Opinion

Taylor v. San Francisco Sheriff's Department

Court: District Court, N.D. California
Filed: May 31, 2024
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 19.0%

stating that Title VII requires the plaintiff to exhaust 26 administrative remedies before seeking a private action for damages

How later courts described this case

stating that Title VII requires the plaintiff to exhaust 26 administrative remedies before seeking a private action for damages
denying leave to amend “where the amendment would be 22 futile”
“the principles defining the 25 preemptive reach of the NLRA are generally applicable in determining the scope of PERB’s preemptive jurisdiction under EERA”
finding that the court had jurisdiction over federal civil rights 24 claims, concurrent with NLRB’s jurisdiction over overlapping unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7 MECHIEL TAYLOR, Case No. 23-cv-04121-DMR

8 Plaintiff,

OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO

9 v. DISMISS

10 SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF'S Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 20, 24, 41, 50, 64

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

13 Plaintiff Mechiel Taylor, representing herself, filed a first amended complaint against

14 sixteen defendants1 alleging civil rights and state tort law claims relating to incidents that

15 happened during her employment with Five Keys Schools and Programs (“Five Keys”). [Docket

16 No. 13 (First Amended Complaint, “FAC”).] Eleven2 of the defendants now move to dismiss in

17 six different motions:

18 - Superior Court of California Contra Costa County (“Superior Court”) [Docket No. 18];

19 - United Educators of San Francisco (“UESF”) and Matthew Milton (collectively “UESF

20 Defendants”) [Docket No. 20];

21 - City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) and San Francisco Sheriff’s Department

22 (“SFSD”) (collectively “San Francisco Defendants”) [Docket No. 24];

23 - County of Alameda, Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”), and Nicole

1 The complaint includes the City of San Ramon as a seventeenth defendant. Plaintiff has since

voluntarily dismissed the City of San Ramon as a party.

2 Five of the defendants—Five Keys, Melanie Fukuhara, Steve Good, Lisa Haynes, and Mary

Vigil, collectively “Five Keys Defendants”—filed an answer to the complaint instead of moving

1 Tremaine Allen (collectively “Alameda Defendants”) [Docket No. 41];

2 - State of California (“California”) [Docket No. 50]; and

3 - Gregory Ahern and Daniel Brodie [Docket No. 64].

4 Plaintiff opposes all motions. [Docket Nos. 54, 55, 59, 70, 71, 72.] The court held a hearing on

5 March 28, 2024. [Docket No. 98.] For the following reasons, the motions are granted.

6 I. BACKGROUND

7 A. Statement of Facts

8 Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the FAC, which the court takes as true for

9 purposes of this motion.3 Plaintiff is a Black woman who resides in Contra Costa County. FAC

10 ¶¶ 7, 47. On July 20, 2016, Five Keys hired Plaintiff as a teacher for Inmate Services at Santa Rita

11 Jail in Alameda County. Id. at ¶ 24. On September 13, 2016, the County of Alameda approved a

12 contract for educational services in Alameda County jails provided by Five Keys which would be

13 valid from September 14, 2016 to September 13, 2019. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26. Gregory Ahern, a sheriff

14 and coroner employed by ACSO, signed the contract. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 26.

15 In 2018, Nicole Tremaine Allen, a deputy sheriff employed by ACSO and a Black woman,

16 began working in Inmate Services at Santa Rita Jail. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 27, 47. Around December 5,

17 2021, Allen “engaged in an unreasonable search, unreasonable seizure, and a continuing seizure of

18 the Plaintiff and her property at the Plaintiff’s residence.” Id. at ¶ 29. On June 12, 2022, Plaintiff

19 made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against Allen with Five Keys and requested unpaid

20 leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act and a temporary restraining order against Allen.

21 Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. On June 17, 2022, Five Keys notified Plaintiff that they would be performing a

22 preliminary workplace harassment investigation. Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff alleges that Five Keys then

23 began “intimidating, discriminating, and retaliating against Plaintiff for filing the formal

24 complaint” and began “evading Plaintiff and refused Plaintiff’s return to worksite.” Id. at ¶¶ 45-

25 46. Five Keys restricted Plaintiff’s access to coworkers “through isolation and deactivation of

3 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all

1 work email account.” Id. at ¶ 51. Plaintiff believes she was excluded from the Five Keys

2 Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy under Title IX. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.

3 Also on June 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed and was granted a temporary civil harassment

4 restraining order against Allen by Judge Judith Craddick of the Superior Court of California

5 Contra Costa County (“Superior Court”). Id. at ¶ 39. The restraining order was in effect through

6 August 9, 2022. Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiff requested a permanent restraining order and submitted

7 supporting evidence, but Judge Craddick denied the permanent order on August 9, 2022. Id. at ¶

8 41-42. In her order, Judge Craddick stated: “You felt things were happening which I don’t think

9 were intended by Ms. Allen.” Id. at ¶ 42.

10 On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against Allen

11 with UESF, the exclusive representative of teachers employed by Five Keys. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 56.

12 UESF did not respond to the complaint. Id. at ¶ 56. On or about June 28, 2022, Plaintiff

13 contacted UESF about Five Keys denying her “salary, benefits, and a safe work environment.” Id.

14 at ¶ 57. Matthew Milton, the Santa Rita Jail site union representative for UESF, called Plaintiff

15 and said the issue was “[o]ut of their hands,” which was the last time he communicated with

16 Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 58. Plaintiff alleges that UESF denied her Catastrophic Leave, Health and

17 Welfare Funds, union representation, a safe work environment, and safety at Plaintiff’s home after

18 receiving information that a crime may have occurred. Id. at ¶ 59.

19 Also on June 21, 2022, Plaintiff made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against

20 Allen with ACSO, which confirmed knowledge and receipt of the Superior Court’s temporary

21 restraining order against Allen. Id. at ¶ 52. However, from June 21, 2022 to August 9, 2022,

22 Allen violated the restraining order in Plaintiff’s workplace at Santa Rita Jail. Id. at ¶ 53. On

23 October 10, 2022, Plaintiff heard Allen at her front door. Id. at ¶ 68. The incident was reported to

24 ACSO on October 17, 2022. Id. at ¶ 71. On October 21, 2022, Plaintiff mailed the County of

25 Alameda a completed government claim form “along with evidence from Deputy Allen.” Id. at ¶

26 73. At some point, ACSO met with Plaintiff, during which they asked Plaintiff “irrelevant

27 questions about Plaintiff’s prior behavior” and “attempted to coerce Plaintiff into making a

1 November 3, 2022, ACSO informed Plaintiff that they had not interviewed Allen regarding

2 Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at ¶ 74. Plaintiff ultimately received ACSO’s investigation disposition

3 letter on August 2, 2023 informing Plaintiff that her allegations against Allen were not sustained.

