Nettles v. Falck Northern California Corp.

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SIMONE NETTLES,

10 Case No. 24-cv-01640-RS

Plaintiff,

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v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

12 REMAND

FALCK NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

13 CORP.,

14 Defendant.

15 I. INTRODUCTION

16 In this putative wage and hour class action, Plaintiff Simone Nettles asserts Defendant

17 Falck Northern California Corporation (“Falck”), a provider of emergency medical services to

18 Alameda County, violated various provisions of California state law. Nettles originally filed this

19 case in Alameda County Superior Court. Falck removed to federal court on March 15, 2024,

20 asserting federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the grounds that several of

21 Nettles’ state law claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)

22 because they depend on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Nettles

23 now moves to remand, arguing Falck’s removal was procedurally improper and that Falck failed

24 to demonstrate any claims require interpretation of the CBA. For the reasons below, the motion to

25 remand is granted.1

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1 Falck requests that judicial notice be taken of several complaints with “verbatim allegations”

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filed by counsel for Plaintiff in other actions. Dkt. 18, at 7. Nettles does not oppose this request.

1 II. BACKGROUND

2 Falck “took over as the exclusive provider of 911 transport for Alameda County” from the

3 County’s previous provider in July 2019. Dkt. 18, at 3. Nettles brings ten causes of action

4 asserting Falck and various Doe defendants violated various California wage and hour statutes in a

5 “boilerplate” complaint devoid of specific facts.2 See id. The complaint identifies a proposed class

6 of similarly situated individuals it defines as:

7 All current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for

any of the Defendants within the State of California at any time during the

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period from four years preceding the filing of this Complaint to final judgment

9 and who reside in California.

10 Dkt. 1-3. Defendants employed Nettles and the other members of the putative class in California

11 as hourly paid or non-exempt workers, and Nettles asserts she was employed by Falck from June

12 2019 to April 2021. Though not mentioned in her complaint, Nettles appears to have worked as a

13 Vehicle Supply Technician responsible for restocking ambulances and otherwise preparing

14 ambulances for emergency calls.

15 III. LEGAL STANDARD

16 A defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action brought in a State court of

17 which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

18 When a defendant removes a case, the plaintiff may move to remand the case at any time on the

19 basis that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Courts

20 strictly construe the removal statute against finding federal subject matter jurisdiction such that

21 doubt regarding the right to remove an action should be resolved in favor of remand. Provincial

22 Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Matheson v.

23 Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The defendant bears the

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proceedings in other courts” where “those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”

26 (citation omitted)).

27 2 Falck points to several nearly identical complaints counsel for Plaintiff has filed in other actions.

1 burden to show removal was proper. Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque, 582 F.3d at 1087.

2 IV. DISCUSSION

3 The parties dispute whether LMRA § 301 preempts Nettles’ state law causes of action for

4 overtime and/or meal and rest breaks and thus gives rise to a federal question.3 Section 301

5 provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . .

6 may be brought in any district court of the United States.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Although normally

7 federal preemption is a defense that does not authorize removal to federal court, § 301 has such

8 ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common law complaint into

9 one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” Curtis v. Irwin

10 Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58,

11 65 (1987)). Accordingly, a civil complaint raising claims preempted by § 301 raises a federal

12 question and can properly be removed to a federal court.

13 Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007), supplies the relevant two-

14 step test for whether § 301 preempts Nettles’ state-law claims. At the first step of the Burnside

15 analysis, courts assess whether a right was conferred by a state law rather than by a CBA. Id. at

16 1059. If a right “exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted.” Id. If the right

17 “exists independently of the CBA,” the second prong of the inquiry turns on whether a right is

18 “substantially dependent on analysis” of a CBA. Id. (citing Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,

19 394 (1987)). Whether a right substantially depends on analysis of a CBA depends on whether a

20 claim is resolvable by looking to versus interpreting the CBA. Id. at 1060. If it is necessary merely

21 to look to the CBA to adjudicate a claim, the claim is not preempted; if, on the other hand, it is

22 necessary to interpret the CBA to adjudicate a claim, the claim is preempted. Id. “Interpretation is

23 construed narrowly,” and “means something more than consider, refer to, or apply.” Alaska

24 Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 922 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Where a provision of a

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26 3 Nettles makes several arguments that Falck’s removal was procedurally improper such that

remand is appropriate. These arguments need not be addressed given that, as detailed below,

27 Nettles’ claims are not preempted by the LMRA.

1 CBA is “only potentially relevant to the state law claims, without any guarantee that interpretation

2 or direct reliance on the CBA terms will occur,” preemption is not triggered. Humble v. Boeing

3 Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002).

