The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOCAL UNION 342 OF THE UNITED Case No. 23-cv-04646-VC
ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND
APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING
AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
UNITED STATES AND CANADA, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES
Plaintiff,
Re: Dkt. No. 23
v.
R E MILANO PLUMBING
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
The union’s motion for summary judgment is granted, as is the union’s request for
attorneys’ fees based on Milano’s bad faith. This ruling assumes the reader is familiar with the
facts, the arguments made by both parties, and the applicable legal standards.
There is no basis for vacating the joint conference board (JCB) award. See Sprewell v.
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001). Milano argues that the JCB exceeded the
scope of its authority by failing to continue the hearing. But the JCB concluded that Milano had
not requested a continuance. Dkt. No. 23-8 at 2. And the JCB’s conclusions are entitled to a great
amount of deference, especially its findings of fact. See Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v.
Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1202–10 (9th Cir. 1989). Even looking
at the underlying record, the JCB’s conclusion that Milano never requested a continuance is
reasonable. After Milano’s owner was informed about a hearing date of April 25, he responded
only that he was not personally available until September. He did not explain why he was
unavailable, offer an alternative date, offer to send a representative, or otherwise engage in the
scheduling process. His only other communication was on the morning of the hearing, when he
declined the meeting invite and said that he could not attend. A representative for Milano was
also copied on the initial scheduling exchange—he replied that he did not know if he would be
representing Milano at the hearing but that the date did not work for him, and he later followed
up to say he would not be Milano’s representative. Thus, the JCB’s conclusion that there was no
request for a continuance is reasonable.1
Moreover, even if Milano had made a request for a continuance, a party is “not entitled to
a postponement merely by requesting one.” Sheet Metal Workers International Association,
Local No. 162 v. Jason Manufacturing, Inc., 900 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990). Rather, “a
party must have good cause for requesting a continuance.” Id. Milano did not communicate any
reason that a delay was needed, let alone a good one. After the hearing, Milano’s owner said that
his presence had been required at a business meeting in Alaska. To the extent this is meant to
suggest that there was no day between April and September that Milano’s owner could fly to
California for a hearing, that is simply not credible. And even if Milano had provided a credible
explanation for why its owner could not fly down during that period, it does not absolve
Milano—there is no apparent reason the company could not have arranged for someone else to
appear on its behalf. Finally, the case that Milano relies on most heavily only confirms that
Milano was not entitled to a postponement under these circumstances. Scott v. Prudential, 141
F.3d 1007, 1016 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding an arbitral award where no continuance was
granted because the absent party “had not advanced any compelling excuse for his absence”).2
1 Milano’s owner states in a declaration that he did tell a union representative, in a phone call,
about the reasons for his unavailability in April and that he would be available all of September.
But the declaration does not provide a date for this phone call. So there is no evidence suggesting
that the call happened before, rather than after, the hearing itself. More importantly, even if that
phone call happened exactly as Milano’s owner described and happened before the hearing, it
would change none of this Order’s analysis. There was still no attempt to seek a reasonable
continuance and no reasonable justification provided for a need to postpone.
2 The only other argument that Milano makes for vacating the arbitral award is that it was
“fundamentally unfair,” citing Costco Wholesale Corp. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local No. 542, 850 Fed. Appx. 467, 468 (9th Cir. 2021). The facts of that case are so
A court may award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party if the losing party “acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” International Union of Petroleum &
Industrial Workers v. Western Industrial Maintenance, Inc., 707 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness, 421 U.S. 249, 258-59 (1975)). The record
shows that Milano has been engaged in bad faith conduct in this case from the very beginning—
from refusing to seriously attempt to schedule a hearing, to refusing to pay the award without
justification and thus forcing the union to file this action to compel payment, to this baseless
attempt to vacate the award. See id. at 428 (upholding an award of attorneys’ fees where the
company “refused” to pay the sum awarded “without justification”). The company and its owner
have effectively thumbed their noses at the legal process from the start, and for that they must
pay the union’s fees.
Thus, summary judgment is granted to the union and the JCB’s award is confirmed. The
union is also entitled to attorneys’ fees. The union should file documentation in support of
attorneys’ fees by March 21, 2024. Any objection to the amount requested or the support
provided for that amount should be filed by March 25, 2024.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 11, 2024 =
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge
extreme as to provide no reasonable analogy in this context. And Milano’s contention that the
JCB refused to hear its evidence is incorrect—Milano failed to show up to present any evidence
for the JCB to hear.