fact traceable to the

23 || defendant’s conduct and capable of being redressed by the courts, and so he possesses

24 ||standing under Article III ....” Doran, 524 F.3d at 1042 n.5.

25 1. Website

26 || - (a) Actual or Imminent Injury

27 In the context of ADA discrimination claims, the Ninth Circuit recognizes a

28 || deterrent effect doctrine. See, e.g., Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc,, 524 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th

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1 2008). A disabled individual has suffered an actual injury if he is “currently deterred

2 || from patronizing a public accommodation due to a defendant’s failure to comply with the

3 |ADA....” Id. at 1040. In this case, Plaintiff's “knowledge” that the Inn is not ADA or

4 ||state law compliant comes entirely from his review of Defendant’s website. Evidence of

5 ||the plaintiff's “actual knowledge” of a barrier is sufficient to demonstrate an actual

6 ||injury. Moreover, “[w]here an individual knows of ADA violations at a public

7 ||accommodation, he is not required to keep returning in order to show imminent injury.”

8 || Gastelum v. Canyon Hospitality LLC, No. 17-CV-2792-PHX-GMS, 2018 WL 2388047,

*6 (D. Ariz. May 25, 2018). Instead, the ongoing deterrence is sufficient to satisfy the

10 |jrequirement of an actual and imminent injury. Doran, 524 F.3d at 1040. Here, it is

‘11 undisputed that Plaintiff gained actual knowledge of the alleged barriers.

12 Defendant argues, however, that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an actual injury

13 |} because his sole motivation for acquiring that knowledge was to initiate a lawsuit. (Doc.

14 ||No. 13.) This argument, however, is inconsistent with prevailing Ninth Circuit law,

15 || which maintains that “motivation is irrelevant to the question of standing under Title III

16 |jofthe ADA.” See Civil Rights Educ. And Enforcement Ctr. v. Hospitality Props. Tr., 867

7 F.3d 1093, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter “CREEC”); Gastelum, 2018 WL

18 || 2388047, at *6 (“This so-called ‘tester standing’ rule means that a plaintiff can visit or

19 || otherwise obtain information about a public accommodation solely for the purpose of

20 |/ensuring ADA compliance and with the intent to bring a lawsuit if deficiencies are

21 ||found.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's knowledge of alleged barriers is sufficient evidence of

22 actual and imminent injuty.

23 (b) Concrete and Particularized Harm | □

24 A plaintiff may show a concrete and particularized injury by “stating that he is

25 ||currently deterred from attempting to gain access” to the public accommodation due to a

26 || barrier. Doran, 524 F.3d at 1040. A barrier in a public accommodation must “interfere

27 || with the plaintiffs full and equal enjoyment of the facility.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports

28 || (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). A barrier, however, “only amounts to such

1 |{interference if it affects the plaintiff's full and equal enjoyment of the facility on account

2 || of his particular disability.” Id. A “bare procedural violation” unassociated with a

3 || plaintiff's particular disability “cannot satisfy the demands of Article III” standing.

4 || Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).

5 For example, in Chapman, the plaintiff alleged “that he is ‘physically disabled,’

6 || and that he ‘visited the Store’ and ‘encountered architectural barriers that denied him full

7 ||and equal access.’” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 954. The plaintiff, however, “simply

8 j|identifie[d] alleged ADA ... violations without connecting the alleged violations to [his]

9 || disability or indicating whether or not he encountered any one of them in such a way as

10 |/to impair his full and equal enjoyment of the Store.” Jd. Asa result, the Ninth Circuit

11 || found these allegations insufficient to establish a concrete and particularized harm for

12 || purposes of the injury-in-fact requirement.

13 || . Likewise, Plaintiffs failure to connect the alleged ADA violations from

14 || website and reservation system to his specific disability is fatal to his ability to show a

15 concrete and particularized harm, More importantly, since this is a motion for summary

16 |) judgment, Plaintiff must present evidence of harm to support his claim of Article II

17 ||standing."° Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Inn’s website violates 28 C.F.R. 36,302(e)(1),

18 || requiring facilities to “identify and describe accessible features ... in enough detail to

19 ||reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given |

20 hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs.” (Doc. No. 1-2 §{f] 22-32.) In

21 case, he did not state what accessibility feature(s) were missing, or explain how it

22 |\prevented him from reserving a room utilizing the website reservation system. Later,

23 || when Plaintiff attempts to rectify this shortcoming in his reply, he only generally

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26 “Of course, standing ‘must be supported at each stage of the litigation in the same

27 |;|manner as any other essential element of the case,’ and what suffices at the Rule 12(b)(6)

28 stage may not suffice at later stages of the proceedings when the facts are tested.” Syed v.