4 A. Overtime Claims

5 Falck does not make an argument under the first prong of Burnside; instead, it argues,

6 under the second prong, that Nettles’ claims will require interpretation of the CBA. Falck claims

7 that, in response to its requests for admission (“RFAs”), Nettles raised a dispute over the meaning

8 of the terms “Vehicle Supply Technician” and the “non-field” (as compared to “field”) job

9 classification in the CBA.4 The CBA distinguishes between “field” and “non-field” employees in

10 specifying the overtime pay to which employees in each category are entitled but does not define

11 those terms. Falck explains it has “followed the rules requiring the payment of daily overtime” for

12 non-field employees since 2019, Dkt. 1, at 11–12, suggesting it believes § 514 (and, therefore, the

13 CBA), rather than § 510, governs employees’ entitlement to overtime. Falck, however, has not

14 made a showing or submitted evidence that the CBA meets § 514’s requirements, which are

15 provided below:

16 Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective

bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours

17 of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement

provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular

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hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the

19 state minimum wage.

20 Cal. Labor Code § 514; see, e.g., Ariola v. Raytheon CA Techs. Corp., No. CV 23-4664-MWF

21 (AGRx), 2023 WL 5764296, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023) (finding defendants failed to show

22 § 514’s requirements were satisfied).

23 It is thus necessary to proceed to step two of the Burnside analysis and assess whether

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4 In its opposition to Nettles’ motion to remand, Falck appears to clarify the only terms it believes

26 require interpretation for Nettles’ overtime claims are “field” and “non-field.” Thus, regardless of

whether Nettles’ job title was “Vehicle Supply Technician” or “Vehicle Service Technician,” those

27 titles are interchangeable and do not require CBA interpretation.

1 Nettles’ right to overtime will require interpretation of the CBA. Falck argues interpretation will

2 be necessary to determine whether Vehicle Supply Technicians like Nettles waived their

3 entitlement to daily overtime. Falck, however, has not made any showing that the CBA complies

4 with the requirements of § 514 such that that section—rather than § 510—applies to Nettles’

5 overtime claim. Compare Radcliff v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 519 F. Supp. 743, 749 (S.D. Cal.

6 2021) (finding defendants demonstrated plaintiff was “subject to a CBA compliant with section

7 514”). Thus, Falck’s argument that the terms “field” and “non-field” must be interpreted to

8 adjudicate whether the CBA’s ostensible waiver of daily overtime for field employees applies is

9 speculative, as there is no “guarantee that interpretation or direct reliance on the CBA terms will

10 occur.” Humble, 305 F.3d at 1010. Section 510 entitles employees to overtime for “[a]ny work in

11 excess of eight hours in one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek.”

12 Falck has not shown it will be necessary to look beyond this provision to determine the pay to

13 which any employee was entitled.

14 Even were § 514 applicable, Falck has not met its burden to show it would be necessary to

15 interpret, rather than merely look to, the meaning of “field” or “non-field” in the CBA so as to

16 invoke § 301 preemption. It is not obvious, as a preliminary matter, that the parties dispute the

17 meanings of “field” and “non-field” as descriptors for types of employees. See Livadas v.

18 Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994) (“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of

19 dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of

20 state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.”). Nettles argues her

21 responses to Falck’s RFAs on the subject simply stated she lacked “enough information to admit

22 or deny that she was within this classification”—not that she has a different interpretation of “non-

23 field” than Falck. See Dkt. 17, at 16. There is nothing to suggest the parties hold clearly

24 distinguishable views regarding the meaning of these terms.

25 Nor does the fact the CBA defines neither “field” or “non-field” mean judicial

26 interpretation of those terms will be required. See Huffman v. Pac. Gateway Concessions, Inc.,

27 No. 19-cv-1791, 2019 WL 2563133, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2019) (holding court could “simply

1 look to” CBA to assess which job description applied to plaintiff). In Huffman, the court found

2 assessing whether an employee qualified as a “Lead” required no more analysis than determining

3 whether that employee qualified as a “Prep Cook” or a “Cook.” Id.; see also Cranton v.

4 Grossmont Hosp. Corp., No. 22-cv-443 JLS (MDD), 2022 WL 16572028, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1,

5 2022) (finding what constituted “special premium pay” determinable based on “factual

6 assessment” outside of CBA). “Field” versus “non-field” positions, according to Falck’s own

7 representations, are easy to differentiate, as they are terms “routinely used within the ambulance

8 industry.” Dkt. 18, at 12. Falck explains “field” refers to “EMTs and Paramedics that operate the

9 ambulances,” whereas “non-field” refers to “support employees such as VSTs, who remain at

10 headquarters as opposed to out in the community.” Id. For these reasons, even had Falck shown

11 “field” and “non-field” are necessarily implicated in this case, it has not shown a need to interpret

12 those terms rather than merely look to them. There is no basis to find Nettles’ overtime claims

13 preempted under step two of the Burnside analysis.