4 Id. at ¶¶ 87-88.

5 On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff reported ACSO to the State of California for “policy

6 violations.” Id. at ¶ 79. On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff applied to the State of California

7 Victim’s Compensation Board for moving expenses “out of terror of living at the home where

8 Deputy Allen had trespassed” and included evidence from Allen in her application. Id. at ¶ 81.

9 The Victim’s Compensation Board ultimately denied her application because the only report they

10 received from ACSO was an unrelated report written three years prior by Allen. Id. at ¶¶ 84-86.

11 In July or August 2022, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “psychological injury from

12 cumulative trauma.” Id. at ¶ 60. She has been prescribed medication for chronic violent

13 nightmares and ongoing panic attacks. Id. ¶¶ 64, 72. Plaintiff has been on leave without pay from

14 Five Keys since July 1, 2022. Id. at ¶ 61.

15 Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants “did not provide policy, procedure, or law about being

16 an alleged victim of a crime.” Id. at ¶ 67.

17 B. Procedural History

18 Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 14, 2023. [Docket No. 1.] She amended the

19 complaint on October 23, 2023. [Docket No. 13 (FAC).] The Five Keys Defendants filed an

20 answer on January 8, 2024. [Docket No. 47.] The remaining eleven Defendants now move to

21 dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(1) and

22 12(b)(6).

23 The FAC contains seven claims for relief: 1) violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right

24 to free speech; 2) violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to protection from unreasonable

25 search and seizure; 3) violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection

26 under the law; 4) a Title VII hostile work environment claim; 5) a Title IX hostile environment

27 claim; 6) trespass to chattel; and 7) invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion. Plaintiff

1 Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.

2 II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

3 The court sets forth the elements for each of Plaintiff’s claims before addressing the

4 arguments raised in each motion to dismiss.

5 A. Section 1983

6 Plaintiff brings the first three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “provides a

7 cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

8 Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990)

9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely

10 provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Nunn v. LeBlanc, No. C

11 14-0905 PJH, 2014 WL 1089551, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490

12 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989)). To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two

13 essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

14 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of

15 state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245

16 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff makes section 1983 claims based on three different constitutional rights:

17 the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment.

18 To allege that her First Amendment rights were violated, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that the

19 plaintiff ‘was engaged in constitutionally protected activity’; (2) that the defendant's actions

20 caused the plaintiff ‘to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from

21 continuing to engage in that activity’; and (3) that the ‘defendant's adverse action was substantially

22 motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.’” Knapps

23 v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1160–61 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Mendocino

24 Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300–01 (9th Cir.1999)).

25 To assert that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Plaintiff must show that her

26 “persons, houses, papers, [or] effects” were subject to an “unreasonable search[] and seizure[].”

27 Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. amend.

1 upon one of these enumerated areas, or invades a protected privacy interest, for the purpose of

2 obtaining information.” Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012); Katz v.

3 United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967)). Where the search did not involve a physical

4 intrusion, the plaintiff must show that an “objectively reasonable” expectation of privacy was

5 violated. See Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). A seizure is a “meaningful

6 interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [their] property.” Brewster v. Beck, 859

7 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)).

8 To assert that her rights were violated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

9 Amendment, Plaintiff must show “that a class that is similarly situated has been treated

10 disparately.” Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2014)

11 (quoting Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1225

12 (9th Cir.1990)). Plaintiff must show that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

13 discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los

14 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

15 (9th Cir. 1998)).

16 In any section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted “under color of

17 state law.” See McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000). This requires that the

18 defendant “exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the

19 defendant is clothed with the authority of state law.” Id.

20 B. Title VII

21 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on

22 race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff alleges Title VII

23 discrimination under a hostile work environment theory.

24 Title VII prohibits “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” which is “so severe or

25 pervasive that it create[s] a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender,

26 religion, or national origin.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (internal

27 citation omitted). To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff

1 [plaintiff’s protected category]; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was

2 sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive

3 working environment.” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008). In

4 evaluating a hostile work environment claim, courts consider “all the circumstances, including the

5 frequency of the allegedly discriminatory conduct, its severity, and whether it unreasonably

6 interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id.

7 C. Title IX

8 Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex

9 “under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. §

10 1681. A plaintiff can pursue a private right of action “against recipients of federal education

11 funding for alleged Title IX violations.” Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of California, 956 F.3d

12 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020). The funding recipient does not have to be a traditional educational

13 institution. See Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Title IX to

14 prison educational programs). However, Title IX only applies if the discrimination occurred in the

15 context of the funding recipient’s education program, and the plaintiff may only recover damages

16 if the “official policy” of the recipient discriminates on the basis of sex. See Karasek, 956 F.3d at

17 1104 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)). “In sexual

18 harassment cases, it is the deliberate failure to curtail known harassment, rather than the

19 harassment itself, that constitutes the intentional Title IX violation.” Mansourian v. Regents of

20 Univ. of California, 602 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2010).

21 If the Title IX claim for damages arises from harassment on the basis of sex, the plaintiff

22 must show: (1) the defendant “exercise[d] substantial control over both the harasser and the

23 context in which the known harassment occur[red]”; (2) the plaintiff must have suffered

24 harassment “that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the

25 [plaintiff] of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the [defendant]”; (3)

26 an official with “authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective

27 measures on the [defendant’s] behalf” must have had “actual knowledge” of the harassment; (4)

1 defendant’s “response to the harassment or lack thereof [was] clearly unreasonable in light of the

2 known circumstances”; and (5) the defendant’s deliberate indifference must have “subject[ed the

3 plaintiff] to harassment.” See Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1105 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of

4 Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 739 (9th

5 Cir. 2000)).

6 D. State Tort Claims

7 Taylor brings two claims under state tort law: trespass to chattel and invasion of privacy by

8 intrusion upon seclusion.

9 Under California law, trespass to chattel “lies where an intentional interference with the

10 possession of personal property has proximately caused injury.” Thrifty–Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46

11 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 (1996). To establish intentional interference, the plaintiff must show

12 that either (a) the defendant “dispossesse[d]” the plaintiff of the personal property; (b) the personal

13 property “is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value”; (c) the plaintiff “is deprived of the use

14 of the [personal property] for a substantial time”; or (d) “bodily harm is caused to the [plaintiff], or

15 harm is caused to some person or thing in which the [plaintiff] has a legally protected interest.”

16 Restatement Second of Torts § 218.

17 Intrusion upon seclusion under California law has two elements: “(1) intrusion into a

18 private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.”

19 Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 231 (1998). To establish an intrusion, the

20 plaintiff “must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy

21 surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff.” Id. at 232. The plaintiff

22 must have had an “objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place,

23 conversation or data source.” Id. Determination of whether an intrusion was offensive involves

24 analysis of all the relevant circumstances, including “the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct

25 and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the

26 setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.” Miller v.

27 Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483-84 (1986).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Pleadings by a self-represented litigant must be liberally construed and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The

Ninth Circuit has held that “where the petitioner is pro se,” courts have an obligation, “particularly

in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of

any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). “This rule

relieves pro se litigants from the strict application of procedural rules and demands that courts not

hold missing or inaccurate legal terminology or muddled draftsmanship against them.” Blaisdell

v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013). “This duty applies equally to pro se motions.”