M-I, 853 F.3d 492, n.4 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

1 describes various barriers that affect him when he stays at hotels, such as lack of

2 ;,accessible routes to and from entrances, accessible routes inside facilities, accessible

3 parking, accessible bathing facilities, handrails and support, accessible pools, accessible

4 ||elevators, wide enough doorways, and accessible service counters. (Doc. No. 14 at 8.)

5 ||Once again, Plaintiff “does not even attempt to relate the alleged violations to his

6 disability.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 954. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain standing

7 ||to bring the lawsuit on this bare procedural allegation.

8 (c) Injunctive Relief .

9 A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must also show that there is a “real and

10 ||/immediate threat of repeated injury.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. In ADA cases, a plaintiff

11 ||may show a real and immediate threat of injury in two ways: (1) “he intends to return to a

12°||noncompliant accommodation and is therefore likely to reencounter a discriminatory

13 |) architectural barrier;” or (2) the “discriminatory architectural barriers deter him from

14 returning to a noncompliant accommodation” which he would otherwise visit in the

15 || course of his regular activities. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 950. In recognizing the deterrent

16 || effect and tester standing doctrines, “the Ninth Circuit did not relax the requirement that

17 || the Plaintiff demonstrate real and immediate threat of repeated injury by showing a

18 legitimate intent to visit again the public accommodation in question.” Gastelum, 2018

19 || WL 2388047, at *6. Demonstrating “past exposure to illegal conduct” alone is not

20 || sufficient to demonstrate a present case or controversy; instead, “the plaintiff must allege

21 |}continuing, present adverse effects stemming from the defendant’s action.” CREEC, 867

22 ||F.3d at 1098. For instance, a plaintiff may show continuing adverse effects by showing

23 |\that a “defendant’s failure to comply with the ADA deters [him] from making use of the

24 ||defendant’s facility.” Jd. But, to be deterred from making use of the defendant’s facility,

25 must have a true desire to return to the facility but for the barriers. See, e.g., D’Lil v.

26 || Best Western Encino Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037-38 (9th Cir, 2008).

27 In determining whether a plaintiff has a future intent to visit the public

28 accommodation at issue, courts consider a series of factors, including: “(1) the proximity

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1 || of the place of public accommodation to plaintiff's residence, (2) plaintiff’s past

2 || patronage of defendant’s business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff's plans to return, and

3 the plaintiff's frequency of travel near defendant.” Harris v. Del Taco, Inc., 396 F.

4 || Supp. 2d 1107, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Courts are to make a case-by-case determination,

5 light of all the evidence. See CREEC, 867 F.3d at 1100.

6 Defendant argues that “Plaintiff fails to demonstrate, concrete plans to stay at the

7 || [Defendant’s Inn] in the future. ...” (See generally Doc. Nos. 13 and 15.) The Court

8 agrees. Plaintiff has never stayed at the Inn. In fact, he has only visited the Defendant’s

9 || website. Although Plaintiff likes to travel to San Diego for pleasure, and other times for

10 || litigation purposes and hearings, there is insufficient evidence that he actually stays in

||hotels of the same caliber as Defendant’s property for any of those purposes. (Doc. No.

12 || 14-1 16-20.) And, although Plaintiff avows that he wants to visit “Defendant’s Hotel”

13 |) overnight given its reputation as a luxurious and comfortable hotel, he fails to articulate

14 |) any specific plan to return or explain why he is likely to want to stay at or visit

15 || Defendant’s hotel in the future with any specific detail. Jd. Plaintiffs suggestion that he

16 |} would like to “visit” and “stay overnight” is anything but specific about that time."

17 ||(Doc. No, 14 at 11.) Absent a showing of specific plans or that he likely would visit

18 || Defendant’s Inn, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a real and immediate threat of □□□□□□□□

19 injury. See Gastelum, 2018 WL 2388047 at *7. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have

20 || standing to pursue this ADA claim.