14 B. Meal and Rest Period Claims

15 Falck also argues Nettles’ meal and rest period claims will require interpretation of CBA

16 terms such that § 301 preemption is warranted under Burnside’s second step for those claims. For

17 the reasons explained above, Falck’s argument with respect to the “field” and “non-field” terms in

18 the CBA does not persuade. Setting those terms aside, Falck also contends it will be necessary to

19 interpret Article 10.10 of the CBA, which provides for employee meal and rest periods, in order to

20 determine whether it is facially compliant with California law. Falck claims an actual dispute

21 regarding whether Article 10.10 is facially compliant with California law providing for meal and

22 rest periods arose when Nettles refused to admit, in response to Falck’s RFAs, to that proposition.

23 Article 10.10 provides as follows:

24 Non-field employees shall be provided paid meal and rest breaks. Non-field

employees shall be allowed a thirty (30) minute paid meal period reasonably

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close to the middle one third (1/3) of each eight (8) hour segment of their shift

26 and any additional segment over three (3) hours. All employees are required to

take at least one fifteen (15) minute paid rest break every four (4) hours.

27 Employees may be called back from their breaks or meal periods due to

operational necessities. Bathroom breaks shall not be unreasonably denied.

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2 This language is straightforward. A court would need only to look to Article 10.10’s terms to

3 determine what it requires. See McGhee v. Tesoro Refining & Mktg. Co., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1062,

4 1069–70 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (finding defendants’ policies neither “complicated” nor “necessarily

5 disputed”). Nor has Falck shown an actual dispute regarding whether Falck’s meal break policy is

6 facially compliant with § 512. Falck does not point to any specific contract term in Article 10.10

7 that the parties dispute. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124. In other words, this is not an instance where

8 specific industry terms in a CBA need interpretation. See Marquez v. Toll Global Forwarding, No.

9 18-cv-3054-ODW (ASx), 2018 WL 3218102, at 3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2018) (finding need to

10 interpret specific terms like “load” and “unattended”); see also Gunther v. North Coast Coop.,

11 Inc., No. 20-cv-2325, 2020 WL 3394547, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2020) (finding no active

12 dispute about meaning of terms where defendant did not “point to any specific terms that are

13 undefined, disputed, ambiguous, or otherwise require some interpretation”). Though Falck

14 contends the parties dispute what Article 10.10 authorized, “the focus remains on Defendant[’s]

15 actions, not the CBAs’ authorizations.” McGhee, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1069.

16 Falck concludes Nettles must have had a different “understanding of the verbiage” of

17 Article 10.10 because of her refusal to admit to RFAs that she was “authorized” to take or was

18 “provided” appropriate breaks. Dkt. 1, at 16. It is far from clear this is the case. For one thing,

19 Falck points to no particular “verbiage” to which the parties ascribe different meanings. Simply

20 asserting a court will have to interpret whether a CBA provision complies with other authority is

21 insufficient to demonstrate an active dispute. See Linebarger v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, LLC,

22 No. SACV 20-00309 JVS (JDEx), 2020 WL 1934958, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2020) (noting

23 mere assertion CBA conflicted with relevant wage order insufficient to demonstrate active

24 dispute). Nettles’ refusal to respond affirmatively to Falck’s RFAs does not, without more,

25 establish she disputes Article 10.10’s facial compliance with § 512, especially given that she

26 supplemented her RFA responses with interrogatory responses explaining she was not provided

27 compliant breaks as a matter of practice.

1 Finally, Falck contends interpreting Article 10.10 will be critical to any eventual class

2 || certification analysis because that analysis will turn on whether the CBA is facially compliant with

3 California law. As Falck acknowledges in its briefing, however, that a particular theory of liability

4 (for instance, a facially deficient policy) may be a basis for class certification does not mean such

5 a theory must serve as the basis for certification. There is no guarantee determining whether Falck

6 || provided compliant meal periods will require interpretation of Article 10.10.

7 V. CONCLUSION

8 Nettles’ motion to remand this action is granted because Falck has not met its burden to

9 || show Nettles’ claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.

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11 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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13 Dated: June 6, 2024

a

RICHARD SEEBORG

IS Chief United States District Judge

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98 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

CASE No. 24-cv-01640-RS