United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). However, “a liberal interpretation of a

pro se civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

pled.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be granted as a matter

of course, at least until the defendant files a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). After

that point, Rule 15(a) provides generally that leave to amend the pleadings before trial should be

given “freely . . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied

with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.

2003) (quotation omitted). However, leave to amend may be denied where the complaint “could

not be saved by any amendment,” i.e., “where the amendment would be futile.” Thinket Ink Info.

Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004).

A. FRCP 8(a)

Rule 8(a) provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he short and plain

statement must provide the defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quotation

omitted).

B. FRCP 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is a

challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A court will dismiss a party’s claim for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction “only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by

prior decisions of th[e Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve

a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court sculpts its approach

according to whether the motion is “facial or factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.

2000). A facial challenge asserts that “the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on

their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039

(9th Cir. 2004). A factual challenge asserts that subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist,

independent of what is stated in the complaint. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. In contrast with a facial

challenge, a factual challenge permits the court to look beyond the complaint, without

“presum[ing] the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citation omitted). Even the

presence of disputed material facts “will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the

merits of jurisdictional claims.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citations omitted).

C. FRCP 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in

the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and may dismiss a

claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual

matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief,” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,

622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009);

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has

facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

1 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and

2 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.

3 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).

4 IV. SUPERIOR COURT

5 Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against Defendant Superior Court (section

6 1983 claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, and Title IX). The Superior

7 Court moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter

8 jurisdiction. [Docket No. 18 (“Superior Court Mot.”).] The Superior Court raises two arguments:

9 that state superior courts are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that federal

10 courts are barred from reviewing previous state court decisions under the Rooker-Feldman

11 doctrine. The Superior Court also moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12 12(b)(6).

13 A. Eleventh Amendment

14 Under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff cannot sue the Superior Court under section

15 1983.

16 “[T]he Court long ago held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit

17 against the citizen's own State in federal court.” Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Pub.

18 Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134

19 U.S. 1, 10, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)). The exception is when Congress has

20 “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity ... pursuant to a valid exercise of [its]

21 power.” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252

22 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Based on this exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity,

23 a plaintiff may bring Section 1983 claims against cities and counties. Greater L.A. Council on

24 Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). But a plaintiff cannot bring section

25 1983 claims against the state or an “arm of the state.” Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty.,

26 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). The Superior Court of California Contra Costa County is an

27 “arm” of the State of California, so it is immune from section 1983 claims. See id. This immunity

1 claim against the Superior Court is dismissed with prejudice.

2 However, a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title VII and

3 Title IX upon receipt of federal funds. See, e.g., Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 982

4 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 237 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001); Steshenko v. Gayrard,

5 70 F. Supp. 3d 979, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Plaintiff asserts in her opposition that the Superior

6 Court receives federal funds, which would abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect

7 to Title VII and Title IX.

8 The Superior Court argues under Rule 12(b)(6) that Plaintiff has failed to state claims

9 under Title VII or Title IX. Plaintiff concedes in her opposition that the Superior Court is not her

10 employer. [Docket No. 54 (Sup. Ct. Opp’n) 4.] Therefore, her Title VII claim is dismissed with

11 prejudice. Plaintiff argues that the Superior Court is a recipient of federal funding and operates

12 educational programs under Title IX. However, Plaintiff is not able to allege that she suffered

13 discrimination in an education program being operated by the Superior Court. See Karasek, 956

14 F.3d at 1104. Title IX only prohibits sex discrimination in the context of the educational programs

15 or activities operated by the defendant. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX prohibits sex

16 discrimination “under” an education program or activity. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The plain meaning

17 of this statute is that the discrimination has to be in the context of the education program operated

18 by the defendant. See Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.

19 629, 645 (1999) (defining “under” as “subject to the authority, direction, or supervision of”).

20 Plaintiff cannot allege that she experienced sex discrimination under an education program

21 operated by the Superior Court. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is also dismissed with

22 prejudice.

23 B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

24 In addition, all three of Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court are barred by the

25 Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

26 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal

27 courts from exercising appellate review over final state court judgments.” Reusser v. Wachovia

1 court from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court

2 judgment, and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment.” Bell v. City of Boise,

3 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). “The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from

4 collateral federal attack. Because district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court

5 decisions, they must decline jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence being called upon to

6 review the state court decision.’” Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030

7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983)). The

8 doctrine applies to both final judgments and “interlocutory state court decisions.” Doe & Assocs.,

9 252 F.3d at 1030.

10 To determine whether the doctrine applies, “a district court first must determine whether

11 the action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision.” Bell, 709 F.3d at 897

12 (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003)). “A de facto appeal exists when ‘a

13 federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks

relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.’ In contrast, if ‘a federal plaintiff asserts

as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does

not bar jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164).

If a plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de facto appeal, the plaintiff “may not seek to

litigate an issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judicial decision from which

the forbidden de facto appeal is brought.” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). The Ninth Circuit

has clarified that the “inextricably intertwined” language “is not a test to determine whether a

claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.

Should the action not contain a forbidden de facto appeal, the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Id.

(emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court rest on her contention that Judge Craddick

“used her opinion instead of evidence” when deciding on Plaintiff’s permanent restraining order.

FAC ¶ 42. Plaintiff argues that her claims are not a de facto appeal because she is not asking the

court to review the Superior Court’s decision, but only to review Plaintiff’s exhibits and the

exhibits attached to the Alameda Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. Sup. Ct. Opp’n 2;

1 [Docket No. 42 (“Alameda RJN”)].4

2 Plaintiff’s sole challenge is that in the order denying Plaintiff’s request for a permanent

3 restraining order, Judge Craddick stated: “You felt things were happening which I don’t think

were intended by Ms. Allen.” Id. at ¶ 42.5 Plaintiff essentially attacks Judge Craddick’s

reasoning. This is precisely the type of act protected by Rooker-Feldman. See Noel, 341 F.3d at

1163. The appropriate remedy when a judge allegedly uses flawed reasoning in a decision is to

appeal the decision. Plaintiff does not bring any complaints against the Superior Court which are

not “inextricably intertwined” with Judge Craddick’s decision. Further supporting this conclusion

is Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief; Plaintiff requests that the Superior Court reverse its prior

decision and grant Plaintiff’s permanent restraining order against Allen. In short, this is a

prohibited de facto appeal.

In her opposition, Plaintiff points to the “policy” described in Judge Craddick’s temporary

restraining order which prohibits the recipient of the order from owning or possessing guns, other

firearms, or ammunition. Sup. Ct. Opp’n 5. However, this “policy” is merely a statement of law

ordered by Judge Craddick. It is not separate from the judge’s exercise of her decision-making

power. Plaintiff’s claims arise solely from Judge Craddick’s reasoning supporting her decision

not to issue the permanent restraining order.

