“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 1 subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s 2 || discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks 3 || omitted
How later courts described this case
- “[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 1 subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s 2 || discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks 3 || omitted
- screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 27 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”
- discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
- “We cannot 15 conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State 16 from being sued without its consent. […] We hold that neither a State nor its officials 17 acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 DAVID DEAN WATKINS, Case No.: 3:19-cv-1000-JAH-WVG
CDCR #V-04739,
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ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
Plaintiff,
13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
vs. FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND
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FOR SEEKING DAMAGES FROM
JUDGE BERNARD REVAK;
15 IMMUNE DEFENDANT PURSUANT
STATE OF CALIFORNIA;
TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
16 TALETHA SUITTS,
AND § 1915A(b)
17 Defendants.
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23 I. Procedural History
24 On May 28, 2019, David Dean Watkins (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the
25 Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) located in Corcoran, California, and
26 proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl.,
27 ECF No. 1.
28 / / /
1 Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when
2 he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)
3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).
4 On July 3, 2019, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but
5 simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief
6 could be granted and for seeking money damages against immune defendants. (ECF No.
7 3 at 9-10.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the
8 deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On August 2, 2019,
9 Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 4.)
10 II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
11 A. Standard of Review
12 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-
13 answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these
14 statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of
15 it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants
16 who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
17 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.
18 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that
19 the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”
20 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford
21 Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
22 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
23 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
24 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668
25 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th
26 Cir. 2012) (screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in
27 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).
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1 Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
2 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
3 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed
4 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
5 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
6 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-
7 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
8 common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-
9 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.;
10 see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
11 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
13 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
14 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
15 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030,
16 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).
17 C. Discussion
18 1. Heck Bar
19 Plaintiff’s FAC is far from clear, but it appears is that he is challenging his
20 conviction following a jury trial in 2003. (See FAC at 3.) Plaintiff requests that this
21 Court “reduce” his sentence and order a “new trial in the interest of justice.” (FAC at 7.)
22 He also seeks $155,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. (See id.)
23 First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief based on claims
24 that he was wrongfully convicted, he may not pursue those claims in a civil rights action
25 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction has already been
26 invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
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1 In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
2 in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
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actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
4 sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
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expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
6 tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
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corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
8 relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
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10 Id. at 486-87; Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054-55
11 (9th Cir. 2016).
12 “Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within
13 ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state
14 prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but
15 not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir.
16 2003) (emphasis added), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973)
17 (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a
18 state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in
19 federal court).
20 Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence, he may
21 not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless that conviction and/or sentence has already been
22 invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a
23 showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no
24 cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489.
25 Thus, because Plaintiff does not claim to have already invalidated his sentence by
26 way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either a state or federal
27 court writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his current FAC must be dismissed in
28 its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.
1 2. Rooker Feldman Doctrine
2 Additionally, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking a ruling from this Court essentially
3 overturning a California State Court decision. However, this is not a viable form of relief
4 in this action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “‘a losing party in state court
5 is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment
6 in a United States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment
7 itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir.
8 2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see District of
9 Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 & 486 (1983); Rooker v.
10 Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
11 Review of state court decisions may only be conducted in the United States
12 Supreme Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 & 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see 28
13 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies even if the complaint
14 raises federal constitutional issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 & 486; Henrichs v.
15 Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the bar
16 applies if the challenge to the state court decision is brought as a § 1983 civil rights
17 action. See Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995); Worldwide Church of God
18 v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986).
19 A complaint challenges a state court decision if the constitutional claims presented
20 to the district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision in a
21 judicial proceeding. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. “[T]he federal claim is inextricably
22 intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent
23 that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
24 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)(Marshall, J., concurring); see also Worldwide Church of God, 805
25 F.2d at 891-92.
26 Because Plaintiff appears to seek this Court’s assistance in overturning orders
27 made by state court judges based on the same claims brought in this action, his claims are
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1 inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings, and are barred by the Rooker-
2 Feldman doctrine.
3 4. Eleventh Amendment
4 Plaintiff also names the “State of California” as a Defendant. (Compl. at 1, 2.)
5 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state, absent the state’s affirmative waiver
6 of its immunity or congressional abrogation of that immunity. Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd.
7 of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The
8 Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types of relief,
9 absent unequivocal consent by the state.”) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit
10 has recognized that “[t]he State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment
11 immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme
12 Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment
13 immunity.” Brown v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009);
14 see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 71 (1989) (“We cannot
15 conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State
16 from being sued without its consent. […] We hold that neither a State nor its officials
17 acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).
18 Accordingly, the Court dismisses the State of California as a party to this action
19 sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) as barred by the
20 Eleventh Amendment.
21 F. Leave to Amend
22 Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his pleading
23 deficiencies, as well as an opportunity to amend those claims to no avail. See ECF No. 3.
24 Therefore, the Court denies further leave to amend as futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned
25 Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself,
26 justify the denial of ... leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845
27 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir.
28 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has
1 subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s
2 || discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks
3 || omitted) (second alteration in original)).
Conclusion and Order
5 Accordingly, the Court:
6 1) DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend for failure to
7 || state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
8 H§ 1915A(b);
9 2) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant
10 || to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and
11 3) | DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to
12 close the file.
13 IT IS SO ORDERED.
14 || Dated: August 22, 2019
15 Hoy. JOHN A. HOUSTON
16 United States District Judge
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7 ok oe