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24 Plaintiff would like to return to the Website and visit Defendant’s Hotel overnight

25 || given its reputation as a luxurious and comfortable hotel. He plans to stay overnight at

the Hotel with his fiancé and they will be driving the wheelchair accessible van she

26 requires to travel via automobile (she uses a power wheelchair that deploys viaramp □□□

27 from her van). Plaintiff also plans to use his Rollator walker to ambulate when he visits

the Hotel, since he has been using it more frequently recently due to worsening stenosis

28 symptoms and corresponding difficulty in mobility.” (Doc. No. 14 at 11.)

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1 2. Reservation System

2 Plaintiff's also alleges that Defendant’s website reservation system reserves _

3 || accessible rooms differently than non-accessible rooms. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

4 |\that “[t]he ... online reservation system prevented me [sic] mak[ing] a reservation for a

5 ||room designated as ‘accessible’ (regardless of inadequate descriptions of how a room is

6 || accessible) because it required an extra step to make a ‘special request’ before I could

7 ||make a reservation,”!? (Doc. No. 1-2 § 21(f).) However, he provides little explanation of

8 || this purported difference other than asserting that the reservation system requires a

9 || special request be submitted. As with his other website-related claim, Plaintiff's vague

10 || assertion is insufficient. Therefore, the Court finds that it lacks standing over Plaintiff's

{jsecond ADA allegation as well. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as

12 |\to Plaintiff's ADA claim.

13 ||B. State Law Claim — Unruh Act

14 Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's damages claim under

15 ||the Unruh Act. (Doc. No. 16 at 8.) Because the Court grants summary judgment on

16 || Plaintiff's ADA claim, the only remaining issue is whether the Court may exercise

17 ||supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claim.

18 The Court has supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related to

19 claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case

20 |) or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The ADA and state law claims share a common

21 |inucleus of operative fact and are “part of the same case or controversy”; both use

22 || identical factual allegations and violations of the ADA to constitute violations of the

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mai

25 ||'2 | When attempting to make a reservation, Plaintiff found that the Website treated the

26 accessible rooms as a special request and hot as a room type that can be reserved as

can other rooms with the following special request options: "Handicapped Accessible

27 ||Room" and "Handicapped Accessible Room w/ Rollin Shower"; however, the □

98 information provided lacks specificity and does not provide sufficient detail for

Plaintiff to determine whether the Subject Property will meet his accessibility needs.

I parallel Unruh Act. Nevertheless, once the Court acquires supplemental jurisdiction, it

2 ||may decline to exercise it if: .

3 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law;

4 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

5 - district court has original jurisdiction;

6 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction;

T° or

8 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

9 jurisdiction.

10 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

11 |} The decision to retain jurisdiction over state law claims is within the district court’s

12 discretion, weighing factors such as economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Brady

13 ||v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995).

14 Here, the Court granted summary judgment on the ADA claim, the only claim over

15 || which it has original jurisdiction. “[I]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are

16 ||/eliminated before trial, the balance of factors. ...will point toward declining to exercise

17 ||jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484

18 343, 350 1.7 (1988).

19 Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

20 |i Unruh Act claim, as it has “dismissed ail claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

21 ||28 U.S.C. § 1367(c\(1); see, e.g., Oliver, 654 F.3d at 910 (finding that the district court

22 || did not abuse its discretion in dismissing state law claims under the UCRA and CDPA

23 |/after losing original jurisdiction over ADA claim); see also Rodgers v. Chevys

24 || Restaurants, LLC, No. C13-03923 HRL, 2015 WL 909763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24,

25 ||2015) (“Ina Title WI ADA action, a district court may properly decline supplemental

26 jjjurisdiction over related state-law access claims once the ADA claim has been

27 |/dismissed.”). Since the Court is declining supplemental jurisdiction, we are required to

28 || REMAND the Unruh Act claim back to the Superior Court.

12

1 TV. CONCLUSION

2 For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for

3 ||Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's federal ADA claim. The Court DECLINES to

4 || retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs State law Unruh Act claim and

5 |j accordingly REMANDS this action to the San Diego County Superior Court.

6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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-8 ||Dated: July pin ;

9

. on t T. Benitéz

10 United States DistrictJudge

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