In sum, Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court are dismissed with prejudice.

V. UESF DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against the UESF Defendants (UESF and

Matthew Milton). These are the same claims she asserted against the Superior Court. As

previously explained, Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to make a formal complaint of abuse and

stalking against Allen with UESF, but UESF did not respond. FAC ¶ 56. Plaintiff later contacted

4 For reasons discussed below, the court denies judicial notice of the Alameda RJN.

5 Plaintiff’s makes two allegations against the Superior Court: that it “prohibit[ed] Plaintiff to

peacefully assemble at work and her private residence after receiving evidence that a suspected

crime had occurred,” id. at ¶ 43, and that it “did not provide policy, procedure, or law about being

an alleged victim of a crime.” Id. at ¶ 67. These allegations are conclusory and confusing. At the

1 UESF about Five Keys denying her “salary, benefits, and a safe work environment,” but Milton

2 (on behalf of UESF) responded that the issue was “[o]ut of their hands.” Id. at ¶¶ 57-58. Plaintiff

3 alleges that UESF denied her Catastrophic Leave, Health and Welfare Funds, union

4 representation, a safe work environment, and safety at Plaintiff’s home after receiving information

5 that a crime may have occurred. Id. at ¶ 59.

6 The UESF Defendants move to dismiss all three claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). [Docket

7 No. 20 (“UESF Mot.”).]

8 A. Section 1983

9 Plaintiff’s third claim is for deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42

10 U.S.C. § 1983. In any section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted “under

11 color of state law.” See McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000). “Generally,

12 private individuals and entities cannot be held liable under section 1983, because this section

13 ‘excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’” I.H.

14 by & through Hunter v. Oakland Sch. for the Arts, No. 16-CV-05500-SI, 2017 WL 565069, at *3

15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)

16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Action taken by private individuals and entities

17 are only under color of state law if the action meets one of four tests: “(1) the public function test;

18 (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; [or] (4) the governmental nexus test.”

19 Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997).

20 Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the UESF Defendants does not meet any of the state

21 actor tests. The union does not serve a “public function” traditionally performed by the state. See

22 id. The claim also does not meet the joint action test. The joint action test requires “an agreement

23 or meeting of the minds” between the defendant and a state actor. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d

24 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff does not plead an agreement between the UESF Defendants

25 and the state. Plaintiff alleges that the UESF Defendants denied her benefits and failed to properly

26 respond to her complaints against Allen. She does not allege that the UESF Defendants acted

27 jointly with the state, nor does she raise any facts indicating a conspiracy between the UESF

1 does not allege that the state coerced or encouraged the UESF Defendants to deny her benefits.

2 See id. at 1119-20. Lastly, the claim does not meet the governmental nexus test. This test requires

3 a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so

4 that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. at 1120.

5 In her opposition, Plaintiff states that the UESF Defendants and state actors “acted

6 pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy or a widespread or longstanding practice or

7 custom.” [Docket No. 59 (“UESF Opp’n”) 10.] This is conclusory. Plaintiff’s opposition also

8 contends that Milton had “a conversation” with Melanie Fukuhara, a principal at Five Keys, on the

9 same day that Milton called Plaintiff. UESF Opp’n 11. Plaintiff does not allege that Melanie

10 Fukuhara or Five Keys are state actors. Even if she did, the mere fact of a “conversation” does not

11 create a “nexus” or evidence of a conspiracy. See Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (finding that

12 defendant’s conversations with the police did not demonstrate that defendant had conspired with

13 the police). “To be liable as a co-conspirator, a private defendant must share with the public entity

14 the goal of violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 445. Plaintiff has alleged no facts

15 that would allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that Five Keys and UESF shared a

16 common goal of violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

17 The UESF Defendants were private actors, not state actors, when they allegedly denied

18 Plaintiff’s union benefits and did not properly respond to her complaints. See Franklin, 312 F.3d

19 at 446. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a viable section 1983 claim against them. Plaintiff’s

20 section 1983 claims against the UESF Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. See Thinket Ink

21 Info. Res., Inc., 368 F.3d at 1061 (denying leave to amend “where the amendment would be

22 futile”).

23 B. Title VII and Title IX claims

24 Title VII and Title IX claims cannot be brought against individuals. Lum v. Kauai Cnty.

25 Council, 358 F. App'x 860, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (“there is no individual liability under Title VII”);

26 Doe By & Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993)

27 (“Title IX makes institutions, not individuals, liable”). Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX claims

1 At the March 28, 2024 hearing Plaintiff conceded that her complaint was unrelated to any

2 educational programs or activities operated by UESF. As discussed above, Title IX only applies if

3 sex discrimination occurred under the funding recipient’s education program. See Karasek, 956

4 F.3d at 1104. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against UESF is dismissed with prejudice.

5 With respect to the Title VII claim, Plaintiff conceded at the hearing that UESF was not

6 her employer. However, Title VII applies to unions as well as employers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–

7 2(c), 2000e–3(a). “[§ 2000e–2(c)] forbids discrimination by any labor organization, and [§

8 2000e–3(a)] forbids retaliation against a person who has asserted rights under Title VII or

9 supported another person's assertion of rights.” Green v. Am. Fed'n of Tchrs./Illinois Fed'n of

10 Tchrs. Loc. 604, 740 F.3d 1104, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014). A union may be liable under Title VII if a

11 union member can show that the member “was singled out and treated less favorably than others

12 similarly situated on account of race or any other criterion impermissible under the statute.” Beck

13 v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 99, 506 F.3d 874, 884 fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

14 Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982)). The plaintiff does

15 not have to show that the union breached its duty of fair representation or that the collective

16 bargaining agreement was violated in order to make a Title VII claim. See Garity v. APWU Nat'l

17 Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 863 (9th Cir. 2016).

18 Taylor did not plead facts to support that UESF treated her less favorably than others

19 similarly situated because of her race or gender. She also did not plead facts to support that the

20 union retaliated against her because she was asserting her Title VII rights. At the March 28, 2024

21 hearing, Plaintiff alleged that UESF denied her benefits because UESF had a preference for San

22 Francisco Unified School District employees as opposed to Five Keys employees, and because

23 UESF improperly applied its non-fraternization policy to Plaintiff’s complaint. Neither of these

24 allegations implicate Title VII, because they do not suggest that UESF’s conduct was motivated

25 by Plaintiff’s race or gender. Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against UESF is dismissed with

26 prejudice.6

1 In sum, Plaintiff’s claims against Milton and UESF are dismissed with prejudice.

2 VI. SAN FRANCISCO DEFENDANTS

3 Plaintiff brings her first, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh claims against the San Francisco

4 Defendants (CCSF and SFSD). These claims are for violation of the First Amendment and the

5 Fourteenth Amendment (both brought under section 1983), Title VII, Title IX, and invasion of

6 privacy. In her opposition, Plaintiff dropped her invasion of privacy claim against the San

7 Francisco Defendants.7 [Docket No. 70 (“SF Opp’n”) 13.]

8 The San Francisco Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them for improper

9 joinder under Rule 21 and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). At the March 28, 2024

10 hearing, CCSF argued that the court may consider facts outside of Plaintiff’s complaint in order to

11 determine if joinder of the San Francisco Defendants is proper. However, CCSF did not brief the

12 court on the propriety of considering outside facts in its motion to dismiss [Docket No. 24 (“SF

13 Mot.”)] or in its request for judicial notice [Docket No. 28 (“SF RJN”)]. Under Ninth Circuit law

14 a defendant may present facts beyond the plaintiff’s complaint showing misjoinder, but only in the

15 specific circumstance of an alleged “fraudulent joinder” where the plaintiff joined the defendant to

16 defeat complete diversity and the defendant is seeking removal to federal court. See McCabe v.

17 Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). That is not the case here. Therefore, the

18 court will not consider facts beyond Plaintiff’s complaint and judicially noticeable facts when

unfair labor practices. UESF Mot. 8. PERB does have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair practice

charges brought under the Education Employment Relations Act (EERA). Cal. Gov. Code §

3541.5. PERB also has exclusive jurisdiction over common law and state law claims which have

“potential overlap” with the unfair practice charges. El Rancho Unified Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Educ.

Assn., 33 Cal. 3d 946, 959 (1983) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council

of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 200 (1978)). However, this exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to

federal civil rights claims. See De Malherbe v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp.

1121, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (finding that the court had jurisdiction over federal civil rights

claims, concurrent with NLRB’s jurisdiction over overlapping unfair labor practice charges under

the NLRA); El Rancho Unified Sch. Dist., 33 Cal. 3d at 953 (“the principles defining the

preemptive reach of the NLRA are generally applicable in determining the scope of PERB’s

preemptive jurisdiction under EERA”). Plaintiff only brought federal civil rights claims against

the UESF Defendants. This court has jurisdiction over her claims.

7 Plaintiff conceded that her invasion of privacy claim should be dismissed against the San

1 evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint under both Rule 21 and Rule 12(b)(6).

2 A. SFSD

3 The San Francisco Defendants argue that SFSD is not a separate legal entity from CCSF

4 and should be dismissed as a defendant because Plaintiff has effectively named CCSF as a

5 defendant twice. SF Mot. 11. A governmental entity that lacks separate legal status from its home

6 municipality is “incapable of suing or being sued in its own name.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 784

7 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015). In such situations, the court may substitute the municipality as a

8 party in lieu of the governmental entity. See id.

9 To sue SFSD, Plaintiff must provide evidence that CCSF intended to create the Sheriff’s

10 Department as a separate legal entity, such as evidence that SFSD has an operating budget as an

11 independent entity. See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial

12 of reh'g (Dec. 5, 1995). Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that SFSD was created as a

13 separate legal entity subject to suit. Ordinarily, the court would substitute CCSF as the proper

14 party. See id. Because CCSF is already a named defendant and the same claims are alleged

15 against it as against SFSD, the court simply dismisses SFSD as a party.

16 B. CCSF

17 1. Misjoinder

18 Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, permits a plaintiff to join

19 multiple defendants into one action if “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them . . . arising

20 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any

21 question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

22 20(a)(2). When determining whether defendants are properly joined, the court should “liberally

23 construe [the requirements] in the interest of convenience and judicial economy in a manner that

24 will secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action.” Call of the Wild Movie,

25 LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 342 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation & quotation marks

26 omitted); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); Diabolic Video

27 Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, at *3. If defendants do not satisfy the test for

1 be prejudiced by the severance.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997)

2 (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an

3 action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party”).

4 Plaintiff’s claims against CCSF arise from her allegation that CCSF is “the local

5 governmental unit for which [Five Keys] worked at all times relevant hereto.” FAC ¶ 20.

6 Plaintiff does not plead any challenged actions taken independently by CCSF. Instead, at the

7 March 28, 2024 hearing, she asserted that CCSF operates Five Keys and is therefore responsible

8 for Five Keys’ acts against her. Plaintiff represented that she has documentary evidence showing

9 that SFSD was her employer during the events in her complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims

10 against CCSF can only go forward if Plaintiff can plead facts that support a reasonable inference

11 that CCSF violated her rights as her employer, or if she can otherwise plead that CCSF is legally

12 liable for the actions of Five Keys.

13 The FAC does not allege sufficient facts under either theory. The court liberally construes

14 the pleadings to allege that Five Keys is (or was) also called “San Francisco Sheriff’s Department

15 Five Keys Charter School.” FAC ¶ 8. This allegation supports the possibility of a connection

16 between SFSD and Five Keys. However, it does not support the inference that SFSD controlled

17 Five Keys during the relevant time period, rather than at some earlier time. In her opposition,

18 Plaintiff alleges that the Five Keys Board of Directors includes CCSF employees and affiliates,

19 including “Sheriff Paul Miyomoto in his official capacity.” SF Opp’n 7-8. Even if Plaintiff were

20 to amend her complaint to add allegations that San Francisco employees sit on the board of Five

21 Keys, this would not be sufficient to support the inference that CCSF controls the actions of Five

22 Keys.

23 At the March 28, 2024 hearing, Plaintiff stated that she could amend the complaint to

24 include other facts and evidence showing that CCSF was her employer during the relevant time

25 period. Plaintiff’s claims against CCSF are dismissed, but Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her

26 complaint with facts showing that CCSF was her employer.8

2. Section 1983

Even if Plaintiff is able to plausibly allege that CCSF was her employer during the relevant

time period, Plaintiff must also plead sufficient facts to state a claim against CCSF. The FAC fails

to state a section 1983 claim.

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments do

not meet the requirements for municipal liability, also known as “Monell” liability. A

municipality may face section 1983 liability if it “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or

‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60

(2011) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)).

However, the municipality may be held liable “only for ‘[its] own illegal acts.’” Id. (quoting

Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). It cannot be held vicariously liable for its

employees’ actions. Id. (citations omitted). To establish municipal liability, plaintiffs “must

prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Id. (quoting Monell,

436 U.S. at 691). “The ‘official policy’ requirement ‘was intended to distinguish acts of the

municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,’ and thereby make clear that municipal

liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur, 475

U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis in original). Official municipal policy includes “the decisions of a

government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and

widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted).

Such policy or practice must be a “moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.”

Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

In the Ninth Circuit, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 under three possible

theories. Rodriguez v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018). The first is where

“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflict[ed] the injury.” Id. (quoting

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Second, “a local government can fail to train employees in a manner

government claims filed by Plaintiff against CCSF. Because these documents do not shed light on

1 that amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional right, such that ‘the need for more or

2 different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of

3 constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been

4 deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390

5 (1989)). Finally, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 if “the individual who

6 committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an

7 official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id. at 802-

8 03 (quoting Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation

9 marks and citation omitted)).

10 Here, Plaintiff has not stated a Monell claim against CCSF. The FAC does not contain any

11 allegation that Plaintiff was harmed by the execution of a CCSF policy or custom. This is not like

12 the facts in Monell, where the plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Social Services and of the

13 Board of Education of the city of New York had an official policy which forced pregnant

14 employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons,

15 and the plaintiffs were harmed by that unlawful forced leave. Monell, 436 U.S. at 661. The

16 complaint also does not contain any allegation that CCSF failed to train its employees in a manner

17 that amounts to “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Rodriguez, 891

18 F.3d at 802-03 (finding that a “failure to investigate and discipline employees in the face of

19 widespread constitutional violations” could show deliberate indifference). Nor does the complaint

20 allege that a CCSF official with final policy-making authority harmed Plaintiff or ratified a

21 subordinate’s harm of Plaintiff. See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347-50 (9th Cir. 1992)

22 (finding no municipal liability for the allegedly unconstitutional discipline of a fire fighter, where

23 the chief of the fire department did not create the city’s policy on disciplining fire fighters, and

24 where the city manager did not make a deliberate choice to endorse the chief’s decision to

25 discipline the fire fighter).

26 At the hearing, the court asked Plaintiff to identify any additional facts she could allege to

27 support Monell liability against CCSF. She could not. Therefore, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims

3. Title VII

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim fails because she has not alleged that CCSF was her employer,

as discussed above. Even if CCSF were her employer during the relevant time period, Plaintiff

has not sufficiently pleaded facts to support a Title VII claim based on a hostile work

environment.

To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show:

“(1) the defendants subjected [plaintiff] to verbal or physical conduct based on [plaintiff’s

protected category]; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1108. Additionally, if a non-employee is the harasser, the

plaintiff must show that the employer “either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking

immediate and/or corrective actions when it knew or should have known of the conduct.”

Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has not

alleged that Allen is a CCSF employee. Plaintiff has also not alleged any specific facts to show

that CCSF ratified or acquiesced in Allen’s harassment.

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against CCSF is dismissed with leave to amend to show that

CCSF was her employer during the relevant time, and to add specific facts supporting her

allegation of hostile work environment against CCSF.

4. Title IX

As discussed above, a plaintiff can only bring a Title IX claim against a federal funding

recipient if the discrimination occurred within the context of the funding recipient’s education

programs or activities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Like Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, Plaintiff’s Title IX

claim against CCSF fails because Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support that CCSF

was her employer at Five Keys.

Similar to her Title VII claim, Plaintiff has failed to show that CCSF was deliberately

indifferent to known harassment. See Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 967. Plaintiff alleges no facts

supporting that CCSF had “substantial control” over Allen or the Five Keys workplace; that a

CCSF official with authority to institute corrective measures had “actual knowledge” of the

1 harassment; or that CCSF’s response to the harassment was “clearly unreasonable,” subjecting

2 Plaintiff to further harassment. See Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1105. Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against

3 CCSF is dismissed with leave to amend.

4 In summary, Plaintiff’s claims against SFSD are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s

5 section 1983 claim against CCSF is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX

6 claims against CCSF are dismissed with leave to amend the complaint by making non-conclusory

7 allegations to support that CCSF was her employer, to establish the elements of a hostile work

8 environment, and to establish that CCSF ratified or acquiesced in the harassment (for Title VII) or

9 was deliberately indifferent (for Title IX).

10 VII. CALIFORNIA

11 Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against California. Plaintiff clarified at

12 the March 28, 2024 hearing that her claims against California are based on how the California

13 Department of General Services handled her complaint against Allen and County of Alameda, and

14 how the Victim’s Compensation Board handled her application for moving expenses. California

15 moves to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and Rule 12(b)(6). [Docket Nos. 50

16 (“Cal. Mot.”) and 70 (“Cal. Reply”).]

17 A. Eleventh Amendment

18 As discussed above with respect to Defendant Superior Court, a plaintiff cannot bring

19 section 1983 claims against the state. Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977,

20 980 (9th Cir. 2024). Taylor’s section 1983 claim against California is dismissed with prejudice.

21 However, a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title VII and Title IX

22 upon receipt of federal funds. See Carmen, 982 F. Supp. at 1405.

23 B. Failure to State a Claim

24 Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against California is dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff

25 cannot assert that California is her employer.

26 Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against California is dismissed with prejudice because her

27 allegations are unrelated to any education programs or activities operated by California. As

1 in the context of the defendant’s education programs or activities.

2 For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against California are dismissed with prejudice.

3 VIII. ALAMEDA DEFENDANTS

4 Plaintiff pleads all seven claims against the Alameda Defendants (County of Alameda,

5 ACSO, and Allen). As previously explained, Plaintiff alleges that Allen “engaged in an

6 unreasonable search, unreasonable seizure, and a continuing seizure of the Plaintiff and her

7 property at the Plaintiff’s residence” on December 5, 2021. FAC ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that she

8 made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against Allen with ACSO on June 21, 2022 and

9 notified ACSO of the temporary restraining order against Allen, but ACSO allowed Allen to

10 violate the restraining order. Id. at ¶ 53. On October 10, 2022, Plaintiff heard Allen at her front

11 door. Id. at ¶ 68. The incident was reported to ACSO on October 17, 2022. Id. at ¶ 71. ACSO

12 later met with Plaintiff, during which they asked Plaintiff “irrelevant questions about Plaintiff’s

13 prior behavior” and “attempted to coerce Plaintiff into making a statement about a piece of

14 evidence that Plaintiff brought to the meeting.” Id. at ¶¶ 76-77. On November 3, 2022, ACSO

15 informed Plaintiff that they had not interviewed Allen regarding Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at ¶ 74.

16 Plaintiff ultimately received ACSO’s investigation disposition letter on August 2, 2023 informing

17 Plaintiff that her allegations against Allen were not sustained. Id. at ¶¶ 87-88.

18 The Alameda Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6).

19 [Docket No. 41 (“Alameda Mot.”).] For the same reasons discussed above regarding SFSD and

20 its relationship to CCSF, ACSO is dismissed as a party pursuant to Rule 21 because the complaint

21 already asserts claims against County of Alameda.9

22 A. Section 1983 Claims Against Allen

23 Defendant Allen argues that she is not liable under section 1983 because she was not

24 acting under color of state law with respect to her actions challenged by Plaintiff in this lawsuit.

25 “[A] state employee who is on duty, or otherwise exercises his official responsibilities in

9 The Alameda Defendants request judicial notice of the transcript of the August 9, 2022 Superior

Court hearing on Plaintiff’s petition for a permanent restraining order against Allen. Alameda

1 an off-duty encounter, typically acts under color of state law.” Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1037

2 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing West, 487 U.S. at 49–50, 108 S.Ct. 2250; McDade, 223 F.3d at 1139–41).

3 “That is true even if the employee's offensive actions were illegal or unauthorized.” Naffe, 789

4 F.3d at 1037. “A state employee who is off duty nevertheless acts under color of state law when

5 (1) the employee purports to or pretends to act under color of law, (2) his pretense of acting in the

6 performance of his duties had the purpose and effect of influencing the behavior of others, and (3)

7 the harm inflicted on plaintiff related in some meaningful way either to the officer’s governmental

8 status or to the performance of his duties. On the other hand, a government employee does not act

9 under color of state law when he pursues private goals via private actions.” Id. (cleaned up,

10 citations omitted).

11 Allen asserts that Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against her arise solely from her

12 “domestic disputes” with Plaintiff. Alameda Mot. 6-7. Plaintiff’s allegations are sparse and do

13 not elaborate on the nature of her relationship with Allen or provide any context for the claims she

14 asserts against Allen. The FAC does not contain enough facts about Allen’s challenged conduct to

15 survive a motion to dismiss. However, the court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiff could

16 make allegations to support that Allen (a deputy sheriff) was a state actor with respect to

17 Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Allen, as opposed to a private citizen. Plaintiff is granted

18 leave to amend her complaint.

19 In addition, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Allen fail because she has not alleged

20 facts showing that Allen violated her constitutional rights. To allege that her First Amendment

21 rights were violated, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that the plaintiff ‘was engaged in constitutionally

22 protected activity’; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff ‘to suffer an injury that

23 would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity’; and (3) that

24 the ‘defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff’s exercise

25 of constitutionally protected conduct.’” Knapps, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1160–61. To assert that her

26 Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Plaintiff must show that her “persons, houses, papers,

27 [or] effects” were subject to an “unreasonable search[] and seizure[].” Patel, 738 F.3d at 1061.

1 Amendment, Plaintiff must show that Allen “acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

2 against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” See Lee, 250 F.3d at 686. The

3 FAC makes only conclusory allegations that Plaintiff’s rights were violated, and it does not allege

4 any facts to support the elements of each claim described above.

5 Plaintiff’s claims under section 1983 (claims one, two, and three) against Allen are

6 dismissed. Plaintiff may amend her complaint to allege specific facts about what Allen did to

7 violate her constitutional rights and how Allen was acting under color of law.

8 B. Section 1983 claim against County of Alameda

9 As previously discussed, to establish Monell liability, a plaintiff “must prove that ‘action

10 pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. Here,

11 Plaintiff has not stated a Monell claim against the County of Alameda, as the complaint does not

12 contain any facts supporting Plaintiff’s allegation that her constitutional rights were injured by an

13 official municipal policy. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

14 C. Title VII and Title IX claims against Allen

15 Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX claims against Allen are dismissed with prejudice because

16 such claims cannot be brought against individuals. See Lum v. Kauai Cnty. Council, 358 F. App'x

17 860, 862 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe By & Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,

18 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993).

19 D. Title VII claim against County of Alameda

20 1. Common-law agency test

21 Defendant County of Alameda argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed

22 because County of Alameda was not Plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff’s complaint states that

23 Plaintiff was a Five Keys employee, and that Five Keys signed a contract with County of Alameda

24 to provide educational services in Alameda County jails. In her opposition, Plaintiff argues that

25 Alameda County was her employer because it controlled “the means and manner of Plaintiff’s

26 work performance.” [Docket No. 55 (Alameda Opp’n) 8.] Plaintiff alleges that County of

27 Alameda provided her with her original hiring document, that it controlled her security clearance

1 Alameda employee) to supervise her classroom. Id.

2 Under Title VII, an employee may have two or more “joint employers” who are equally

3 liable for discrimination. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d

4 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit applies the common-law agency test to determine

5 whether a party is a joint employer. Id. at 639. “Under the common-law test, ‘the principal

6 guidepost’ is the element of control—that is, ‘the extent of control that one may exercise over the

7 details of the work of the other.’” Id. at 638 (quoting Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates,

8 P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003). The Ninth Circuit provided a non-exhaustive list of

9 factors to determine the extent of control:

10 the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the

location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the

11 parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional

projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion

12 over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired

party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part

13 of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is

in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment

14 of the hired party.

15 Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)).

16 The fact that Plaintiff worked in an Alameda County jail because Five Keys had a contract

17 with County of Alameda is not enough by itself to support an inference that County of Alameda

18 and Five Keys were her joint employers. The FAC does not currently state a claim against County

19 of Alameda on a joint employer theory. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint to

20 include factual allegations supporting a reasonable inference that County of Alameda is her joint

21 employer.

22 2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

23 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff

24 did not plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co.,

25 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that Title VII requires the plaintiff to exhaust

26 administrative remedies before seeking a private action for damages). Plaintiff did not plead

27 exhaustion in the complaint, but in her opposition, she states that she received her right-to-sue

1 against County of Alameda. Alameda Opp’n 9. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint

2 to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies.

3 3. Failure to State a Claim

4 County of Alameda argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed for failure

5 to allege a prima facie case of discrimination. As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to establish

6 the elements of a hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff’s belief, asserted in her opposition

7 brief, that “if a male engaged in the same type of misconduct as Defendant Allen, [Plaintiff’s]

8 complaint would have been handled correctly,” is conclusory and speculative. Alameda Opp’n 9.

9 Factual allegations in a complaint must be more than speculative. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

10 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

11 Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against County of Alameda is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted

12 leave to amend her complaint with specific facts and evidence showing that County of Alameda

13 was her joint employer and that County of Alameda discriminated against her based on a hostile

14 work environment theory.

15 E. Title IX claim against County of Alameda

16 Like her Title VII claim, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim fails because she makes only conclusory

17 allegations of harassment on the basis of sex. In addition, she has not clearly alleged facts

18 sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the County of Alameda exercised “substantial

19 control” over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred; that the County

20 of Alameda acted with “deliberate indifference” to the harassment, such that the defendant’s

21 “response to the harassment or lack thereof [was] clearly unreasonable in light of the known

22 circumstances”; or that such deliberate indifference subjected her to further harassment. See

23 Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1105.

24 Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against County of Alameda is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted

25 leave to amend her complaint with specific facts and evidence showing that she was harassed on

26 the basis of sex and that County of Alameda is liable under a deliberate indifference theory.

27 F. State law claims against Allen

1 actual harm. Allen moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim because Plaintiff failed

2 to plead an offensive intrusion in a private place.

3 1. Trespass

4 Plaintiff’s trespass claim appears to be based on Allen’s “unauthorized physical contact

5 with Plaintiff’s Wi-Fi network, front door, and cellphone at Plaintiff’s residence.” FAC ¶ 107.

6 “[T]respass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel,

7 or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.” Alfaro, 645 F. Supp. 3d

8 at 958. In order to make out a claim for trespass to chattel, “the defendant’s interference must . . .

9 have caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiff’s rights in it.” Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30

10 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350 (2003). Where there is a trespass to personal property, the owner “may

11 recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of

12 its use.” Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 551 (1946). Plaintiff makes only conclusory

13 allegations that Allen had “unauthorized physical contact” with her personal property. Plaintiff

14 does not plead that this “contact” damaged her property or interfered with its use.

15 In her opposition, Plaintiff alleges that Allen committed trespass to land by forcing her

16 way into Plaintiff’s home. Alameda Opp’n 11. But Plaintiff’s claim is for trespass to chattel

17 (personal property), not land (real property). Even if Plaintiff did claim a trespass to land, her

18 allegations are still deficient. In order to plead trespass to land, the plaintiff must show that: “(1)

19 the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or

20 negligent entry on the property; (3) lack of permission to enter the property, or acts in excess of

21 the permission; (4) actual harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct as a substantial factor in causing

22 the harm.” Williams v. Santander Bank, No. CV1504188SJORAOX, 2015 WL 4484202, at *3

23 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) (quoting Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers

24 Union Local 8, 186 Cal.App. 4th 1078, 1085 (2010)). Plaintiff has not pleaded specific facts to

25 show that Allen intentionally, recklessly, or negligently entered her property; that Allen lacked

26 permission to enter her property; and that Allen’s conduct was a substantial factor in Plaintiff’s

27 harm.

2. Intrusion upon Seclusion

An action for intrusion upon seclusion has two elements: “(1) intrusion into a private place,

conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Shulman, 18

Cal. 4th at 231. The plaintiff must have had an “objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or

solitude in the place, conversation or data source.” Id. at 232. Liberally construing the pleadings,

Plaintiff has alleged that Allen obtained unwanted access to data about Plaintiff’s personal

schedule. FAC ¶ 111. Plaintiff has not explained why she would have an “objectively reasonable

expectation” that she could keep this schedule private, and why Allen’s access to the schedule

would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” See Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 231. Plaintiff

must allege enough non-conclusory facts for the court to evaluate the nature of Allen’s alleged

intrusions and whether they were objectively offensive. Plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion claim

is dismissed with leave to amend.

G. State law claims against County of Alameda

Defendant County of Alameda moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s two state law claims against it

because Allen’s alleged conduct did not occur in the scope of her employment.

“The doctrine of respondeat superior applies to public and private employers alike.” Mary

M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 209 (1991). “[R]espondeat superior liability attaches if

the activities ‘that cause[d] the employee to become an instrumentality of danger to others’ were

undertaken with the employer’s permission and were of some benefit to the employer or, in the

absence of proof of benefit, the activities constituted a customary incident of employment.”

Purton v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 4th 499, 509, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912, 919 (2013)

(quoting Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 3d 792, 804 (Ct. App.

1987)). Liability does not attach “where the misconduct does not arise from the conduct of the

employer’s enterprise but instead arises out of a personal dispute . . . or is the result of a personal

compulsion.” Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1006 (1995). “In such

cases, the risks [of harm] are engendered by events unrelated to the employment, so the mere fact

that an employee has an opportunity to abuse facilities or authority necessary to the performance

of his or her duties does not render the employer vicariously liable.” Id.

1 Plaintiff has alleged that Allen was employed by the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office.

2 FAC ¶ 10. However, Plaintiff’s trespass claim against County of Alameda appears to be based

3 entirely on Allen’s conduct as a private individual. Plaintiff does not allege that Allen trespassed

4 in the course of providing some benefit to County of Alameda, or that the trespass was within the

5 scope of Allen’s employment. Plaintiff’s opposition alleges that Allen harassed Plaintiff while on

6 duty, but harassment is not an element of trespass. Alameda Opp’n 10.

7 Plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion claim appears to be based on Allen acquiring Plaintiff’s

8 personal schedule from other Five Keys employees. Plaintiff does not allege that the acquisition

9 of her personal schedule was for the benefit of County of Alameda or otherwise within the scope

10 of Allen’s employment with County of Alameda.

11 Plaintiff’s state law claims against County of Alameda are dismissed with leave to amend.

12 IX. AHERN AND BRODIE

13 Defendant Gregory Ahern was sheriff and coroner of ACSO. Defendant Daniel Brodie

14 was the captain of ACSO’s Internal Affairs when Plaintiff made her formal complaint against

15 Allen to ACSO. Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against Defendants Ahern and

16 Brodie. Ahern and Brodie move to dismiss. [Docket No. 64 (“Ahern Mot.”).]

17 Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX claims against Ahern and Brodie are dismissed without

18 leave to amend because such claims cannot be brought against individuals. See Lum, 358 F.

19 App’x at 862; Doe By & Through Doe, 830 F. Supp. At 1563. The only remaining claim against

20 Ahern and Brodie is under section 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

21 It is not clear from the pleadings, but Plaintiff seems to be alleging that Ahern and Brodie

22 discriminated against Plaintiff in their capacity as ACSO employees. She elaborates in her

23 opposition that Ahern and Brodie are liable for Allen’s discriminatory harassment because they

24 were Allen’s supervisors, were aware of the harassment, and did not take action to stop it.

25 [Docket No. 72 (“Ahern Opp’n”) 9.] “A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s

26 constitutional violations ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

27 violations and failed to act to prevent them.’” Maxwell v. Cnty. Of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075,

1 To begin with, Ahern and Brodie could only be liable under a supervisory theory if Allen

2 is liable under section 1983 herself, and Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts supporting

3 this claim, as discussed above.

4 Plaintiff also did not plead sufficient facts showing that Ahern and Brodie were Allen’s

5 supervisors. Liability does not attach to “administrators [who] had no supervisory authority over

6 the [state actor] who allegedly committed the violations. . . . They cannot be supervisors of

7 persons beyond their control.” Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff

8 states that Ahern is a “sheriff” and Brodie is a “captain,” but this does not support an inference

9 that they had supervisory authority over Allen or that Allen was within their chain of command.

10 See Wright v. Airway Heights Correction Ctr. MSU, No. 2:20-CV-00436-MKD, 2022 WL

11 17543678, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2022). Additionally, Plaintiff makes only conclusory

12 allegations that Ahern and Brodie were aware of Allen’s discriminatory harassment and failed to

13 act on it.

14 Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Ahern and Brodie are dismissed with leave to

15 amend.

16 X. CONCLUSION

17 The court rules as follows:

18 - Superior Court’s motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend.

19 - UESF Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend.

20 - San Francisco Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff may amend only her

21 Title VII and Title IX claims against CCSF.

22 - California’s motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend.

23 - Alameda Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff may amend all her claims

24 against County of Alameda. Plaintiff may amend her section 1983 and state law claims

25 against Allen.

26 - Ahern and Brodie’s motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff may amend only her section

27 1983 claims against Ahern and Brodie.

1 California against Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint by June 21, 2024. The

2 court refers Plaintiff to the link entitled “Representing Yourself” on the Court’s website, located at

3 https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/, as well as the Court’s Legal Help Centers for

4 unrepresented parties. Parties may schedule an appointment by calling 415-782-8982 or emailing

5 FedPro@sfbar.org.

7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

8 Dated: May 31, 2024

9 ______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

Chief Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.